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December 9, 2016
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September 13, 2000
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September 27, 1949
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Approved For R a s e 2 4 : CIA-RDP79-090A000q 20013-5 DOCUMENT NO. -9 NO CHANGE IN CLAS ^ INT .RNP;TIO AL CRG;NIz;;TIor; S GROU DECLASSIFIED LASS. CHANG : TS S C 7 .:'",?I ~= a'.T. "".'w -RY NO . 39 AUTH uf,_y . i `or week ending 27 September 1949 Volume II The International :Week of most interest on the international scene was the reve Ration of an atomic explosion in the USSR. Such evidence of Soviet ability to produce atomic weapons will probably have widespread psychological repercussions, especially in Western Europe and lead to renewed pressure for UN atomic control. ".eanwhile Soviet Foreign 'jinister Vishinsky unveiled the Soviet propaganda theme for the 1949 GA in calling for a Five Power ?'Peace Pact" The issue posed by Yugoslavia's SC candidacy continued to perplex UN members. '"ore Vishinsky. Adhering to his general pattern in re- cent GA meetings, Soviet U'oreign '.inister Vishinsky conducted the usual philippic against the western Powers ending with the introduction of a purely propagandistic proposal as the lttw Soviet GA "leitmotif." There was nothing essentially new in the opening Soviet diatribe except its brevity. It led up to a three pronged proposal that the GA (a) specifically condemn the war preparations of the US and UK, (b) call for the immmedi.-, ate and unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of "rigid international control," (c) note the "mighty popular movement for peace and against warmongers," and request the five major powers to conclude a Peace pact. No one of these proposals has the slightest chance of adoption by the GA in any recognizable form, as the USSR well knows. How- ever if any resolution finally emerging from the GA should even touch the same subjects as those of the Soviet proposals, the USSR will undoubtedly claim the initiative for all that is good in the and product. ''Peace Partisans" to stage 'world--wide demonstrations as UN cons dens Sov st "pact". An " ntea?netional Day of Stru gle For Peace,'' to be held October 2 in all countries, will climax the drive of the "lorld Peace Partisans and other me jor Communist front organizations to organize world public opinion behind Soviet "peace objectives" and against Western defense plans. At the recent Moscow Peace Congress peace partisans everywhere were urged to hold a "mass rising" on this day and "to show daring and convince themselves of their own power." These demonstra tionsr, coinciding with the UN Ganeral Assembly, were planned at Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020013-5 Approved For Rase 2 iW : CIA-RDP79-0 9OA000100020013-5 a midswnxuer meeting in Paris between representatives of the Permanent Committee of Peace Partisans, the world Federation of Trade Unions, the '?.orld 7ederetion of Democratic Youth, and the 'Zomen's International Democratic Federation. Com- munist determination to give maximum impetus to the current drive is reflected in (1) Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky's proposal in the UN for a Five-Power peace pact, (2) a Polish plea for UNESCO support of the peace movement, (3) a reported Swiss Communist plan to present to the UN a monster "peace petition," (4.) the scheduling of September peace congresses in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. The effect of these cumulative peace efforts has been that of a well-coordinated preparation for the Soviet Foreign `.tir..t.ster's "peace pact," which, he declares, will give expres-- siou to "the mighty popular movement for peace and against warmongers. 1" Uncertainty over Yuposlcvia's SO Candice. A murk of indec son over .e grade's bid for an SC seat continued to hang over Flushing Meadows,, The testern Powers were still waiting for GA majority sentiment, to crystallize wh,..le the ma- jority were looking toward the weet f'or a lead. Secretary General Lie advised key GA off is a si of Soviet Assistant Sec- retary General Zinohenko's statement that the USSR was "pretty much worried" about both Yugoslavia and its SC aspirations. This development, together with the announcement of an atomic explosion in the USSR, may have injected a new note of caution into the situation. In what looks like a last minute switch, the U^SR apparently shifted its choice from Byelorussia to Czechoslovakia, perhaps in recognition of the widespread aver- sion to placing members of the Soviet Union itself in the SC. Delay in the SC elections may work against Yugoslavia as the delegates have more time to ponder the full implications to the UJN of the Soviet reaction. 25X6A Approved For Release 2001/3/04: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020013-5 Approved For Rease 20~ : CIA-RDP79-090A000100020013-5 25X6A France opposes closer UN'. C0 into ration with UN. The recent US proposal for c osertntegration oP nto the general UN structure has led to reconsideration of UNESCO's basic character and purposes at the current Paris Conference. The French believe that the "spiritual nature" of UNT.SCO should be stressed and that it should not be too closely identified with the political problems of the U TV This position probably reflects French disinclination to see UN]SCO coma under too close control of the UN, which they regard as US--dominated. Support for this attitude is expected from Latin American dele- gates, who are often moved by appeals to spiritual values and who feel happier when discussing UNESCO as a cultural approach to peace. Despite this development, the UK and British Common- wealth, sharing US impatience with the multiplicity and in- coherence of past UNESCO programs, will probably continue to insist that it concentrate on a few "concrete" objectives such as fundamental education and technical assistance. effect on UN Budget.. The general devalua- tion of currencies followin'; British initiative is certain to lend impetus to the economy campaign in the UN. It will give additional point to Brazil's proposal to eliminate prolifera- tion and overlapping of projects of the UN and its specialized agencies. It will result in trimming the budgets of such specialized agencies as UNESCO. It will rule out any reduction in the US contribution to the UN budget, now about 40%, and put steam behind the demand that members be permitted to pay part of their assessments in soft currencies. Finally it may give rise to requests that more meotitws be held in soft currency areas where prices will not be so steep for participating na- tions. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020013-5 Approved For Rele a 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-010W000100020013-5 Satellites may end coilabpratlon aith UNESCO in protest over German program. The recent walk-out of Poland, Czecho- Tvek1a an Iungary aftor.the UNSSCO Conference's adoption of a German program may presage the and of active Satellite participation in that organization. Although they staged a similar walk-out from the UNESCO 1947 conference, Poland this time warned that a decision to work with the "neo-Fasoist '!estern German government" might determine whether UNESCO would continue to be a world organization. The mounting irri- tation of the Soviet-orbit powers at any UN recognition for the Bonn Government was indicated earlier in the year by their repudiation of ''pest German representation in the ILO and is currently reflected in their plan to force reconsideration in FCOSOC of UTESCO's German program. Increased Pressure for UN atomic control. The announce- ment E t t a U.~SR has produce an m explosion" will re- sult in greatly inorea ed pressure in the UN for some form of international atomic energy control. The disappearance of the t?S ('monopoly" and the mastery of atomic energy by a powerful potential aggressor will give new impetus to attempts to break the East-":est deadlock which has so for blocked all UN efforts in this field. LTany UN membera,,increasingly concerned over the devastation implicit in an atomic conflict, will be pre- pared to take the calculated risk of accenting ra compromise UN control agreement rather than allowing continuation of the present deadlock and intensified ato is aryls race. The futility of trying to move the USSR from its position will lead some states, particularly in the Far Fast and Latin America, to direct increasing pre-,sure upon the US to cot. promise with the TTSL in the belief thut only through US concessions can any sort of atomic control agreement be reached. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020013-5