INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 32 FOR WEEK ENDING 29 DECEMBER 1948

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100010002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 23, 1948
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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11 3 itTIQt+W CROM ZAT1ONS GROUP
Y 81*4Aay NO. 32
For week ending 23 December 1945
The International k
Prompted by a US-Australian request, the Security Council opened
discussion on renewed Dutch "polices action" against the Indonesian Republic
in violation of the August,194? UN truce agreement. Re j action ' of .the Israeli
mernbereliip application, despite added support by Argentina and Colombia,
resulted from failure to gain more than-five affirmative SC votes, The
narrow currency aspects of the Berlin dispute are still under study on an
expert level by the ccrrmittee of six SC "neutrals." The sixteen ERP nations
reportedly estimated their 1948-50 dollar requirements to be under
$4,)00,000,000 ?- a figure over a half billion dollars below the 1948-49
dollar aid.
A Outlook or SC Indonesian discussion. Although ren wed Dutch "police
action" against the Indonesian Republic directly violates the. 1947 UN trtxc:e,
it is doubtful whether the Security Council will., i. able to halt present
military operations. A new cease-fire order, providing for the release o_'
captured Republican officials and for the withdrawal of Netherlands troops
to they previous atu crag lines, is the utmost which can be initially
expected. Although the Dutch have i.ndicata>rd wi:! lingnecs to accept a cease-
fire once their objootive is gained, they are unlikely to comply at this
.:Mme and any;. attempt tb force obedience would re4vira sanctions under
Chapter VII bf the UN Charter. The role of the Netherlands in ] Trelux,
Western Union, the proposed North Atlantic Pact and the uropean Recovery
Program will influence any decision of the US, UK Franca and Belgium to
support even limited economic sanctions. Were the Dutch confronted with
resolute SC pressure such as a compleate embargo, they, would probably be
compaslled to yield. Beyond bitter expressions of resaesntnent, they could
do little except choose betwoon isolation and eastern orientation. The
latter is unthinkable and tht? former practically impossible.
In voting sanct1onog the SC would split along colonial and anti.-colonial
lines. The USSR, Uikraine, thins, and thpt Arab repreeentetiVe will undoubtedly
approve. The decisive Latin American position is undatert':ined but Cuba (a
Council member after 1 January) is likely to favor stronger r:eastrrQs than
will Argentina. A French veto constitutes the ? najor threat to a vote for
sanctions. A staunch colonial power, France. could nt?verr approve such
economic pressure. On the other hand, a veto would further aggravate its
difficulties in the Par East and in North Africa. While supporting a ceasP-
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tire, the UK will oppose the vac of aamot& ms, but ill probably abstain
in view of the violent pro-Rerp iblies* see i w me of its Asian dominions --
Australia, Bern Zealand, Indla,.,lCeyloai and Pmkistan. Canada is'likely to
follow snit. Helgf um, until its rsple:os ht on the Council by Norway in
Jarntary, will stoutly doftind tbs Noft r1ands. Ths Nc wwglane favor awes
lengthening ow w and hems pbbsbLy npport punitive. messures
rennet tbo I toh. Manwhile, outside tb SC, the entire Near:, ISiddle ss d
Par East barn beams aroused against U W A1tah (for deetaile on f oroign re-
Action eel PR/P Bratrch 11a6ki y go. 32 ftt+ d 3 ) December). ,Tips* states,
tvp ether with the Slav nations, w+mid tons a strong blbc shot tit inability
to obtain ef"Peotift auti.oa in the SC land to discussiou of the case by the
Qr4n?ral Asssmbly at its ?prii taseting. `' .
ftM413111-0 of M4'LCt A1?m~ =
hetwpen Cone+uaiet and non-Ccemaynist labor in EC1-receiving countries,
particularly in France and Italy, indicates that the diet labor
organisations enjoy certain marked advantages in organising the labor forces
of these countries. Par the present, at least, they are able to draw upon
~'eater reserves of: (1) money, (2) "biuzd core" trained organissre and
3) available rnswapriut and office supplies. These advantages are attributable
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in large measure to the dronstrated abtt]`3ty of the UM to furnish both
open and covert atrt to those labor and poiitieal organizations which it regards
as strategic instrwents of its foreign policy. During the French coal strike,
Soviet and Satellite trade urdtAe openly raleesd and renege available to the
striking CG? r+iners steadily meswt1ag sums In French francs. In addition
to such open aid ahatnerls, the QS$B reportedly has had at its disposal the
Banque Commerciale pour 11ftrops du Nord as well as outwardly legitimate
commercial firms in Prance and Switserland tI! rougb which it can siphon +ds
to Communist unions. In contrast, the um-Coarmtunist national labor orgarg-
sations, such as the Pk nch Y woe auTr'iero and the Italian ,t O receive
only iierited financial assistance from the free trade union movements of the
Western Hemisphere. The chess-pyrirIg ambers of the American AFL and CIO,
for exe p1e, have not been in a, position to make contributions matching
those thrown Into the struggle by inatrwsantslitiea of the Soviet Oovernment
and its satellites.
This disparity between the foreign support ro eiVed by the Social
Democratic and Communist labor forces in Western Europe has beers an important
factor in the retarded-capabilities of the Western-oriented trade unions for
resistance to Cc uniet-epcneored strikes and sabotage of production. To
offset aubatantiel support of the kind sent from Soviet sources to aid the
French coal strilce, Western Rutepeen labor urgently requires comparable
assistance.. frfm its allies. The failure of the Yr.noh Communist nd.ners to
achieve all their Cbjoatiwre3 cannot be laid to inadequate t'oreifl support
since substantial aid was promptly extw!x-ded. Whenever the next Communist
blow at the Eu rapean Recovery Program is launched, material as letance from
Soviet and Satellite sotu'Oes will be an an wen larger scale.
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t e n .,dioU14 ? Although events in Berlin have ov.Ir-
taken tlx+ six SC "neutrals'" 6olibera ions ca t M currency prob1oepa, SC
rriediattcn on breeder 11 :a a*y still * llsed to effect a settlement based
upon the existiaa 1. Sha ..ald mdistioa be impossible, any her
ultimate as justtaeat wi1.3. probably be