NEAR EAST/AFRICA BRANCH INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 17 AUGUST 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100050007-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 1999
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 17, 1949
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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!C4 11_, INT`'., L itE C1i AGENCY
1OTI E. This docu e m i ? a wurr.ung Paper, not
.r: official CIA issua ,--e, I.'T h a been co-crdi a-
witbin O1%E, but not wi.t? tit IAC Agencies.
e wets c .er?re i is 14,4u.3 I? pecialists in
CI. , and, is des .I;ne+d 1w? u&k, b t zt*a s ge ed
in silrlilar or o ver,i pping ~-; udics. The opinions
expressed here;.. x 1nay b e evia d )efo fina.I
and udildal pubii.cati. gin.. It is ir:Aetuded solely
:L the ib t ma on Uo. Lhe a.:ct :t . see and nut for
urther dissexr:i.r atior~.
'.,f Nom.
AS'S. CHANQEQr
Co:y f? .':
AZ- + HR 70
j~~ Ai( REV)EWER: 0
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In Egypt, which had been strongly supporting Zaim, the initial reaction
was one of shock and surprise; three days of official mourning were de-
clared. Some segments of popular opinion, however, were not greatly
displeased, having felt some apprehension lest a dictatorship, similar
to that of Zaim, be established in Egypt. There appears to be a general
awareness in government circles in the various Arab states that the ass-
assinations were unfortunate because they give further impetus to a bad
precedent already established by Zainms original coup.
Although any firm estimate at this time of the consequences of
the coup would be premature, the new regime would appear to have a
somewhat better than even chance of surviving. If it does so, the tendency
toward a split in the Arab world into two opposing groups of states will
at least be checked, and the possibilities of some mind of "Fertile
Crescent" union increased. The relations of the US to Syria will pro-
bably not be significantly affected, and the position of the UK is definitely
improved at the expense of France. After some period of delay, it is
probable that the pipe-line agreement and the Israeli armistice will be
re-affirmed.
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Gra, nmos salient may assume. critical tical injpQj : The apparent witndrawal
f considerable n hers : guerrilllss anto Alba is in the face the rapid
progress of the Greek Army offensive launched in the Vitsi area on 10 August
presents the possibility of a speedy guerrilla redeployment elsewhere on the
Albanian border and may give critical importance to the coming Grammos
phase of the 1949 anti-guerrilla o(fensive- In contrast with their retreat
in the Vitsi area, the guerrillas have been defending stubbornly and exact-
ing relatively high casualties in their 250-square-mile Graff os salient,
although the anti--guerrilla offensive has not yet reached its ful) intensity
there.
The guerrillas will probably continue to defend the Grammos a~=ca
as long as possible because: (l) the terrain is more forbidding, offers
better possibilities of harassing actions on the flanks and to the rear
of the Greek Army, and is more useful. than the Vitsi area for guerrilla
movements in and out of the mountains of central Greece; and (2) the guer-
rillas could ill afford to withdraw from both their major salients below
the Albanian border at the height of Tito's taunts about Soviet liquida-
tion of the Greek guerrilla movement, and before the September UNGA.
meeting with its new possibilities for peace propaganda. Furthermore,
by their use of the Albanian highways in the frontier zone for swift
redeployment, the guerrillas may actiailly gain temporary tactical
advantages inasmuch as thefacilitie. f or corresponding movements of the
Greek Army south of the border are not nearly so good. What has been
accomplished thus far in the Vitsi area therefore seems only a prelimin-
ary to more difficult operations against the Grammos salient and any other
2tts on the Albanian border chosen by the guerrillas for re-infiltration.
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INDIA -PAKISTAN
Afters s: India and Pakistan, which celebrated the second anniversary
cf their independence this week, have made some noticeable progress along;
the road to stability since the departure of the British authorities from a
divided subcontinent on 15 August 1947. Some of the dangers which threatened
the two new dominions at the outset are still present. The unsettled Kashmir
dispute has kept alive the spirit of distrust, bitterness, and uncoopera-
tiveness between Moslem Pakistan and the Hindu leaders of India and has
helped create the present tribal dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan
(which may be largely motivated by an Afghan desire to assure that the
lands west of the Indus do not revert to India in the event of war between
India and Pakistan). These infra-regional tensions have diverted statesmen
from more constructive matters, saddled India and Pakistan with heavy
military expenses, and retarded economic stabilization in the two dominions,
whose economic interdependence is obvious. There is still a possibility
that full-scale hostilities may break out, leading to the disappearance of
Pakistan as a political entity, the reduction of India to a strife-torn and
communally inflamed state, and the emergence of an Afghanistan so beset
by tribal restiveness and internal turmoil as to invite Soviet occupation.
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Nevertheless, the three governments already possess a considerable
degree of internal stability, and if a peaceful and mutually satisfactory solu-
tion of the Kashmir dispute can be obtained, it is likely that they will be
able to effect a gradual improvement in their economic condition even without
special outside help. Under such conditions, the present trend toward
political stability in the region could be expected to continue for some
years to come.
A basis for continued stability is most firmly established in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Politically, the Afghan Government encounters
only sporadic internal opposition; economically, although it may not be
able to complete all of its ambitious development programs, it should be
able to alleviate Afghanistan's primary problem--that of assuring adequate
food production. In Pakistan, despite the recent emergence of an internal
opposition, the conservative and benevolently paternalistic group now in
power appears firmly entrenched f or the next five years or more. The country
possesses a sufficiency or near sufficiency of food and a surplus of other agri-
cultural products; unless external factors intrude, Pakistan's economic situation
should slowly improve over the next few years. There is no subversive
group of significant size, at least in West Pakistan, and although a large
and potentially disaffected refugee population still exists, the government
supposedly has adequate lands for use in resettlement.
India presents a more complex picture. Its economy is currently
under considerable stress; discontent exists among the laboring classes
and peasantry in many parts of the c(=try; and there is enough opposition
by both Communists and non-Communist, to constitute something of a threat
to the governments present leadership. However, increasing economic and
political stability appears attainable even without extraordinary foreign
loans, beyond those that may be obtained from the IBRD and the Eximbank.
While the government's expectation of achieving self-sufficiency in food-
stuffs within the next two or three years would appear to be over-optimistic
(even should dollars be immediately available for the many multi-purpose
dams and land reclamation projects which are planned), its strenuous attempts
to increase food production and utilization should result in a considerable
decrease in the quantity of essential food imports, especially if (as is
probable) the authorities realize the necessity of doing something about the
maladministration, transport difficulties, and dishonest distribution which
have all too often resulted in famine. In the field of industrialization
(as in that of agricultural development) the advantages of rapid procure-
ment of foreign capital goods must be weighed in the light of the effect on
India's foreign exchange position, and under present circumstances it is
doubtful that the government can go in for rapid expansion. Even so, the
determined and sometimes ruthlessly forceful group now in control of the
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C'I
country should be able to meet the basic psychological needs of the Indian
people sufficiently to assure its continuation in power for the next six or
seven years. During that period a slow but apparent economic improvement
may result from the more gradual development of India's potential through
increased purchases of capital goods from soft currency areas and through
the rational and efficient utilization of India's own capital resources.
Communist agitation a and
threat to Indians political and economic
will continue to constitute
stability whatever policy of development and improvement the government
may be able to follow. However, the Communist danger will decrease as
substantial economic improvements are obtained, and the government's
apparent willingness to take wal) necessary hich it can safely spend in obtaining such should
increase materially the time
results. Should either Nehru or Patel (or both) disappear from the scene
because of illness or assassination, the government would be subjected to
additional and severe strains. Such strains might eventually prove dis-
astrous; certainly the cleavage between groups of different ideology within
the ruling Congress Party would become
willtretain indica-
by Nehru and However,
tions are that the group currently power for a few years at least.
Current relations between India and Pakistan: The UN Commission for
India and Pakistan (UNCIP) has formally invited the GOI and the GOP
to attend joint political meetings in New Delhi on 17 August, under UNCIP
auspices, for the implementation of the Kashmir truce agreement. UNCIP
feels that this effort to effect a truce by mutual agreement is warranted
in view of the recent conciliatory attitude displayed by both governments
in effecting a cease-fire line in Kashmir
The GOI has maintained thus far an over-legalistic attitude on the
matters still in dispute. However, discussions between the US Ambassador
in New Delhi and Bajpai, GOI Deputy Minister of External Affairs, and the
reported pressure of GOI economic i~ pcommitment may result in a
settlement and for an honoring plebiscite
a more conciliatory attitude.
The joint political talks will be under the chairmanship of the
Czechoslovak UNCIP delegate. The GOP will probably be represented by
Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan. Bajpai Ayyangar, Minister of Trans-
port, may be the GOT representative. The GQI is reluctant to confer
plenipotentiary powers on its delegates to the meeting, although UNCIP
will probably insist that the representatives be invested with sufficient
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authority to conclude an agreement, subject to ratification by their
respective governments. IJNCIP is also expected to indicate that the
ta..'cs will be terminated if an agreement is not reached within a reason-
able time.
Despite the obviously divergent interests ct the two dominions,
UNCIP will ask that both governments submit the truce proposal to arbi-
rration ii the joint political talks fail. In the event of an arbitral award,
Admiral Nimitz is to be named Kashmir Plebiscite Administrator. The
GO may, in the joint talks, insist on a definite statement of an intentwc.u
LU told the plebiscite and may demand that the date be fixed for ins taiii;ig
the Plebisc.t+ Administrator.
There is little optimism over the outcome of the political talks.
Further, the GOI`s reply to UNCIP suggests that the talks begin on 22 August,
a five-day postponement.
Additional disputes of considerable magnitude which plague GOt-
GOP relations and which provide at least a psychological deterrent to an
amicable settlement of the Kashmir problem pertain to water rights and
refugees? property.
A recent Indian ordinance banned the sale of property left in India
by Moslems emigrating to Pakistan. Following India's action, the GOP
promulgated a similar regulation in regard to non-Moslem refugees'
property in Pakistan. In late July, the GOP announced that, by emergency
decree of the Governor General, all dealings concerned with evacuee
property were to be banned for a two-month period. This week, the
Pakistani Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry announced a
boycott on Indian goods. This boycott will place India in a serious position
of deficit trade balance with its best customer and will aggravate its alr. eady-
nad foreign-trade position.
Moreover, this week the GOI-GOP conference on the division of the
Punjab river waters ended without conclusive result. In fact, Zafrullah
Khan formally proposed submission of the dispute to the International
Court of Justice. India asserts ownership of the waters flowing from India
into Pakistan and plans dam projects for the East Punjab, which, .Pakistan.
fears, will drain the Indus watershed, affect 80 percent of West Pakistan's
agriculture, and return the area to desert. India suggests that the GOP
proposal to approach the International Court of justice is premature and
considers justified a proposal to survey the total water resources of
Pakistan's Indus basin to find substitute sources for irrigation water now
being drawn by Pakistan from rivers flowing out from India- -such investiga-
tion being without prejudice to any legal rights in the area.
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Both sides stubbornly a& ,ere to t: eir original positions and fail
to approach even the technical problem ?1 water utilization in a practical
and sincere way. These consl6ex ations bode ill for the relations between
India and Pakistan in important aspects of their national lives.
NOTED IN &&U F
The close cooperation on Turkish domesu'c afairs practiced by the
Peop Ts~ epublica.n Party (PIMP), which is the government party, and
its chief opposition, the Democratic Party, appears to have ended, and
the political campaign from now until the 1950 elections bids fair to be
a rough-ands-tumble fight with few holds barred. PRP spokesmen allege
that the national oath drawn up by the Democratic Party Incites members
to the use of force. Celal Bayar, head of the Democratic Party. has for his
part asserted that President Mona (who leads the PaP) bears the moral
responsibility for the present situation in Turkey and that the country
must follow a different political line if democracy is to develop normally.
Under the circumstances, accusations by the minor Nation's Party that
the PPP and the Democrats are "collaborating" appear somewhat far
fetched.
In the cclnsinncdf the Ankara + i,i i UDi :"r for financial reasons, the
Nations Party has lost the only daily newspaper to give it whole
hearted support. This blow, in addition to the probable end "colla-
boration" between the PRP and the Democratic Party which has been one
of the principal appeals of the Nation's Party to the Turkish people, is
likely to result in a dimunition of the party s power in spite of its recent
incorporation of the Independent Democrats.
A Turkish crowd has ar ril demonstrated against alleged irregularities
at the Istanbul race-track. The incident is unusual. In that tempers rose
high enough for the good citizens to set fire to buildings beside which they,
have been dishonestly parted from their hard-won liras for many a year.
Subsequent efforts of law-enforcement officers to quell the riot were
resisted. Ankara officials apparently link this most unusual resitance
to recent guarded opposition hints that the Turks might take the law into
their own hands if cheated at the next elections. There may, In fact, be
very little difference in the react ion. of a Turkish voter, whether robbed
of his vote or of his money.
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FJurh sg T.r .qi Prime Minister : uri Said 's Visit to I don, discussions with
t o U reign office were confined "almost entirely to Iraqi finances.
Nuri indicated that at least 10 million p unnds are needed to meet urgent
current obligations. The UK is sympathetic toward granting a loan, but
the problem of collateral is a stumbling block. Oil royalties cannot be
pledged since they are tied to an International. Bank loan application;
increased taxation cannot be imposed by a government already under
criticism; reopening the Haifa pipeline, while increasing Iraqis revenue,
would benefit Israel and is therefore politically out of the question. The
Foreign Office is investigating the possibilities of a private loan.
Thp a cUp rash's first Senate is to commence the latter part of
August, with the election of the Majlis to follow soon thereafter. Martial
law has been lifted in Tehran, and the Shah has issued orders "to
insure free elections." vw*hile the lifting of martial law is reportedly a
t'ictorry for the opponents of Chief of Staff Razrnara., it is expected to
have little effect on the army's ability to steer the elections.
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