WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS LATIN AMERICA BRANCH, ORE, CIA 8 FEBRUARY 1949
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Publication Date:
February 8, 1949
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SUMMARY
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Week:ly Contributions
Latin America Branch, OF2L, CIA
S February 1949
Of the developments reported on this wek, that of greatest interest
is the insecure status of Bolivia's government (p. 3). The now military
gcrven ments of Peru (p,. 4) and of Venezuela (p. 3) are be nE; tiaatched with
interest as in both consiierablo opposition to the governing juntas is
becoming ovid ;nt.
NORTIIGRN DIVISION: In the Caribbean area the "spiritual and intellectual
bloc" now forming is essentially a propaganda movement capable of adversely
affecting future joint solution of inter-Am rican problems (p. 2), The
Third 1"test Indian Conference passed many resolutions of interest to other
countries (p. 5). Mexico at present is relatively quiet politically and
enjoys a fair degree of economic stability (p. 6).
C,' TRAL DIVIST-;N: Brazil faces a serious decline in coffee production
(p. 2). In Venezuela a change in the leadership of the military junta may
be imminent (p. 3).
SOUTHERN DIVISION: Bolivia's government is threatened as tyro array groups
are plotting against it (p. 3). Peru's military rulers are likely to con-
tinue the state of siege and to postpone elections because of increasing
opposition (p. L1.). Chile's president, for reasons of practical politics,,
has related controls over Communists (P. 4). Chile's response to President
Tr Ban's inaugural offer of US aid to other countries includes moves de-
signed to attract US private capital to that country (p. 14).
DOCUMENT NO. "
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Weekly Contributions
B,M, CIA
February 1919
1. CARII3I3EAU: Propaganda Campaign for the Democracies
Efforts toward the forma ion of a spiritual and intellectual"
bloc of the Latin Ar.rican democracies to oppose the Caribbean greats
"dictatorships" are indicated by recent activity in Havana. According to
the NY Times president Prfo initiated discussions on the formation of a
spir3.tua " bloc during his pre-inaugural visits to Costa flica, Guatemala,
riaxico, and Venezuela. The US I rnbassy Havana reports that the Ecuadoran
;sinister of the Interior has personally discussed the matter with President
Prfo on the latter's initiative and that Ecuador has approved the idea.
Also President Prfo has publicly indicated his interest in a "continued
opposition" to Latin American dictatorships. Recently, in Havana, the
Committee for Democratic Union of the Caribbean has issued jointly with the
National Executive Committee of the Association of Veterans and Anti-
Fas-cist revolutionaries of Cuba a demand for severance of Cuban Dominican
diplomatic relations and a "general spiritual mobilization" against the
Dominican Republic. There has lately been incorporated in Cu .n a commer-
cial firm called Cuavagua, the purpose of which is probably to serve as a
cover for anti-"dictatorship" activities of Dominican revolutionaries.
CIA estimates that the "spiritual and intellectual" activity
apparently desired by President Prio (1) will be primarily of a propaganda
nature designed to supplement the conspiratorial and combative maneuvers
of the Caribbean Legion; (2) will draw most of its financial support from
Cuban government f unc tionaries i and (3) may possibly develop into a full-
scale publicity campaign on behalf of the Caribbean Lemon and Central
Amnerican-Caribbean problems as distinguished from South American problems,
Although an active "spiritual and intellectual." democratic bloc
among the other American xtpublics will not directly affect US security in-
terests inherent in the concept of Hemisphere solidarity tavrd encroach-
ments from without, it may have a divisive effect on antra-femi.sphcre pro-
blems and their solution by Joint inter-American action.
2. BRAZIL: Brazils coffee industry is approaching a period of crisis. The
dec ins of coffee production , begun ,ry government res ric ions In
the face of the overproduction of the Bets, has been accentuated by a
coffee-plant disease (the broca). only 3,000,000 lags from former surplus
crops are left in goveznmont storehouses and these may well be sold to
round out the short 19L;.n coffee crop. The coffee industry has habitually
turned to the rovernment for aid in times of emer-.ency and now it may be
expected to do so again. Substantial government aid could irerease coffee
production fairly rapidly, in spite of the four-year gap bets en planting
and bearing which is ci ractex'istic of coffee trc..s since such aid vrould
include more effective measures against the destructive coffee-plant disease.
Although the problem of finding; sufficient funds to aid coffoe producers
C O T A L
2.
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'Weekly Contributions
U/LA, C IA
9 February 1919
L iU pose difficulties for President I)utra., whose financial program is one
of rigid economy., a solution must be found if brazil is not-to face a drop
in foreign exchange receipts, one-third of which aro normally derived from
coffee exports.
VENEZUELA: A chap a in the leadership of the a2verning milita unta may
be n , as recent reports again suggest that junta resi-
dent Delgado Chalbaud may be removed and made Ambassador to France. Delga-
do s removal has been predicted frequently, since he is opposed by certain
army officers because of his French military training, his past association
*th Accion Democratica,, and his tendency towards moderation and compromise.
It is not certain whether the opposition is directed against 1 erez Jimenez
as well as Delgado, but it appears more likely that, should changes be made,
Perez io]d stay on, possibly to head a reorganized junta.
A possible pattern of opposition to the junta as now constituted
is suggested by reports that ex--president Ledina is attempting to influence
high army officers to remove the ikccion Den cratiea taint from the govern-
ment. Consonant with this is a report that General Colis Paredes, Governor
of the Federal District, may be included in a reorganized junta. Celts
Paredes, who formerly held acabinet post under L'edina, was in 'retirement
throughout the Accion Democratic., regime. Another military leader mentioned
as a possible junta member is ,.a jor i:endoza, Commander of the La Guaira gar-
rison, whose relation to the ? ?edina group is not knot:n,
The loss to the junta of the moderating influence of Delgado
Chalbaud would probably result in a further shift to the rifrht of government
policies, with treater control by the military. lovover, even if such a
change in the junta should materialize, there is no reason to believe that
US interests mould be seriously affected.
25X1 X4f ^ ^JE
I3OLIVL1: A coup against the Hertzog government may be attempted
of two i ry groups
,
The first croup, headed by the Inspector General of the ;army, is collaborat-
ing with the pro-Argentine ',,HII. Younger officers, who were previously re-
ported to be planning; a joint army-i.i,f coup., apparently support this move-
ment (see E/LA kly for 7 and 23 Doc L19). The second group, probably headed
by the Chief of Staff, is anti-i.qJR. To forestall an M?1112 coup, this Group is
said to be considering setting up a government with the Chief of Army as its
head. As the loyalty of the top command is the main support of the Teak,
but generally pro-US, Hertzog government, the participation of key officers
in current revolutionary activities increases the likelihood of a coup
against the government. (Used in CIA 'eekly 4 Feb 19)
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Weekly Contributions
B/LA, CIA
8 February leg
5. PERU: Considerable unrest is evident in Peru at this time. Although Gen-
era t3drxa ? s -position as President of the Junta was strengthened
recently by a decree giving him the right to remove other members of the
Junta, his o n tenure continues to be threatened by the ambitions and the
plotting of Lt. Colonel Alfonso Llosa now Ilnister of Development (see
13/IA ;Wkly for 18 Jan 1j.9 and 11. Dec The Junta has revealed its sense
of insecurity by maintaining in effect the suspension of constitutional
guarantees originally invoked by the ?hztan me overnm nt. It has used
the special povers thus obtained to arrest considerable numbers of the
friends and political supporters of the ex president. It has also forced
many Apristas from their jobs. Some Odria partisans allege that the gov-
ernment can escape its present difficulties only by calling elections in
the near future. It seems more probable, holeever, that it will continue
the present state of siege and postpone elections, in which event the dis-
satisfaction with the Odria regime evinced by most Peruvians, together
with the struggle for power within the Junta itself, make the continuation
of the Junta, as at present constituted, uncertain.
6. CHILE: The voluntary and unexpected easin of control over uomrunists in
Ch"i7e Yias beee clained by PresidenT GVnza ez as a move to assure
democratic practices in the Y`arch congressional elections. Actually,
this move shows that Gonzalez estimates that the political advantages to
be derived outweigh the risks attending such action. The President evi-
dently believes that Communist strength has deteriorated to the point where
there is no question of the government's ability to restrain any disruptive
effort they night make before or during the elections. Furthermore, he
evidently expects to regain more votes from non-Conrnunist el ments hitherto
disaffected by the administration's repressive anti-Communist measures than
the reenfranchised Communists can add to his opposition. It is also pro-
bable that the President believes that the popular appeal of the administra-
tion's anti--Communist crusade has been weakened considerably.
7. President Truman's inaugural offer of US assistance to undeveloped
areas has been seizedon by President Go:1za ez Videla in an enthu-
siastic bid for participation in the program. By offering a number of re-
assurances concerning security, taxation, and remittance rights, Conzalez
apparently hopes to attract private US capital to supplement the 3 8 mil-
lion already obtained from the Import-Import Bank and the ' s16 million bor-
rowed from the :gorld Pink.
SAL
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Weekly Contributions
B11 A., C IN
Article 6-49
10A000200010005-4
C February 1949
The Third vest Indian Conference
The Third Vest Indian Con :'erence met in Guadeloupe, French ;' est
Indies, 2-13 December 1945 with delegates present from the Caribbean col-
onial territories of the US, UKi Netherlands, and France.
The Conference adopted a series of resolutions, which, in turn, wre
submitted to the Caribbean Commission for consideration. The resolutions
recommended the creation of machinery to coordinate loan applications made
by the local governments to the International Bank, the study of territor-
ial tariffs with a view to their reduction, and the establishment of a
permanent Caribbean Committee on Tourism. The Conference also requested
the Caribbean Commission to work for the removal of all forms of discrim-
inatory restrictions affecting; shipping, air travel, and air freight;
the reduction of telegraph tariffs; and the convocation of meteorological
experts to study the possibility of establishin,- an efficient hurricane-
warning system.
Following the conclusion of the Conference, the elected representa-
tivesof the British Caribbean territories met in private session and
adopted a resolution protesting the April 19!40, fogota decision to set up
an American Committee on Dependent Territories. The resolution stated in
part that "the social, economic, political and all other affairs of the
British territories are the concern solely of those territories and their
metwonolitan country". A similar resolution had been transmitted to the
President of France in June 1 5 by the General Council of Martinique solenr
],y "protesting against arry attempt to include Martinique, French territory
in the Caribbean Sea, in the territories to be considered" by the American
Committee. B/LA believes that both resolutions reflect the sincere senti-
ment of the elected representatives of the colonial peoples involved.
No amount of pressure from the UK Colonial Office could have forced such a
declaration from the British '..`est Indian delegates the would have resented
any attempt to restrict their independence of actions In the case of Martinique., the General Council, elected by universal suffrage, appeared to
articulate the natives= genuine pride in their status as full-fledged
citizens of the French Republic.
I IAL
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