INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 22
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020030-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 13, 2000
Sequence Number:
30
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 1, 1949
Content Type:
PERRPT
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Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020030-6.pdf | 310.19 KB |
Body:
Approved For Releas2001/03/0 RDP79-0109000100020030-6
INT RNATIO?iAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
" j'E11.Y SUMMARY NO. 22
For week ending 1 dune 1949
Volume II
The International YTeek
r,rAfter a week of preliminary sparring at the CFP, the Soviet
and .estern positions were still tar apart and there were no
indications of any radical shift in Soviet tactics. The peace
talks between Israel and the Arabs remained deadlocked at Lausanne,
t?1TR'',AT FROM "?ARS AW
A After a week of preliminary sparring in Paris, there are
still no indications that the Kremlin is prepared to make any wide
concessions on German unity to the Western Powers in order to se-
cure a voice in all Germany. Although the Ilestern Powers pressed
V1shirzsky to reveal the Soviet position on a political and economic
program for Germany, the anticipated sweeping gesture of Soviet
benignity toward the German people foreshadowed at Warsaw failed
to materialize. Hammering on the need of first reestablishing
four power control of Germany with the inevitable entanglement of
the veto, the wily Soviet Foreign Minister held back disclosure of
the shape of Moscow's proposals for Germany, Thereafter the Western
Powers seized the initiative and trotted out their proposals to
unify Germany politically and economically by extending the Bonn
arrangements to the entire Reich. Vishinsky lost little time in
indicating that these were unacceptable.
Back of the USSR's reluctance to relax its existing hold on
Eastern Germany may be (1) lack of confidence in its ability to
influence the course of German political evolution without tight
controls and (2) skepticism as to Western willingness. to remove
overall controls on Bast-hest trade. The returns from the Eastern
German elections on the eve of the Paris meeting may have come as
a severe jolt to the Russians although it is also possible that
they were "ri:;ged" in this manner to provide propaganda evidence
of democracy in the Soviet zone. ":hile the USSR will trumpet the
"people's Congress" as the authentic voice of "democratic," Germany=,
using it as a propaganda counterweight to Bonn, this device will
fool almost nobody, neither Germans nor the Politburo itself.
Moreover, the Satellites hr:ave shown continuous apprehension over
any haste in restoring German sovereignty. Soviet sensitivity as
to this aspect of the problem is reflected in Maalenkov's reassuring
reference before the Czech Communist Party Congress to the "removal
of the century