INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 25

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020027-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: June 21, 1949
• Content Type: PERRPT

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
UEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 25
?or week ending 21 June 1949
The international Week
Volume II
The Council of Foreign Ministers adjourned after agreeing in
prineiple on an Austrian Treaty but failing to achieve more than
a modus vivendi on Germany. The UN Commission for Indonesia noted
progress towiTT restoration of the Republic to Jogjakarta while in
the Kashmir case, India became more conciliatory regarding trace
terms. However, at Lausanne, the Palestine peace talks were on the
point of breaking down. The UN Human Rights Commission completed a
draft human rights covenant, At its Luxembourg meeting, the Western
Union Consultative Council discussed defense matters. The Food and
Agriculture Organization announced the dissolution of the Inter-
national Emergency Food Committee, which allocates foodstuffs in
short supply.
SUGAR COATED DEADLOCK
Although the CFM accomplished almost nothing toward final
settlement of the German problem, it has had the effect of lessen-
ing the cold war tension by demonstrating that the USSR is still
anxious to negotiate with the West. After protracted failure to
settle on any formula for reuniting either Germany or Berlin, the
USSR and the Western Powers agreed on a loose and inconclusive
modus vivendi relating to Zest-West German trade and access to the
capital. It registeredimportant progress toward an Austrian treaty,
agreement being reached on the 1938 Austrian frontiers and on the
sum to be paid the USSR for releasing certain former German assets
in its zone.
Soviet reluctance to make more definite commitments at Paris
is rendered a mystery by the apparent eagerness of the USSR to re-
sume the CFM: talks last springS. It then appeared that the Kremlin
was bent upon delaying the formation of a West German state, retard-
ing the consolidation of Western resistance to Soviet expansionism
and reopening the blocked channels of East-West trade. By the time
the CFM actually convened, however, the USSR seemed hesitant to
make any firm commitments on Germany, or to relax its grasp on Eastern
Germany and Berlin. Some explanation may be found in: (1) the rude
jolt to the USSR from the Eastern German elections; (2) Satellite
fear of any Soviet concessions to German nationalism; and (3) grow-
ing signs of an approaching US recession which had become more pro-
nounced between the time when the CFM meeting was first reached and
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the session's opening. Moscow may well have detected these economic
storm signals and concluded that the approaching Western depression
might at last present it with some long sought opportunities. To
leave itself free to exploit this situation, the USSR may have pur-
sued an ambiguous objective at Paris in somewhat reducing East-West
political tensions while avoiding any hard and fast commitments pend-
ing further clarification and development of the economic picture.
The Politburo may anticipate the following effects of a deepening de-
pression: (1) increased difficulty in persuading an economy-minded US
Congress to provide needed financial support to the ERP and the Mili-
tary Aid Program; (2) aggravated economic cleavages between the US
and UK, already manifest respecting the Anglo-Argentine Trade Agree-
ment; (3) diminishing US ability to induce Western European countries
to uphold the policy of trade restrictions against Eastern Europe,
particularly if potential Eastern European markets could ease growing
unemployment in the West; and (4) increasing distress and discontent
in Western Germany where a "plague on both your houses" attitude is
already beginning to display itself.
In the above context it was logical for the USSR to seek some
detente preventing the CFM from disbanding without a slight appearance
of progress made. Any too brusque reaction to the West at the Palais
Rose might have led to further intensification of Western rearmament,
producing an artificial boom which would, in Soviet eyes$ help stave
off depression, Thus the USSR apparently endeavored to create the
illusion that East-West negotiations were progressing, meanwhile de-
pending on a depression to realize some Soviet objectives which
earlier USSR tactics had failed to bring about. A wait and see policy
would better answer Soviet aims than resort to truculence which :maid
arouse somnolent Western legislatures already preoccupied with domestic
economic troubles. This reasoning may have led the USSR to make its
substantial concessions on the Austrian treaty -- the least signifi-
cant agenda item, where indeed it has exacted handsome indemnities for
its scuttling of Tito's claims.
Austria asides the chief result of the Conference has been to
formalize and prolong the partition of Germany, while achieving some
normalization of the East-West split, This continued deadlock arose
from the reluctance of either side to risk revival of a unified Reich
at this time on terms which might favor the other. Neither side thus
feels itself free as yet to alter the present transitional arrangemens4 The Western Powers seek to maintain their control over Tri-
zonia$ not merely to prevent its-coming under Soviet domination but,
especially on the part of France to forestall any resurgence of
German militarism. The USSR, on the other hand, apparently allowed
its fear lest freely expressed German nationalism assume an anti-
Soviet orientation to outweigh for the tire being its long term hope
of someday making common cause with Germany against the West. Conse-
quently the larger effect of the CFM session had been merely to
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postpone the solution of the German problems while reviving the
machinery through which any future settlement might be reached.
env
VFW to stress AsialLIALTE_Elkas and "trade departments" at ?
Milan. The MiranCongress of the Vijialra erat on of Trade TJnions,
ci-p7iiing 28 rune, may be expected to reiterate current Communist
emphasis on "working class unfAy" and the "defense of peace", but
will probably turn its major efforts to plans for increasing WFTU
influence in the Far East and Southeast Asia and for minimizing losses
in Europe and the Western hemisphere.
The WFTIT organizing drive in Asia, temporarily stalled, is now
likely to be accelerated as the Federation moves to counteract last
week's decision by eight Middle and Far &astern labor delegation
at the ILO Geneva session (Turkey, Japan. China, the Philippines,
India, Pakistan, Iran and Indonesia) to form a non-Communist Asian
Labor Federation. Designation of a 30-man Chinese labor delegation
to the Milan Congress reflects the significance which MITI' leaders
attach to this drive as well as the key role which is apparently
assigned to Chinese Communist labor leaders. However s the absence
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of Indian and Japanese representatives w;11 weaken the impression
Ilinu strength in ti s vree, while still other Asian countries may
be unrepresented, owing to leca of ifsa end foreign exchange facili-
ties Nevertheless, the WTU will probaaly proceed with plans for
a Pan-Asiatic Labor Conference in eelpinr where it 4opes to assemble
a wide Asian labor representetion this fall.
In the West, the WFTU wial direct is energies to combatting
preparations of the Western c(ftlition of free trade unions for a new
labor international. To meet this challenge it probably will: (1)
Increase its efforts to launeb a substantial number of WF TU "trade
departments" by August 1949: metal workfrs, textile and clothing
workers, miners, leather ,aorkers, seamen, building trade workors ani
teachers; (2) direct particular attention, to Western colonies where
It charges "mass repression" or labor is practiced- and (3) unleash
e propaganda barrage against the "(astern labor organizations designed
GO ter, tnem as "blackleg" unicns controlled by capitalist governmeats.
Aaothen step: toward Libxan UflY[ eyid lariss al Senussi has
indicaerT6 a TriValtanian celegation willincness to rule a
united Libya and the terms uncer wnich he would support Tripolitanian
unity aspirations. The Emir vernea, however, that either the return
to Tripclitenia of the anti-Senussi spokesman Leshir Seadawi or con-
firmation of Italian trusteesaip over trio area would void his promiee,
limp1oreover5 the problem of the aereditary dynasty (or which Saaaawi
always based his opposition to federation under Serussi leadenship
still remeins, Meanwhile a cnilateral eaclaretioe of independence
on the part of the Tripolitanian leaders is a lossibility in the next
few montbs, as a result of rowing sentient for trdependence spurred
by the Cyrenaican example.
The UK also remains undecided as to supporting unity or opposing
it. Supporting it would epaerse the Araos althougt involving the UK
in commitments on Tripolitanit which it has assiduously sought to
avoid; opposing it would enperse France and Itelye The French remain
firm in their opposition to an adjacent Independent Arab state which
would increase native French torth African aspirations, The Italians,
if unable to get a trusteeship over Tripolitania, might support an
independent Libya, provided st Sficient guarantees were given for
Italian Interests in Tripolitnia.
USSR may alter rigid stand on UN membershin. During Security
CouncIT-Faliw of rfirkeiFeiSilipleIrcataans the Soviet attitude to-
ward the admission of new states to the UN may change, as a result
of the USSR's more conciliatory attitude toward the Weet. Although
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41101 desirous of gaining a oroeere'_oreve inc 'ease in UN membership
the Jilitultaneous accett?eee i ite Satellites -- Albania, Bulgaria,
Hungary. Outer Mongolia eee Ptmania -- the USSR may decide to admit
one or two states for exemp31 ItIly, in an effort further to arpre-
elate its currency In its ere3ent lpee o-" offensive. The propacande
adventae,e in Italy of uci a love Neu3d be greet and the Soviet veto
of Italy is based on proulds lastee te abandon (simultaneous adris-
sion ot al- the ex-enPrny states) :t'lan F.,:e other Soviet vetoes. Fin-
land too is an ex-eni,)y sta-e, qy approving the admission of these
two nations the USSR :ouid print op its generosity while criticizing
Western violction of tee Prxaro Avereement (as interpreted by the
Soviets) in refusing te eJ1ILt Huere rv Rumania and Bulgaria,
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TOG NOTES
Demand for internatignal.tin aareempnt. Foreseeing an
imminent surplug-ln world tin production, most major exporting
codntrias in the Tin Study Group strongly favor calling a UN con-
ference as soon as possible to negotiate a tin agreement. The UK
demands this move, the Dutch remain neutral and the US, which still
questions whether a real surnLus is yet in the making, is opposed.
This development is indicative of a treed, exemplified by the Inter-
national Wheat Agreement, toward meeting the problem created by a
return to surplus conditions in major raw material markets by regula-
tion through intergovernmental commodity agreements.
A Czechoslovakian Mindszenty_case. The Czech Government's
current assaults upon tIWCatolic Church and Archbishop Beran
closely parallel the similar attacks in Hungary which culminated in
the conviction of Cardinal inedszenty. There is an important distinc-
tion, however; Hurgary under its peace treaty, made specific promises
to the US and UK respecting fee-dom of worship, promises absent in
the case of "liberated" Czechrslovakia.
"This is where we came int." The thee? year struge;le to devise
vilsoccepTaM internatioael controls for atomic energy has ended just
where it started -- in the 1,es of tae six sponsors of the 1946 UN
resolution creating the Atomic Energy Commission -- the Big Five
and Canada. The AEC Tiorkinv, Gemmittee, after weeks of futile debate,
turned down the Soviet pronosei to the 1948 GA for two simultaneous
treaties, one banning the atomic bomb imnediately end the other set-
ting up controls, and resolved that further study of the issue would
be futile until the six couneries could agree. The USSR wants control
subject top and the West wants it free from, the veto. The USSR also
rejects the principle of an ireernatona: atomic energy authority.
The chances for agreement ere eemote
New prompals .rorj.gluD4sq. The Secretary General has revamped
his proposgls for a UR p-;uard so as to call for a UN field service of
300 men with a 2,000 man reserve panel. The USSR will probably con-
tinue to oppose any guard proposal, however labelled. Nevertheless
the GA could authorize such a Vorce over Soviet objections.
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