OFFICIAL DIARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01041A000100040258-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 258
• Publication Date: January 21, 1953
• Content Type: NOTES

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Official Diary
Wednesday, 21 January 1953
1. Notified DCI that IAC had been cancelled this week.
2. Informed DCI that the summary evaluation paper had been
signed by the President and recommended the appointment of General Bull
as DC Vs representative. DCI approved.
14 WA
3. Informed DCI that was
iw* receiving CIA material.
Li.. Commented at the Deputies' meeting that the situation in
Burma was approaching a serious clash between Government troops and EMT.
The question of removing the KMT troops was stalled in State Department,
and unless action were taken immediately this unfortunate result could not
be prevented. It might already be too late. In response to DCI's question
of what might be done, I suggested that if State determined to take some
action, Ambassador Sebald could be informed and could request the Burmese
to withhold their offensive until an opportunity had been given to evacuate
the KMT troops. I pointed out that Ambassador Sebald in numerous cables
had been emphasizing upon State the urgency of this situation, which
approximated a Greek tragedy. DCI phoned Doc Matthews at State and men-
tioned the urgency of this situation to him. I later had OCI call to the
attention of Matthews' office the most recent State cables on this issue.
5. At the morning meeting, commented on the grave need for more
vigorous implementation of the Brownell Committee report respecting TJSCIB.
I felt that one excellent solution would be to secure the appointment of
Al McCormack as Sec/Def's representative on USCIB matters, succeeding
General Magruder. There was some discussion on this point and DCI
instructed me to take no action until he and Mr. Dulles had had a chance
to think this matter over. I later phoned Bill Jackson and requested that
he take no action until he had word from me or had at least spoken to
Mr. Dulles. He indicated that he would clear before doing anything on
this matter.
6. Requested Mr. Armory to arrange a briefing with Aldrich at
11:30 on Friday.
25X1A9a
7. Chatted with on the following points:
25X1A9a 25X1A5a1
indicated that desired a general
review as to the value of its external research facilities
and I concurred. I expressed, as my personal view, that
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Subjected to individual systematic review
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Official Diary
21 January 1953
25X1A5a1
possessed valuable research facilities but,
as yet, we had not learned the most efficient way to
utilize them.
25X1A9a
25X1A5a1 projects within CIA. I indicated that = 25X1A9a
25X1A9a the new liaison officer, was well competent
head. Up to now this had been too clos el checked 207\lHya
and was also held up by the inability of
shop to push matters through the DDP complex. I indi-25X1A9a
cated that I would s p to and to DDP and sug-
a eak
gested that do the same. 25X1A9a
c. Suggested to what the recent development
of Jew-baiting in Soviet countries suggested a vulner-
ability that had not been pin-pointed in the- 25X1A5a1
undertook to have it done. I also suggested, in the 25X1A5a1
same connection, that might find it advisable to
make appropriate amendments in the version
of the study. SW '
25X1A9a25X1A5a1
d. raised briefly the question of _ rela-
tions with the new Jackson Committee on the cold war. He
felt that such relations should be through CIA rather than
directly with ~aand I concurred. 25X1A5a1
25X1A9a
8. phoned and requested the identity of the CIA
designate on e committee under NSC-79, "U. S. Cover-all Objectivesn. I
told him that after discussion with Mr. Dulles we had determined to desig-
nate Bill Bundy, who would be in fairly constant touch with both Mr. Dulles
and myself .
25X1A9a
9? consulted me as to the desirability of a preliminary
clearance of the IAC progress report for NSC and I undertook to look over
his draft.
25X1A9a
10. Consulted as to the schedule for the 25X1A9a
FOIAb6 Friday briefing of the President. called back, stated that he and
Mr. Cutler had seen the President who desired that CIA daily material go
who would call to the President's attention items that he
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Official Diary
21 January 1953
thought required immediate high-lighting. This, of course, is without
prejudice to DCI or CIA's determination that particular items should be
brought directly to the White House. As a result, however, the President
would not have read the daily flow of material prior to the Friday brief-
ing, which would be in the main oral. I undertook to advise DCI and
also consult him as to whether the time currently fixed for the Friday
meeting should be continued. Later discussed this with Mr. Dulles. For
the present week we shall continue the prior schedule.
25X1A9a
11. consulted me as to the classification of the s emi-
annual Atomic Energy eport. Heretofore this has been carried as a
scientific intelligence report, but the feeling is that it should be brought
within the regular series of NIE, SE, or SIE. One proposal was that it
be characterized a National Scientific Intelligence Estimate. I tended
to prefer calling it a SIE, and regarding that category as including all
s eciall sensitive estimates with strictly limited distribution.
undertook to coordinate. 25X1A9a
25X1A9a
25X1A9a 12P. Was briefed by respecting the
cable on the similarity between American and British estimates
of the likelihood of all-out war. I expressed the view that, although
the conclusions were stated in similar terms, the argumentation was so
different as to make a substantial difference between UK and US views by
reason of the context in which they were placed. re uested that an
analytical study be made, which we could send to for his guidance. 25X1A9a
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