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Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 13, 2000
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Publication Date: 
June 1, 1949
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020030-6.pdf310.19 KB
Approved For Releas2001/03/0 RDP79-0109000100020030-6 INT RNATIO?iAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP " j'E11.Y SUMMARY NO. 22 For week ending 1 dune 1949 Volume II The International YTeek r,rAfter a week of preliminary sparring at the CFP, the Soviet and .estern positions were still tar apart and there were no indications of any radical shift in Soviet tactics. The peace talks between Israel and the Arabs remained deadlocked at Lausanne, t?1TR'',AT FROM "?ARS AW A After a week of preliminary sparring in Paris, there are still no indications that the Kremlin is prepared to make any wide concessions on German unity to the Western Powers in order to se- cure a voice in all Germany. Although the Ilestern Powers pressed V1shirzsky to reveal the Soviet position on a political and economic program for Germany, the anticipated sweeping gesture of Soviet benignity toward the German people foreshadowed at Warsaw failed to materialize. Hammering on the need of first reestablishing four power control of Germany with the inevitable entanglement of the veto, the wily Soviet Foreign Minister held back disclosure of the shape of Moscow's proposals for Germany, Thereafter the Western Powers seized the initiative and trotted out their proposals to unify Germany politically and economically by extending the Bonn arrangements to the entire Reich. Vishinsky lost little time in indicating that these were unacceptable. Back of the USSR's reluctance to relax its existing hold on Eastern Germany may be (1) lack of confidence in its ability to influence the course of German political evolution without tight controls and (2) skepticism as to Western willingness. to remove overall controls on Bast-hest trade. The returns from the Eastern German elections on the eve of the Paris meeting may have come as a severe jolt to the Russians although it is also possible that they were "ri:;ged" in this manner to provide propaganda evidence of democracy in the Soviet zone. ":hile the USSR will trumpet the "people's Congress" as the authentic voice of "democratic," Germany=, using it as a propaganda counterweight to Bonn, this device will fool almost nobody, neither Germans nor the Politburo itself. Moreover, the Satellites hr:ave shown continuous apprehension over any haste in restoring German sovereignty. Soviet sensitivity as to this aspect of the problem is reflected in Maalenkov's reassuring reference before the Czech Communist Party Congress to the "removal of the century