NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 12 APRIL 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100060014-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 12, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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APR 121950
NOTICE: This c~cu 1rze1 a wol. kirxg paper, ZIC
to " is 3 1= is . at rat- :.- at ha.s been co-orGina-
ted vit.z;in CfU, bu;.. Prot w_Lth the lAO Agencies.
it _reat=osc.its t;hi ki..r by specia.Lists
in CIA, a td is d :s .fined for. use by others engaged
in s imi1.ar or v v ti 4.appi-n;; studi..es The opinions
e cpxess ci , .:r b-, revis,Dd before final
..nd ofl ii_tiia:.. pub ..1 -,&tion, 1L is intended solely
?or the I.1Ai`tjr at.. 11 o the addressee and not for
tur"taea t~l s ait;lxa i, zt
MENT NO.
No G IN CLASS. D
LASS. CHANGE: ^~ S C
AUTH; r~ HR 770 2
DAT6CR~i/.s--~--'EVI i:: W Eft:
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Copy cor
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,.A%WOO',
1 MST/AFRICA DIVI ZIOi
i
INY
r 'z :~ C II3CE SU 1RY
or week Ending
1.2 April 1950
2AB E OF COATMn"d
`o1. V No.
Gr3eCe
Tito remins cool
: s..goslavia against closer ties with present Greek Govern nt
~t~rkey _ .
Were the parties stand a. . . . 1
0 position does not call for drastic changes in policy 2
If Bayar wins . . . . . ,r . . . . . . . . a . . . . . , e . 2
Top Democratic leadership experienced and apparently capable
The Mansur Cabinet ? . . . . . . . -. a . . . . . . . . . a 93
How much it will accomplish is probl enticai
Noted in Brief
Turkey, Lebanon, bomalia, Iran, India-Pakistan . . . . . . .4
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w x 5`f;/ it Lt, 11 s ~: ?attT at : 5 LiM Y
o c ns coo: The ,nencsa 01? au a x5J inprovement of
_V,03 l aq.Greek reiai~ inns , M=g e~%a acs s.y with regard to re-
' apening the Salonika-:.heigre W x.a 1 11le, have been sharply
purer. ,s in Greece. 'fife ?s
LL -
educed by post-elecrion deve.4
?ece&; statement that he vas .9). epared to cooperate with a
Vtastiras Government under oert.ai.n conditions obviously does
not apple to the present 1'exu.st,.los Cabinet, which the
`:'u~rosl.av press has s evorely a u racked for Its dependence on
rightlat support. Although Tiro would be cautious in any
event about developing closer _~,elatiarss with Greece, he
undoubtedly feels it pol1tica1..y unwise to modify his pre-
sent cool, critical attitude toward Greece unless some govern-
ment free of "manarckXZ-fascist" Influence emerges. With the
formation of such a government, Tito would probably feel
justified in resumi g, at least iim ted economic ties with
Greece.
erg the part es stand: An examiasation of the peat "orms of
`furs{ear y or party es Indicates fairly clearly that the
country i s domestic and f"ox oigr policies will continue without
startling changes even if the opposition Democratic Party
(which has recently su::' fer:ed from int rna3- dissension) does
unexpectedly succeed in upsetting the ruling People's RepubI-:--
can Party at the national el ec t ion:= four weeks hence. Turku, ? e
pre-sa t foreign policies have =L only the wholehearted sup-
ppor. t of the Democrats but also the backing of the lat1on
1 arty .: the only other party which has even an outside chance
of winning may seats, any at all. In the domestic field,,
opposition denunciation oi' the goverment for allegedly un-
constitutional and iii ti.. han&a actions in violation of civil
liberties has recently beco :.e noticeably more moderate in
tone, doubtless because tx .e gcvarnment has taken such criticism
to heart and put into effect & number of the reform demanded
by Turkey's newly-Iror ied oppoe-ition parties, k i.le both
the major parties claim to clwmpion the cause of individual
enterprise in economic affairt, it is manifest that state
capitalism will be retained :n Turkey whichever wins. Probably
the Democrats would go 3omet .t farther and faster than the
PRP in giving Turkish private capital a limited chance to
become productive and nationally beneficial. DP leader Bayar
bas suggested that an at aphore be created which will prove
helpful to private enterpriae, c tt:ck allegedly extravagant
governmental open .lion of tlxe q a .i t system, and correct
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the abuses of what he regards as an irresponsible and iner-
fleient bureaucracy. In rebuttal, government spokesmen point
to the great promise of ratio +1. economic rehabilitation now
discernible under ECA-supported programs, for which the PRP
understandably clam all the credit it can, and counter-charge
that the DP speaks in generalities and has nothing specirle
to offer. Insofar as one issue is concerned--labor--the
accusation is unjust: the DP firmly demands that labor be
given the right to strike, as agaLr t the equally positive
ovex'nment view that, under beneficent PRP leadership and in
view of Turkey's proximity to a lazge and menacing neighbors
to grant labor the right to strike now would be both unnec-
essary and dangerous .
Both parties appear to feel some legitimate apprehensiost
lest r4.oslem religious sentiment be used by the somewhat
inchoate and in= derate Nation Party as bait to catch votes.
Nation Party spokesmen might well accuse the PRP of no u go inj_;
far enough in its recent relaxation of rigid state control
over religion in a laicized nation and thus pick up votes
among the faithful, notably in provinces near the southern
border. Such appeals to the eleotortte will have to be care-
fully worded, however, if BF speakers wish to avoid the long
arias of stern Turkish law.
Controversy concerning the use or suppression of vio-
lence has not died downs particularly since President. IrJnfi
is making it a major theme of -his election speeches. in&nUls
warnings against violence have evoked promises by Bayar, at
least, that the Democrats will be law-abiding. In the last
analysis, however, much will depend upon how carefully local
officials--particularly those who favor the government party--
resist any temptation they may have to tamper with the ballots.
Although the Turk has been accustomed to being pushed around
(provided it is done by duly constituted authorities in what
he accepts as a proper and customary manner) he has now been,
told by both the government and opposition that mishandling
of his electoral privileges this time would be most improper.
If it happens, he will object most strenuously.
If Bayar wins: Since there Is a possibility that the opposi-
tion Democratic Party my in the forthcoming national elections-- -
although all US observers so far have reported that the govern-
ment party will almost certainly stay in power--the question
arises as to how well the Dezrncrat could conduct the nation's
affairs. The answer, based largely- upon the record of the
VOM
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party as top leaders, is -i;h at -c e ; art# probably capable or
doing a good job, although doubtless they would make mistakes
Stud would have considerable di?fflevity at first in finding
efirfieient men for all the n jor and minor posts that would
?have to be filled. Celal BaZfar., the Democratic leader, is
a former Prine Minister,, one of Turkey's outstanding adminis-
trstors, and, inciaent ,11y, ono of the very few former pro-
,alnent politicos in Turkey who was once a member of parlia--
mextt under the defunct impria Ottom .n regime still active
in political affairs. As a esbinet minister in the early
days of the Rcpublie, ax d as the first head of one of the
:Dst powerful state-owned "ban', " Bayer played an outstanding
role in the creation of the Turkish system of state capitalib --
uhich some observers -very mistakentLy appear to believe he nom
intends to destroy. Fua.t K8prtU11, a potential DemDcratic
foreign minister (or even Prize minister if $_.yar should pre'er
the presidency ), is one of Turkey's leading figures in the
fields of literature and histczj and a member of the Ottoman
.Empire's most famous family of statesmen. Adrian mien cares,
who would probably get the principal economic post in the
government, is a wealthy landrwner from Western Anatolia who
has been his party s chief' spckcsrtn on financial and economic
matters in the National Assembly for the past four years.
Another prospective cabinet m ornber is R;;f ik Koraltan, the
fourth of the quedruii irate oif deputies vho founded the
Democratic Party, while the veetex n Refik Ixrce, who has
become prominent in the party although not at present a member
of the Assembly, might possibly be given the post of Minister
of Justice, one he held durine; the nationalist struggle for
Independence before the proclamation in 1923 of the Turkish
Republic. Vvbat would happen if the D. macrats won and if Ba?rar
chose to be prime vdnister rather than president is more
difficult to predict. One possibility is that the presidency
might be offered to All Fuat Cebesoy, who .s one of the
founders of the republic, has held cabinet rank, and has
presided over the National Assembly. Cebesoy, although not
a member of the D... cratio Party, recently resigned from the
government party and, if a h..gh enough position were offered
him, tight presumably be coaxed into accepting it. Cebesoy l s
occupancy of the top -x n in? position would be in keeping
with Turkey's military tradition, inasmuch as he is a retired
arnj general with a brilliant record of military leadership
In World War I and in the War of Independence.
The i axisur Cabinet : just what the ayh ur Government will
accomplish is problem .t1ca.1. Tht~ recently formed cabinet
consists mostly of seasoned veterans of Iran?s political
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N0001 .1 *MW
4rry-go-rood choseii ?'oz ,roved political sbility,
ai though tine i are, v +.th few tauptions, =nen of good reputation.-
A balance to Prime ! nAlIxter 1+ ;xuxr's opportunism nay r'ell be
provided by Foreign .Minister- Sosain Ale., especially in Irano-
~..>oviet relations. Ala i the o=.x4stauding member of the new
cabinet. Ae ambaese.dor in ;fasbil ngton, he v,ox ked diligently
to strengthen in ,u's relations :;pith the Meat, and he my be
expect fed to demand full autho rl zy In the conduct of Iran'*
foreign relations. The Prime Minister himself has executive
abilit;, but he has a. reputation for corruptness and is not
likely to institute reformu necessary for permanent economic,
and social betterment. Unless the shah, who is apparently
entirely responsible for Ii".a,naur's appointment, presses Mansur
to act, the government may fall into a atate of political
inertia, as previous governments have done. libreover, since
Vansur is a "Shah's ran," the :shah's own prestige, which has
been declining as economic detorioration continues, will
suffer further if he permits the Mhnsur Governunt to flounder.
L OT : I "N" 13H :x.10"
The death of h.pshal F Z ?a 4&_X _is particularly unfortunate
from the viewpoint of the Nation Party., which has thus been
deprived: in the middle of tho election campaign of the great
prestige of having Turkey's respected and only Mrshal as its
nominal leader. Unless some other national figu 'o can be
persuaded to accept the post, Hikmot Bayur (founder and real
leader of the party) is likely to take over the party's
titular leadership himself .
The endin _of the at -~ a t. D t z i rt daft rY of the Iraq,
Petroleum Company IPC was accouulished on-3 April. The
strike vas touched off by a repot;; that 1,000 of the 4,000
workers were to be discharged. Moreover, the IPC union
members objected strongly to tha employment of Palestinian
Arab refugees and British personnel formerly connected with
the Haifa refinery. The Leb. ne3e and Palestinian workers
have apparently resolved their difficulties, but Arab employees
rep .in aligned against the 400 British workers. Although the
IPC union is non--Communist at4 the strikers do not appear
to have been influenced by Communist labor groups, agitation
against the British, parti.cular1y in the oil industry, is in
keeping with the local Commruncist line. L banese Communists
my be expected to exploit this xenophobic tendency and in-
creasing une loyaasent .
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ra =o r l a formerly ItelIan
'he sf'er oa tie acs _s u =at
LL-
wn sand) from the U to Italy took place without incident
I April. Little i riciio12 lz xpocted to develop between
the nev adminis t ra,tiori and the r at 1vo population; the Italians
will probably mate ever, effort to conduct a model administre-
`ton and to Improve the lot of the Sonalis, and even the
; 3xploa ive Somali Youth Longue has adopted a "wait and see`'
policy toward the adn LnlatratiaL. Z vertheless, the unsettled
border between Ethiopia and Somalia is a potential source of
danger in view of conflicting Italian, h0iopisn, and Somali
Interests In the area.
Former Iranian Prime I .nister= quy . despite his age and ill
health, appears determined to re-enter the Iranian political
arena. For some months Q3vam as allegedly been conniving
with Tudeh Party members In Paris, and he recently sent a
letter to the Shah strongly challenging any attempt on the
part of the latter to obtain veo power over parliament.
Should Qavam, who still has a cooaiderable folloving in Iran,
be permitted to return to Tehran, he nay well attempt to regain
political control of the country by opportunistically solicittl-
In_.g the support of Tudeh ae he did In 1946. H Is return to
Tabran, which the Shah will probably endeavor to prevent,
might produce a serious political crisis in Iran.
The successful outcome Of the -Waguat 1 1i NM talks
gives rise to the hope of a general improvement in Indo_
Pakistan relations. The accord reached apparently applies
only to the minority problem in East and West Bengal, Assam,
and Tripura, and not to the ails of both countries as the
Pakistanis 'would undoubtedly bane preferred because of the
steady flow of refugees Into western Pakistan from Uttar
Pradesh and other nearby areas. It Is in the states mentioned
by the accord, however, that the cowl situation had be_
come most critical, and honest implementation by both govern-
ments will greatly reduce the likelihood of developments which
could result in warfare. The success of the two leaders in
reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement on so tense a
subject can in Itself be expected to encourage negotiations
on other utters of serious dispute.
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, 'Z- ree=nt a we w has
been reported which would ui ke OO,OOO bales of Pakistani
jute available to India, with Pakistan receiving jus,e goods
and other items in return. These reports would seem to
indicate that conRnercial interests in the two countries,
rather than the governments, are taking the initiative in
an effort to break the trade stalemate existing between India
and Pakistan since devaluation of the Indian rupee. Any
agreement of this kind m wt have the sanction of the respec-
tive governments, and it is possible that the recent talks
between the Prime I41.nis3ters mar have laid the groundwork for
favorable official consideration of the proposals initiated
by the jute trade. If a jute agreement is reached, it could
be the forerunner a agreements among other trade associa-
tions and the means of ending the trade impasse which has had
such serious effects on the eoonoasy of both countries.
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