INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 20

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020032-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: May 17, 1949
• Content Type: PERRPT

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C INTFRNA.TIOrTAI. ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
For week ending 17 May 1949
Volume 11
The three Western Powers conferred in Paris so as to prepare
a united front for the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting In
the UN? the General Assembly voted to admit Israel (37--12-9);
i:pprovGd a convention on press freedom (33-6-13); invited India,
P--A 1stan and South Africa to enter round table discussions on the
treatment of Indians in South Africa (47-1-1O); but rejected the
proposal to lift the ban on chiefs of diplomatic missions in Spain
(26-15-16).
25X6A
Future SC lineup, The UK is considering; various .means of
oounteractirig; tie effect of a Communist shift in the Chinese
Government on the political composition of the Security Council.
Hitherto, a Soviet Satellite bas always been elected to the SCE
giving the Slav bloc two sure votes.. During; the 1947 GA, the
Ukraine and India were deadlocked for many ballots before the
rorme.r finally won out as a replacement for Poland. Now a UK
delegate suggests that if a Communist China should brig; a second
"automatic" vote to the USSR, the fourth GA should replace the
Ukraine with India, thus restricting the Soviet bloc to its
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present two votes, rote China is a permanent SC membex,, however,,
the USSR could occasionally abstain, thereby sharit.g the on^u: of
the veto with the Chinese. Prior to this suggestion, it had been
anticipated that India might replace Canada and that the UkrOne
would be succeeded by another Eastern European state, thus main-
taining the geographic balance set forth in the Charter.
Press freedom advanced b GA approval of convention. Against AK. bitter av opposition, t' ie enerai Assembly 7pproveF-11-6--i a
Convention on the International Transmission of News and Right of
Correction which, although considerably weaker than the US would
have desired, is sufficiently free from serious objections tojus.
tify US ratification, The Convention extends to news, radio and
film correspondents in all adhering countries the rights and priv-
ileges they now enjoy in the US. The chief US victories were:
(1) omission of peace--time censorship, except that directly re-
lated to national defense; (2) placing the"tight of correction"
an a voluntary, not a compulsory, basis; (3) defeating Soviet-
backed bans on 'war propaRands o and "fascist propaganda" which
might have opened the way to "'back--door censorship"; and (4)
placing the duties of correspondents on a basis of professional
ethics rather than upon leqrai ob11' ations
Thile the Convention beco_.es effective upon the adherence of
six states, ratification will not begin until after the regular
1949 GA acts upon the companion Freedom of Information Convention,
The USSR, however, has stated that it will not, sign the present
Convention and it will thus not apply behind the iron Curtain
where it is most needed.
The debates on the Conveiti.on developed somewhat surprisingly
the existence of strongly-held views on press censorship in coon-
tries where one would hardly suspect such notions to thrive4
Consequently, the extension of Anglo-Saxon ideas of freedom of
information and freedom of the press will undoubtedly, in the im-
mediate future, have to be effected more widely by bilateral than
by multilateral treaties.
Soviet motives at Red Cross Conference. At the current
Geneva conference dr.aft n, a nit,... r1 Cross Qenvantion setting up
protections for civilian populations and Prisoners in warttme
the USSR has aligned itself with the Scandinavians and. Swiss in
seeking the broadest application of these humanitarian rules.
The USSR wishes to apply t} ess ,self-denying regulations not only
to regular warfare between arses but to civil conflict and
oolonial wars. '.While such an extension of the laws of war? makes
an idealistic appeal to the Scandir...avian.s and. Swiss who have no
colonies, the USSR undoubtedly has other fish to fry in assuming
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this position, Since its long range plans embrace incitation of
insurrection and colonial conflicts against non-Communist govern-
ments, the proposed broadening of humanitarian rules would bene-
fit the USSR by (1) extending protection to its agents and in-
strumentalities of subversion; (2) permitting it to bring charges
before 'the UN whenever any government',.. seeking to maintain its
authority, refused to treat saboteurs and traitors as "prisoners
of war"; end (3) thus tying the hands of established regimes in
repressing revolts. On the other hand, despite any provision to
the contrary, it would, as a practical matter, be impossible to
enforce observance of such regulations by Soviet-sponsored terror-
ists and revolutionaries who would be left with a free hand.
Accordingly, the British opoose any rigid formula which would
effectively restrict their freedom of action in such situations
and wish to confine the rules to regular warfare. The US, China
and Canada feel that the new rules should apply to internal war-
fare only after insurgents have achieved such do facto authority
as to justify recognition of their belligerency. ie 'Scandi-
nav ions, however, with memories of the German occupation still
fresh., are anxious that genuine resistance movements against
hostile occupations be cloaked with the protection of a new Geneva
convention.
Democratic '"lomen's Federation launches drive in Asia. The
Communist drive for new a erents In t fie t Ie anti ast will
be reinforced during coming months by the ',omen's International
Democratic Federation (''IIDF), a powerful front, organization claiming
thirteen national women's organizations in Asia. In addition to
its fully matured groups in China and India, the WIDF has well-
established links -.with the women of Pakistan, Burma, Malaya, Siam
and Israel, and, during recent months, has for the first time
contacted women's. organizations in the Phili pines, Ceylon and
Cyprus. It is currently concentrating on: (1) preparations for
a Conference of the Women of Asia to be held before September
191,9, probably in China; (2) organization of National
Cc,raaittees to ensure support for this conference; and (3) a :tab-
lishment of contact with Asian women's groups not yet in the "IIDF
fold, particularly in Japan, Afghanistan, Turkey and Iraq The
campaign to extend WIDF influence in these areas will be entrusted
to an "International Commission of the "lomen of Asia ah.d Africa."
Formation of this Commission, already functioning provisionally
in Paris, parallels the recent establishment bv_ the 7orld R"ed.-
eretion of Democratic Youth of a "Bureau of Students Fighting
Against Colonization" and reflects the Kremlin's apparent deter-
mination to organize the widest possible support for Soviet ob-
jectives in the Middle and Far East.
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USSR permits continued Satellite participation in ILO.. The
"' ~' ~"'e'ar~ ~ s recent visit to z.2oscow to
C Tech ~._ nls e-r6 f: ..3coiat.
ascertain the Soviet attitude towards Czech and Polish partict-
pation in the International Labor Organization apparently elicited
a "go-ahead" from the USSR. Despite its obvious irritation at
ILO acceptance of an ECOSOC mandate to investigate slave labor:,
the fJSSR raised no objection to continued Satellite member bip in
the ILO for the time being. This decision, which may reflect a
Soviet desire to maintain the current ILO!"W'FTO liaison, wil..l.
allow both Czechoslovakia and Poland to press for ILO technical
aid and for participation in the training-within-industry plan at
he forthcoming ILO conference in Geneva. Recent Czech inquiries
concerhing alleged cancellation in the UK of ILA conVer?.tions
against night work by women and children suggest that the Sate;
l~.to delegations at Geneva will attempt to magnify their own
"scr;iai achievements" and to contrast the prompt ratification of
"'L10 conventions in Eastern Europe with the difficulties encountered
elsewhere
Prcosed~reshufflin, of EEC. In an effort to curb, in at
least a.n~e small corner o the ' the time-consuming inter j ectlon.
of ideological propaganda into purely technical matters, a oom-
nittee of the UN Economic and Employment Commission has recornmond-
ed by a straight ast-:'pest vote the abolition of two subsidiary
bodies. It is planned to replace the Economic Development and
the Employment and Economic Stability Subcommissions with groups
of experts selected on the basis of special qualifications in
the fields coi=cerned rather thou on the principle of geographic
1dJ.str.ibution.
~acoe" offensive on skis. The cold war may henceforth be
OV'.well `e air s :s; 'Chi ntexna tonal Ski Wederation at its
recent Oslo meeting has admitted the USSR to full membership, a
mcvs i.ahich may presage Soviet participation in the 1952 'Minter
Olympic games,. The Soviets have also m.anifeated increasing
,:- egaricusnesa in sports like wrestling, weightlifting, swimming
aid track where they have `pined international athletic t'edera r
t`i.ons a Even in the sporting world the USSR could not wholly
.l:andon the political slant for at Oslo it unsuccessfully sought
t~; exclude Spain from the ski federation. The Kremlin has not
vet demanded a veto over the referee's decisions,,
Failure of Evatt's Balkan conciliation anticipated~ The
only pasT E v e result expected f pm GA resit ent vatVs coneili-
ation efforts in the Balkan dispute is Greek acc ntance of the
proposed. Greek-Albanian agreement a Although reportedly stating
that he would facilitate Albanian and Bulgarian admission tc the
1~t'
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UN If these states would adopt e. more conciliatory attitude,
Evatt also scored the Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav represent-
atives for holding out for Greek renunciation of its claims to
Northern Epirus. The Satellites will Ohange their position only
on orders from Moscow which, despite the current Soviet peace
offensive, are unlikely.
Prospects for Indonesian case. Although the UN GA has post-
poned action on n ones a until Tts regular fall session, possible
Assembly consideration at that time serves as a threat still hang-
ing over the Netherlands --- the effect desired by the Australian-
Indian sponsors of the original proposal. The continuance of the
case on the GA agenda should help ensure ttat the recent gains
ac._.neved in Batavia 'Ali not be lost through second thoughts at
Ths Hague.
Kremlin rules out Western dictation. Izvestia's shrill
protes against any '-?estern D kta or Germany may reflect
Soviet awareness that the climate of negotiation in Paris has
changed radically from that of London. The USSR is approaching
the CFM meeting under adverse political and economic pressures
which did not obtain at earlier conrerences.
pl ECONOMIC ISSUE y AT THE CFM
Recent Soviet overtures for the reduction o:" economic
controls between East and. "!eat indicate that economic consider-
ations played a large part in the Soviet decision to lift the
Berlin blockade and convene the CM. Not only has the "'extern
counter-blockade been detrimental to the economy of the Soviet
zone of Germany, but the Western export controls arising from
the cold war have hampered the development of the Soviet bloc
economy as a whole. Those Soviet industries which depend on
Western imports, for example, have had the poorest production
records. That the USSR is greatly concerned over these develop-
ments is indicated by (1) its proposal that reparations and re-
ciprocal deliveries from the Eastern and '"extern zones be resumed;
(2) recent Polish and Czech overtures for increased trade with the
Vest; (3) Soviet bloc attacks on Western export controls, com4-
bined with the relatively cooperative attitude at the current ECE
session. These factors lead to the conclusion that the USSR is
strongly feeling the pinch of the Western blockade and seeks to
alleviate it. Moreover, the USSR must be concerned over the
growing economic consolidation and recovery in Western Europe as
opposed to the unhappy state of affairs in the East, and fears
the effect of this on the Satellites.
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If the USSR recognizes the failure of its present policies
in. Europe and. seeks a detente with the '%'ea t as a preliminary to
a e:tiod of consolidation in the Soviet sphere, then a Major
aspect of an.,, such policy shift >vill be to seek reduction of the
existing East- ie. t economic barriers?, As revealed in the ECE
report on the European economy in 1948, Satellite recovery prog.
:ess is behind that of the Thet. and there are other indications
of increaain ; economic di_fficult5.es in such countries as Czecho-
slovakia and F tngary. Ccn}sequer by the USSR must feel that if it
is to carry out its planned eaconom'= c development in the Satellites
and at home, it urgently needs "i+stern goods and credits. The
'JS,R may therefore seek at the GYM a mutual reduction of trade
barriers and a stimulation of East-West trade. Beyond this, the
USSR may hope, as a result of ita new tactics, to persuade the
''lest to grant economic development assistance to the Satellites,
'?dhiie the USSR could hardly -permit its Satellites to join the ERP,
it might seek such aid through agencies like the ECE and the
International Bank.
1ioreover, the USSR may hope that through an accord on Ger.-
many it will gain certain economic weapons which can be used
against the ?'emst F .rst, the USSR may estimate that an economiic--
ally revived Germany ~,vou r inevitably gravitate eastward for mar-
kets, particularly since :A~'estern_. European fear of German competition.
is freezing Germany out of its prewar markets in the non-Soviet
world. The Soviet bloc's ins. tiab1e demands for capital goods., on
the other hand 7 will, provide a tra jor market 4. Second, the TJSSR
might be able, through its new voice ? n Germany, to reduce Ger-,
.many' key contribution to the ERP and to obstruct the full eco-
nomic integration of rrersnany with the 'Vestern OEEC bloc. Third,
the USSR might seek in any accord on Germany to prevent the ap.?.,
plioation in that area of the present 'Western export controls
Germany would than be a major breach in the export barrier and
its industry :could provide the Soviet sphere with -any or the
products now barred to it by the 'Vest, Under these circumstances,
it is quite possible that the US.'R looks on the CF1 meeting as an
opportunity to (1) circumvent the present East-":'est ?.nomla
barriers and secure much-needed capital goods for Eastern Europe;
(2) obstruct the recovery of. 7-,ettern Europe; and (3) gradually
orient Germany economically toward the East
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