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December 9, 2016
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September 13, 2000
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January 25, 1949
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Approved For Rele 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-0104000100020048-7 INTERNLT24MAL ORQt RATIONS GROUP WJMKLY STWWtY NO, 4 For week ending 25 Janueiy 29,49 0 Volume 11 MM-ladurnattanaj Week The Security Council appears about to pass a four-power resolution on Indonesia setting a timetable for establishment of a sovereigns state by 1950. The Rhodes armistice talks between Israel and Egypt are temporarily deadlocked over who shall remain where in the Negeb. Secession of UK9 US and Dutch uniona from the WITU v 11 be followed by open efforts to create a new Western trade mien grouping under the aegis of the ERP Trade Union Advisory Committee, As the International. Wheat Conference convened in Washington, it was.highlighted by attendance of both Argentina and the USSR, A ImDasse on Furonean unitX Man hallygow d temnor ** " parent impasse in the Western Union study group on P;u n"European **Despite unification ait it appears likely that a compromise solution will be achieved, if not at , the current Western Union Foreign Ministersa meeting., at least by the time of the next meeting three months hence. The will probably in- Clude not only a Council of Ministers; as proposed by the UK,,but some form of parliamentary assembly. as favored by the other four Brussels Pact powers. The chief stumbling block is the UK, which proposes inatnad of an assembly a European Confer. nee of delegates appointed by the various governor nts, who would vote by country instead of izidividually. Ths French reportedly believo the UK suggestion to be dictated largely by the Labor GovernmentQo fear of the role Churchill would play in any assembly to which he could be elected. The isolated Britiab position appears untenable in the long run, however, and may in tine have to be anodifind to moot the views of the other powers British opposition vsd1l also be influenced by the UX belief that the US favors prompt steps toward greater Furopecn unity.** Aa Conferences of 1947 and 1948. aooriet Soviet inter .st, in International Wh,eattCConfe USSR ranee, The action of the in sending a delegation, reportedly with full powers to sip ,n any uF,eerent, to the current International Wheat Conference in Washington is directly contrary to previous Soviet policy toward international economic organizations and agreements. The USSR has not only failed to Join most UN economic bodies qxcnpt the ECE (where it played little role in actual operations) but also did not attend the GA17 or ITO meetings and ignored the Previous International Wh t DOCUMENT NO. CHANGE IN CLA DECLASSIFIED Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP Approved For Relee 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-01 R'BI' 000100020048-7 mctiveea is attending the Conference which is to draft an international, wheat agreement, may stem f"rotet . (1f Soviet desire to demonstrate more Interest in international eeoacmjc affairs as part of a "peace Offensive"? (2) Soviet interest in developirn Fast-Kest trade in order to permit imports of strategic items lacking in the Soviet orbit econony; (3) Soviet concern corer marketing its exportable surplus of wheat. (Argentina, the only other sof or exporter which did not si;rn the previous draft agreeaftnt, is also attending)o PSt`anca-British talks on ion Color`iess "Recent discussions on the Italian colonies between Foreign Ministers Eevin and Schuman forecast another attempt to sectary USdUHpP~reneh agreement on returning Tripolitania to Italy? Although Schuman urged restoration of both Tripolitania and at least the Maesawa,Aomara Portion of Eritrea to Italy, Bevin appeared re- ceptive Only to the return of the former, Schuman favored Italian trustee- ship for Tripolitania on the grounds that: (1) the Italians had sufficient military force to make possible their return,, particularly if undertaken in stages; (2) the Government might otherwise fall; and (3) denying Italy thle colony would be a setback to Italian adherence to the Western European bloc. Although the present Foreign office view Is that the Government would not faO.l and Bevinseriously doubted Italian ability to control the colony, he agreed to ask the US whether it wish d t e o ter then US-UK O agreed position favoring postponement. Schuman also urged either a collective trusteeship, with Italian and Ethiopian participation9 for Massawa and Asmara or at least postponement on these areas, but Bevin adhered firmly to the US-UK position for cession of the bulk of Eritrea to Ethiopia.* It appears possible that Italy it pressing its campaign for both colonies largely In the hope of recovering at least one. The Italia reaction is now apparently the key factor in the colonies picture,, and despite other unfavorable consideration,,-the desire of the Western powers to cement Italian relationships with the Western bloc and bolster the present Government may well lead them to favor granting Italy some form of control over Tripolitania. 25X6A -Approved.-For Release -2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020048-7 25ftRroved For Relea `e 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-010 000100020048-7 ad?n2dan dgyA* bIW 0 The SC is now conFronte~d with a choice be- competing four competing resolutions on Indonesia, the Joint 1_Norway China.. Cuba resolution, a Dutch, an Australian, and one proposed by the nineteen. action New Delhi. Conference. The Conference die-p1&yed considerable moderation in limiting itself to adoption of a resolution exhorting the Security Council to take strongest action against the Dutch. Without taking explicit steps to erect a permanent Asian bloc, It succeeded in placing the collective weight of regional opinion behind a call for vigorous SC measures. Australia, one of the New Delhi participants, is pressing for a resolution strongly denouncing the Netherlands and setting up an SC Commission with discretionary powers to determine the time and extent of Dutch troop with- drawals from Republican territory. Australia opposes adoption at present of a fixed timetable and favors letting the commission study the situation and pre-pare a definite plan for Dutch evacuation. The Dutch in turn have drafted a resolution which enders lip service to the Renville principles and envisages the establishment through free elections of a United States of Indohesia prior to 15 November 1950. The Dutch draft, however, Ignores the existence of the Republic and calls for replacement of the Good Offices Committee by a UN Plenipotentiary with powers limited to the observation and verification of Dutch good works. All of these resolutions probably will be scrapped In favor of the US-backed fcur-power resolution. Despite the pressure of the New Delhi conference, it is unlikely that the four-power resolution can be materially strengthened and still hold in line all. of the precarious seven votes required for passage. The res- olution at.t;,;'pts to apply the maximum practical pressure oathe Dutch to carry erat their avowed intentions to establish a United States of Indonesia and directs that tho Witch doa1 with the Pep:abiic. bray resolution which passes the Security Council is almost csrtaln to be unsatisfactory to the New Delhi nations and they will probably study further steps to bring pressure against the Netherlands. Under Indira leadership, they may seek to invoke sanctions against the Dutch indepondently of the UN. Such measurer would conflict with the UN Charter which, while authorizing collective measures of aealf-defenses under Articles 51, does not allow im- position of sanctions by regional groups without the approval of the SC. Neverthelessp it is improbable that the letter of the UN Charter would as a practical, matter restrain these nations from employing strong economic measures against the Netherlands. Moreover9 Dutch defiance of the several SECRET -Approved for Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-01.09OAQ001.0092Q048-7 Approved For Rele`e 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79-010000100020048-7 SECRET resolutions of the SC would furnieb masse moral justification for the Asian nations themselves taking action which they could well ole&n should in the first instance have been talon by a fc'thright and fearless C. had labor famen to Mat W r ibc1 . The 5eeeesicn of the British, 'QS, and Dutch labor organizations from the Weld Federation of Trade Unions and their current moves to, establish a Western-oriented labor international are apparently inducing Soviet Russia to tighten the grip it maintains on world labor farces through Communist treader unions. A recent Cooinfora directive stresses Soviet labor leadership in the International labor rovemeent and thrr necessity for "exclusive obedience" by local Communist parties to Moscow. Tighter Communist Party control of labor forces hats been Instituted in recent months in the Soviet Zone of Germany, where the functions of the std' "work councils" are being transferred to the Communist directed trade union .executive coneaitteess, and in France and Italy where the Communists have seated themselves on labor-management couuoile in key industries. These successive moves probably reflect a revised Soviet world labor strategy designed largely to minimize any loss of influence among the workers should a strong anti-Communist labor international be established. Despite the walk-out of its US.. UK and Dutch delegations, the WFTU, with 64 of its 67 national labor organizations still utembeers, will continue to function as a world forum for propagation of Soviet foreign policy ob- jectives. The Communist members of the WFTU Executive Bureau, who "abstained" from voting on the British proposal for WFTU suspension, will probably utilize the January 28 meeting of the Executive Committee (a larger VIPTU body embracing 26 national labor centers) to censure the seceding Western labor organizations and to try to prevent the defection of other non= Communist national labor groups. Efforts of the 15=nation ERP Trade Union Advisory Committee,, currently meeting in Bern, to set up a new labor international will be retarded so long at the AFL and the CIO are unable to agree on the terms of US labor representation and on a joint international labor program. Continued APL insistence on recognition as the predominant US labor organization will impede they coordinated participation rehicb the Western European, partienlarly the British, trade unions desire and will probably deter their adherence in substantial numbers to any US-UK sponsored international. Such disunity in the Wasttwn labor camp is likely to ben still further aggravated by current AFL attrnptz to block selection of s veteran Belgian trade unionist, now a WFTU Assistant Secretary-General, as Secretary of the Trade Union Advisory Committee This official, who is supported by the TUC and the CIO, would probably be assigned responsibility for drawing up the ground-plan for the new international. SECRET Approved--For .Re-lease 200 -/03/04 CIA-RDP79.-0 .09-QAQQ0100020048-7.