INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 21 FOR WEEK ENDING 24 MAY 1949 FOR WEEK ENDING 24 MAY 1949 THE INTERNATIONAL WEEK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020031-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: May 24, 1949
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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S RE11
isf Og GROUP
r o iurne
'=??e Paris c;oune tl or _o :i;:n t niaters met in a cordial
tuicxiy agree . cg otr en ouda M.?seanwhile, Berlin dis-
ex neutralized Laraine of tue cep e. ita anticipated from the
"t i A of the blockade. after rejecting the, bevin-SrOrza
nn or the Italian oolonies L4...3i-7 the General Assenb y
a"ned A aoviet proposai or s big power settlement of
jou
.
the Greek civil war, by-passit*, Greece and the UN, was re j cited
by the UK and US. Pakistan resurrected the Hyderabad case in
the Security Council
r.,A balance sheet. vn belance, the repent GA session
roduoea raEher negative r saJ.ts because of its failure to
;stain agreement on the ney lyeiiaa colonies question. This.
:issued by all odds the mpg ; important before this meeting, W 3
s= n que in that final powers of disposition insteae of more
recommendation rested wi vn the Assembly. The tfS-'?UY favored
.avi.n- arorza plan was defeated by a comoination of the Arab,
Asiatic and Slav blocs. The acin fission of Israel to UN member..-
=hip at this time a'.so appears a deoatable contribution in that
_L may have strengthened Israel ,B iatransigeant attitude at
Lausanne. The GA failed to !&t We ban on ohiefs of mission
to Spain, although a simple majority favored this course.
Among the Assembly's accomplishments were the recommendations
o L lirnitinA the veto and approval of the Convention on the
International Transmission or hews and Kight of Correction.
While inadequate from the US 'point of view, this convention
marks an important advance toward u uiversai freedom of the
press. The most important event o the session was at most e
by-product .y-- Lake success providec the trysting place for the
Jessup-Malik meetings onion eventu?,tei. in the lifting of the
Merlin blockade.
the :session was notabia for the csontinued isolation of the
:soviet bloc which formed a rrti.a: r i t of six on almost every
East-West issue. Leon-dovi.et QW frcerfibers appear at long last
a 1early aware of the ustare cf soviet Div obstructionism and
loviet propaganda at the UN is beouming; less and less effective.
DOCUMENT NO.
NUHANGE IN CLAS
DECLASSIFIED
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aother sliznificant trend seems to have developed in the
--abMission of an increasing number of human rights oases to the
lira - The Mindszenty trial and tt!e Soviet :dives issue. as well
the long-standing problem of the Indians in South Africa,
:irnplify this type of case., it each instance the defendant
state has protested interference in a matter of domestic juris-
diction. There is likely to be an increasing flow of human
rights problems into the UN. which will tax the resources and
pa-cienoe of that body.
*'Vor? want of a nail....." For want of a Haitian vote,
the o rucial Trinolitanian v ra,raph In the GA Political Com-
wIttee?s Italian colonies solution was defeated. As a result.
the entire resolution was lost when the Latin American states,
trance and South Africa refused to accept the emasculated
compromise. Disobeying his Government's instructions to ab-
.Haitian delegate St. Lot voted along the "color" line
in support of the African natives against "white" domination.
India, Pakistan, Burma and the Philippines also joined the Arab-
`soviet group in blocking the Tripolitanian proposal,. reflectin
the hostile reaction among anti-colonial states to the nower
politics of the Bevin-Sforza epreenent. The US "lost face"
among these nations which are extremely bitter over its support
of the big power "deal" and its "blatant" disregard of native
desires.
The defeat of the Ravin-Sforza plan lessens the chances
that any future colonies solution will be as favorable to
Italy. The Intensity of native reaction in Tripolitania to
prospective Italian return will aot only rive pro-Italian states
pause but wil increase Arab sentir:ent for unity and independ-
ence. In Libya. under the British caretaker regime and in the
face of continued economic steRnation, the population will
remain restive. Meanwhile. Italy is depressed by the Assembly's
rejection of both its Tripolitanian and Italian Somaliland
tru.steeships.. Furthermore. the endorsement of Ethiopian annex-
ation of the bulk of Eritrea. inoludinp;.the two Italian cities
of Asmara and Massawa, has also wounded Italian pride. The
cooling-off period before the next GA will. however, soften
the shook of a non-Italian settlement.
From the extensive lobbying certain to develop in the coming
three months, two alternatives -- independence or multi-power
trusteeship -- are likely to emerge for the key Libyan area.
Multi-power trusteeship could probably have been obtained during
the present session had the British not rejected it. The UK may
continue to insist on sole control over strateato Cyrenaica in
which case a multilateral trusteeship would be difficult to
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obtains If the UK does so, and the Latin American states re
fuse to abandon their ~ro-ftali~n a;and, then the British
sack an independent Libya tied to the UK by treaty. :,,n
c;n y future settlement., t=A approval of the cession of the bulk
of Eritrea to Ethiopia will probably be sustained. Finally,
Respite Italy:s failure to win control over Somaliland this
lprinp,, it is possible that t;ijs eo.i.ony may be returned to
t.,ly,` as a trust, territory throuh some bargain struck with
he anti-colonial pouters which woalu satisfy their desire for
united Libya.
developments. The recent xeneva session of the
conomi c-Go`min oti 'for Europe was notable for the relatively
YO attitude of tho `iovlet boa, despite its continued cr3 t-
c am of ";astern export corntroi 4. l.his attitude probably re-
elects increasing Soviet concern over the fester economic
recovery in ~'Testern than in pastern Europe, with resulting
dissatisfaotion in the 3atellite countries, and over the pinch
A' present "Testern export controls. Should some form of East-
?Test detente emerge r'rom the curx-ent CFPli, it is likely that
o.;astern Europe xviil adopt a rucn more cooperative policy tower
,09 and seek to use it as a means not only of promoting trade
but of securing aid from the 'Jest.
The concrete acnievement or the session was its unanimou3
approval of a permanent Trade committee., after the ;'Western
delegates had defeated attempts to widen Its scope to include
4economic development" problems. This Committee, in the avenb
of Eastern European oooperatioab, wculd provide machinery for
}any expanded East-West trade
va oinf.i.uence with '".astern European
`"i'TJ seeks to salvage ,~
laboro e ."Tor d 'eaera n $3 Trade Unions is ar from ready
to surrender its mentorship of Vie labor movements of ,?Westerr,
Europe to the anti-Uommunist ~-"estezn labor coalition which i
now seeking to form a new tivor.cz labor organization. The re-
ported visit to Brussels or the iFW Secretary General., in an
attempt to dissuade Belgian labor from leaving the Federation,,
reflects the persistent hope o'' WF`da s Communist leadership
that at least a token representation from non-Communist nation-
l unions may be retained. Tbi move, following similar
efforts by the USSR to influenoe Swedish and Australian labor;
:suggests Soviet awareness that the ":YFTU's claim to world labor
representation will be sharply deflated once the small power
unions withdraw (the Danish and New Zeeland unions voted to do
so last week). ".'hile it may try rurther persuasion, the T" FTC
will probably succeed in retaining only the Austr'an and Finr:ish
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i bor federations. vnich,. l ric.u h had iajist-or'ientecl, are
a`t3iyart:.ntly reluctant i cr t"o p usop v to labor the Soviet dis-
as re tia, sat'3.r:.Jli`tv 'r i ,t;C' 3. 1.NFf._ ,
~, _ nr~~+saal,v,, the "wit ;Yacretary tieraerai reportedly
., ?.'.ovd H to o "oposs t, is L an uin s;iu wais;ut to the desires of
. ?r Gorman workers OSp' O LU',..3.4 I U Md ttu ir." 'ioWev'er,.. any :YT
ycopoM.J. to "unify" we 'tU :r :Yf,!.E P.sj s wit;n sne l ommunl.st labor
kererts of Marlin and E, s srsra G rr qny would be readily spvttad
._ an temot, to uroruote a ac,~i cifr ren ; all-German labor
,tovc s ti nip. Such a aL Opc's 31 wou. b u unI teiy to deceive ";estern
-T
epresencatives? now weii. o-iWnro Vi Juv.tat cori roi over the '.rFran
. . , a ojC'r,~uul..ci ivy rist Atlantic and is __ter--
Communists move
i :neanmeari,1 tim. zrker=, `, )Rnun:~.: attempt to organize r~or-;h
Atlantic e.nC ".eCl .terrar,ean maritime ;yorcers as an instrument
Our sabota.rin ; the oceanic trace o:i anti-Soviet countries is
:i 3gp;ested by recent deviceiopm a"5 in riorlay, .r eland and Italy
Within the sarile week: (1) the Norwegian Seamen's Union re-
forted the transference o.i kay . omr:,unis : agents from other
industries to the merchant marine; ) in Iceland, the Communist-
dominated unions or stevecores ana merchant snipmen scheuu ed
widespread strikes; n :) szo ita an Seamen's Union concluded
in `5armisticV with test, Carr tirs.n Lst- ;cntro7.led CGIL to avert a
;s,
COIL attempt to seize E;oritrot of the union. These developrnera
any:ociated in part sYit , local .4nirw nist objectives (3,g.
s eoaptur1nr contrui ui ie i nu . s ..a?bur movement) may be linked
with a broader Communist, plan .o disrupt commercial shipment :
?u areas of sa,ratanio rai,E C st to Ao USSR. The existence of
ouch b plan is indicated by to renewer activity of As World
ederution of Trade Unions in ari r.irne organization. The W U
is now striving to establish a iaritime workers "department"
and to incorporate :lei g.wirt S lon shorermen (IL?tJ) and Austr0ian
dockside workers. Should these efforts succeed, the WYTU would
eventually be in a woe k.tien to call international maritime
r; orikes capable of crippling a substantial portion of the world'
Shipping facilities. particularly in the Pacific.
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""."fir`
4'oviet concept of UN Sect tar e, t unchanged. The USSR
recently grant
teri Kortstanin i.i.HF)oh9nk0, newly appointed Assistant
ooretary General in charge of Seoirity Council affairs, the
,, nk of .Inister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. This
n? tatua, inoonsistent with Chaster requirements designed to pr~a-
teat the exaiusiveiy international character of the Secretariat,
!a another inclination of the USSR's failure to distinguish be-
tween JN and soviet service us first evldenoed in the Gubitchav
to on Nepalese t To t~of ex ec ted . The line of Soviet
questurs on the status of Asa re a unship to the UK
presages another Soviet- veto on a membership application. Such
alleged lack or s?vere p,rit; ws; th ground on which the USSR
vetoed the applications of Tr?easjowdan and Ceylon.
~!lbanis may settle earth Wtiannei case. Albania is report-
edly attempt ng an out-or-court sauna cry settlement of the UY`a
claim. recently upheld by the International Court of Justice,,
for compensation for the ~linirF of the two UK destroyers in The
Corfu Channel in 1946. Albania may vwish to avoid becoming t'le
first nation in modern history to disregard an award of an
international arbitral tribunal, even though the amount of tie
claim is a substantial one for such a tiny state. A more likely
reason, however, may be a Soviet desire to remove a serious
obstacle,to the eventual admission of Albania to the UN, which
would give an additional vote to the Slav bloc
youth African ex !pr on ro`;.J. South Africa's recent
d iaer~ m natory M import con brol are opposed by the US as an
evasion of the requirements of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade and of the reg?;,,lations of the International Monet try
Fund. The US believes that t;2is policy is being inspired by
the UK to force South. Africa into preferential trade arrange-
ments. The South Africans are seeking to divert imports from
the US to the UK and oUher "'astern European soft currency
Qou.ntries in order to eorserve their dwindling hard currency
reserves. The US, however, contends that South African soft
currency holdings have declined about as much as its dollars,
leaving no legitimate finenolal basis for discrimination between
the two as required by GATT, and has therefore raised the matter
at the Annecy oonfersnce4
Investment aspects of" ?'pint Four. The UN Economic and
Employment Commission has D opose special Inducements to
stimulate foreign investment. It recommended that underdevel-
oped countries study (1) duty--free or duty--reduced imports of
capital equipment; (2) full; or non-disoriminstory exemption of
profits, interest and dividends from taxation, especially when
reinvested for productive purposes; and (3) elimination of
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nable taxation= t rang Per .q rr t' c: for ntnf its.. div? dear d;a
OF interest, any pr?ovigin . rt r repatriation of capital. This
ninposal sugres;;s ?:? nattn,p1 me r the bilateral or multilateral.
Teeruen1 s whicJ= will be I nape y to er_reoursge the flow of
t
-
Ivate canitel abroad nn1 aityr,nt; which Point Four oblaett es
-snot be fully act lewd
11 ror Jarer still 'm l ik+P1v- Despite t;.US efforts to oott-
a3 t the 1 gram i2rnnrKar>e Ar ne? u,nuealth countries, a ma 3ority
or them. led by the TTK ctt; 11 strongly oppose extens on o.f Vmoet-
-Fvored-nation treatment to .PIRA[!., Their fear of Javanese
trade oomrsetition and of revival of its prewar dumping prac-
tiose still outialphs the US contention that MFN will aid the
rehabilitation of 3anan. Gor?soquently, it is doubtful whather,
t r the absence of the : tr nrraest rressure . the US can this year
otoure a Ianane;ai UFM amrwAmnni similar to that for the V zone.
ors eots for SOME.. Lebanon, heretofore the chief proponent
nt an "" ao om: c hmo ssT'on for the Middle East, may not press the
tasue at the Jul..v Eoonorio and Analal Council session., At
p asent the most imnortant considerations in establishing an ECI
ra Israeli membership and Point Your assistance. Since t=he De-.
pa?tment of State has reeRrt!v stated that a regional commission
is not necessary in order tt t, the Middle East receive technical
assistance, there Is l tt? e inducement for the Arab states to
'ace, during the ourrar t i4.rats-Israeli tension, the logical but
unwelcome necessity of ineladinn Israel in the Commission when
It is eventually es ?bl fished
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