INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 7

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020045-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: February 15, 1949
• Content Type: PERRPT

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INTF,RNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
,EKLl S WAR_A, NO. '
For week ending 15 February 1949 BQl pme II
The International Week
In a propaganda counteroffensive against the USSR9 the US has called
vn ECOSOC to investigate slave labor in the USSR. Previously the Sr, re-
cted another Soviet propaganda attempt to revive its proposals for Atomic
energy control and disarmament,. :Meanwhile it appears likely that both the
Atlantic Pact and the Mindszenty trial will show up in one form or another
as East-West issues in the UN. Both Korean regimes have applied for UN
membership but their rejection seems certain,.
The tindzen casq- No legal attack on Hungary?s conduct in the
Mindazenty case, whether utilizing the UN or the machinery provided in the
Hungarian peace treaty, may be expected to produce any practical result
other than propaganda.: In the SC,, the only UN organ with any power
action9 a Soviet veto would be a foregone, conclusion. There is already'
considerable Latin American pressure to raise the question in the UN Econom-
ic and Social. Council, but action by either the GA or ECOSOC is limited to
recomsnenda'4ono The peace treaty procedure offers the advantage of enabling
a complainant to obtain a non-unanimous decision which, on paper at le%.st9
would bind Hungary,, the other hand,, the peace treaty provides for a
three=membrer commission with a neutral umpire (named by the UN Secretary
General if the parties cannot agree) which,, through majority vote, is em-
powered to render a legally binding decision. This commission could act
on a complaint that Hungary failed to heed Article 2 of the peace treaty
obligating it to observe fundamentte human rights and freedoms. While the
USSR would block the execution of any commission decision, the very existence
of a binding adjudication condemning Hungarian justice would serve to rally
Western opposition to Communism, Moreover? subsequent to Hungarian defiance
of such a decision,, the Mindszenty case could be laid before the UN and
could then be more effectively expa.oited for its propaganda valueoL **Further-
more, a strong UN resolution might act as a restraining influence on other
Eastern European countries and sere as an indication of continued Western
concern for the welfare of the people of those countries.**I
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Atlantic Pact i.n the UN. While there have been no indications so
far that the USSR intends tuu make a major issue of the Atlantic Pact in
the UN.9 as opposed to outside propaganda means, it could nevertheless de-
rive considerable propaganda advantages therefrom. while risking nothing.
The USSR could confine itself to citing the Pact, along with other alleged
aggressive acts, as evidence for baking an omnibus charge that the US and
UK are plotting an-imperialist war, The Kremlin might go further., horee?,;er,
and introduce a resolution in the SC or GA specifically condemning the Pact
as a Charter violation:. It could claim that the Atlantic Pact is aggressive
in purpose and thus is a threat against the political independence of other
countries in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter. The USSR could also
question whether the selection of Pact members follows any truly regional
criteria as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter and could charge that
it represents only a step turd the encirclement of the new democracies.
While as a practical matter the UN would be certain to reject such conton?
Lions, the USSR might nevertheless win a few propaganda skirmishes and
shake the resolve of some prospective members.
RgLe n n , o ? Trig g UestiQ The recent Soviet request for an SC re-
hearing on the appointment of a Trieste governor,, although unlikely to
result in his selection, probably indicates that the USSR is as yet unwill-
ing to abandon its objectives in Trieste merely because of the rift with
Tito. The USSR may be willing to accept a Western candidate in order to
facilitate creation of an international regime and to force withdrawal of
Allied troops, thus paving the way for an eventual Communist coup. Should,
however., selection of a governor prove impossible despite Soviet conces-
sions, the USSR, having played to the hilt its role of staunch advocate of
treaty commitments, may attempt to further its "peace offensive" by suggest-
ing that Trieste be divided between Italy and Yugoslavia along zonal lines.
Although this proposal would not match that made by the US, UK and France
in 1948, it might prove, acceptable to Italy and Yugoslavia.
Settlement on German dismantling stalled. **Prospects for an early
agreement on the retention of industrial plants in Germany are fading as
a result of disagreement between the US and UK over linking this issue with
that of prohibited and restricted industries. The US is unwilling to seek
agreement on the dismantling question by granting concessions on prohibited
and restricted industries since the latter problem involves basic decisions
on the future structure of the German economy, the extent and duration of
Allied control and the pattern of European recovery.** The need for an
integrated overall US, UK, French approach to the German problem is con-
stantly being pointed up by differences on individual problems such as dis-
mantling and prohibited and restricted industries.
Nwrinu,
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Gritic_al eta eat Geneva Loran ,ronfgEence~ US efforts to extend
the use of Loran long range radio navigational aids) in the Northeast
Atlantic Area beyond the I July 1949 deadline have met major obstacles,
High level approaches were made by the US to secure French support, but the
resultant governmental agreement is apparently being ignored by the French
delegation at Geneva; similar approaches to the Scandinavian countries have
produced no results. The continuation of Loran, especially in event of
emergency large-scale aircraft moverents, is of strategic importance to the
US, and its apparent inability to secure wide support at the conference
seriously threatens its position. Moreover, the reported Soviet intention
to propose that any decision on Loran should be unanimous seems to offer
the USSR an excellent opportunity for blocking acceptance of the US plan,,
o'FoirA% Tour az?dra~?da. ECOSOC, the logical forum for discussion
of President Truman's proposal for technical aid to underdeveloped countries,
will probably be the scene of concerted Soviet bloc propaganda attacks upon
technical assistance as but another euphemism for "dollar diplomacy." This
issue will put Soviet propaganda skills to a seven test, for the Soviets,
as the self-styled protectors of colonial peoples, will be placed in the
rather embarrassing position of opposing measures designed to bring progress
and higher standards of living to "backward" areas. The skillful handling
of "Point Four" by the Western Powers could furnish the weapon for wresting
the initiative from the Soviets in the propaganda battle over colonial issues.
UN ton the spot's iIIndonesian case. caught between continued Dutch
evasion of the Security Council's 28January resolution and pressure from
the Republic and its Asiatic supporters, the UN and with it the US is "on
the spot" in the Indonesian case As the first deadline for reporting
"progress" in establishing an interim government passed, the Dutch were still
reeling from a recent cabinet shake-up over Indonesia, while the Republicans
continued to insist on full implementation of the SC terms prior to opening
negotiations. If the cabinet changes at The Hague should soften the Dutch
attitude toward restoration of the Republic, then successful conclusion of
negotiations between the Dutch-backed Federalists and the Republicans is
still possible, An SC decision to "string along" with the holding of the
all-Indonesian talks? particularly with Republican approval, might succeed
in putting off the restive Asiatic states. The Republicans, however, may
find the plan to retain Dutch troops and the Royal High Commissioner in the
islands unacceptable, notwithstanding a nominal transfer of sovereignty well
in advance of the SC timetable. Should the Republicans find the Daitch'
sponsored terms less desirable than those of the present SC resolution, or
should the Dutch revert to their past intransigeance, the Asian conferees
will once again become indignantly vocal. The resultant pressure would
force the SC to resort to concrete enforcement measures or completely for-
feit Asian confidence.
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