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November 9, 2016
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January 26, 1999
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March 15, 1950
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Approved For lease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-15f090A000(100060010-4 NEAE EAST/ 14'1/1C/, DIVINiON OFFICE OF REPOIITS Al:?4D 'ESTIMATES cENTRIa, INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 1.-VDRIUNC PAPER MAR 15 1950 NOTICE: This dcn s a. NO pape; VI Di an official CIA,i. been rdth ted -within ORE, but nut with i IAC Agencies. tepresents cut rInkirg by sPaCilliStS CIA, anti is desir-fv,id ki use by ofhcrs Gagned sitni17.1L-orc.,..-2-tlal3pize, Tilt.: opinions express;qi tivir:;1:;1 my be rer,ii-L,A beioil-er) and oifictla.1 pub.f..L:1Y41::)n, ItL solely for the informal:lord ( 41 nhdresse,t., ta!:,,,d not for further NO MENT NO. I.P---------. 1N CLASS. 0 DECLA CLASS. CHANGED S S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: Ailli t70-ZIA. DATE:L:12v ON_._ REVIEWER: 006 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 0flAaaq I4Aflfl1 0-4 Approved For'44ftlease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79:61090A000100060010-4 el".1111- unT. V Vv. 10 4.0c4xAkit Y7.7ir Week 1h1r?g March..-.L.950 --4.bLE Ole liTkiATb Thunder on the right . Wing and ultra-rightists bitterly oppose Plastiras Coalition runors Imminent mergJr of PRP and DI roderates appear', doubaul The assault on Riad 3u111 2 Attack on prewier reflocts gcneral dissatisfaction Anti-Ethtopian bloc disintegrating , Independence forces now at only fraction of former trength. s 11, _ Nazmara and the preAoz4a140 Demanaa for a nutong urn" vill continue *NAJfk-,akisn jJ. (lehru under fire . , . , . Patel gi,.oup ikL2.i criical of major lines of po The Bengal situation . citoment decramsing at present but area still 25X6A Turkey, 5audt AraL4f zsusranalc.G., Iran, Africa . 0 4 CJ 4 6 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-kDP79-01090A00162=010-4 ' Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000100060010-4 1?1&;i UI1UiI GL11;4Cit tebender212_ etroevee%.ive eautriet coalition lMd by the b3-year old Republican revolutionary hero, General nastitas, is encountering bitter opposition from rightist circles. The three center leader's, Venizelosr Papandreou, and Plastiras--who appear assured of the support of some e5-60 perceat of the 250 membees of the new Parliament?have agreed un a moderato program welch specifically recognizes the conetitutional posLtien of the Crown and promisee a contin- uation of a firm prc-Weetern aeel anti-Communist policy. These guaraatees, however, have not allayed rightist, and specifi- cally Palace, dietaste for Plestiree, whom Xing Paul sees as a traditional foe of monarckw, a potential Communist appeasers and a rival for the strong-mat rola the Xing has envisaged for flarshal Papagon. The Falece tee already made an unsuc- cessful attempt eo enliet OD support in thwarting the forma- tion of the centrist bloc. The Xing ray still try to delay the appointment of a 7'lastirae Government until just before the convening of Parliament on 30 Aarch in the hope that the delay might waken the coalit!,on materialiy, thus noces- sitating new elections in -which Papagos could participate. The centrist leaueess nudaUttLin-opared eo work in harmony on imporeaet nat'Lone0 policies, could expect ade- quate initial support from Pvrliament. Their coalition, however, would probably become incroaeingly subject to undercutting, not only from ;he right wing which, 2ed by the plurality Populists, vil% control some 30-35 Percent of the (hamber but aleo from the Communists, who will probably be able to influence about 10 percent of the new deputies, including perhp a=call but significant fraction of Plastiras own backing. In their attempts to fruatrate and divide the coalition) the opposition may be able to take advantage of exteenal presoures on the government. The wage- price issue, Which might weJ1 furnish the government's first real test la view of the recent sharp rise in infla- tionary tendenciee, provide. a partieularly good opportunity for a joint onslaught ou the government by the right wing, which dominatee the top trade union leadership and the Core munists, who are currently attempting to encourage labor =reset. The failure of a cenerLst government under this or atsy other of the numorous ppee-election stresses would fteeost certainly leave Greece vit-eoet any otaor viable governmental combination w%thin the present l'arliament, New election would then be U4 ienlinent orobabllity, Cale time under a aajorite system ef voting 94) that a "strong" govern- ment could more eaelly be f'oread Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01090A00014M010-4 Approved For Rase 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01220A000100060010-4 MIRMIMPITWIL oaJLjtjcyi rUUDIV: CUkrWitt Ui ae impending coaon of the opposition Democratic Peete (DP) and the ruling People's Republican Party (FRPI probably deserve little eredence, at least foe the present. Some grounds for a possible regrouping of Turkey 'e tem major partiee does exiet. Democratic leader Cele' Bayer, for example, probably feels R certain sense of feuetrationeover occaeional defectiome by aome of his more active supportere, who accuse him of arbitrary leadership and lack of anti-government vigor, and over the ? adeptness with which the PRP moderates have enacted and taken the credit for legislation the DP has demanded; he might veil feel more comfortable enaconeed In the cabinet alongeide Deputy Prime Minister Heim and other PRP moderates than with some of the more fiery gentlemen in his own group. A3 for the PRP, there is even less in =moon between the moderate wing and such diehards as ex-Premiee Poker than between Bayer and the malcontents who bave been dropping out of the DP; a coalition of the moderate element in both parties might make good political uense. Vevertheless, the factors militat- ing against a coalition appear Ulu, far to be compelling. With tho elections nov expecteC to take place in May, Bayer would hesitate at this late date to riek the alunst certain loss of much of the DP support he has built up, while the PRP moderates, mindful of the advantages of having a smoothlr operating political machine at their disposal, may well be more tnclined to party regularity than ever. Perhaps all conceened may prefer to wait and soe how the elections go before deciding on the advantages or otherwise of any pos- sible re-alignmente, 1.1BA140-1M The eesault on Riad 6uth: The unsucceusVul attempt on the life of Prime Minieter Riad Selh made on 8 Merch can pro- bably be taken as eymptomatie of the general dissatisfaction with the government, even though the motives of the would- be assassin have not been definitely eatablished as political. Opposition to corruption and dietational methods of the en- trenched Lebanese Government has been increasing, and various elements have unsuocessfully advocated a general political house-cleaning and the holding of new elections. The Inability of the various anti-government splinter forces to forma united front has left the oppesition particularly ineffective, however. Although Zulh's assailant is reportedly a member of an illegal organization, 'tee 5erian Popular Part yt members of other groups KayaL b terpted to resort to violence. The Lebanese Government'a expected efforts to cighten anti- opposition controi 1LU. probably only make the political pot boll more violently. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01090A I 01 SS I 60010-4 Approved For Reese 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0V0A000100060010-4 01101,11n1 _Hqi-Tr01.4 Anti-Et41.22141a group,die e le apg; Aecent wholesale defections from theti-Ethlopiein) Eritrean Independence Aloe leave the organized independence movement at a fraction of Its former strength. In part, the falling away of pro- independence elements refleots a growing realization that the Italians?who are backing the independence movement, would eventually dominate an independent Eritrea--an idea ae dis- tasteful to nationalists as union with Ethiopia. The defec- tions, however, mainly represent a belief that some sort of . union with Ethiopia is now inevitable; the majorite of the Independence Bloc have decideclto jump on the Unionist band- wagon, hopiog to salvage some eonoessions from Ethiopia through a compromise plan. Representatives of the hgra Liberal Unionist Party, composed of Copts and Nbslems who split from the pro-independence Liberal Progressives have already been in Addis Ababa for several wke ee reportediy securing concessions from the Ethiopian. Government; they are said to have agreed on somethlog simalar to the UB federation plan euggested during the last General Aesetb1y. Although the majority appear to favor a loose form of federation with ilthiopia as a workable compromise plan, the 'ON Commission of Inquiry appeare to be too violently nplit to come out with a unanimous recommendation to that effect; the Guatemalan and Pakistani representatives favor Independence, and the Norwegian, South African, and Burmeee representatives favor some form of union with Ethiopia. In any event, however, it will b, up to the GA to make the fin& decision, and a great deal of oressure can be brought to bear between 15 June vbet the Commission must deliver its findings, and SeptemLer, when. the GA meets. Deepite the Commission's possible split recommendationa? a compromise favorable to Sthiopia is still likely to be reached in the GA. Rezmara and the premierehipt The spreading belief of maue lranians--that their country's economic woes call for strongev leadership than can be found among the shopworn group of politicians who have thua far rotated in office--was strikinely illustrated when 35 members of the Najlie recently called on Chief of Staff Razmara to urge him to eeek the premiership. General Razmara, who has recently been proclaiming that drastic economic, eoelal, aad admenistrative reform is the only alternative to revolution, gave the deputies a non- committal reply despiee his peeviouz assertion that be collie bring order out of oliace eiLhtle six months; in view of the reported Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000100060010-4 Approved For F,ease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0a90A000100060010-4 ? eppositian of the 6han to hie esnendeeyi anuary, when Ise indicated his availabilite to hued the eovernment, it Is entikely that Razmara will make tee direct attempts to seek the premierahip. Indeed, there la considerable question as to how he fits Into the political picture despite his eeformist statemente, Ais most better opponents are the liberal elements of the Dr. Roseedoe group, and hia present eupport may well come from coneervative members of the ruling elass wore interested in checkin6 the current disintegration in Iran that in carrying throue4 the long-range reforme Aaemara has advocated. Nevertheeesse demands for a "strong eeln" will undoubtedly increese usiese something drastic is done to improve Iran's economic.' lot, and (as Razmara may well hope) the course of events may eventually lead the Shah to bring his chief of etaff to power. nehZU vuder fIxe: rrime NJ-alto-se senreee conduct or 1ndi3'8 affairs is evidently encountering strong opposition from both within and without the government. Recent reports indicate that Deputy ?rime Minister Patel, supported by a majority of the cabinet, ha a become sharply critical of ueveral major aspects of cuerenl Indian policy, reportedly cnarging that Nehru has (1) toed away the potented bene- fits of closer ties with the U3 and UK in the unrealiutic hope that India might achieve lnsting friendship with Com- munist China and the USSR as weel; (2) failed to make a eufficiently determined effort to come to term* with Pakietan; and (3) frightened away foreign and domestic investors with the spectre of socialism at a time when India has urgent need of private inveetments aboee and beyond the fundn the government itself can obtain. Aeanwhile, Nehru is belng pressed to take a more oe11izer3nt attitude toward Pahletan be extremist anti-Ebslem elements, notably in West Bengal and among the Sikh and Punjabi refugees. These outcroppings 04 oppoki.ltioa Lo Nauru do not proeag,,,, his fall from power. iatee's &roup, despite the sweeping nature of its criticises, has been attempting to persuade she prime minister rathe.o than eo displace him, and, in general, Nehru seem aeeered o: remaining the outstanding single influence in the countre unless some catastrophic development completele the Indian Government. Nevertheless, this doulae etesek on la:Ls policies has un- doubtedly shaken a sen s'eo bad hzvcd that his leadership would be accepted :41oL, tiriy 'wit 11.0 %ndia but throughout Asia. His current mood iu seeereetly co of frustration and .11111=li. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000100060010-4 Approved For lease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-trr090A000100060010-4 indecision: although he privatela concedes Patel 's contention taet India has no real friends he stubbornly refuses to change ii 'oreign policy, and althougi. he arts that capital has nothing to fear from his government ha fails to support legis- lation which vould make those assuranees convincing. That a powerful group in the eaeinet favors a more realietic Policy--a view which evidentle utens from the aober fears of the business community about continuing political and economic tenzion--gives promise treat a more etable and sore Pro-Western India may eventually emerge. Until and unless Nehru can be persuaded to cone to terns with Patel 's groups, however, the present intra-governnental dissention will dissipate the energie* of Irdia's leaders and will make the government more vulnerable than ever to pressure from those who oppose any compromase pith Pakistan. The,Bengal pituatiohe Excitement over the situation in Bengal, cuivently the focal point of tenvion between India and Pakistan, seens to be decreasing for the moment, India, 'which at one point appeared to be seriously eoneidering the stationing of troops so that they could easily be sent across the border to protect at Bengal Hindus, has sent some additional troops Into the Calcutta area but appears thoroughly aware of the grave military and International conzequences which an inva- sion of Pakistan would entail. _Pakistan, for its part, realizes that it would have little chance of winning the war Which would ensue. Tte two Bengals, however, remain a uource of almost eertain disturbance. Over population, the existence or large religious minorities In both provinces, and the effect of economic warfare on their inter-deperdent economaes provide a strong basis for social unrest; in addition, the Bengalis are a people noted for a volatile temperament and a predis- position toward violence, Thus far the persecution of Hindus has apparently been more 'widespread than the ma/treatment of their Ebs/em counterparts across the border, and resentment Is strongest among the West -Sengal hindus. The principal danger, consequently, is that new anti-Hindue outbreaks In East Pakistan may not only provoke new retaliations In West Bengal but also enable the Bengali leaders and various reace tionary Hindu groups to bring etrong pressure for interven- tion on the part of the Indian Government. There are a number of West Bongali groups wieh irridentist aims in Beet B.;ngal 'which would welcome such an opportunity to press for action, and it is even poseiole that acme of their members might act as agents prevocateure IIPMW Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000100060010-4 Approved For *lease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0/1590A000100060010-4 t1 ? .2COTED IV fatiEk? The Turkish ;Legation 131 *cfla has just been handed strongly worded Bulgirlan note in vhich the Turics are reportedly de- nounced for their alleged failure to safeguard Bulgarian representatives in Turkey and ror their generally "scandalous attitude" in the matter. Obviously, it will be difficult for the Turkish Government to continue in its current attitude of forbearance toward Bulgaria; the language of the note leaves the distinct impression that the Bulgarian Government is aiming, if not at a total break in diplomatic relations, at least at the recall of Turke5i'a repreeentatives in Bulgaria, In order to avoid obliging the Bulgarians, however, the wily Turks might temporize by once acaln suggesting that ciftference: between the two countries be referred to the Internet:A:1ne1 Court or Justice for adjudication, In according de jure recognitien to 4grael, the Turkieh Government undoubtedly hopes to promote peace and stability in the Near and Middle East. The Turks are realistic enough to realize that their Arab neighbore will not promptly follow Turkey's lead. However, Iran has just decided on dpq_EAsast_ recognition of Israel ,and the Turks may well expect that other states of primarily Moslem population may follow suit. 25X6A Jaw Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000100060010-4 Approved Forlrelease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-trr090A000100060010-4 Tenston in_the Jeyis,h community 91 lpaq_may_ease if the fiegent signs a pending bill which legalizes emigration, on conda.tion Coat nationality is forfeited and VD more than !-NO dinars ($140) is withdrawn by am. emigre. The prospect oi tnus ei;arting life afresh in Israel will probably not appeal to the more settled majority of the Tevieh community, particu- larly eine? the government has recently relaxed a regulation prohibit Jews from disposing of property valued at over 2,000 dinars($5, 00). Neverthe/ese, tha bill does provide a way for malcontents to depart without resort to deception and bribery, and the effect on the mOrale or the Jewish community in general should be a salutory one. Poor Iraqi7Egystian_relations--more tie rule than the excep- tion since the war--have again been underscored by two recent incidents. When Iraq prevented a 'Misr" plane from continu- ing from Cairo to Tehran, Egypt retaliated by grounding an Iraq civil plane. Last week the dgyptian Voreign Minister raised another issue when he stated that Egyptian school teachers would soon be withdrawn from Iraq, ostensibly be- cause ggypt needs their services, but actually because Egypt is displeased with Iraq's foreign policy. Behind these in- cidents, stands a long-term rivalry for power in the Arab area. At the Arab League meeting in Uairo last fall Egypt proposed a general "collective security pact," mainly to thwart the development of an enlarged Hashimite kingdom in which Iraq would be the dominant influence. Iraq in turn, as eager for the replacement or the Egyptian Secretary- General of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha, and the eetablishment of an entente involving the emile Crescent nationm alone. The recent fall in Baghdad of the Jawdat Government, whose relations with Egypt were on a reirly cordial basis, and the subsequent formation or a pro-buri Cabinet terminated a brief honeymoon. It is unlikely that am firm friendehip can be developed between the two countries however, as long as basic rivalries remain unresolved. 25X6A Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000100060010-4 Approved Forftelease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-irr090A000100060010-4 ?041011.1ff 8. 25X6A Prime.1044ster Onar_Eansour Aeicnia c4Ija_Eggt1.2a has resigned following charges by thu adviso-;1-61raneican rational Council that he was guilty or represeivo ac ',,ions and "old style" Turkish) methods. The Znir plans to wait for the new Wational Assembly to nomlua',e a new prime mtnister, fol- lowing the elections scheduled for L0-25 Parch. It i3 dif- ficult to See how the iesembl ,.3an be elected and meet by its scheduled date or .i?) March, however, in viev of the conplete lack of electoral machinery and a modern communications system. As a result, Cyrenaica my be without a prime minister for longer than the Emir expects. U4_po1i2v toward Iran vie reci.y attacked during a Najlis debate on the program of the *tced Government. Deputy Ashtiani Zadeh, an ex-Qavandet, aoeused Premier Saed of placing Iran In an antagonistic position tovaxd the USR by surrendering Iranian independenoe to ',G11.U3 witheut receivin6 a sl.ngle concession. He also expreese4 eviews of a number of Majlis niemhers %MD wish to stop the 11c.dlo Teheran relay of VOA, by ..10111 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000100060010-4 Approved Forlt6lease 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-M90A000100060010-4 4011111.110P 9 :Accusing the US broadcasting unit of attempting to create cAeorder in Iran. Increased pro-Soviet_activity has been noted in several areas of 'Iran. Martial. law has been established in the Gurgan area (adjoining TuriacentibR), where a group of fifty Persians and Turkmen has been arrested on charges of espionage and subversive activities. At Shahi in the Caspian Province of Mazanderau eight Tudeh agitators have been arrested? In Khorassan, the US Consulate at Neshed reports that an increase In leftist activity hae been marked by the appearance of several leftist newspapers and oi a new Soviet-sponsored party (HIZB,AZADKHAH, party.of freedom lovers). A well-placed US observer visiting itheeaz, seat of Iran's oil industry and an important transportation center, reports that Communist Influence is also spreading there, 3uspicion of DS participation in A:Crime affairs was evidenced at the inter-goverhmentel African Teansportation Uonference recently concluded in Paris. DeJ_egates from the states having African dependencies showed an unwillingness to discuss rtCA suggestions for a comprehensive survey el* transportation. needs in Africa south of the Sahara, apparently in the belief that acceptance of an WA proposal for such a survey would be used by political opponents as evidence that the us is diatat- Ing in the affairs of their overseas territories. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000100060010-4