NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 29 MARCH 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100060012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 29, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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1.43"ftP,30 ItVIELL,,a-/p.;.tsiCE AGENCY
,q(7.131clasIci PAPER
MAR 29 1950
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Vcr Week Ending,
_March J.950
iLE Ow (NATENT.5
Vol. V Vo. 12
Instability likely . . . . . .
Formation of Venizelos Government has unsettling- effect
Turkey
Intinn's program . . . . . .
Turkish President calls for peaceful reform
? 4
5ov1et gestures ........ , ,...? . 9 ? 290 02
"Conciliatory" USSR plays on current Iranian uncertainties
The now premier . . ? , 4 o 9 ? ? ? 0 9 ? 0 0 0 3 -
Appointment of Pansur a blow to hopes of reform
War tendencies .
1TPAint,(9.31-
? S 9 ??
. 9 R P ? 0 0 ? ? 0 V ? 'c
Factors making for conflict are potent
25X6A
Arab League, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Gold
Coast . a t . qJ OM94 404 0 S 6 6 as? *Ca
:Ooted tu. Brier
?441,6aitelZ
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WEAR FAST/AFRICA IliTtL,LIGV UE BUPWARY
GREECE
Instabilitx_likely: The recent rormation or a new government
by Liberal leader Venizeloe will have unfavorable repercus-
sions in Greece and abroad. Baying alienated the other center
parties (and a significant portion or his own following) by
withdrawing from his earller promdee to participate in a
centrist coalition under General Plastiras? Venizeloe now
heads a weak cabinet representing less than one fourth of
the new Parliament and dependent for its existence on the
tolerance of basically unsynpathetic rightist parties. Under
these circunstances there ie little likelihood of stable and
effective government, and unloue the broadly based centrist
coalition can be reconstituted, Greece will probably soon be
faced with the prospect or new elections.
The key role of the Palacio In thwarting the formation
of a now government accurately reileuting the election swing
toward the center has not escaped popular notice and can
ecarcely fail to involve the Xing in charges of politioal
favoritism and intrigue. New elections, on which the King
apparently counts to put in orf ice a strong Palace-backed
party under Marshal? Papagos, would probably result in the
revival of traditional dissension over the monarchy, the eclipse
of the established political parties, and the division of
Greece into rival monarchist and republican cans. These
developments would be severely damaging to the effectiveness
of the US aid program end to the stability of the Greek nation.
TURKEY
Inand's programa With Turkey's elections now definitely
scheduled for 14 Nay, President Inlind last week launched his
own campaign for a seat in parliament with what nay well
prove to be one or the met astute speeches of him career.
In offering what he termed a program for the next four years,
the Turkish President expressed himpelf eo as to appeal to
progressive elements in the electorate without sacrificing
his well-earned reputation for caution and coneervatiene
After announcing that be would "guide the foreign policy of
Turkey on the path of marete--a statement hardly calculated
to startle b43 auditors--Indna announced that his two major
aisle were to prevent the outbreak of political violence and
to amend the constitution "in accordance with the requirements
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4400 NWT
diggimP.
of our democratic life In thus using his old technique
of proposing the very sort of reform the opposition most
hotly advocates (meanwhile appealing to the prudent to vote
against the potentially violent opposition hotheads), Inana
has left the government oarty's opponents with little undis-
puted ground except in the realm of economic affairs.
With regard to constitutional reform, the president did
not elaborate beyond suggesting the creation of a second
legislative assembly and a careful definition of the duties
and powers of the chief of state in relation to such a bi-
caneral legislature. However, he was obviously thinking of
the fact that at present every article of the constitution
except the first one, designating Turkey as a republic, can
be amended by a simple two-thirds vote of the National Assembly;
many thoughtful voters would doubtless be reassured if the
amending process were changed so that 'alai's ruling People's
Republican Party (or any other party) could not swiftly enact
sweeping changes in the fundamental law of the land. The
government party, however, appears to be placing its principal
emphasis on the political violence iseue3 President inand'e
warnings on the subject were echoed by Premier analtay? who
promised fair and free elections and, obviously recollecting
dark threats made by the opposition during the past year,
sternly warned the electorate to act in an orderly manner.
These expressions of concern about possible violence seem
somewhat exaggerated, even though the political temperature
is likely to rise now that the electoral campaign is officially
on. If any outbreaks take place, they are likely to occur
after the balloting, on the basis of opposition charges of
foul play at the polling places, rather than before. Indeed,
there is a good chance that the electoral period will be
entirely free of violence, first, because the Turks (regard-
less of opposition threats) are not given to that sort of
thing; second, because most Turks--if they do not recognize
it in advance--would realise the danger of violent internecine
strife in the face of the Soviet menace; and third, because
the elections, while unlikely to be conducted under conditions
anywhere nearly perfect, may quite possibly be run more
smoothly and fairly than any others that have been conducted
anywhere in the Asiatic Near East In modern times.
Soviet gestures: Iranian reaction to the conciliatory
attitude which the USSR is currently displaying toward Iran
Mate
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3 -
ranges from advocacy of a reciaLevai Iranian policy to
pessimism over Iran-o vulnerability to Communist penetration.
By way of supplying tangible evidence of their new attitude,
the Soviets have refrained from precipitating any border
incidents in recent weeks, have reduced their propaganda war
on Iran, and have quietly recalled a member of their Embassy
staff in Tehran whom the Iranian Government considered persona
non grata. Although the Iranian Government is not likely to
abandon its distrust of the USSR or deliberately to enter
negotiations prejudicial to its friendly relations with the
West, economic distress and disillusion over the alleged
inadequacy of 115 aid may well lead to some modification of
Iran's firm policy toward the USSR. The Iranian press which
has become less harsh in its treatment of the Soviet Union
and appears reluctant to print articles favorable to the US,
reflects the opinion of an influential segment of Iranian
politicians. The now ?rime Ninister, All Haneur, is unlikely
to oppose this trend. Meanwhile, the USSR will exploit the
situation fully, blaming Irangs economic plight on the US.
The Kremlin will probably assure a friendly official attitude
while, at the same time, stimulating the growth of the Tudeh
Party and awaiting the Iranian regime to collapse under the
weight of its own ineptitude.
ThaAgm_p_mokm; The sudden appointment of All Mansur as
prime minister repreeente a severe blow to the hopes of rany
Iranians that thedhab could be counted on to designate some-
one Who would take energetic measures for social and economic
reform to replace the weak Saed at the head of the government,
The designation of Mansur, after considerable vacillatior on
the part of the Shah may possibly be a temporary measure,
reflecting a belief that a man of Eansur'e shrewdness and
political connections is needed to steer the new AIOC con-
cession agreement through the Najlis; the Shah may contenplato
replacing Mansur with a strongly reformist premier (possibly
even Chief of Staff Razmara) after the Vajlis acts on the
natter. Nonetheless, the appointment is an obvious gesture in
the direction of the powerful elements in the ruling class
who strongly opposed the Shah's social and economic reform
program. Mansur himself has not only an unenviable reputation
for corruptness but also a record of persistent obstruction
with respect to the Seven Year Plan for economic development.
Many progressive Iranians consequently will probably follow
the lead of the two most prominent men in the planning program,
Prince Abdor RJZS and Minister of National Econory Naar, in
declining active participation in the Mansur Government.
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2:14DDI-PAKISTAN
War tendencies: The announcement that the Prime Ainistere
of Pakistan and India will soon meet in New Delhi to discuss
means of curbing the tension between their two countries
eaphasizes the fact that neither government wants war and
may lessen spread of talk on both sides about the inevit-
ability of a resort to hostilities. Nevertheless, the
underlying factors naking for a possible outbreak of hostilities
remain potent. A new wave of large-scale destruction of
Hindu life and property in East Bengal--possibly in retalia-
tion for a similar outburst in Vest Bengal, now seething with
anti-Nbslem feeling--might well create an irresistible popular
demand for the sending of Indian troops across the border;
while Pakistan night then rely on an appeal to the UN, the
far greater probability is that it would initiate retaliatory
action of its own The possibility still remains that India's
increasingly clear determination to hold on to the territory
it occupies in Nashnir may lead to a popular invasion of
Kashmir by Pakistani nationals, a move which would probably
be followed by an Indian invasion of West Pakistan and a
full-scale war. Meanwhile, the recent buildup of Indian troops
and supplies near the West Punjab border intensifies the
danger that one side or the other may attempt to anticipate
what it regards as an imminent attack by the other.
WED Th BRIEF
The neetinsALAI)e Arab League Council) which opened in Cairo
25 March, is exacerbating the currently strained relations
among the Arab states. Jordan's absorption of Arab Palestine
and its attempts to make peace and open trade relations with
Israel have already been strongly criticized by most members
of the League and may result in sanctions being applied
against it. Jordan's refusal to send a delegation to the
Cairo meeting under the current barrage of criticism has
further antagonized the other League members and has influenced
them to permit an "independent" representative of Arab
Palestine to attend the meetings. Even if Jordan is not
evicted from the League, as many Arabs, particularly in Egypt,
are demanding, the schism in the Arab world has been critically
intensified, and the recent sentiment against establishing
peace with Israel has been strengthened. Other issues
scheduled for discussion are the Arab Security Pact, Iraqi
-
Syrian union, and Azzam Pasha's tenure as Secretary General
of the Arab League. In view of the present crisis in the
Zittalk
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5
feague, however, it is unlikely that firm decisions will be
reached on any of them even if they are discussed.
25X6A
The_Imgl.gp Government is current) reviewing its policy
grammling_the transit of Iraqi 'ews. The government is not
opposed in principle to the use of Iran as a first stop for
Jews emigrating from Iraq. It is, however, concerned about
the effects of the concentration of Jews in Tehran or other
large cities; 1,300 Iraqi Jews who entered Iran illegally are
now in camps on the outskirts of Tehran and more are arriv-
ing daily. For the present it is probable that the Iranian
Government will not grant visas in large numbers to Iraqi
Jews unless there are definite arrangements for their immediato
and inconspicuous departure,
The_mtgaLlg_the USSR's current interest In Pakletan is
Indicated by the fact that Alexander Stetsenko, who has just
arrived as the first Soviet Ambassador in Karachi, has
brought a staff reported to be approximately twice that of
the US delegation in Karachi and three timea that of the
Soviet staff in New Delhi. One of Stetsenko's primary tasks
is to arrange for the visit of Prime Ninister Liaquat All
.Khan to the USSR; another is the resumption of trade talks
which were abandoned some months ago after the Pakistan
decision not to devalue the rupee; a third is the encourage-
ment of pro-Soviot cultural and Intellectual groups,
?-
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Ofailarsa
6.
Almost all of Pakistan's exportable surplus of wheat and
cotton remains unsold -because 4 the1gh askingprice.
This state of affairs is a eerious one for the economy of
the country, which badly needs the funds from the sale of
these commodities, and also creates the danger that the Wheat
and cotton might deteriorate because of insufficient ware-
housing facilities. As a result, Pakistan is becomIng aware
of the need to be more realistic in its pricing policies.
Afghanistan is betsg_pressed by other Nips e
countries to reach a settlement with Pakistan on the Patbanis-
tan problem. Iran, Iraq, and 3audi Arabia are among those
which have approached the Afghann individually, and there
Is a possibility that the matter will be taken up by the Arab
League Council during its current m.$)ting in Cairo. Reports
In the Pakistan press that Iran and Pakistan are negotiating
a mutual defense pact also suggest the advisability of a
settlement. The motivation behind the Afghan Pathanistan
campaign has never been satisfactorily explained, and it is
still too early to discover whether representations from other
Moslem nations, as well as the D3 and UK, will overcome the
reasons for waging it. Nevertheless, since this new pressure
Indicates that the Nbslem nations, in addition to others,
f Afghanistan to be primarily to blame for its difficulties
f ties
with Pakistan, there is some hope that Afghanistan will be
forced by international opinion to silence Its anti-Pakistan
proPaganda.
Lajajp_r_aljamin_um indgatm_for t4e GOA Coast now shows signs
of beaming an actuality. With the Volta River currently
being surveyed to determine the best site for a large demand
hydroelectric installation (which would also make electricity
and irrigation water available to the surrounding area), the
British Aluminum Company has indicated its readiness to
invest in a plant there. Meanwhile, the British Government,
which would have to supply considerable capital, has increas-
ingly realized that, from a strategic point of view, the
Gold Coast offers the best location for a plant to replace
the UK's current dollar-consuming Canadian sources of aluminum.
The ECA Mission to the UK is recommending D3 aid for the
scheme, arguing that it would not only stimulate the Gold
Coast's general economic development but would also aid the
UK's own recovery.
111.155
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