INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION WEEKLY SUMMARY NO.8 ENDING THE WEEK 28 FEBRUARY 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100030020-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 1999
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: February 28, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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V%'M,1(LY SUM Jth NO., 8
For week ending 28 February
Lost significant event or Lrie weer was the British election
split between Labor and Conservatives which brought into question
the present governments ability to pursue strong policies both
at home and abroad. Meanwhile a revival of pessimism is apparent
in Western Europe, as a result of recent Soviet successes, US
slowness in implementing the Atlantic Pact, and the threat of new
and more terrible atomic weapons..
improved Prospects for Israe =Jordan N n-A , _ res ion Pact.
Jordan and Israel's recent tentative agreement on a five year
non-aggression pact greatly improves the prospects for normaliza-
tion of the situation in Pales'-.ine On 24 February Jordan and
Israel initialed a text formulating principles suggested by King
Abdullah (for details, see D../In Weekly 21 February 1957). The
Israeli Cabinet had previously agreed in principle to the King?s
proposal and the Jordan Cabinet has also reportedly accepted the
document as a basis for formal talks.. The memorandum also deals
with the problem of Jerusalem, presently under consideration by
the UN Trusteeship Council in Geneva, by providing for a joint
Israeli--Jordan guarantee to the UN of access to and freedom of
the Holy Places as weal as for acceptance of international super-
vision of such sites. Jordan and Israel have not yet reached
final agreement and there is plenty of room for argument over the
somewhat vague and general provisions of the initialed memorandum.
Moreover strong reaction from other Arab States is to be expected.
Nevertheless a long step forward as been taken, thus improving
prospects for normalizing the relations between the two states
chiefly involved In the Palestinian territorial vuestion.
Stalerrate on Eritree Progress towards Italo--Ethiopian
rapprochement has been endangered by Ethiopia's negative reaction
to a draft formula for settlement of differences over the dispo-
sition of Eritrea. This formula would provide that both parties
desist from propaganda aci v :ies in the territory and from advo-
cacy of particular proposals, whL..a reserving the right to uphold
their interests before the Commission if reauesteda Italy adopt-
ed a conciliatory attitude throughout t4~t ~_scussions arfd
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is believed to have gone as iar as it can with the draft, which
also promised future negotiations of a more specific character.
Italy has thus indicated its willingness, despite its own doubts
as to the wisdom of this proposal, to establish friendly re-
lations with Ethiopia, ana the next step is up to the latter,
The atmosphere in Addis Ababa is reportedly unfavorable to these
overtures,, but Ethiopia may ye" be persuaded of the advantages in
an agreement with Italy .at Luis time.
tholi trade unions s it divided on new intepna on :: .
The decision of the Belgian i hristian trade unions not to affili-
ate independently with the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions ICFTU) but to recommend unified action by all
Christian national unions re4.-ie4:ts the continued-division of
Europeis Catholic trade unions on this issue. The Belgian and
Dutch Catholic unions, together with the leadership of the Chris-
tian labor internationalL .Cl.80., are shifting increasingly from
neutrality to open opposition t' the Brussels international, which
they characterize as "not dynamic enough" and US-dominated.
Belgian support for continua,icon of,the Christian international
is reportedly also influenced by CISC efforts to organize an
independent Catholic labor movement in Germany, an objective
which the Belgian Christian unions strongly favor.
Officials of the Christian labor international are current-
ly attributing their opposition to ICFTU to: (a) doubt that
European Socialist labor is r: fling to work with an international
sponsoring a non-Socialist program, and (b) resentment over AFL
"threats" against those failing to join. Actually, their opposi-
Lion more likely stems from determination to keep the Christian
international. intact:. ?.1 : unity, however, can be maintained
only if the Christian nationals trade unions adopt a common posi-
tion. Such a position is apparently improbable at present since
the Italian trade unions and leftwing French Christian unions
still insist on joining the L FTU, The CISC Bureau is therefore
likely to postpone final action until the April CISC meetlxtg and
in the meantime will probably seek to avoid the defection of
these two important, groups by emphasizing its readiness to collab-
=crate on a basis of equality with the Brussels international.
-i 6;. A US-UK+-Cuban-Porwegian resolu-
New Ita?sm r apAroact
tioii calling on India Gnu. k?aJ istan to prepare and execute a pro-
gram of demilitarization within five months and appointing a UN
representative to assist in the preparation as well as supervise
implementation of the progratii has been placed before the SC. It
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.ails for termination of UN :IP and transfer of its powers ani
responsibilities to a UN representative who is "to place himself
at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan and to
place before those governments or the Security Council any sug-
gestions which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the
expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute." The proposed
resolution thus opens the way to ;s solution other than plebiscite,
although any such solution would depend on the agreement of both
'India and Pakistan., Although Pakistan Foreign Minister Zefrulla`'9
has indicated that the resolution is acceptable, the Indian views
are not yet known.
Chinese representationn The conviction that within
Chi
a few weeks a Chinese Communist representative might su.ccessfuli:
be seated on the Executive Board of the International Children
Emergency Fund probably lies behind the cancellation of a recen.
Board meeting by its Polish chairman Ludwik Rajchman. (Eleven nt'
the Board's twenty-six members have recognized the,Chinese Com-
munists and at least two or three more may do so soon or may ab-
stain on a vote.) Aside from wishing to avoid a walkout of the
board's three Satellite members who with four other Eastern
European countries have received the lion's share of ICEF allb=
cations, Rejebman may be particularly anxious for a favorable
vote on the Chinese Communists Since their government stands to
receive an allocation of $7 million as soon as It is seated on
the Board and can negotiate a sa .:isfectory agreement. Under pres-
sure from the US and other governments Rajchman has now sched--
uled the Board meeting for 6 L.r h:.
Chinese UN re esent , Ecuador's UN representative
believes it desirable to withdraw recognition from the Chinese
Nationalists and seat the Communists in the SC without recogniz-
ing the Corur.unist Government, A w1Zch in Ecuador's position
would leave the SC only one vote short of seating the Chinese
Communists assuming three factors% that the USSR returns to the
chamber for
abstains, and
Its own behalf.
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REVIVED SUE.-TIC iSly i1MCN vAT NATICNS
A succession of recent events seem to have revived laten%
scepticism among some of the NAT nations, notably France and
Italy, as to the security value of `'e Atlantic Pact and the
Military Aid Program. The oc::sxr:nces which have brought West
Europeans to reexamine the validity of their adherence to the
Atlantic Pact and MDAP are: (1) Reported Soviet acquisition of
the A-bomb several years ahead of previous estimates, thus ending
the US monopoly; (2) US determination to rake a hydrogen bomb;
3) The Fuchs spy case, which ca.ls into Question how far Anglo-
American atomic security might have been compromised; (4) US
political and press comment which could not fail to create some
impression that even US self-confidence and nerves have, for the
time being at least, been badly shaken; (5) Churchill's election
call for a new direct approach to the Kremlin; (6) The Chinese
debacle with its patent effect on the world power balance and
its pos-ible Influence In shifting US exertions from Europe to
the Far East; and (7) Some renewed European fears that the US is
not firmly committed to all-out support of Western Europe and
may yet relapse into neon-.solationism.
When the Atlantic Pact was signed in April 1949, it was com-
monly
in that
Soviet believed
exclusive possession m of dthe A-bomb over the
this superiority was both suffiC:Cient to counterbalance Soviet
superiority in conventior.al armaments and enduring enough to
afford ample opportunity to restore Western European power before
the USSR could approach atomic parity wits: the US.
Today, however, most. Europeans are aware in differing degrees
of an acceleration in the growth of Soviet war potential and a
+concomnitant urgency in filling the post war power vacuum in
Western Europe. At the same time they see little concrete evi-
dence of comparable increase in Western military strength. On
the continent the effect Las been to make more vocal thoseele-
ments which all along have favored "neutrality" and the creation
of a European "third force." Prevailing opinion, however,
particularly among government of icials, recognizes the essential
unrealism of the "neutrality" concept and can see no practical
alternative to a political end military link to the US short of
accepting the status of a Soviet satellite. Nevertheless, even
those who maintain cool heads probably are less confident of US
ability to contain the USSR than they were one year ago.
In large part the present revival of defeatist tendencies
in Europe is the result of the inevitable lag between the signing
of the Atlantic Pact and the appearance of concrete evidences of
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tO\0E't
jr;,reased strength in the vest, and will thus tend to disappear
US arms begin to flow and the AP nations themselves begin to
show increased defensive capabilities., It also reflects, however,
the deep-seated psychological indecision which is Western
Europe's heritage from two world wars and which undermines Ergo-
peen will to resist,. bang Europeans particularly the French
traditionally long for a security which would either remove all
danger of aggression or at least guarantee that any invasion
apt ' en pc. be repelled at tx-ie frontier,. The desire for such "absolute,,
security" will continue to be a major psychological factor it
European uneasiness until such time as economic recovery, continued
US aid, and the deveio.pn:ent of cormron institutions have restored
European confidence in their ability to survive. In this con-
nection only tangible evidences of US deterrr,ination such as an
expanded and accelera :ed. JUDAP and continued economic aid will
bring any substantial reassurance to Europe.
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