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December 9, 2016
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September 13, 2000
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May 24, 1949
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Approved For Rase 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-090A000100020031-5 S RE11 isf Og GROUP r o iurne '=??e Paris c;oune tl or _o :i;:n t niaters met in a cordial tuicxiy agree . cg otr en ouda M.?seanwhile, Berlin dis- ex neutralized Laraine of tue cep e. ita anticipated from the "t i A of the blockade. after rejecting the, bevin-SrOrza nn or the Italian oolonies L4...3i-7 the General Assenb y a"ned A aoviet proposai or s big power settlement of jou . the Greek civil war, by-passit*, Greece and the UN, was re j cited by the UK and US. Pakistan resurrected the Hyderabad case in the Security Council r.,A balance sheet. vn belance, the repent GA session roduoea raEher negative r saJ.ts because of its failure to ;stain agreement on the ney lyeiiaa colonies question. This. :issued by all odds the mpg ; important before this meeting, W 3 s= n que in that final powers of disposition insteae of more recommendation rested wi vn the Assembly. The tfS-'?UY favored .avi.n- arorza plan was defeated by a comoination of the Arab, Asiatic and Slav blocs. The acin fission of Israel to UN member..- =hip at this time a'.so appears a deoatable contribution in that _L may have strengthened Israel ,B iatransigeant attitude at Lausanne. The GA failed to !&t We ban on ohiefs of mission to Spain, although a simple majority favored this course. Among the Assembly's accomplishments were the recommendations o L lirnitinA the veto and approval of the Convention on the International Transmission or hews and Kight of Correction. While inadequate from the US 'point of view, this convention marks an important advance toward u uiversai freedom of the press. The most important event o the session was at most e by-product .y-- Lake success providec the trysting place for the Jessup-Malik meetings onion eventu?,tei. in the lifting of the Merlin blockade. the :session was notabia for the csontinued isolation of the :soviet bloc which formed a rrti.a: r i t of six on almost every East-West issue. QW frcerfibers appear at long last a 1early aware of the ustare cf soviet Div obstructionism and loviet propaganda at the UN is beouming; less and less effective. DOCUMENT NO. NUHANGE IN CLAS DECLASSIFIED ...'ij fLT (C kSS. CHANGJ Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP7 l XT _ Approved For Rase 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0 690A000100020031-5 aother sliznificant trend seems to have developed in the --abMission of an increasing number of human rights oases to the lira - The Mindszenty trial and tt!e Soviet :dives issue. as well the long-standing problem of the Indians in South Africa, :irnplify this type of case., it each instance the defendant state has protested interference in a matter of domestic juris- diction. There is likely to be an increasing flow of human rights problems into the UN. which will tax the resources and pa-cienoe of that body. *'Vor? want of a nail....." For want of a Haitian vote, the o rucial Trinolitanian v ra,raph In the GA Political Com- wIttee?s Italian colonies solution was defeated. As a result. the entire resolution was lost when the Latin American states, trance and South Africa refused to accept the emasculated compromise. Disobeying his Government's instructions to ab- .Haitian delegate St. Lot voted along the "color" line in support of the African natives against "white" domination. India, Pakistan, Burma and the Philippines also joined the Arab- `soviet group in blocking the Tripolitanian proposal,. reflectin the hostile reaction among anti-colonial states to the nower politics of the Bevin-Sforza epreenent. The US "lost face" among these nations which are extremely bitter over its support of the big power "deal" and its "blatant" disregard of native desires. The defeat of the Ravin-Sforza plan lessens the chances that any future colonies solution will be as favorable to Italy. The Intensity of native reaction in Tripolitania to prospective Italian return will aot only rive pro-Italian states pause but wil increase Arab sentir:ent for unity and independ- ence. In Libya. under the British caretaker regime and in the face of continued economic steRnation, the population will remain restive. Meanwhile. Italy is depressed by the Assembly's rejection of both its Tripolitanian and Italian Somaliland tru.steeships.. Furthermore. the endorsement of Ethiopian annex- ation of the bulk of Eritrea. inoludinp;.the two Italian cities of Asmara and Massawa, has also wounded Italian pride. The cooling-off period before the next GA will. however, soften the shook of a non-Italian settlement. From the extensive lobbying certain to develop in the coming three months, two alternatives -- independence or multi-power trusteeship -- are likely to emerge for the key Libyan area. Multi-power trusteeship could probably have been obtained during the present session had the British not rejected it. The UK may continue to insist on sole control over strateato Cyrenaica in which case a multilateral trusteeship would be difficult to ~iTE.RLM-r r Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020031-5 Approved For R ase 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0T69OA000100020031-5 obtains If the UK does so, and the Latin American states re fuse to abandon their ~ro-ftali~n a;and, then the British sack an independent Libya tied to the UK by treaty. :,,n c;n y future settlement., t=A approval of the cession of the bulk of Eritrea to Ethiopia will probably be sustained. Finally, Respite Italy:s failure to win control over Somaliland this lprinp,, it is possible that t;ijs eo.i.ony may be returned to t.,ly,` as a trust, territory throuh some bargain struck with he anti-colonial pouters which woalu satisfy their desire for united Libya. developments. The recent xeneva session of the conomi c-Go`min oti 'for Europe was notable for the relatively YO attitude of tho `iovlet boa, despite its continued cr3 t- c am of ";astern export corntroi 4. l.his attitude probably re- elects increasing Soviet concern over the fester economic recovery in ~'Testern than in pastern Europe, with resulting dissatisfaotion in the 3atellite countries, and over the pinch A' present "Testern export controls. Should some form of East- ?Test detente emerge r'rom the curx-ent CFPli, it is likely that o.;astern Europe xviil adopt a rucn more cooperative policy tower ,09 and seek to use it as a means not only of promoting trade but of securing aid from the 'Jest. The concrete acnievement or the session was its unanimou3 approval of a permanent Trade committee., after the ;'Western delegates had defeated attempts to widen Its scope to include 4economic development" problems. This Committee, in the avenb of Eastern European oooperatioab, wculd provide machinery for }any expanded East-West trade va oinf.i.uence with '".astern European `"i'TJ seeks to salvage ,~ laboro e ."Tor d 'eaera n $3 Trade Unions is ar from ready to surrender its mentorship of Vie labor movements of ,?Westerr, Europe to the anti-Uommunist ~-"estezn labor coalition which i now seeking to form a new labor organization. The re- ported visit to Brussels or the iFW Secretary General., in an attempt to dissuade Belgian labor from leaving the Federation,, reflects the persistent hope o'' WF`da s Communist leadership that at least a token representation from non-Communist nation- l unions may be retained. Tbi move, following similar efforts by the USSR to influenoe Swedish and Australian labor; :suggests Soviet awareness that the ":YFTU's claim to world labor representation will be sharply deflated once the small power unions withdraw (the Danish and New Zeeland unions voted to do so last week). ".'hile it may try rurther persuasion, the T" FTC will probably succeed in retaining only the Austr'an and Finr:ish 9aFX6RtfT Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020031-5 Approved For Rase 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-OP90A000100020031-5 i bor federations. vnich,. l ric.u h had iajist-or'ientecl, are a`t3iyart:.ntly reluctant i cr t"o p usop v to labor the Soviet dis- as re tia, sat'3.r:.Jli`tv 'r i ,t;C' 3. 1.NFf._ , ~, _ nr~~+saal,v,, the "wit ;Yacretary tieraerai reportedly ., ?.'.ovd H to o "oposs t, is L an uin s;iu wais;ut to the desires of . ?r Gorman workers OSp' O LU',..3.4 I U Md ttu ir." 'ioWev'er,.. any :YT ycopoM.J. to "unify" we 'tU :r :Yf,!.E s wit;n sne l labor kererts of Marlin and E, s srsra G rr qny would be readily spvttad ._ an temot, to uroruote a ac,~i cifr ren ; all-German labor ,tovc s ti nip. Such a aL Opc's 31 wou. b u unI teiy to deceive ";estern -T epresencatives? now weii. o-iWnro Vi Juv.tat cori roi over the '.rFran . . , a ojC'r, ivy rist Atlantic and is __ter-- Communists move i :neanmeari,1 tim. zrker=, `, )Rnun:~.: attempt to organize r~or-;h Atlantic e.nC ".eCl .terrar,ean maritime ;yorcers as an instrument Our sabota.rin ; the oceanic trace o:i anti-Soviet countries is :i 3gp;ested by recent deviceiopm a"5 in riorlay, .r eland and Italy Within the sarile week: (1) the Norwegian Seamen's Union re- forted the transference o.i kay . omr:,unis : agents from other industries to the merchant marine; ) in Iceland, the Communist- dominated unions or stevecores ana merchant snipmen scheuu ed widespread strikes; n :) szo ita an Seamen's Union concluded in `5armisticV with test, Carr tirs.n Lst- ;cntro7.led CGIL to avert a ;s, COIL attempt to seize E;oritrot of the union. These developrnera any:ociated in part sYit , local .4nirw nist objectives (3,g. s eoaptur1nr contrui ui ie i nu . s ..a?bur movement) may be linked with a broader Communist, plan .o disrupt commercial shipment : ?u areas of sa,ratanio rai,E C st to Ao USSR. The existence of ouch b plan is indicated by to renewer activity of As World ederution of Trade Unions in ari r.irne organization. The W U is now striving to establish a iaritime workers "department" and to incorporate :lei g.wirt S lon shorermen (IL?tJ) and Austr0ian dockside workers. Should these efforts succeed, the WYTU would eventually be in a woe k.tien to call international maritime r; orikes capable of crippling a substantial portion of the world' Shipping facilities. particularly in the Pacific. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020031-5 Approved For RelVa~e 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-01 Q90A000100020031-5 ""."fir` 4'oviet concept of UN Sect tar e, t unchanged. The USSR recently grant teri Kortstanin i.i.HF)oh9nk0, newly appointed Assistant ooretary General in charge of Seoirity Council affairs, the ,, nk of .Inister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. This n? tatua, inoonsistent with Chaster requirements designed to pr~a- teat the exaiusiveiy international character of the Secretariat, !a another inclination of the USSR's failure to distinguish be- tween JN and soviet service us first evldenoed in the Gubitchav to on Nepalese t To t~of ex ec ted . The line of Soviet questurs on the status of Asa re a unship to the UK presages another Soviet- veto on a membership application. Such alleged lack or s?vere p,rit; ws; th ground on which the USSR vetoed the applications of Tr?easjowdan and Ceylon. ~!lbanis may settle earth Wtiannei case. Albania is report- edly attempt ng an out-or-court sauna cry settlement of the UY`a claim. recently upheld by the International Court of Justice,, for compensation for the ~linirF of the two UK destroyers in The Corfu Channel in 1946. Albania may vwish to avoid becoming t'le first nation in modern history to disregard an award of an international arbitral tribunal, even though the amount of tie claim is a substantial one for such a tiny state. A more likely reason, however, may be a Soviet desire to remove a serious obstacle,to the eventual admission of Albania to the UN, which would give an additional vote to the Slav bloc youth African ex !pr on ro`;.J. South Africa's recent d iaer~ m natory M import con brol are opposed by the US as an evasion of the requirements of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and of the reg?;,,lations of the International Monet try Fund. The US believes that t;2is policy is being inspired by the UK to force South. Africa into preferential trade arrange- ments. The South Africans are seeking to divert imports from the US to the UK and oUher "'astern European soft currency Qou.ntries in order to eorserve their dwindling hard currency reserves. The US, however, contends that South African soft currency holdings have declined about as much as its dollars, leaving no legitimate finenolal basis for discrimination between the two as required by GATT, and has therefore raised the matter at the Annecy oonfersnce4 Investment aspects of" ?'pint Four. The UN Economic and Employment Commission has D opose special Inducements to stimulate foreign investment. It recommended that underdevel- oped countries study (1) duty--free or duty--reduced imports of capital equipment; (2) full; or non-disoriminstory exemption of profits, interest and dividends from taxation, especially when reinvested for productive purposes; and (3) elimination of Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020031-5 Approved For Releas 4001/03/04: CIA-R -01090 00100020031-5 nable taxation= t rang Per .q rr t' c: for ntnf its.. div? dear d;a OF interest, any pr?ovigin . rt r repatriation of capital. This ninposal sugres;;s ?:? nattn,p1 me r the bilateral or multilateral. Teeruen1 s whicJ= will be I nape y to er_reoursge the flow of t - Ivate canitel abroad nn1 aityr,nt; which Point Four oblaett es -snot be fully act lewd 11 ror Jarer still 'm l ik+P1v- Despite t;.US efforts to oott- a3 t the 1 gram i2rnnrKar>e Ar ne? u,nuealth countries, a ma 3ority or them. led by the TTK ctt; 11 strongly oppose extens on o.f Vmoet- -Fvored-nation treatment to .PIRA[!., Their fear of Javanese trade oomrsetition and of revival of its prewar dumping prac- tiose still outialphs the US contention that MFN will aid the rehabilitation of 3anan. Gor?soquently, it is doubtful whather, t r the absence of the : tr nrraest rressure . the US can this year otoure a Ianane;ai UFM amrwAmnni similar to that for the V zone. ors eots for SOME.. Lebanon, heretofore the chief proponent nt an "" ao om: c hmo ssT'on for the Middle East, may not press the tasue at the Jul..v Eoonorio and Analal Council session., At p asent the most imnortant considerations in establishing an ECI ra Israeli membership and Point Your assistance. Since t=he De-. pa?tment of State has reeRrt!v stated that a regional commission is not necessary in order tt t, the Middle East receive technical assistance, there Is l tt? e inducement for the Arab states to 'ace, during the ourrar t i4.rats-Israeli tension, the logical but unwelcome necessity of ineladinn Israel in the Commission when It is eventually es ?bl fished Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0109OA000100020031-5