INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION WEEKLY SUMMARY NO.27 FOR WEEK ENDING 11 JULY 1950 THE INTERNATIONAL WEEK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100030001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 11, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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r'-:TER.NkTIONA.L ORGA11xuMIO i tIVIS1O11,
..LEEKLY. 8U1.u. . NO, 27
For week ending 21 July 1950
The International d; oek
Volume ill
Formal agreement on the European Payments Union marks a
major step in European integration, especially toward the cre-
ation of a single non-discriminatory trading area:. Although a
tissue of compromises, it is a notable improvement over the old
Inter-European Payments Agreement and provides a basis for future
advances In a related field t developing cleavages indicate
that France, Germany and Italy rsa..7 proceed with the Schuman Plan
without the Benelux countries.
z. eanahile, the M consolidated its support of US action .rt.
Korea by Puthorizing the appointment of a UN commander-in-ehitf-
and the flying of the UK flag,.
crone n orxcern over eft"ev4_ iigzaa . unt list non .it AY.,
The ever heavier US coriMrenv in the Korean conflict to n e. W n to
arouse acute fears in c extern European j:f T countries as to its
effect upon the availability of US forces to support ester'a
Europe and, more immediately, upon arris shipments wider the TDA m
This concern, already voiced by Parisian newspapers, ill be
increasingly evident in the European press and on the part of
the NAT goverrit:ients themselves. The French government, acutely
aware of lour Asiatic involvements can play hob with home
defenses and relying heavily on US aid to equip its metropolitan
forces, will be particularly concerned, The Europeans will
maintain that the Korean situation, with its clear implication
of sharply increased Soviet aggressiveness, makes even more
urgent an accelerated strengthening of European defense Under
these circumstances any buildup of US forces in Asia at the
expense of MT commitments may well have an adverse effect on
continental riorale.,
pY rE IN 4LASS.D
n nuARlfTS S C
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.m^ . ti ans orcef to gn nla s r jor Id C on.Fs_
Vin? Ge ,o,,, ,,, The turn of events Which makes it necessary for the
World Peace Partisans to hold their next World Congress in a
satellite country, Instead of in Western Europe as originally
planned, will probably impair the success of this meeting by
exposing Soviet inspiration and direction to the non-Cotmunist
supporters of the movement W As a result of Italy's refusal to
permit foreign delegates to attend the proposed October meeting
in Genoa, the Peace Partisans have now decided to hold the
meeting in Poland. Although the Italian Government's action in
refusing entry to these "peace partisans" was not taken in
response to any popular demand, it was made politically feasible
by public reaction against the Korean invasion. !ioreover,
holding the meeting in a satellite country is not likely to
promote popular support since it will inevitably increase aware-
ness among non-Communists of the movement's identification with
the USSR. For the same reason, the effect of the campaign which
the Partisans have been conducting throughout the Egestenr
countries (with particular success in. France) for a world ban
against an "atomic war" is likelj to be at least temporarily
weakened. While the Communists -acre now pressing this campaign
more vigorously than ever, in an effort to divert attention from
the blow dealt to their "peace" propaganda by the North Korean
aggression, their recent c :~ t tu 11M support
+ r tti y ..r y ... M. y ~Q `F^(j~.. _,~;tii~~~~ the
Y i t e rlr.O1:..I'c sine 1"j Z~.. .-ni4E:i ~ wa ue 1
13G"~.:_t.:.....l.t.a A= z ?r ` ; %,, of tie -3 0,v. o t t
Point li ova hopes re uc 4 Curtailment of the US and N
Technical Assistance programs by a reduction in the US contri-
bution would have unfortunate consequences at this tire. Above
all, Far Eastern nations in the process of reexamining their
foreign policies in the light of the Korean aggression will
suffer a sharp blow to their hopes, Communist propaganda will
attempt to demonstrate that US interest in these nations is
strategic only and fails to be concerned with their true needs.
This propaganda may make some headway, inasmuch as the Point
Four concept has been steadily reduced from its "bold, now pro-
gram" status to very modest beginnings. Any further reductions
will tend to develop cynicism cnd suspicion of the nature of US
Interest in the economically be-.ckward nations. In addition,
retrenchment would hinder the UN's program of technical aid, to
which the US has pledged about b of the contributions for the
first eighteen months., Other countries might also be tempted to
reduce their contributions and the nearly universal support for
this program may be undernineo, Uenerai disillusionment
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fol?ccast in initial reports from Nev Delhi and the UN Economic
and Social Council at Geneva g may be expected to crystallize if
the program is not carried out to the full measure as pledged.
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