BASIC SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01048A000100020007-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 10, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 1, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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NAVY RESERVISTS
Jan 1958
BASIC SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
? Period open on any topic
Difficulty of distinguishing foreign and domestic
Embryo period thought would have relations only with proletariats.
Gradual emergency to reality of intelligence politics in 30s
Increasingly addressing relations to governments in classical
sense rather than through parties.
Stress broad currents and period 1945-75
Expand on "historical epoch" attitude - Marg. Chase Smith
How Soviet Foreign policy is made
Stalin "interlude" - Quintets and Septets
Presidium with Groymko sitting in
Flexibility in execution novel and hard to say how much it is basic
to policy
Whin saving of Molotov (of Tucker thesis)
damental assumptions as to internal developments.
Dynamics of growth
CA,
ducation 100% through high school. Selection top flight
scientists & engineers -- balance technicians toward stalled
labor force
orced Investment to overtake US-Machine tools 19 or 20 years
But continual if modest improvement in standard of living
I8-57 up approximately 50% say per year
'Enough of a welfare state to have considerable sales appeal
Hence Stability and confidence provided no war.
Attitude toward war (major
Clearly not an instrument of policy acceptable under present or
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Mao's
Historical analysis shows them terrible set backs of Vd I and
WW II. Mikoyan says cost them 15 years.
(Mao) Believe socialism has already won provided we don't throw it
away by breaking the peace in the next 15 years.
Suslov at 40th Anniversary warned of necessity of keeping the peace.
Bellicose statements most often either inferiority complex or
or desire to demonstrate won't be pushed around
But if war forced on them by direct attack or threat to really
vital interests (which will mention below) prepared to battle
even against heavy odds.
et als views. In such a case would be bulwalked by faith that desperately
wounded world would have to adopt Communist-like system to
recover.
Big debate on risking war by miscalculation in local situations
Their initiative vs. wests or just plain accident.
Crossing curves of scale of disaster vs. free world's
reluctance to call bluffs or become involved
Consensus of Wash.-London thinking (from NIE)
That they will go further & further in local situations
confident that West will be increasingly deterred by growing
might of Soviets.
Real meaning of adventurism
Involvement in situations that are marginal (Syria, Yeman,
Guatemala)
Risk crisis or loss of face (Egypt-& Suez excellent example)
Dangers in premature revolutions
Back to main thread - What point in expansion?
9/25 worlds people - most resources they need
Make system work as example
(Bulganin - if with 900 works o.k. will win, if won't work
with 900, adding another 100 wort help.)
Intensively develop power base on lands now have
Sputnick diplomacy or Desire to be treated as equals to get over inferiority
complex and get the dividends from having achieved technical
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military parity - i.e. recognition of territorial status quo. and
right to talk 'd deux to U.S.
Tempting targets for assassination foregone
Diem, Hussein, Shah
cf. Kashmir and Trijillo
Economic Aid &. Trade
Economic advantage - end of antarchy - ..,rational division of
labor among states
Prestige and good name
Do not mix it up with subversion as we so frequently charge
Soviet experts are such eschew politics and live inobtrusively
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5. US and Bloc Foreign Aid.
In over-all terms the US aid program to underdeveloped countries
of the Free World is substantially larger than that of the Sino-Soviet
Bloc. Since the first Bloc aid was extended about 2-1/2 years ago, the
countries in the Sino-Soviet Bloc have extended credits and grants for
military and economic uses amounting to nearly $illion. In com-
parison, aid by the US Government (including PL 480, MSP, and Ex-Im
Bank) committed to the underdeveloped. countries of the Free World dur-
ing this period amounted to about $8 billion. The US program also was
broader in scope, with 50 underdeveloped countries receiving assistance
compared with 17 underdeveloped countries receiving Bloc aid.
Appraisal in total terms alone, however, provides an inadequate _,_
basis for comparison of the two programs. In nearly all countries where
the Sino-Soviet Bloc is competing with US aid programs, the Bloc is
currently committed to larger amounts of aid than is the US. With the
y: s* which are
exception of Syria, all of-t_ie..nine underdeveloped countrieI
the principal recipients of Bloc aid also have been receiving funds from
the US. These 9 countries have received credits or grants from the
Sino-Soviet Bloc amounting to about $1.8 billion during the last 2-1/2
years. Over the same period, about $1bil.lion in assistance of all types
was received from the US.on a governmental basis. Although exact com-
parisons are not available, it is estimatedthat Bloc technical. personnel,
in these 9 countries number more than 2, 000 compared with less than
1, 000 under programs financed by the US Government.
One characteristic of the Bloc aid program worthy of note is its in-
dependence from military pacts. The contrast with the US is quite ap-
parent: the bulk o f US aid to underdeveloped couxnt:ries goes to those with
which the US is allied in military pacts, but no underdeveloped country
receiving Bloc assistance is a member of a Bloc military alliance.
Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Syria, and Yugoslavia.
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Relations with Red China
True partnership
Extensive aid - toughly bargained
Little evidence of rivalry in NK & NVN
Little sense of past injustice --religious factor
What of the future -
Hopes & fears
Empty lands
Is Russia trying to keep China isolated
Policy toward Satellites
Foreign in Soviet eyes - despite enslavement as we see it
Minimum requirements (remain communist stay in bloc)
Poland vs. Hungary
Economic drain vs. gain - $1 1/3 billion in credits and grants
poured in in last year
Fear of Germany
Basic European Policy
Finnland - Austria
Get US out - why
Elementary geographical fact - feels its leverage should replace
UK and France's and not let US block it out. At minimum be
recognized as one..of big !.
Desire for warm water port?
Oil -no
Strangle W. Europe, doubt it
Arab Israeli conflict.
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Africa - doubt too deep involvement too early. Will play on
Nationalism and anti-colonialism rather than try to establish
real base of power, but Yemen-Somalia danger area & carrier vons(?).
India & Indonesia
2d 5-year plan
15 years of patience before Aidit & Co. try takeover
Concepts of the U.S.
Vital factor -but very difficult - Kremlin clearly split on this.
Showing more realism - But if recession deepens dogmatists will
crow we told you so and K may be tempted to rashness
Attitude toward exchanges - opening up
Nonsense of trying to make US spend ourselves to death.
Attitude toward disarmament
1) Good propaganda gist (Soviet is strong but peaceable)
2) .Also would help avoid hostilities
Save costs --
Inspection not bugaboo-'.it would have been in Stalin's day.
3) Get US out of peripheral bases.
Unilateral disarmament - demobilization - not all real but enough~u-
to to be highly significant.
Air transports rather than bombers.
US attitude of to Max Lenin's statement about exaggeration always
attributed by our ancestors to the Indians.
Let's not underestimate our enemy by the intangibles as we have
in the tangibles by overestimating his malevolence. Danger of
confusing his inhumanity with subhuman attainments.
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Military Strengths
Impressive but not currently threatening.
Within this year achieving Nuclear "Enoughness"
Delivery - capabilities
Heavy Bombers reval ours in numbers & performance
Medium jets 1/3d but no bases near
Hence, punch is one shot - one-way - but we can't
discount their willingness to execute if forced
But theirs is not a war or pre war economy
14% GNP to defense of our 11%
Gives them roughly same hardware
Really cutting back numbers of men in arms
Need for manpower in production not doing Squats right
New have same % pop under arms as we
Next spring may well be down to 2.5 - disarm negots.
Military Policy
Chances of their initiating all-out global war negligible
Doing too well in peaceful camp
No desire to risk all they've built up in nuclear
haulocaust - Defenses still weak
Moreover, hardly more likelihood of their starting Korea or
even sihaller bush fire .
Since '53 have liquidated Korea & IC
Recently Pathet Lao & IC have shown they want to put
quieters on even possibility of bush fires.
As Bulganin said in private conversation - system with 900 million
would succeed or fail and addition of another 100 million no gain.
We have tended to think too much in terms of the Acreage of Power.
They (Russia & China) convinced intensive increments to power from
development own lands are what counts rather than extensions areawise.
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(Matsu & Quemoy exceptions because regarded as purely internal
police affair by Chicoms) as we would the suppression of a Com-
munist regime on Nantucket & Martha's Vineyard.
While ready to pick up by revolution or subversion any tottering free
world country, promoting disintegration and revolution not uppermost
in their minds, CP of India has orders to
program work not obstruct it.
They are concentrating on a classical tough
to the Real politik of Imperial Germany or
of Victorian Britain or the U.S.
First make themselves No 1. industrial
help make India Economic
power drive comparable
the commercial expansion
Second set contagious example for the underdeveloped nations
that theirs is the short cut to plenty
Third demonstrate even to firmly independent, even capitalistic
countries that their foreign trade policies more advantageous
than those of U.S. (Long-term commitments - no strings, buying
agriculture surplus even when don't need. Low interest soft loans.)
This long range policy developed in the years after Stalin's death and
promulgated last spring at 20th Party Congress.
Based on unshakable confidence that they have the solution to the complex
technological, sociological problems of 2d half 20th Century.
That their system of direction downward by a self perpetuating elite
carefully replenished by a massive educational program.can outstrip
our system of control upward by free men speaking through the ballot
box and the market place.
That is nature of the challenge - more subtle and more difficult to
cope with than overt aggression.
It will take all the genius energy and self denial a great free people pos-
sess to counter and turn back this challenge. The neasures we should take
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are not my business - but to recognize the nature and magnitude of
the threat is the duty of everyone who occupies a position of
position of responsibility in our society.
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