BRIEFING FOR MR. ARNESON FOR THE JULY 16 MEETING OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01048A000100060006-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: BRIEF

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SEPT
BRIEFING FOR Nit. ARNESON FOR THE JULY 16 MEETING OF
THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
I. The Upheaval in Soviet Leadership and the Bloc Economic Offensive
in Underdeveloped Areas
A. General Statement
The upheaval in Soviet leadership does not herald abrupt
policy changes, as Khrushchev's policies appear to have prevailed
for the most part since 1954.
1. Internal questions, both of domestic policy and of leadership
alignments, seem to have played the greatest role in the ousters
of Molotov, Malenkov and company.
2. Although the Central Committee resolution described at length
Molotov's hampering of Soviet foreign policy, it is unlikely
that disputes in this field had more than a secondary importance.
However, there was specific condemnation of Molotov's intransigence
on such Soviet policy moves as the rapprochement with Yugoslavia,
the efforts to reduce international tensions, the coexistence
campaign, and the exposition of the "separate roads to socialism"
doctrine.
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4+. This suggests that the genesis of the economic offensive
which lies largely in the more flexible post-Stalin approach
to foreign policy objectives, remains unchanged. Bloc foreign
economic policy -- in its arms, trade, credit, and technical
assistance programs -- is an integral part of the Bloc's
general policy of political warfare against the West, and
is directed toward the same objectives.
5. Although we expect no substantial change in Bloc foreign
policy objectives the shake-up may well increase Khrushchev's
freedom of maneuver. In the past he has had to overcome
opposition and has been forced to debate and compromise.
Greater flexibility and easier decision-making with respect
to foreign economic policy will now be possible.
B. Conclusion
The upheaval in Soviet leadership does not at this time lead
us to modify in any important respect the analysis and conclusions
as to Bloc motivations, objectives, and capabilities, as set forth
in NIE 10C-57, "Sino-Soviet Foreign Economic Policies and Their
Probable Effects in Underdeveloped Areas."
II. Regarding the General Outlook for the Next Year or Two, the Basic
Conclusions of NIE 100 Remain Valid
A. Bloc trade is likely to expand further as programs under existing
trade and credit agreements gain momentum.
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B. While Bloc capabilities for expanding credit programs are
substantial, the rate of expansion in the next year or two
will probably be slower than in 1956.
C. While few additional states are likely to enter into major aid
arrangements with the Bloc in the immediate future, the Bloc
will be alert to opportunities where aid offers promise political
gains.
D. Bloc prestige and opportunities for exercising influence will be
maintained in the Middle East and Asian countries which are
already involved in major Bloc economic programs.
E. In the uncommitted states the availability of Bloc aid will tend
to raise the cost to the West of exercising influence through aid
programs. In states allied with the West, it may make such aid
a more necessary and expensive condition of maintaining the West's
position.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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