INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 3

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020049-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 1999
• Sequence Number: 49
• Publication Date: January 18, 1949
• Content Type: PERRPT

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
NEWLY SUMMARY NO. 3
Por week ending 18 January 1949
watime II
Spurrnd by Aaiatic concern over the Indonesian Imbroglio, the Security
-
Council is cootemplating further action to force the Batch toward a reason-
able settlement. Meanwhile progrese in the UN-sponsored Rhodes armistice
take betwoen Egypt and Israel have given rise to cautious optimism. The
break-up of the WPTU into eastern anti western blocs appears at hand as the ,
WFTU Executive Bureau meets in Paris.
ea 0 ea
agagtem6jkatmallaxaftemeat. With the US Congress about to cast a
arnica' eye upon European economic cooperation and progrosb towards re-
covery, the ERP countries will probably soon take reasures to strengthen the
?EEC on a high political level. The British, previously the chief holdouts,
have reportedly agreed to such a mod and are thinking of establishing a
five-man working committee of key ministere from the UK, Franc, Italy,
Benelux and a Scandinavian country, which would meat frequently to deal with
auch vital problems as reconciling the conflicting UK and continental re-
covery views. Belgium Premier Speak has expressed concern over bringing
the UK to understand the continental view that the ER? is concerned with
the needs of Europe as a whole, which, according to Speak, basically differs
from tbe British view, seemingly concerned only with UK economic recovery.
There is indeed a basic difference between the UK view that recovery planning
should be on a severe austerity basis in order to achieve a balance of pay-
ments by 1952, and the French view that itashould ain at a reasonably good
living etandard based on expanded imports an exports. The UK four-year
plan, baaed on continued austerity, envisages limiting imports from the
continent, while the French rely on increased exports, largely to the UK.
Palpstine qgve1onmgat2. Last week2s tension in the Middle Rest fol-
lowing the Israeli attack en RAT'Oanes has been somewhat relieved. Civility,
if not warmth, appears to prevail at Rhodes and progress of the talks between
Egypt and Israel, including release of the Faluja garrison, justifies some
optimism respecting the outcome of the conversations. The conforence, how-
wver, has not yet come to gripe with the probler of drawing permanent armistice
lines, which will inevitably exorcise a practical effect upon tha ultimate
sooner
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territorial settlement. The British are still backing the Arabs in seeking
a corridor across the southern &gab to connect Pgyet with Transjordan and
Iraq. Israel still desires an outlet to the fled Sea at the head of the Gar
of Aqaba. If, however, the Jews min obtain a peace which rill permit the
resumption of much-needed =mai economic activity, there is aoms Chance
that they may ultimately make 8QMS concession irethe Hegel).
aft 0 am
ReearatipeeepzeWeeeellhALsed France. US plans for building up the
Western German economy as an integral part of the TiRP may be impeded by dis-
agreement between the US, UN and France over two aspects of German reparations:
(1) dismantling of industrial plants and (2) use of rolling stook in Germany.
Current intergovernmental negotiations concerning the flumphrey Comeittee
report reveal stiffened resistence to US proposals for retaining in Germany,
to aid general European recovery, a number of industrial plants originally
scheduled for disnantlinp. The British refuse to agree to the retention
of forty-eight of the one hundred sixty-seven plants on the Committee's list.
Furthermore, they have expressed unwillingness to postpone any longer the
dismantling of certain plants on the reparations list on the grounds that
further delays in the face of open German resistence will -seriously endanger
Britain's prestige as an occupying power.
In the matter of rolling stock, the French are causing the difficulty.
The July 1948 agreement for exchange of 23,000 of the 70,0Q0 German freight
oars held by France has been only partially implemented. The French rain-
tam n that the German cars are German external assets and, as such, belong
to France and now Beek to divert new re& oars from Bizone to France as the
price for returning the German oars. Since the US considers this unaccept-
able, the French may present the issue to the Inter-Allied Reparations
Agency (IARA) where they believe their claims to the German cars will be
upheld. Permanent retention by France of the disputed freight cars, coupled
with the possible return of French rolling stock now being used in Bizone,
would put a considerable strain on the transportation facilities of Western
Gernany and hamper its economic recovery.
lob 0 ?17 ?
I Sov_eeeepeiet:eweLaela_peNeSeeebnicaLbcdies. No international body, how-
ever technical its functions, appears sufficiently remote fron the ideological
battlefield to be overlooked as a vantage point for Soviet propaganda. For
example, Soviet Chairman Chernyshev'e remarks in recent discussions of the
UN Fiscal Commission on the fiscal &lappets of the Trusteeship Council's
Provisional Questionnaire for Trust Territories sounded the opening gun in
another local skirmish of the Soviet propaganda war on the "colonial" powers.
Chereyshev followed this up by denouncing a project for eliminating inter-
national double taxation as a scheme to protect investors who exploit under-
developed countries.
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Firacefieir
0..gmegiiteidaLallaraemEW of Pal stine mi attn. The
International Refugee Organisations which in May 1948 relinquished respon-
sibility for the movement of Allah refugees to Palestine because of the
unsettled conditions there, will reconsider thie decision at ite 25 January
Geneva meeting. The Jewish volumtary aid agencies, which have borne this
responeibility meanwhile are reoneating resumption of IRO financing and
are strongly supported b; the US but opposed by the British, who contend
that conditions In Palestine remain too unsettled to justify a reversal of
the present policy. A conproaise proposal by the IRO Director General to
authorize temporary resumption of payments within the limits of the Organi-
sation's budget may also be opposed by the UK. Support for the British
position has been pledged by the Commonwealth representatives on the
Executive Committee (Australia and Canada) while China and Belgium are ex-
pected to favor the comemomise. Belgium, however, has indicated its belief
that the DO should inetitete additional controle over refugee movements to
ensure that only eligible persons are repatriated with IRO funds and to
avoid billing IRO for such atonements Baer they have been completed. Final
resolution of this, the most serious political issue 'which has confronted
the IRO, may prove less difficult as official British agitation over Anglo-
Israeli relations subsides and as Arab-Israeli truce talks progress. Re-
establishment of reasonably settled conditions in Palestine will almost
inevitably reduce UK opposition to renewed IRO activity in this field.
0
1?0-22BREILETIAL1121M2Bal--2.9..gtarn labor 12.41.42E1122111-90.
Despite a last-ditch Soviet effort to forestall it, dissolution of the
World Federation of Trade Unions into its eastern and western components
will be the practical effect of the decision of the Western trade Unionists
to walk out of the Paris meeting of the WFTU Executive Bureau. The British,
US and Dutch labor organisations decided upon this move when it became
apparent that the British proposal for suspension of the Federation for one
year would be rejected by the Stylet labor bloc. Substantial Soviet con-
cessions which might have been effective a few months ago (e.g., acceptance
of further limitations on WFTU activities and admission of the anti-Communist
Force Ouvriere) are almost certain to be refused by the now thoroughly dis-
illusioned TUC and CIO. Further Soviet attempts to postpone the outcore by
referring the TUC proposal to other WFTU bodies will be equally unsuccessful.
At a conference of the ERP Trade Union Advisory Committee in Born im-
mediately following the Paris meeting, TUC and CIO leaders, together with AFL
representatives, are expected to begin consultations looking toward a new
labor international which would eventually unite the non-Communist labor forces
of approximately twenty countries embracing an estimated trade union membership
of 25 millions. Whether such a federation will be established promptly or only
after costly months of debate will depend largely on forthcoming conferences
between TUC and AFL-CIO leaders concerning the terms of US labor representation.
The TUC, while nominally committed to bringing the two US organisations into
closer relationship, may be reluctant to hasten thio development since
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British labor mould exert proportionately greater influence while IE labor
remained divided.
With the failure of their effort to salvage WITU unity, the Soviet
trade inions will probably reorganise the Federation on a more exclusively
Communist basis and attempt to perpetuate the myth of world labor solidarity
by ansocieting with themselves fractional leftwing groups within the TUC,
CIO and other Western labor orranisations., The 177114 retaining the support
of dominant labor organizations in the romairing tbirty-five to forty
countries, would continue to be a potent instrument for the projectiee of
Soviet propaganda and power in the noneCommunast world.
o
;Satallitiemmetritlgraw from TLO. Rocrnt indications that Poland and
Czechoslovakia may shortly withdraw from the International :Labor Oreaeizetion
Probably refleot not only their own altered Victral toward the Organization but
also Soviet determination to avoid letting the ILO, with eastern and7estern
parte intact, survive the demise of the WFTU, Tho defection of Poland and
Ozecheslovakia, once staunch /L0 supporters, was foreshadowed at thR San
Freecisco Conference last eummer when they attacked the allegedly undemocratic
character of the ILO Constitution and charged that ILO structure failed to
represent adequately "the new democracies," Preseure from the USSR may not.?
hasten this withdrawal as Soviet tactics are revised to meet the new international labor situation. So long as the WPTU cculd be maintained undividecl,
the strategy of the Soviet labor bloc was to tolerate Satellite parUcipatioe
In the ILO, but at the sane time to criticize it as an ineffective tri-
partite organieation in which labor was inadequately represented and te strese
the era:race-of WYTU as the only aethentic voice of world labor, Nowobonevere
the Mon apparently sees the ILO left as the sole eeeting ground ofearld
labee een may be unwilling to aanetien Satellite partieipation in an erganS-
satien ehte'n it holds in contempt as r'refermast-deminated," The current
elsit eS ::Ite ILO Dieector General to Poland and Czecheetovakia ray delay,
but is not ii7Kel." to prevent, their exi fr.lm the OrganilatiolL rug 1e'.t
tic ,'rSetfalite ILO remb,lr, has rYYt attfrnded recent donfere.nocr;
1a9 P IYgivn notief! of intent ton tn withdrar.
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F\t71-,p qC actiot on Indonesia- An UN consideration of the Indonexiien
imbroeele enters a new phase, the Security Col,mcll, having failed to halt
Dutch "podce action," will seek to compel Lho Netherlands to carry out its
promnse nthe Linggadjati and Renville Agr,-ements Siwe rertoration oi
the 18 Ons6mbmr status gyp, as desired by 'ale Republic's Asiatic ffien0s, i6
obviously impessible in the face of Dutch refusal to withdraw their ferceo,
the Council reeognizing this fait eecoeeli, will probably pass a resolutice'
(1) callinr upon the Dutch to follow a close schedule (in accordance with
own announced timetable) for the formation of a federal Indonesian gov.,rnnt.Lt
and the transfer of Netherlands sovereignty to at; and (2) establishing at
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expanded UN committee With stronger powera to supervise this proomss. The
final resolution, heftier, will to purpospfullyeague about gradual with-
drawal or Netherlandstroops. The SC is under pressure to take same such
further action beoanse of both the threat of unilateral actict by the
Asiatic states convening at New Delhi amd the resultant lois of UN prestige
should the SC, seised ot the question for ?m aceihs, now'act indecisively.
Council members exteg for the USSR, Ukraine, France and Argentina (which
will probabiy abstain on sey such resolution), have /greatly expressed
qaalified acceptance of the US draft wiebodying these principles. In case
of an unanticipated French veto on the grounds that the algae ocepottence
to coedder such an internal dispute, the question will probably be referred
to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.
Despite repeated statements that Owe= not amply with each a rea-
elution, the Netherlande will probably not ccmpletely refuse to accept
its terms. The Dutch are also highly unlikely to withdraw from the UN and
their threats to do so arm rather an attempt to disocurage effective action.
Should the Netherlands fail to comply, however, serious international roper-
deeMi0118 might follow. The Asiatic nations might then claim that since the
Dutch would not be bound by UN decisions, they, too, should be free to take
Unilateral action. Also the Republican UN delegation reportedly will apek
freedom of action by asking the Sc to drop the issue. Faced with those
attitudes and with the improbability that a majority favoring stronger action
can be obtained, the SC can merely wait a softening of Dutch obstinacy
resulting from eventual realisation that ems:cootie attrition following upon
continued guerrila activity will seriously damage the Dutch exchequer.
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