NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 14 DECEMBER 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100050024-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 1999
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: December 14, 1949
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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:t: AST/AY Cri DIVISION
(JFFIC:.E OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
t' NTI{M, IAIE1, iCi NCE AGENCY
DEC 141949
NCTIC: E: This do ume -c is a wur-king paper, not
ficial (LA issu t.nce.< i I a been. co-ordina--
'ed within (,A. but not Wji N the LAC Agencies
I k represent,. current Wiuaing; uy specialists in
s `IA, and is desigi td for use by others engaged
is similar or ov&s tapping bLudmi- The opinions
xpresst u ere in in y tie rt:,v,t,EG before final
A'Ad Ox:fIC:.lal oublicattun, it is lawaded solely
the iturma iun a rh** ,ddi essee and not for
DATE1~~Q REVIEWER;
AUTH: Hi 70-,
NEXT REVIEW PATE
ECL D
UMENT N?.
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;` EAST/At C UW&ON
iiiF Vol. 77,1 No.. 49
INTELIJ69NCE SUMMARY'
; e'+ ' 9G ' 3! 149
'he internationalization oZ jer sa, em . u , ., w ? . a r n .. ? , .... ? ? .
resolution gener iy conceded to be unenforceable
`1`tuyl
Wheat from Syria. .. .
Long-hoped-for deal only partially solves grain problem
17N aGdOn for Arab refugees , ,. _ ? ...... _ .. , w , . ? ... _ . ? .
CA resolution calls for less reli. and more work
Cabinet changes
No substantial shift In policy expected
xF"wu3~kelingas on .SJA s. v . r.. . o r r r r.. c o ~
Pakistanis getting restive over prolongation of stalemate
)toted in Brie
Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen,, youth Africa . ,> . , .. 4 4
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40" Ole W-
o;aOf fer Baleen. 'tae over- effect of the
ssexxsbly c;ecisto i fatty to interwationadze Jerusalem wiU be
era1
.
A.
t add net' elements of confusion to the aA a dy confused Palestine sit-
-fi:=tern without achieving iuternatta lx .t,oo `our factors contributed
. p a e GA's u n e x p e c t e d adoption Of t h e . uw-- resolution, which even
Uiolic U1' r,~nemberss to s cuz'e its vas;.e; (2) the. Soviet
a re ono Ca
.
.., , -
supported the measwe, &ubileass with Ile hope of obtaining a voice
Borers and the Ulf majority, and in order to register its displeasure
g t Israeel"s Western inclinations; 01 the Arab states saw a chance
to put Israel on the spot;. and (4) the Westri Powers failed to display
leadership in supporting any aiterna v^e ssol siorz.
Thus the UNGA finds itssrelt com::nitted to a measure which the
majority of the delegates privately admit is unrealistic and unenforce-
able. The expected refuaa . of Israel ar;i Jordan to cooperate with the
Trusteeship Council or to permit the entry of a UN Commissioner into
Jerusalem would effectively block implementation of the UN resolution.
The SC would be empowered to act onl3r if there should be a threat of
or a recurrence of fighting in Jerusalem between Jordan a Israel. Such
a development appears unlikely islsmuch as the recent GA decision does
not affect the existing armistice between Israel and Jordan. These states
are likely to work together, at least to the extent of preventing incidents
which would present the SC with grouts for intervening in Jerusalem.
Nevertheless, the Gena ral Assembly resolution will have signi-
ficant consequences. on the cruet silly (aa far as the US is concerned),
Israel may for the present modify its forts to maintain a neutral
position between the Soviet and Western worldsr "Me Israeli Government
has already halted all further transfer of ilusssian, church properties to
the USSR, and there have been a considerable number c defections from
the Israel Communist Pa3~ty. On the debit side, the 'PI had laid itself
open to charges of irresponsibility, a the effectiveness of its machinery
in other aspects of the Palestine case will be seriously irnpaire4t The
Th1s article is a joint product of W:aft D
rMW~
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alest1nce Conciliation Com ssion, which meets in Geneva in January
to conti Its efforts to lead Israel and the grab states toward a com-
prehensive peace settlement, will certainly find Israel no more coopers--
live than in the past. Tel.Aviv will almost surely intensify its efforka
to negotiate directly with the Arab states, although there is little reason
to believe that it is any more prepared now than formerly to moderate
its major claims. With the exception Jordan, the Arab states will take
courage from Iarael"s defeat on the Jerusalem issue to maintain their
policy of general intransigence and ostracism toward the Jewish state.
Now that the GA has passed the resolution, it is likely that search
will be made for some formula permit ng the UN to beat a retreat ?rom
its present difficult position. Former U Mediator Bunche has already
suggested that the Trusteeship Council might call on Jordan and Israel
to state what action they are prepared to take to internationalise Jerusalem.
On receipt of the expected negative answers, the Trusteeship Council
could then report to the next GA its i bility to implement Its decision.
Pending subsequent UN action, the peace of the city and the safety of the
Holy Places and access to them will continue to depend entirely on Israel
and Jordan.
TURKEY
Wheat from Svria: After months of negotiation, the Syrian Government
has finally agreed to provide the Turks with 50,000 tons of wheat, in
exchange for livestock and other surplus Turkish products. This agree-
ment will alleviate the wheat shortage in Turkey somewhat, It is more
than probable, however, that the Turlm will still have to find considerable
additional wheat in North America, earmarking more of their precious
gold stocks (accumulated principally during the war) in financing the
process. ECA credits have been helpful in this connection, but only to
a limited extent, so that--with national elections only a few months
distant--the Turks have already felt constrained to overcome some of
their deep-seated reluctance to tamper with their gold reserves. No
government in power can contemplate with equanimity the spectacle of
voters going to the polls hungry.
PAL1 SiAi E
action for Arab ref ees: Arab refugees will get less relief and
more work if the U resolution of 8 December is implemented. The
resolution calls for a $ 54 million prcgr. a n of works projects and relief
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It envisages the gradual assurnptioa of responsibility for both work
projects and relief by participating Arab states and the eventual termina-
tion of relief. This emphasis on sel t -help will appeal to the member
states of UN which will have to vote funds for implementation of the
new program. If successful, the program will reduce the necessity for
outright relief by providing at least some ofr the refugees with worth-
while work, which in turn will benefit the economies of the Arab states.
At the name time, the program may oe expected to lay a basis for the
ulttmate resettlement outside Paleati of many of the refugees, although
for poUttcal reasons the Arab govern ents will continue, to demand that
the refugees be permitted to return to their homes in Israel.
IRAQ
Cabinet chances: All Jawdat, the new Iraqi Prime Mtlinister, appears to
have won his point, A short time ago Jawdat (former Prime .nester
and 3ftnister to the US) agreed to accept the premiership on condition
that prime Minister Nuri Said and Defense :mister Shak3ir el Wadi
were not included in the cadet. This stipulation proved unacceptable
to the Regent, who persuaded Nurt to continue in office. Announcement
has now been made, however, the Jawdat will head a new government in
which neither bind nor Shadr el Wadi will hold cabinet posts.
The change probably presages no significant alternation of Iraqi
policy. It is unlikely that Jawdat"s talk of reform will lead to any sub-
stantial progress toward that end inasmuch as most of the key posts in
the now cabinet (notwithstanding the absence of Nuri and Wadi) are
still held by old-guard politicos who may give lip service to progressive
measures but who will undoubtedly drag their feet when it comes to a
question of implementation. They will probably feel particularly in-
different toward the matter of reform now that Ira`s financial difficulties
have been somewhat eased by lows, the increase in oil royalties
resulting from the opening of the 16-inch pipeline to Tripoli, and the
favorable progress of negotiations for an International Bank loam
IA -PAKISTAN
Rumblings on Kashmir Although almost a year has passed since the
end cf organized fighting in Kashmir, there are indications that the
Kashmir issue may still be capable cf producing serious trouble. In
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? .stan, bitterness toward India has stea%tily grown in recent months,
a point where it is perhaps more intense than at any time since the
jab massacres of 1947. In part, tb s sentiment arises out of several
ax-reaching factors not directly related to the Kashmir dispute:
India's economic boycott of Pakistan toltowhg the latter'ss re?usal to
devaluate its currency; the continued stalearaete over the evacuee pro-
rty issue; and the water rights dispute, hick has been publicized in
Pakistan as threatening to turn West Punjab into a desert again., Linder
t tng the irritations regarding these matters, however, is a growing
impatience with India s success In delaying the establishment of a fair
plebiscite in Kashmir -a vote which the Pakistanis are convinced
would be favorable to them. Unless the UN Security Council, in its
forthcoming discussion cf the Kashmir issue, unexpectedly makes more
headway than did CIP, popniar feeling on the subject will increase.,
Rumblings about the annexation a Kashmir by force are already notice-
able, not only among the t:?ibessmen, who would form the spearhead of
such a venture, but also among the more stable working-class element
in the Punjab.
The chances are that tike Government of Pakistan, which well
realises that a war with India might prove to be suicidal, will be able
both to control its own irritation and to nip In the bud any spontaneous
flareup against Indio Given the present popular mood, however, it
is barely possible that the idea c seizft Kashmir might prove irresist-
able; under the circumssta..aces, even the Pakistani Government might
finally bow to the Inevitable and give Its official sanction to the movement,
NOTED IN BRIEF
while the Greek labor ettaaation is still shah^9. , a temporary solution may
be in sight. The government, which is the national collective bargaining
agent, as made some concessions in the settlement of individual strikes,
and has appealed to labor to suspend its claims and participate in joint
government-labor-employer committees which will study and administer
wage adjustments based on production and profit trends. Although labor
leaders have scoffed at the committee plan as a mere delaying tactic,
they may soon be inclined to accept a compromise after further proofs of
government sincerity, in view of the impossibility of obtaining general
across-the-board increases, the flag rank-and-file response In the
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A e -- aeUs Marie, ad the recision c the union
G x~` cancel .?y:,- iui tor ea :a rak. strike.
r r r ~ ~ o, ii.)n A + ej, Is making such A igh
i C?e ~5.`.~'A Bujp R 'tG 101 IGY r. ,wail +irac alai C+44i{.e party a to .~VRe
_
",ip: m- :; tat he really believes, to same v tent, in what he says,..
41
ci ms a oo, i n fact, to-PreSOLt si .ere iOeltat r .xt':e tt t h e U s u a l
lietting t e in
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