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December 9, 2016
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September 13, 2000
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August 23, 1949
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Approved For Felease 20MCIA-RDP79 00020018-0 ,T ;''R~}T: r ION ~j RCIM-1I _H1 .1 ~^14 n[pe ; .~'+: ,!. . 4s~V~~. :W] GROUP LS~i .L i:.t11~9t~ ~ 25X6A NO. 34 For week ending 23 August 1949 '1 Lri orriuti.onal Meek 25X6A Volume It In the Pales ;ine case, the `JS proposed to keep aliv+ the stagnating activity of the PCC by shifting, emphasis to an economic study of th' rer ae problem, as a caonclusion to the patient 3f q'or of the trN Commission for Indo- ayes:a.c ft the Dutch, Republicans am d Federalists sat down to a rot d. table conference at the Hague. Is> ues before the Council ' ;amps d Three interrelated p rc~bl,? powers c the As ti vr_ k?~tiropean Human Rights and German membership, will test the Council of Europe during its Initial session. The Consaltatl-va Assembly has thus far displayed considerable initiative in assn -,-n a greater share of rs'sponsI.y bi..li_ty. than the 3tatut.e im.plies; it has created a committee; which will dis=cuss amending rho Statute to increase Assembly powers vis-a .s the Committee of' T':irais .er. s, and has replaced on the a o,end? ,i-e Human Iii hts i_toraa the : iniste:s had deleted. The Iumcan i?1_ghts issue inciudes nr"o ): aai.s for (1) a European Human 1ta Conveintion; t 2j' R co. i!1? Sa3 on to investigate alloged viola- tions; and (3) a Duman Rights Court empowered to call upon offend-- -s r3;'r states to r peal. national violating the convention. The ;do .ion of such measures, involving sacrifice of traditional - PI national sovereignty, i>ac ark a ;ii nificant step toward siren ;th-. caning the Council and fostering -European unity. The admission of Western Geracany to the 'Council would be accelerated by the adoption of a proposal to hold a special : es'a ion in :Ceoenchsr or Teanua .?y0 An extra se psi can would. help meet French desires for a probationary period Burin , vh l ch the new West German. State could demonstrate its fitness for inclusions and would incro?as the likelihood of German admission before next year's regular sass slono The success with which these initial problems are handled will provide an indication of the future role of the Council of Europe in forging European ?oli=,i ral. unity. DECLASSIFIED nu wr.in_r_n Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-i 'iiJA0020018-0 REVIEWER: 006514 Approved For Release 200' CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020018-0 US _t+r j oses shi.~. t in ACC entt,hasi:s i ecogni ing the bleak outlook' for achieving 'any ooh it zr.a a reer ent at Lausanne, the US proposes that the Palestine Conciliation Commission (FCC) shift its major emphasis to the establishment of an Economic Survey Commission for the Near East. After a visit to Israel and the Arab states and study of the problem, it would report to the GA., through the PCC, its recommendations for economic development of the region and settlement of the refugee question. The immediate result of putting such a commission into the field will be to nroionn the activity of the PCC now almost at a standstill? through a subsidiary organ. This -would make it easier to block off political discussion of the d"alestine case in the next CAA, which at this juncture might producs more acrimony than progress. Deferring discussion would please Israel but would not be as acceptable to the vocal Arabs, who undoubtedly will try to bring the issuaj into the open again. In the long run, the task of the UN is to force sufficient concessions from the Israelis to counteract the Arab conviction. :;ha?t it has consistently thrown Its weight in favor of Tel Aviv. rarael has thus far deftly been playing for time, consolidating its hold over its territorial conquests and replacing the former Arab inhabitants with Jews, To turn completely away from the political issues and concentrate =,,erely on economic questions is susceptible of being construed as an acc9ptance of the political and territorial status quo which would be objectionable to the Arabs. t"oreover, t l a are practical difficulties in determining the capacity of the countries concerned to absorb refugees before boundaries are known. If the commission could turn up an accept- able aid program, however, it might lead to a solution of the Palestine refugee problem and thus facilitate a political settle- ment. Substantial inducements in the form of material aid both to Arabs and to Israelis -.could be requited. however, In the last analysis, this calls for dollars and sterling, and unless these are assured, the report of the :economic Survey Commission will b? likely to share the sane fate as those of its many predecessors. Soviet "leitmotif" in GA may em hasize ',aeste.rn economic Dreblern ,. U.13 ecanorx c ~c~" "i icu ..: col ?ar cr "s s and tie_ d s ~~~ ;tension within- the OEEC as to dollar allocations, topics already stressed by Soviet propagania 4 faay well be reflected in the propaganda line at the forthcomin>~; GA,, The Kremlin will exploit the '."pest's economic tribulations both as a cudgel for belaboring the responsible governments and as an inducement to the "Jestern nations to accept the proffer of Soviet "cooperation." Citing the US as the villein of the piece, the USSR may elaborate on the fatal im- plications to mankind of the prosent plans of the capitalist and imperialist states. The UK will be taunted for surrendering its economic sovereignty to the US Marshall planners; and together with France, Italy and Benelux, M British will be depicted as Approved For Release 2004: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020018-0 Approved For Release 2001161 CIA-RDP79-01A90A000100020018-0 stooges hipped into line by 'JS l: ..tiers and fatally linked to thri crisis-ridden US econoiq. The n:zg~,;r 3se ve Vaalicies of the US will be i-harply contrasted .dth T: 'r is ppeaoefu1 intentions as evi denced by th,3 Soviet role Li ;hi: CF".T enc. its sponsorship of earl -v peace treaties, Peace Oon{ resse:3, d >> sarriman nt, prohibition of the atonic boNb, and East,.:est trade. Y'hroi.:..f;h such propaganda the USSR would seek to (a) ease as%- "e~ ?=t tension and lull the ''.rest into a false sense of r3eeur t?(o) drive a wedge between the astern ' overnraents and between the respective Governments and their peoples; (e) restore &e3t-',re t trade, thereby obtaining uoh._ needed. capital equipment : rid :iiachinery for the USSR and its : atell1tes. The UN Technical Assistance !'ro rati9. The resolution on Technical Ass ~~:ta~'iCE3 to U:hex~si? e>>elopo Coc recently atdoptod by the Economic and Social Council (B'1103 0G) meets the US position in all essentials and 'twill probt:ib ly* be adopted, by the Nall General A,ssermbly -iiibstantiriilyr as it stands. ECOSOC proposed the fpllosi>- ing organizational rzac1iine ?y: ki Technical Assistance Committee of the Council (TAG), and e, iec unical Assistance Board (''"AS), composed of the exaou-uive li,3ads of the UN and the Specialized Agt,noie concerned, wb1ch 1-9 to make r ecoirnrlendations to LCO`3OC through TAC. Thus T10, will provide e centralized body in which assistance projects can be e_, ara lned rend coordinated with the agencies which will handle the aoltia2. iilp1ainent_xtion of the prop rarn< The first $17 raillion cc:n tr^ibctted i s to be divided on the f ollo? ing ba3is, 29,,,; T5140 23%; -1110, `?2%; t,,.sSCO, 14%; ILO, 11%. and ICt1O, 1" . The amouriT q to be coii';ributed by member nations and of ;.er financial ?aspee 215s of the program are to be ;,corked. out by a technical Assistance Coriferenoe w:hroa! :4ill meet during, or shor- 1y after, the September GA. Dissension over alto a-c,ion ol? LOA aid. Britain's flat ?s ~c;ti n of the 84() mi.t: a4>n a ii c}c9a ~, ayn entativolyr proposed b;g the OE 430 has sharpened the clash between the BOA countries over the d1vi; ion of 1949/50 U' aid. ? `ne UK delegate tab ee,tcaei 1 that the OK o,3tirn.ates of t-,-3 viere not ;&iven the arrle cor.:?aide tion as those of other countries. These nations, too;, virtu illy all of vihie h 'aus a 20--' 0% cut in their 1949/50 aid requests v are pro in ;te,~. y at the prospective r~ecductions. The dispute is placing prays a,n on the OTC which, because it must reeoh decisions uoan ausly. will find groat diff ioulty i ! reconciling divergent viaws. 1't s;r that the 0~',C: wil,l in :raa e the JK allocation, thou h. hardly enough to meat e-(yen bfii iiiriwr 3rit i ~h deriiraa ds ;: Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020018-0 %noe Approved For F lease 200 MM: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020018-0 '?FTU throws full "eight behind n6tional strikes, Recent wage and `iour c erg nd s &y Cor rnunI8t lial or i.n prance and Finland reflect the current PT(T tactic of ur?_;in its affiliates to force nation-wide strikes based on such "legitimate" union demands in an effort to retard production and stimulate inflation in non- Soviet countries. Conscious of the failure of the more directly political strikes of last year to arouse widespread worker support, the ;"TFTU is now apparently concentrating more on exploitation of genuine workers' grievances to aediti ve the same end. Recent conferences which rormed "' `TU industrial departments for the miners (Florence), metal workers (Turin), textile workers (Lyon!, and construction workers (Helsinki), stressed the importance of such trade union action. As a consequence, s ocel Communist af- filiates of the ,`dFTU (the French CGT, Italian CGIL,, Finnish trans- port workers, etc.) are apparently under instructions to replace their hitherto flexible programs for labor agitation with coordi- nated demands for wage increases, shorter hours and increased benefits. Initial strikes by Communist unions within ind ividua industries are to be rapidly extended, whenever feasible, to a a walk-out of all Communist unions in every industry where Cum- rnu.nOt influence is effective. The broad objective will be tc set in motion a series of "sympathy strikes" in the hope of obtaining 3ufficierst non-Communist worker backing to snowball Into a general strike. In order to achieve such widespread strike action, the interested ,"CFTC' industrial departrento will probably supply fi- nancial and organization=.l aid (as they did in the London doekers strike) Menever the investment promises substantial returns. Communist fronts in colonial areas. The decision of tho nations Libor f'ederai,in .(UGTT) to adhere permanently to the World Yederation of Trade Uniorns reflects the success of the strong appeal which the ',7FTU and the World Federation of Demo- or?tic Youth (WFDY) are currently making to nationalist parties in the colonial areas. The ability of the Communist-front organi- zations to promote nationalist-Communist cooperation in these areas is enhanced by the Communist support of the cherished nation- alist aim of independence. At its Festival and '`Torid Youth Congress in Budapest, attended by delegates from French, North and lest Afrioa, Indonesia, and :'ed.agascar, the 4 FDY is giving priority to consideration of measures for "active assistance" to the youth movements of colonial Africa and gout, east Asia. In the remaining :riont! s of 1949 the F1FTU, ",FDY and their sister organization, the International Democratic Womens Federation, will probably exert increasing efforts to exploit fully the theme of "national inde- pendence40 in the colonial and dependent areas. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020018-0 NMW Approved For (ease 20 - : CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020018-0 India's SC cancit.dacv. -. ith the US and UK supporting; India as a replacement for .'enade in tha Security Council and with no strong opposition so far apparent, Indira will certainly be elected by the next GA. Honoring Ind is with the second '.?: ritish Cor ?rontl- ealth Beat in the SC should tend to knit New Delhi more closely to the Comrlonweaith. By increasing Indian prestige, it should help build up India as a -)otential leader in Southwest Asia. against Communist expansion. On the other hand, Pakistan may well argue that the Kashmir embroilment di sq ali rie s India for SC membership. However, Egypt's election to the 1_+C last year despite its invol.:re-- ment in the Palestine case would furnish a precedent-, Revival of Evatt ,arooosals in the Greek question. U14 Secretary nor 'ta" e has expressed fig desire to a k t ~e to r~sla es ,jaethor the-,,r are now rr pared to aec,.' - t the final text of the proposals made by GA President ZkVatat last spring;. The Greek UN reprasentutive, with :whom Lie discussed his elan, advised that great caution should bo oxeroised in view of the extremely delicate state s,f Greek-- Yugis lav political relations. Lie agreed and will not reveal h-' ,-s previous consultations .,V'ith the Greeks when he broaches the subject to the rugoslav UN representative after the GA convenes. If he receives a positive response, Lie intends ~: o utilize the same ap- proach with the Bulgarians. Brazil will not sponsor spat ish guesti.on. According 'to its UN r ;pre entati ~1 ,' Br"aril will probably not "ntroduce the Spanish question in the Septe!nder session of the General. Assembly. Brazil is evidently un?oAlling to suf'f'er another defeat on this issue, and loss of Brazilian sponsorship decreases the likelihood. that this g3'estion will be reopened in the coming; GA. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020018-0 Approved For" (ease 2 i04 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020018-0 GREAT PO= VIEW ON ITALIAN COLONISS As the 1949 U!' General Assembly prepares to make a second g tab at disposal of the former Italian colonies. the key Western rowers have altered their positions to meet the new realities Of the situation particularly the strong demand for Libyan inde- pendence. T ollowing the defeat o l. the Bevin-Sf. orZa plan last May the, US and UK, aware of the strong GA opposition to anythin lees Uiitan early independence for Libya, have come to favor this step, They continue to support cession of the bulk of Eritrea to Ethiopia and :italian trusteeship over Somaliland, the latter as a gesture to Italy. On the crucial question of whether the three ~.~ _a ~...n..~., 5 W l Z i nonAPA to See ld h ., _, ou pari;s of Libya s e. united Libya is tempered by concern over +rench opposition.. France, not Italy, now seems likely to be the chief obstacle to US-UK plans. The French, fear 'ui over possible repercussions of early Libyan independence on nationalist element: in French North Africa, prefer a more gradual approach which would allow '.?hi7..a them to make any necessary ad justnents in their own areas. France will reluctantly accept independence for Cyrenaice, it strongly opposes a similar status for Tripol.itania or unification of the two under the Senussi, whose religious influence in FNA it fear?.. Italy, abandoning its efforts to secure a Tripolitan.ien trusteeship, now ire renli.stioa11y favors immediate Libyan inde- pendence, hoping to canitaiize on the favorable Arab reaction thus gained to secure a special position in Tripolitania similar to ~~ that of the UK in Oyrenaica. The Italians, ever reluctant to see the ..r cherished Eritrea go to sthiopia, are banking independen.e_} for that colony as well. `::hough professing little interest in ;.>omiiilan.d, the most worthless of the three colonies, they would probably accept a trusteeship. The USSR, which at the last GA ses.;ion proposed direct i5+ trusteeship for all three colonies and early xndeperdenoe, will have the ground cut out from under its anti-colonial stand by ":eastern advocacy of Libyan statehood. The USSR will probably be forced to fall back upon criticizing the "fictional" neture of any Libyan independence and stressing the puppet character of the of>i axes;, Should a deadlock occur over Eritrea and Somaliland, however, it is possible that the Soviet trusteeship proposal, also favored by UN Secretary General Lie, !.Mould be accepted as an alternative. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020018-0