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December 9, 2016
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September 13, 2000
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June 28, 1949
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Approved ForXlease 2020011KCIA-RDP794t090A000100020026-1 TUTERNATIONAL ORGANIZASIONS GROUP 'OEKLY SUMMARY NC. For week erding 28 June 1949 2 6DOCUMENT NO --fle tip NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0 CL SS. CL SS. CHANGED NEXT RE VIE The International Wee AUTH: - ? " REVIEWER. 006514 A criais has been reacned in the negotiations to revise tle Intra-Europaun Payments Ageeemento With the UK adamantly opposine the ECA proposals. The PeLestine Sonceliation Commission decidee to recess the Lausanne talks. At Lake Success, tne Security Coufeil indefinitely postponed action on the tlyelve long-pending membarstp applieetions In indonesie, progress continued toward comp2cte evaceetion or Dutch troops and restoration of the Republic la t ,s Kae!'mia. case, the UN Commission is coneidering arbitration 52 C, means of resolving the Indan-Pakietan ee:ispute. The UN Balkan Cc ,- miesion again condemned nlnuntan and Beigarian support of the Gxe:l'e se?errilias. At the Geneva conference or free trade unions, the grouoework for a democratele labor international i3 being laid, ak the 7ITTU prepares a militaeCc; counterattack. Pale .me developments, In Palestine, while chances of plo- aTess tir-cl I-6661 -s76-abilization along the Syrian border and in Jerusalem apnearee better, eho long te,-m outlook for a peace settie- ment showed 110 improvement? The hitheeto dismal prospects for oc- cluding a Sylianalsraeli armistice brientened somewhat after both states indiceted willingness eo accept Mediator Bunche's proposae as a basis for discussion leth the Syrian plebiscite succe33fe4 behind him, Zaim may feel eufriciently secure politically to agre3 to withdraw to the internattonal frontier between Syria and Pale' tine The problem of an interim administration or the demilitarized are e however, comIlleated by Israeli insistence on the right to eeferce civil authority in such zone. This demand contradicts Bunches Isie concept that no armistice terns should prejudice the eventual dieoce sition of the demilitarized area. Inaemen as the Israelis regard all territorr on the Palestine side of the border as theirs; thea mey cling stubbornly to this point. However, should Bunche succeed in prevailing on Inreel to drop this demani, the outlook for conelueing an armistice should be reaeonebly zood. Meanwhile tension has somewhat relaxed in the Jerusalem area The US proposal to abclish the Special Committee established unden the Israel-Jordan armistice and to transfer its functions to the Mixed Armistice Committee (MAC) seems to be acceptable to Amman,. Tha Israelis, however, are willing to refer to the MAC only local ques- tions in which they, particularly., are interested, omitting the Approved For Release 20 *CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020026-1 elowe0040R Approved For-1ftlease 2001/03/04 : CI DP79V1090A000100020026-1 larger questions of territorial changes in Jerusalem. If all these questions could be referred to the MAC, which unlike the Special Committee is presided over by UN representative General Riley, de- cisions could be reached in eases of disagreement. At Lausanne, the Palestine Conciliation Commissions after achieving virtually no progress toward a permanent peace settlement, decided to suspend its labors for the time being. Without the ser- vices of Mark Etheridge who recently resigned as US representative, the personnel of the Commission lack the stature required to cope with the difficult task of reconciling the widely divergent Arab and Israeli positions. Militant WFTU revealed in reor anization and new financial polioy. T e Soy e -resta a. eadquarters of t e or e erat on o rade Unions which hopes soon to have increased financial re- sources at its disposal, is rapidly converting the ISFTU into a sub- stantially more aggressive instrument of Soviet policy than was possible before Western labor withdrew. A policy of heavy spending on "international unity" propaganda is to be financed by a doubled membership fee and by a special WFTU "international" fund to which each of its "71 million" workers will be asked to contribute one franc annually. These ri.xnds?-will probably be spent largely in the Far East, in colonial areas and in those Western countries where the WFTU hopes to incorporate leftwing unions into its "trade depart- ments". Their expenditure will be prinarily the responsibility of Assistant Secretary General Rostovsky, reportedly a one-time Red Labor International official, now exercising key powers formerly assigned to Secretary General Saillant. Replacement of the theatrical, nominally Socialist, Saillant with the hard-driving Rostovsky marks the completion of the trans- formation in the character of the WFTU and will enable the USSR to enlist the full resources of this still widely influential world organization behind Soviet objectives. Rostovsky is now in charge of: (1) relations with the national labor unions; (2) press relations; and (3) the world-wide distributed WFTU Bulletin, Indicative of the tightened control which the USSn apparently intends to exercise over the national labor unions is the creatioa, under Rostovsky, of five "regional bureaus". Saillant will apparently retain, besides his nominal leadership, responsibility only for "economic and social ques- tions of interest to the WFTU". Approved For Release 2001/ . tIA-RDP79-01090A000100020026-1 Approved For *lease 2001/03/04: CIA- P7061090A000100020026-1 A new Soviet nropapenda twist. The USPAI has gained supnoct from uneiTiTfia?TaWiters in its familiar stratagem of exploiting technical meetings for propaganda purposes. Last year the Soviets rejected an invitation to participate in the Stockholm conference which drafted a new treaty for the protection of civilian persons in time of war and proposed revisions of Red Cross conventions for the care of the wounded and prisoners of war. This year, however, the USM, which is not erparty to any or the conventions, unexpected- ly appeared at the Geneva conference, now further examining these proposals. Assuming the mantle of humanitarianism, solicitude for improving the condition of the siok, the wounded and prisoners of war, the USSR has proposed to stigmatize, as criminaLany biological experiments and "all other means of exterminating the civilian popu- lation" -- a phrase vague enough to cover any aerial bombardment The USSR naturally avoided direct reference to atomic weapons and re- fused to elaborate the eases intended to be covered. The US dele- gation was confronted with the dieagreeable task of opposing the suggestion solely on dry legalistic grounds. To US amazement and in- dignation, Mexico and Venezuela supported the Soviet proposals even more surprisingly, Israel voted consistently with the USSR. Never- theless, the Soviet amendment was defeated in committee by a 24-11-7 vote and will most likely again be defeated before the plenary ses- sion Approved For Release 2001/0 IA-RDP79-01090A000100020026-1 Approved For*lease 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP706090A000100020026-1 NG NOTES Ecuador seeks Sc post. In the usual jockeying for position prior to the opening of the General Assembly in September, Ecua- dorian delegates, claiming firm commitments from some thirteen Latin American states, have been talking up Ecuador's candidacy for the SC seat to be vacated by Argentina on 31 December. If these aspirations should be fulfilled. Ecuador would probably name its permanent UN delegate, Dr. Viteri-.Lafronte as its SC representative. In view of Viteri-Lafronte's record at the Paris session of the last GA, this might prove a matter of concern to the Western nations. At the Palais Chaillot, Viteri-Lafronte frequently strayed into the Soviet uamp. His eccentric voting probably should not be attributed to Quito but to Viteri-Lafronte's ambitious pomposity and desi7:n3 to attract attention. Feeling that he was regarded as a non-entlty by tha Western Powers, he apparently went to great lengths to antagonize the US by flirting with the Soviet bloc. Pro?afanda on a latter. The USSR's anti-colonial campaign will be given a boost n the current Trusteeship Council session* The unwilling accomplice in this case is the Union of South Africa, which has, in the latest of a series of insults to TO authority, %Illwe practically incorporated its South West African mandate in the Union. When this issue is raised in the TC. the USSR can present a sound case charging South Africa with flagrant violations of TO resolutions and of the very spirit of the UN trusteeship system. There are no adequate answers to these charges and the Soviets will have a solid base from which to launch their already familiar attacks on Western "colonialism", - 0 - French leadership in Council of EurRat. The French have ones again demonstrated their leadership in the European unity movement. In the wake of a favorable report by the Foreign Affairs Committee, the French National Assembly is expected to authorize early ratifica- tion of the statute of the Council of Europe. It is most significant that a majority of the Committee favored the prompt inclusion of Western Germany in the Council. This illustrates not only the continu- ing progressive attitude of the French toward European unification, through which France hopes to increase her stature as the leading Continental power, but also the increasing realism of responsible French thinking on the German problem since the war's end. TJoint pro- - ductThf G/I0 and B/WE). ? Approved For Release 2001 CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020026-1 Approved For *lease 2001 CIA-RDP70r1090A000100020026-1 CRISIS OVER INTRA-EUROPEAN PAYMENTS PLAN REVEALS ERP AT CRITICAL STAGE As the controversy between the US and UK over revision of the Intra-European Trade Agreement reaches its climax, it brings into the open the underlying issues which must be resolved if a viable European economy is to be restored by 1952. The present controversy arises from strong UK objections to the ECA proposal that US aid be used for multilateralizing trade between the ERP countries in order to restore a competitive trade pattern. ECA proposed making in- direct aid drawing rights and their counterpart in conditional dollar aid freely transferable, and beyond this, to make Europe's products competitive with those of the US by allowing some convertibility of drawing rights into dollars if European prices were too high. ECA, with the backing of most continental countries, feels that some such element of competition must be introduced in order to drive European costs down and thus to stimulate their export drive. The UK, however, believes it too early to risk a return to multilateral, competitive trading. Now facing a critical decline in gold and dollar reserves and fearing further loeses of precious gold and dollars, the UK feels that it cannot risk any possible loss of SCA dollars. Consequently the UK is compelled to oppose even a French compromise plan designed to minimize the drain on UK resources. Since the Agreement expires on 30 June, some compromise will be patched up, ECA reportedly hav- Noe, ing already receded from its convertibility demand, but it will be at best only a limited contribution to the basic problems confront- ing the ERP. The trade plan controversy is but one aspect of the larger problem of restoring European viability by 1952. As ERP moves into its second year amid signs of a US recession, it is clear that the ERP nations still have a long way to go to meet this objective. 'nth European production substantially recovered, the ERP has become a dollar problem not a recovery problem. While production has al- ready revived to beyond pre-war levels (except in Germany) and there has been marked progress toward internal financial stability, the ERP states have had only limited success in attacking the key problem of reducing their dependence on US aide Perhaps the greatest single difficulty is that individual countries, instead of seeking fuller integration of the European economy, are tending toward autarky. Rather than rationalize their industries, they seem intent on each building up competing rather than complementary industries, with re- sultant duplication of facilities and investment in uneconomic fields. Second, the ERP countries have not gone far Beau* toward reducing their dependence on US aid by greater trading among themselves and with other non-dollar areas. Greater trade competition would tend to reduce costs and stimulate this trade. Third, many ERP countries are aoparently failing to take adequate measures to reduce their need for dollar aid by stimulation of dollar exports and reduction of dollar imports. While their prospects for achieving this objective depend Approved For Release 2001/03/04 7CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020026-1 fte" Approved For 'lease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020026-1 perhaps as much on US export-import policies as on their own efforts, it is doubtful whether the ERP countries can consolidate the recovery progress already achieved or make significant strides toward long term restoration of Europe's economic position unless they take far .ore substantial measures on their own toward restoring their trade ,osition and integrating their economies. Failure of the ERP to its objective by 1952 would face the US with the unpleasant -tternatives of either continuing a modified Marshall Plan for a 'urther period or seeing Europe forced to reduce its standard of liv- ing with the consequent effect on stability and development of a ttrong anti-Communist European bloc. 41411.22;1rf Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020026-1