NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 15 FEBRUARY 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100060006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 15, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Nor
s DIVISION
OIC 011 REPOWA'S AW ESTIMATES
CENTRAL IN'RELLIGENCE AGENCY
FEB 15 1950
-"WORKING APER
NOTICE: This de.e.t.xn,,ni, is WZY/ kiAg paper,
offlc.Nial CIA isswtace. teis hecri
-withia ORE, buic WIVE with ale IAC
rzpr6scalts cutra,;:At thig*ing by specialists in
CIA, and is dtsigia4A I irt.34-:???: by, others eagagcd
sirtiliar or' .,.)veriLppiag Tbe opinions
6xprezsd ht,:,;:nain may bc'?t ised bdore final
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EAST/iiii,C.. DIVISION
ItNTELLIaCEStilvIMARY
Egicling
,i'ebruary 4D50
TABLE 0* ? ? 'S
)21
,?c)mcaunisf_ eiection aims . 0000000000 ? ? 4 ? a . ? ?
JOKE backs new leftist bloc but is also hc,pefful about Plastiras
key
Turkish-Italian relations . . . . ........ . . .
Tnrks see impending friendship pact as new link with West
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Turkey Syria. Iraq, iIin *mall /and, Iran, India .
N ir firiefl
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NEAR/EAST AFRICA lei e.:LeaGENCE. SUMMARY
eleslits aims: Ithough its iilegai stems prevents the Greek
Ceremunist Party (KKE) from perticipatibig directly in the parliamentary
elections to be held 5 March, Gereek Communiets are hopeful of obtaining
some benefits from the balloting,. The primary object of Communist sup-
port is the fellow-travellirg ex-Foreign Minister John Sophianopoulos,
ehose new "Democratic Feonie ' a combination of leftist splitter groups
etueeded with minor luminaries from the ,eld C0111 Munist-led National
Libeeation Front (EAM), represente the farthest left of the legal Greek
partees. Since the "Democratic' Front" leeks the .strength to wIis more
than a few seats, however the Communists are also keeping an eye on the
possibility c3f eventually altaining a working arrangement with former
Premier (and retired general) Nicholas Plastiras. Plastiras and his
Pregressive Liberal cohorts may win es mato, as 20 or 25 seats and could
thus provide fairly formidable support. for sub immediate Communist
objection as a "general amnesty" (permitting the return of the ICKE leaderit,
from exile), a sweeping relaxation of security measures, azid the restora-
tion of legal status to the Communist Party. While Plastiras seems anti-
communist at heart and not inclined te exaggerate his leftist tendencies so
long as he feels able to meke a onsiderable lamed into the Liberal vote,
ti rnay be more tepee to negotiations with the "Demodratie Front' at
:m-time after the election, particularly 0 he feels that he could thereby
improve his stature within the governinent and possibly affect the balance
of power.
Tierkish-ltalian re1akns rom the Tuzitish pallet of view, the soon-ioehe
eoreekuded Italo-Turkish feiendship agreement is useful chiefly as a means
of strengthening Turkey's relationships with the Western pewers. The
Turks have been deeply resbritful of the tact that another Mediterranean
powareeand a former enemy power to boot?was admitted to the North
Atlantic Pact :,ehen "benevolently' ' neutral Turkey was tlxcatatied. Despite
this feeling, they have reelistically gone ahead with negotiations or the
agreement, which appears to make no provisions for mutual defense
guarantees such as are incorporeted Jae Turkey's still valid 1939 'treaty
'with France and the UK. The Turks evidently geel that, even Sc apparently
lenocuous a document at 'met serves to bind there closer to the Western
community.
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Niao ?404,
NOTED IN BRIEF
Turkey has resortedlz made a direct ofire. to Syria of.' free-port privileges
in the harbor of Iskenderun (Aloxaedretta). The idea 41_ making such an
ofbar has long apogkalecl to many Turks, inasmuch as Syrian acceptance e
such privileges 'would tend to represem 4;61acia recognition of Turkey's
sovereignty over Hatay province, ohich Syria has never formally accepted.
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inallortsof grain into Turkey, or land oe ez.pctled, appear o have solved
ttic problem a tood shortages created by ,7e,;ttr's Invireas Tborp!
is talk of hunger in the Black' Sea coast& &rink, but the Situation does
not appear to be bad. With he aid (47, ECA-linanced agricultuval machinery
and expert advice?and given a continuation of the excellent weather condi-
tions which have so 1.4r obtained--Turkeys grain harvest during the corning
months may well 1m:wide a sizable expoCiabla surplus.
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The "Bring back Quviwatii rncv:rnetApiA, -Ars to be increasirg in strength
in certain Syrian po1itiaI and military circles. The ex-President, ousted
by Zatin in the ffirst of last year's military coups, symbolizes not only
republican sentiment and anti-Iraqi utoitendencies but also a dsgree of
political stability that has been generally teal: since his ouster; lu
addition, he is a friend a Ib n Saud and, by virtue of Ms tAtil*Cgt vesideY1Ce
Egr*,a ot'o puoit }Sepia!' tyrniMhy, Qtre-gNatli
i1/413.1.1s is WI appeaiing rigure 0 Syrian politicians and array officers who
have grown weary of par icipating tr&ow:mu:tents marked by inefeetivencis
and dissention. The catc.i is, og etOtiA'se, that even an attempt to bring back
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atimistal,
tkw. relatively stable conditions othe regime might stit up trouble:
aAf Plum of Quwwatii mighr provoke sUil anrither coup.
&were floods are torecast tor lrn as aesui-i. tit unusually heavy snow-
fall in northwest Iraq and the 1131)1315a14$ of Iran and Turkey. Storms have
already exceeded those of 1946, which brought, widespread devastaaon.
JtaLsvithdrwa1 of General Nasis awointemenk. as Administrator of
ST:Filliland should clear another boulder from the rocky road to Italo-
Ethiopian rapprochement. The Ethiopian Government had strongly protesteyi
this appointment, donouncirg General NISI tor his activa participation in
the Italo-Ethiopian War and lior his subseque.nt conduct as Vice Governor of
Italian East Attica. It also siAted that, it considered his return to East
Mrlua a menace to (he security- of Elhi$.43ia.
The mistence of kaustic wad ethnic iif yecs amoz ie franins has
ftinally been publkly recognized: by the Iranian Government. Radio Tehrar
now inciudes itt its repertory Kardish programs VII various dialects, and
it has doubled the length cit is Turkish program. &Ace the 1920s the
government has strenously promoted the concept of a monolithic 50C1ati
strudure in Iran. Nevertheless, the iitive kongues persisted, and the
Soviets made special language broadcasts tin the Kurdish and Turkish-
speaking people a northivestern Iran. The broadcasts now coming from
Tehran, together with the government'ri curet policy of concilalion
wward the tribal groups which speak Iturdish and Turkish, should help to
r.ouoterr Soviet radio agitakion.
The Iranian Chief of Staff General fiaztnarci has urged that he be given se ale.
tdeaof Trall'S position in the US strategic concept. Specifically, he wants fo
know what US assistance would be immediately aortheoming if the Soviet
Aysray sholdd invade Iran. nartnara kels that he cannot build an efitective
army or justify the proposed increase La Iran's military budget without
high-level discussion (which the US military mission in Iran cannot under-
take) it US-Iranian nailb.a.ry plans. 'Pie Irinian search for greater US suprpont,
whether in the form of material tici 1ilitary guarantees, or closer high-
l(wei cooperation, reflects the LEGiingc 'insecurity which Persistently un -
settles Iranian leaders ;cid their depeiidence on constant reassurances of US
ipterest in Iran.
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ra, -,-.:ubservience oirares banned Tndeh Party to the USSR is underliaed
by a recent pronouncement o the Ca-Ural Committee of the party. Tha
Cornmittee inaluded the Tudeh among those national Communist Partios
Yibiat have declared thta their countries will never fight Soviet Russia,
and it also asserted that the Shah in no way represents the Iranian nation.
The vehemence ei, the statement and the clear indication oR the TudePfs
complete allegiance fo the USSR are boluid to alienate certain elements
*Matta although non-Communist, itavared the Tudeh Party because they
telt 'f.hat it offered thp anty sincere program of internal reforms. Thus the
pronouncement, which was probably prapared at the behest oil the Soviet
Embassy in Tehran. indicates a high-level decision to pare the patty down
to a hard core oq loyal Commimists.
Relations between Ladia ard Pakisean contimie to show serious straira the
gocnI polat of ttension this time being located in the area in and about East
Pakistan. During the, 'last week, serious communal rioting, totio-wed
by small-scale minor ity inigr?attoas across the border, took placcin
Calcutta, (India), Dacca TErist Pakistan), and in several smaller pla.ces,
aral though the prcarincial and caatral vvernments of both countries showed
considera.ble energy in combatting lawlessness, leelim among many elements
og ihe populace remains high. Elsewhere in India and Pakistan manigcstations
6: hostility have subside-td some what as both sides aaniit the outecme UN
consideration dr the Kaatualr dirsia?te. UN progress toward the settlement
ol; that dispute still appears anlikciy, however, and the other matters ,cde
aontantion between the twa, eountries remain equally unsolved. erom ec
less an authority khan Field ivlarstial Auchinleck --fz'orrcer Commander la
Chief,' dr the Indian AI! my?who has just completed a tour of Pakistan
Array units, comes a private extrressiou cg opinion that war In the early
spring is inevitable.
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