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Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 13, 2000
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November 1, 1949
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Approved For Rase 2001/03/04 RDP79-090A000100020006-3 h`T 'dS D VIS CR i DOCUMENTNO. `4,- NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^ DECLASSIFIED 1'CLASS. CHANGED NEXT REVIE AUTH: 4D T ol.rre zl 't r^`ir' .v . f., l -eek ition calling for coi ti r uanee of the 913t-power talks on atconic rie t r control. and stressing the necessity for some surrender of fr ti.on i sovereignty in order to solve the problem. At the same a Soviet cancer i itlon o.--r TS-?IJi< atorric'lobs tructionisrri" was :ejected 5-50-3. In the Trusteeship Conrr,ittee, a resolution ' oy ti.nuir the Jpei iai Co7rjr!lttee on Information frorn Ncrn--Self.- _a rernine Terri.tori es for another three years was adopted a-a well US-Mexican nropn-sa.1 i.nstr:2ac't- rw the Special Comrr.ittee to .xun:ine the pr-obler,; of educ: t:t.on ~_n such ter ?itories, , 3~ee1ai 'oli_ti.ca3,. C;arx,-,ittr?p :;.s;;ed the C-n;:id.fanw-French reso- ;el.rringiy adopted a ^on promii. a se=ttlement (4q-1-8). Meanwr i l.e .A solution to the lrng--drr m out colonies rare"41:1on last appeared in p."c. off': PiT as the "A Pos'..?itic?l Co zrr .= s t' c over- REVIEWER: 0 514 Alias cle&,rly illustrated d._a.rinc'' two: recent Paris rr:eet irt& . As _.n.ticip iced, the Corrrr::i t tee; of Iwi.n::sters' representing the gcvern- rents,:. took a cant .ou a w.mas . negative approach to the Ass r b1y's trasbourg proposals, arousing a strong, react,i.on from the Standing iaix:.ittee of the Asserbly. T ; e 11inisters, convening to consider The Assembly recorr,rr:encia t:ieuns j took nositive action only on the a.dr issiori or Western Germany L!nd the Saar to the Council... :mportant Assembly recc _mi'?ndations on broadening, the Assembly's ; t ciri_ty, creating a European Court of human Fights and fostering j"~firo zean economic ; nte.gr8 i,ion wrerc: ci.ther shelved or referred to iri^us bodies .for furt3el' in addition to taking a gener- :~ i.Iy negative approach ro pro'nosal_s for European: unification, the tern atters p}ted to ^er ova in porta.nt issuvs from the competence _? Assembly 'vclmil:3.t eeS y referring them to bodies such as the a>;EC and U1fli "CC. This tendanev Illustrates the Ministers o prefer- a-gce for dealing with gov -~rnrneni:al. bodies rather than -~sith Assembly organs, wi:ieh. 3rs> composcjd of oarli nmer_tarT repreSerita- =-yves who have displayed a considerable degree of index endence. Conflict within the Coucacil of Europe. The basic 'ive'rgence etween the two rrai.n organs of thF, .fledgling Council of Eurcne =3 embly rec cticp_ to that e tr c tics was r.ui_ckly revealed gii its ; tandi.i, C-o;rxr Lttca(-: hick rest lirrr_ediately following 'iced for action and also a wwry '1 -ink r F ss to take the initiati' e in ie v-inisters a sessi.c'r. Tl-,e,?;ni.mrus revolt of this Corrr;i tee i3 r.s t tea M r?iat':r5' lee:? l " t1 demonstrated an awareness of the Approved For Release 2001/0 A-RDP79-01090A000100020006-3 wap- Approved For please 2001/0310 RDP79-' 090A000100020006-3 proceeding with studies of European integration despite clear _dications that the Min sters opposed further coirrittee meetings. the long run, the Asseroay'; evident deterrninstion to preps ahead coupled with outside -pressures for European integration, will force the Comn.ittee o1 virii.sters to modify its attitude; and bake a more positive ,pproeen .En future sessions. farce l New UN pressures car, cai lay sy 'teens . The potentia s a meckianasn frliquida Ling colonial enpires bee. UN h a e t os~c universal anti-colonial -seated and ain e d f th p e e cause o : attitude of the worlds non-coionihl states is evident in the .1 oceedings of the GA TrusteesrnP Loiorr:ittee. By overwhelrririg jorities, the Coy.. ittee has passed a series of proposals reeonat.ending a greater cregree of UN supervision over colonial areas and holding the colonial powers to stricter accountability for the management of their rie.pendencies. A particularly sil*nif?- -cant extension of UV autr,or1ty is, fur example, the proposal on Mministrative Unions which would permit UN supervision of oomponent non-self -governing terri dories as well as the trust ;,real. Other resolutions call for more rapid steps toward scelal, ,jeonon!ic, educational a.d p .iaticai advancement. These proposals nave ex Lox cec a s irong reaction from the zolor?ial powers. The JOY, nas ver,er:entiy opposed almost every r?eso- ?ution. France and Belgium, usually voting with the UK, have often been joined by Austr?aJ , New Leaiand, Canada, the Nether- lands, South Africa and Greece. 1 he US, on the other hand, has sided with tY:?e majority in all but two or three instances. Al]. the proposals seem assured of pa$bage in the plenary except one, opposed by the US, requesting the Administering Powers to furnish "blueprints" of the steps they intend to take in fostering advance- ment of trust territories toward elf-determination. Despite presuarable GA epprovai of these proposals, a number of them raise issues to which the Charter does not provide a clear-cut answer and appeals to the international Court may be made by one or more of the colonial powers in tree fairly near future. Notwithstanding such legal complications, tneee is no cuestion but that the UN, by providing a forum, in which colonial conditions can be examined, grievances heard, and x ecor,n endations made, is undoubtedly the most powerful sirgie ir.strurr_entality today for giving expression to the aspirations of colonial peoples for independence. Italian, co1rites solut? ,?~ a? suxed. The cverwteirr:ing Political (_ or. rrittee vote for a or--e-package reso i uciori on the Italian colonies, with only Ethiopia in opposiiiun, virtually assures its paSsage by the GA. The resciutlon, While meeting minimal US and U$ securi- ty recuirer:.ents, is neve.!-the_J.ess the lowest common denorr.inator acceptable to the GA. trough its provisions for early independence Approved For Release 2001/03/04 CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020006-3 Approved For Release 2001/0 DP79-e1090A000100020006-3 for Libya (192) ari Scm i .la rc: r er, years), it will ias v Ly a ,:;,3 iiCi:.Gc.: Ede i star, ; Indonesia, Vietnam, find i lc j.?.ties of transit, and ing4. equate x;Jance of ,uii.Inc L rit:a and Japan. However, the ?." o India (the j istan Trade union z k-d rs%: de-ci.sion to amend a deieg~t1on e Ily Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020006-3 Approved For Release 20 753 4 CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020006-3 Notes Yunoslavia will attach I okossoys'sy. appointment. The `u70- '.;~vswill comment sharply on t e appointment of .soviet r a?Ysha'_ hcossovsky as Polish "inister of Defense in the forthcoming debate on the Soviet "Peace Hesclution." They lost no time in sarcastically referring thereto in the Social Committee when in reply to Soviet criticism of Aelgrede's treatment of hits Russian refugees, Yugoslav representative Dedijer said,"Perhaps the Soviet delegate mould like to ex,ort to us a Z_arshal as they did to Poland. Thank you very much for that service, no!" Probable UNCIP recommendations to the SC. It is expected in view or us ana- K support for the proposal, that U?I^IP's forthcoming report :,ill recommInd that the 30 appoint a sinrle i"' Lvidual to attempt to Oring India and Pakistan into agreement over Kashmir. It is likely that _"admiral Nimitz, despite Nehru's coolness toward hire, :gill be the SC's appointee and All be sent to the sub-continent -mitb broad authority to effect agreement without abandoning the nrinciales, of arbitration W plebiscite. Finnish labo-4 will not attend London conference. The de- cision of the Finish Trade Un on iederat ion not to send reprs---- sentatives to the London International Trade Union Conference apparently reflects the denire of Finland's Soeijlist labor leaders not to offend the U39R unnecessarily at this time. The recent visit to Felsinki of the Soviet trade union leader, Kuzrfetsov, may have persuaded the usually firm Tinns that the Russians would cony ider their participation in this "labor- splitting" conference an unfriendly act. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020006-3 0 /0 . ,. Approved For Release 2001 /0?/077 4 CIA-RDP79-0"90A000100020006-3 , .~.~.._ ","he UN Pole in the Tndonesian Di.s ute . "Ithout the intervention of the Security Council in zlu ust 47, at -:which time the disntult.e vas already two ynars ;.horny Indonesian problwrn would still be unresolved. In:3tead :.after 27 months of tort !ous noes otiat.ions under the aegis of ,the UN Coiu 1ssion established by the SC, the Dutch and the Indor osians finally achieved mutial accord on 2 November 1949 with both ,parties 8F,reein ; to establish .o union in which they -All be equal ulcer the Dutoh crown. To the United Nations Commission for Indoi osia together with the military observers attached to that body, oes much of the credit for solution of the dispute. '?.ile both the Dutch and the Indonesians wanted settlement, both were in dif'fi- r:ult positions. Political end economic pressures were harassing, the Dutch and -world oninion turned against therm as the CTS tack firm stand behind the UN and the New Delhi Conference manifested Asian indir,,nation. The Indonesians were aware that Settle lert had to be made to i.revnnt extrAMists farionn them from gettintr, the upper hand. However, to rersnh ap?`reArment far-reachinf* concessions had to be made by both sides, 'ind the UN became the diplomatic bridge beti.ween the two,, The three nation commission (Australia, Belgium and the r13) lent its good offices to the (Iontenders, raedl.ated and arbitrated and finally unraveled the dt. f fl cult nrobl em, with ?'erle Cochran, the US representative, as thecrtvin; force. He made him--elf available at all times to both sides and was the general means of communication between the de),urntions. ' rorkinx behind the scenes, he smoothed over differences and rinds able suf;,estions to tide the Indonesians and the Ditch over difficult moments when a dead- lock seemed. inevitable. 'rlhilA 'nchrnn dealt -with the political talks, the military observers did much to prevent the military situation from .flar:inr~ an. The .work of the observers was partic- ularly important duriri the Haz ue Round Tnble Conference, '?whe e final agreerraent was re. chest, fahd during which time any serious military action in Indonesia - )ould have upset the negotiations. Although the UN has eomnleted the greatest n,;rt of its task in Indonesia, it is -trinortnnt that TI CI re-main in continuous existence to observe Dutch troon withdrawals and the Indonesian elections. "'tth the transfer of sovereignty, stability in Indo- nesia %-jill be tested and a UF1 commission on the scene to observe will lend a stabilizi_nv influence. Any SC decision to termir}nte the t mCI and constitute a new UN body ,would create a dan.nerous vacuum between the time -.overei=rnty Is transferred and ra new body would be created and bei i n, to fit-notion. Nevertheless. Indonesia's prospects for successful transition from colonial status are p.roriisinn: and, in retrospect. the Indonesian case appears as the most successful UN accnrtnlf shment :so far. Approved For Release 20014iN IA-RDP79-01090A000100020006-3