NEAR EAST/AFRICA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 22 NOVEMBER 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100050021-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 1999
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: November 22, 1949
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION
INTELLIGE1CE SUMMARY Vol. IV N o.46
For Week Ending
22 November 1949
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Getting back to normal ................................. i
Political bickeri ngs, wage demands re-emerging
Alleged plot against Inonu ...............................
Basis for charges probably slight
vria
Election results ............... .
Populists win but unrest continues
Tudeh activities ...................................... 3
Government able to contain subversive activities
3rief
Egypt, Iraq, Iran .....................................
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NEAR EAST/A)?RICA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
back to normal: The waning of the military emergency is produc-
Ge~gn
ing a widespread psychological letdown, in Greece. Despite general aware-
ness that a potential Communist threat still exists and that urgent economic
and social problems remain to be solved, signs of lessening concern for
the national interest are e*Ident practically everywhere; even the combat
troops have apparently grown somewhat less vigilant now that all but about
1,5W guerrillas have been temporarily eliminated from the internal scene.
With the pressure for national unity lessened and the 1950 elections approach-
ing, the stability of the present populist-Liberal-Unionist coalition govern-
ment is declining. Members of the Liberal and Populist Parties are becom-
ing increasingly vocal in their partisan objections to the terms of the
coalition, while a tendency toward political fragmentation and new align-
ments is indicated by such developments as the defection from his party
by one of the leading Populists last week. Although the two parties may
be led to compose some of their differences in their common fear of a
pre-election service government under Marshal Papagos (for which certain
elements are increasing their pressure), the party leaders will probably
find it more and more difficult to hold their followers in line. Meanwhile, the
stability of the government is also being strained by a new surge of labor
unrest, with the unions now vigorously advancing huge demands long
deferred because of the military situation. Given the present psychological
atmosphere, the appeals for national unity which the government formerly
had to use with monotonous regularity may well prove to be not only useless
but politically inexpedient.
TUR1..EY
Alle ed plot against Inonu: Although reports are incomplete on the plot
against President Inonu allegedly fomented by a.few prominent members
of the opposition Nation Party, the government s accusations seem to be
based on very slight foundations. Nation Party members, whose hatred
of Inonu probably accounts for the creation of the party, would like nothing
better than to be rid of "that deaf old man," and indiscreet talk, prompted'
by wishful thinking, may well form the basis for the government's charges
and arrests. It is hardly conceivable, however, that the alleged plotters
believed the party capable of taking over the reins of government, as the
government charges.
The government's tactics may succeed in smearing the Nation Party
but not necessarily to the government's own gain. Many people who might
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of . ew-ise have supported tine arty can ea.s.y give their allegiance to
the r: uch stronger Democratic Party, whuch is equally vigorous, if less
violent, it its opposition to the ;overnr rent. Moreover, it the prosecutors ?e
aan&?.'e to make a convincing case of u* allegations, the whole affair may
boomerang, discrediting the government party itself In the eyes of .many
loyal Turks.
lec re infs. Last weeks parliamentary elections failed to provide
a clear-cut test of political strength to Syria. on the surface, the ballot-
ing represents a victory for the incumbent Populist Party (whose 50-odd
deputies represent the only major bloc.in the new 114-seat Constituent
Assembly) and thus confirms the shift in control of the government from
the conservative Damascus politicians of the pre-Zaim era to a more
vigorous element which is particularly strong in the rival city of Aleppo.
The fact that most of the old-line political leaders boycotted the voting,
the apathy of thee'ectorate, and the persistence of army intriguing all indi-
cate, however, that the political undercurrent remains strong in Syria. In
order to appease the various discordant elements, the Populists may have
to give up some of their relatively progressive plans for the country--if
they are not first turned out of office by still another coup d'etat.
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3.
Tudeh activities: Signs of renewed vigor in fran's outlawed Tudeh Party
suggest Soviet exploitation of the general unrest precipitated by the Majli.s
elections and the assassination of Minister of Court Hajir, although the
Iranian Government, with the help of the armed forces, is believed quite
capable of coping with subversive activities in the country. While the
Kremlin continues to manifest a benign official attitude toward Iran,
underground activities of the Soviet-backed Tudeh have Increased, party
members have been stirring up trouble .mong_ Iranian laborers in the
oil fields of nearby Kuwait, and a number of pro-Tudeh newspapers follow-
ing the straight Communist line have appeared on Iranian newsstands.
Whether the Tudeh Party had any part in Hajir's assassination has not
yet been determined, but Soviet financial aid has reportedly been extended
to at least one of the parliamentary opposition candidates said by the
assassin to be implicated in the plot.
NOTED IN BRIEF
Sirry's non-party Egyptian Cabinet, abruptly appointed by King Farouk
less than three weeks ago, has -apparently justified Its brief existence by
finally scheduling parliamentary elections for 3 January. Moreover, the
electoral arrangements made by the cabinet appear unlikely to attract
serious opposition on the part of the press or public. (The Chamber of
S T
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4.
Deputies has been dissolved to avoid the necessity of a protracted debate
opi~ she matter.) The draft electoral law itself is reasonably fair to the,
rna ority (Wafd) party and to the leading minority parties (Saadists and
Liberals). Furthermore, the cabinet's decision to reopen the voting lists,
so that additional names may be added during December, seems to be a
sufficient concession to meet Waidist demands that the "forged" electora
voting lists be revised prior to any election.
r rS
Regent cf Iraq continues to meet difficulties in obtaining a new ycernier.
The Regent would be willing to have All Jawdat al-Ayubi, candidate agar resign-
ing Prime minister Nurt, obtain the post on condition that jawdat retain in
the cabinet at least two of the old guard--Shakir el Wadi (who is alleged
to control the army) and Nuri himself. jawdat, however, wants a free
hand to bring in several young reformists and may refuse the premiership
under the Regent's conditions.
Former Prime minister Q avam of Iran is once ain pulling strings in an
effort to regain the premiership despite his seventy-seven years and
chronic ill health. Although Qavam still has a strong following in Iran,
it is improbable that he will succeed in restoring himself to power. To
do so, he would need the support of the Shah, who, in a stronger position
than ever before, would hardly consent to have an ambitious and domineer-
ing personality whom he has long distrusted obtain so important a post.
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