INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 25 FOR THE WEEK ENDING 27 JUNE 1950 THE INTERNATIONAL WEEK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100030003-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 27, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CUMENT NO.
T-urPu AYATIfOT%1AT, ORGANIZATIONS DIVISIgRECL
WEEKLY S ARY Nfl 25 NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH_HR70-9-
.a or week ending 27 June 1950
`she jnter, bona
Volume In
Facing its most severe test to dates the UN took quick and
de?t.erm:ned action designed to halt the Communist invasion of
South Korea.
Securit C,s u;nez action on Korea For the first timc iyy
uistory,, the UN Security Council has approved the use of force to
1nplement a UN resolutivn6 This decision shows that under proper
.tee ershipy the UT can take strong action for peace and securit;i
Without the USSR. In fact only the absence of the USSR enabled
-;he- tJ to take that quick and decisive action originally envisaged
by the authors of the UN Charter. Because Soviet obstructionism
has thus far blocked conclusion r eon~in~;entseatAthecdisposa3-
qu~.r3ng memba~~ nations to place armed police force on
of the Coursci1s the Sc found itself without any p
~.6hich to call. It therefore in effect accepted the offer of the t
recomme US to furnish armed aid and confined itself o 'oKorea ending -rthat ing UN
members furnish assistance to the Republic
the attack. Under the exigencies of the situation, the UN took the
only positive course open to it.
To insure wide support it is act~.onimportant Korea 3 world by
shou~.d recognize that US armed
the SC as appropriate support of the UN. Unfortunately the resolu-
tion was adopted with the minimum seven votes ablerecutoired under the
Charter. Maintaining that they had The impressiveness of the
Lions India and Egypt failed to vote.
decision as an expression of the judgment of mankind would be con-
hcconccurrrrennceeoofirIndiapaannd Qgypt
siderably enhanced if the subsequent
could be added. As it now stands,
the resolution emanated from the US, countries already linnkedvton, government.
the US under regional treaties and
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in the case of the Chinese lationalists, the additional circam-a
stance that at the request of President Truman, they have rr-
uouneed all naval or air attacks against the Chinese mainland
further weakens their moral authority to speak for China in the
UN? While these factors in no way affect the validity of the
action taken, they are certain to furnish ammunition to Communist
propaganda*
Korean attack_ of" Soviet_ e -- , the
Soviet sponsored attack on South Korea, strongly suggests that the
Kremlin is indifferent about ending its boycott of the UL Corr,
relatively UN reaction to the North Korean breach of the 1 5ac:e has
created new conditions which rake a Soviet return to the UN ruch
more difficult,
Until the attack on the R?K4 the Security Council had studi-
ously avoided provoking the USSR and had in fact confined it elf
to routine and desultory action. But just as the Soviet and
Chinese recognition of the Ho Chi 'inh regime in Indochina seemed
almost deliberately designed to forestall French recognition of
Peiping, the decision on the North Korean attack gust have taken
into account the probability that the SC would take some act's on
against the Plyongyang government, and that one effect would be to
postpone indefinitely the seating of the Chinese Communists;,
Probably the vigor of the UN's reaction has exceeded the
Soviet expectations, By its quick and resolute decision to ro -
list communist aggression, the Security Council has indicated that
it is in no mood to appease the USSR. The temper of the UN hardly
improves the chances for seating the Peiping representatives* n( -
has it created conditions which will facilitate a Soviet return to
the UN;,
Eritrean sagEr: _nrobler, Vices UTJ< The possibility that a
2/3 majority in the UN General Assembly might support a direct UN
trusteeship for Eritrea leading to eventual independence ral.sc:s
the important issue of security, in East .African The wave of bhifta
terrorism in the territory shows no signs of abating and woulc'?. be
expected to increase in the face of any UN decision unfavorable to
Ethiopia. An extension of terrorism might lead to general in,,
stability in East Africa
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7 7
It is unclear where the nece'sary _Locai dof anse forces will come
from under a direct UN administrat1.on, aided by an Advisory Coun-..
all of states, which is proposed b-- two of the five-member TJPT
,omenission of Inquiry,, The Eritrean question will he abated
E, t: in the GAL a lnteriri Co,nmittpe, and security aspects of the
-oblern may be neglected due to the: tre iimndou:~ popular appeal.. of
i-ndenendencei within ten years.
such a solution would be opposed by the UK and US, but any
;fir rac ticai alternative must be aceeptahJ. to both Italy and Ethio-
;!a,;who are as yet unable to resolve their differences over this
quostion, The only likely compromise yet broached is a form of
' 3dnration of Eritresa with Ethi opiu under the crown of the Emp-
erorr. Advocates of this alternative may have to point out rlore
urfi;ently than hitherto the nature of the grave security problem
which will face Eritrea and the TJN should a decision largely moti
Fated by an emotional appeal fail to provide nets-nary defense
forces for territorial security.
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