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December 9, 2016
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September 13, 2000
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April 5, 1949
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Approved For Rase 2001 . CIA-RDP79-0690A000100020 8-8 IUMNATIoNAL CIRGA IZl1TIONS GROW KLY SUZY Na4 14 For week ending 5 April 1949 Volume II The Xnteirnational Week As the UN General Assembly mate in the shadoi of the signin ; Of the Atlantic Pact., the session appears likely to be dominated by Stet eh& rges that formation of the Paot is an aggressive action undermining the UN? Signature of the pact itself represents a n w step in they Vs-Supported ef- fort to build up a Western Eropeaan security bloc. Australia and India took the initiative in p1."ing the Indooe+si.a - dispute before the GA while Dutch- Republican talks remained Stalemated pending the arrival in Batavia of Beth- erlaads delegate Van Roijena Idewwhile the Israeli-Transiordan armistice marks virtual completion of the phase of military stabilization In Palestine. a 4MM1 _SBe ni The recently ocol..uded ?Uc 'renchh a reements an the Hwnphrey Report and the list of Prohibited and Restricted Industries (Pt1) represent a significant step turd a unified German policy. The agreements provide for tte retention in Germany of ap- proximately one hundred and fifty plants Originally' s iheduled for dismantling and for reduction In the number of industries which shall be prohibited or subject to fixed production ceilings. The main issuues involved were French aioncern about security from future German aggression end British fear of future ' Gsrman industrial. cor petition, as oppdsed to the U8 desire to' util.ia e existing German pribduotive capacity for European rsoaVory4 Settlement of these long- issues should smooth the way for Western agreement on the two other outstanding Garman problems =m tri'zoc l fusion and the oocupa.. ti rn statute --, and foster an integrdted I1S-UK rench policy toward Germany. n" t i i S . ov e As further indications of Western consolidation in the face of - - g and g n i - l.... gEJ10 nos y vane anav... MJ6-~ ns the USSR and will be denounced as ocncrete steps to anent the war; pant ial of the "aggressive" Atlantic Pact coalition. f?Possp $ for YRO won&nu t, o The IRO C3ener Councils now msc t robably sirge continuation of the International Refuge G eeneva$ p in resent June 1(240 deadline- Although Belgium a o d th b n e p ey Organisation -41 the smaller European members would prefer to keep the original 'd1 ~? e th r il f t .s .q R.?,,. ... .... _ ----, - ur e a line in order to cur we11 aware that the 7OO,OOO DP?s still in their zones of occupation in; 1 d 4 many and Austria cannot be resettled by that date, France, concerne fu ees tx e l i f a c~ g -?? --- -r b.~ ca po l the steady influx o robably support continuation. ale the UA mar produce so will li t , p as, . ternative plan of its on, it, too, will probably favor extending IR DOCUMENT NO. .DECLASSIFIED Approved For Release 2001 : IA-RDP79- r=5c'FMM E: Approved For Rase 2001/J e.- AEC imoMee continu so Five members of thii Atomic Rns/rgy Commission -- the UK, US, China, France and Canada =? have again reached the conclusion that the USSR is deliberately prolonging AEC meetings for propaganda Ands with no intention of participating constructively in the negotiations. The five have therefore decided to prepare a report for the fourth GA suasion next September stab that the AFC deadlock still continues and again assigning the blame to the USSR. GA DEVELOPMENTS Indspagglia tv~k &ted in CA. The Australian-Indian move to place the Indonesian dispute before the GA is designed to put pressure on the Dutch by once again bringing the situation into the, Ume3 .ight. There will undoubt- edly be widespread sentiment for admitting this item to the agenda since the Asiatic states are strongly antagonistic to the Netherlands position. The item?sa sponsors apparently intend to let it romain at the bottom of the agenda where it would not come up until the end of the session, if at all. This would permit the adoption of a loss critical attitude toward the Dutch should their adamant stand against restoration of the Republic to Jogjakarta or other attitudes of narhromp'?isnco with Security Council instructions be modified prior to GA consideration of the aueAtion. 1oresovwr, under Article 12 of the UN Charter, so long as the Security Council remains seized of this dispute the GA may merely discuss it and can not make any recommenda- tion Unless the, SC so reauests. 25X6A Inndi two rep, _ pgatt t)n Inc lane ,ice, South Ica. India's continued determination to take a strong position in the GA on discrimination against indirtne' in South Africa is'indicated by two recent developments. Nehru des voted i substantial portion of his 22 March foreign affairs .address to 1 question of rpLcta1 d scrimination, using as an illustration the treatmant of Indiana in South Afr$ca. The likelihood that Mrs. Pandit will head the Indian delegation during GA consideration of the South Africa item further emphasizes the concern with which India continues to view this question. I 4&a_9?gl?~. Sentiment for a multi-power trusteeship over Tripoli- tania is spreading, with Brazil, Argentina and India specifically coming out in favor of this formula. Such a solution -- which apparently aiacagesa Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020038-8 Approved For R ase 200J4 : CIA-RDP79-0 9OA000100020038-8 participation by the USb, Italy, F'rance9 the UK and an Arab state would at least give some satisfaction to the claims of both the Italians and the local population as well as to the Arab states and would thus have substantial ap- peal. However,, pro-'Malian UN members will most likely make an effort to extend any such multilateral arrangement to include all of Libya. Sixteen Latin American nations have already agreed to support Italian trusteeship over Tripolitania, rritrea and Somaliland. Concerned over the proposed cession of most of Eritrea to Ethiopia, they decided that, if Italian trusteeship is _ unobtainable, they will propose postponing any decision on this colony pending a report from a GA investigat5ng ccrr,mi ss_iona ;banish case in t U14. Colombia and Brazil appear determined to p_- pose ll fting the ban on Ambassadors in Madrid deepite the fact that the We tern ELAra en states and even some Latin limsri, :a?a rations are not anxious to see the question discussed at this GA rr.eeting~ If, as r_ao been reported, Poland seeks to withdraw its proposal to strengthen UN action against Spain, the GA will have to determine l y ma jori ,y X whAtl^ar or not to acquiesce If the Polish item, were dropped, Brazil and Colombia would be unable to present their resolution without propos n,g a new agenda itpmo There is genes oral agreement that the 1946 resolution has hagen ineffecti.vr- and, although no approbation of the Franco raghre s 3.nt-ndpd, sufficient votes could be secured for its modification this spring, Discussion of any revision now Trill? however, place the Western Powers at a decided propaganda disadvantage o That t,~P USSR may bp woll aware, of this fact is indicated by ',.he rmported Soviet=inspirpd Polish rove to with- draw its proposal. Possible Scviet roti ps for dropping the item are to (1) reduce the number of agenda items to permit Soviet concentrat_Ton on the Atlantic Pact; (2) place the US behind any initiative for revision and link the move to Spa3 n sh paarti cipat3.on in the. AP; and (3) maintain the status c 9 in order to avoid a closer relationship between Spain and the West. If If Brazilian insistence on revision at the 4ipril GA is not abandoned, Soviet bloc opportunities for making posit cal capital against the Atlantic Pact will be greatly increased. Approved For Release 20 1/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0109,0A000100020038-8 Approved For Rase 2001 / i `CIA-RDP79-090A000100020038-8 'End of the Militax ,Ph.. qal in Ps saw A ooncclluslon of the Israeli?Trans3ordan armistice on 4 April marks the Mompletioa of the phase of military stabilisation in Palestine,. In little more then a monthas time, Israel has corasssluded armistices with Egypt., LA- b---a non and Tranejorda uq while two other Arab states, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, have withdrawn from the field. By the terms of the Transjordan armisjicrs, the Arab Legion will take ever the Iraqi sector in dentral Palestine Mote- over, despite the recent Syrian coupe the outlook for an early armistice with Syria is good a The same pattern was rollovied. in each of the crucial controversies ? ? first with Egypt and then with Transjordan d- which ender in armistice negotiations.. In eaoh dace, Israel stiwitt3.y seised kay areas which it claimed and.oonfronted the Arabs ,with f'ji. alc tiLi acooi paniod by blunt threats; of further attacks on rpmsining Arab-hold territory unlese the Arabs promptly acsquiescedb F Wt and Transjordan, faced with elearcut Is- raell military superiority and pa of lly aware that they could rely on neither the UN nor the Big Powers, were forced to yield. The resulting military line, which will probably determine in 1ar ;e meaasur o 'thP ultimate frontier, le w7es Israel in firm contx+ol of most of P4castine o The next round in the Passlesetine controvarsy will, most likely b negoti- ations under the ausapie es of the Palestine Conciliation Com dessi.on to convert the armistice into a pearman:nt peaces settlement., In this phase that PCC is aertaain to run into serious snags over three- sna jbr Issues; . (1) . provision for. the Arab refugees ; (2) the status of Jerusalem) and (3) final delimitation of frontiers. The critical factor in all three oases will be the extent of Israeli willingness to compr?oe .i9 . It is certain that thb Israelis, flushed with victory, are not going to yield on any of those points without a hard struggle. They will r' fuse to perrsit more than a token nunbear of Arabs to return to Israel. They are certain to clixag ta?natsi.ously to New JQruealem, to which they plan to move several ministries and which they raga 'd as the spiritual capital of Jewry. Finaal1lts they are prepared at beat to make only slight territorial concessions in cikler to retain other areas which they feel they won in the age-old arbitrament of. war, only vigorous pressure by the 0 and the UN will induce the Israelis to make': any auxbstantial compensation along these lines,, In particular, the US is unlilo ly to be abler to induce Israel to apply the Presidential formula that it give compensation for addi- tional territories ceded to it beyond the UN partition plan or its. egniva?? le*nt. Should the US fail to make gos d? on its ass=ances to the Arabs, it will suffer souse loss of prestige throughcut the r addle Fast. Approved For Release 2001/03;: IA-RDP79-01090A000100020038-8