WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS LATIN AMERICA BRANCH, ORE, CIA 8 FEBRUARY 1949

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-01090A000200010005-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 27, 1998
Sequence Number: 
5
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 8, 1949
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-01090A000200010005-4.pdf433.8 KB
Body: 
Approved For Relbese I 999/0 0 -01 OA000200010005-4 Week:ly Contributions Latin America Branch, OF2L, CIA S February 1949 Of the developments reported on this wek, that of greatest interest is the insecure status of Bolivia's government (p. 3). The now military gcrven ments of Peru (p,. 4) and of Venezuela (p. 3) are be nE; tiaatched with interest as in both consiierablo opposition to the governing juntas is becoming ovid ;nt. NORTIIGRN DIVISION: In the Caribbean area the "spiritual and intellectual bloc" now forming is essentially a propaganda movement capable of adversely affecting future joint solution of inter-Am rican problems (p. 2), The Third 1"test Indian Conference passed many resolutions of interest to other countries (p. 5). Mexico at present is relatively quiet politically and enjoys a fair degree of economic stability (p. 6). C,' TRAL DIVIST-;N: Brazil faces a serious decline in coffee production (p. 2). In Venezuela a change in the leadership of the military junta may be imminent (p. 3). SOUTHERN DIVISION: Bolivia's government is threatened as tyro array groups are plotting against it (p. 3). Peru's military rulers are likely to con- tinue the state of siege and to postpone elections because of increasing opposition (p. L1.). Chile's president, for reasons of practical politics,, has related controls over Communists (P. 4). Chile's response to President Tr Ban's inaugural offer of US aid to other countries includes moves de- signed to attract US private capital to that country (p. 14). DOCUMENT NO. " NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^~ H DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C/ J NEXT REVIEW DATE: C AUTH: HR 70.2 DATEI EVIEWER: _37''2044 1 Approved For Release I 999/0 - DP79-01090A000200010005-4 Approved For ReleYse 19"/ 1 f, tDP79-01 MA000200010005-4 Weekly Contributions B,M, CIA February 1919 1. CARII3I3EAU: Propaganda Campaign for the Democracies Efforts toward the forma ion of a spiritual and intellectual" bloc of the Latin Ar.rican democracies to oppose the Caribbean greats "dictatorships" are indicated by recent activity in Havana. According to the NY Times president Prfo initiated discussions on the formation of a spir3.tua " bloc during his pre-inaugural visits to Costa flica, Guatemala, riaxico, and Venezuela. The US I rnbassy Havana reports that the Ecuadoran ;sinister of the Interior has personally discussed the matter with President Prfo on the latter's initiative and that Ecuador has approved the idea. Also President Prfo has publicly indicated his interest in a "continued opposition" to Latin American dictatorships. Recently, in Havana, the Committee for Democratic Union of the Caribbean has issued jointly with the National Executive Committee of the Association of Veterans and Anti- Fas-cist revolutionaries of Cuba a demand for severance of Cuban Dominican diplomatic relations and a "general spiritual mobilization" against the Dominican Republic. There has lately been incorporated in Cu .n a commer- cial firm called Cuavagua, the purpose of which is probably to serve as a cover for anti-"dictatorship" activities of Dominican revolutionaries. CIA estimates that the "spiritual and intellectual" activity apparently desired by President Prio (1) will be primarily of a propaganda nature designed to supplement the conspiratorial and combative maneuvers of the Caribbean Legion; (2) will draw most of its financial support from Cuban government f unc tionaries i and (3) may possibly develop into a full- scale publicity campaign on behalf of the Caribbean Lemon and Central Amnerican-Caribbean problems as distinguished from South American problems, Although an active "spiritual and intellectual." democratic bloc among the other American xtpublics will not directly affect US security in- terests inherent in the concept of Hemisphere solidarity tavrd encroach- ments from without, it may have a divisive effect on antra-femi.sphcre pro- blems and their solution by Joint inter-American action. 2. BRAZIL: Brazils coffee industry is approaching a period of crisis. The dec ins of coffee production , begun ,ry government res ric ions In the face of the overproduction of the Bets, has been accentuated by a coffee-plant disease (the broca). only 3,000,000 lags from former surplus crops are left in goveznmont storehouses and these may well be sold to round out the short 19L;.n coffee crop. The coffee industry has habitually turned to the rovernment for aid in times of emer-.ency and now it may be expected to do so again. Substantial government aid could irerease coffee production fairly rapidly, in spite of the four-year gap bets en planting and bearing which is ci ractex'istic of coffee trc..s since such aid vrould include more effective measures against the destructive coffee-plant disease. Although the problem of finding; sufficient funds to aid coffoe producers C O T A L 2. Approved For Release I 9' f'': 1W-RDP79-01090A000200010005-4 Approved For Re ase I 9 ~RiIp-RDP79-0 J0A000200010005-4 'Weekly Contributions U/LA, C IA 9 February 1919 L iU pose difficulties for President I)utra., whose financial program is one of rigid economy., a solution must be found if brazil is not-to face a drop in foreign exchange receipts, one-third of which aro normally derived from coffee exports. VENEZUELA: A chap a in the leadership of the a2verning milita unta may be n , as recent reports again suggest that junta resi- dent Delgado Chalbaud may be removed and made Ambassador to France. Delga- do s removal has been predicted frequently, since he is opposed by certain army officers because of his French military training, his past association *th Accion Democratica,, and his tendency towards moderation and compromise. It is not certain whether the opposition is directed against 1 erez Jimenez as well as Delgado, but it appears more likely that, should changes be made, Perez io]d stay on, possibly to head a reorganized junta. A possible pattern of opposition to the junta as now constituted is suggested by reports that ex--president Ledina is attempting to influence high army officers to remove the ikccion Den cratiea taint from the govern- ment. Consonant with this is a report that General Colis Paredes, Governor of the Federal District, may be included in a reorganized junta. Celts Paredes, who formerly held acabinet post under L'edina, was in 'retirement throughout the Accion Democratic., regime. Another military leader mentioned as a possible junta member is ,.a jor i:endoza, Commander of the La Guaira gar- rison, whose relation to the ? ?edina group is not knot:n, The loss to the junta of the moderating influence of Delgado Chalbaud would probably result in a further shift to the rifrht of government policies, with treater control by the military. lovover, even if such a change in the junta should materialize, there is no reason to believe that US interests mould be seriously affected. 25X1 X4f ^ ^JE I3OLIVL1: A coup against the Hertzog government may be attempted of two i ry groups , The first croup, headed by the Inspector General of the ;army, is collaborat- ing with the pro-Argentine ',,HII. Younger officers, who were previously re- ported to be planning; a joint army-i.i,f coup., apparently support this move- ment (see E/LA kly for 7 and 23 Doc L19). The second group, probably headed by the Chief of Staff, is anti-i.qJR. To forestall an M?1112 coup, this Group is said to be considering setting up a government with the Chief of Army as its head. As the loyalty of the top command is the main support of the Teak, but generally pro-US, Hertzog government, the participation of key officers in current revolutionary activities increases the likelihood of a coup against the government. (Used in CIA 'eekly 4 Feb 19) Approved For Release 199 TCIA-RDP79-01090A000200010005-4 Approved For Relfse 1999/09/.&& W'-DP79-01 OA000200010005-4 Weekly Contributions B/LA, CIA 8 February leg 5. PERU: Considerable unrest is evident in Peru at this time. Although Gen- era t3drxa ? s -position as President of the Junta was strengthened recently by a decree giving him the right to remove other members of the Junta, his o n tenure continues to be threatened by the ambitions and the plotting of Lt. Colonel Alfonso Llosa now Ilnister of Development (see 13/IA ;Wkly for 18 Jan 1j.9 and 11. Dec The Junta has revealed its sense of insecurity by maintaining in effect the suspension of constitutional guarantees originally invoked by the ?hztan me overnm nt. It has used the special povers thus obtained to arrest considerable numbers of the friends and political supporters of the ex president. It has also forced many Apristas from their jobs. Some Odria partisans allege that the gov- ernment can escape its present difficulties only by calling elections in the near future. It seems more probable, holeever, that it will continue the present state of siege and postpone elections, in which event the dis- satisfaction with the Odria regime evinced by most Peruvians, together with the struggle for power within the Junta itself, make the continuation of the Junta, as at present constituted, uncertain. 6. CHILE: The voluntary and unexpected easin of control over uomrunists in Ch"i7e Yias beee clained by PresidenT GVnza ez as a move to assure democratic practices in the Y`arch congressional elections. Actually, this move shows that Gonzalez estimates that the political advantages to be derived outweigh the risks attending such action. The President evi- dently believes that Communist strength has deteriorated to the point where there is no question of the government's ability to restrain any disruptive effort they night make before or during the elections. Furthermore, he evidently expects to regain more votes from non-Conrnunist el ments hitherto disaffected by the administration's repressive anti-Communist measures than the reenfranchised Communists can add to his opposition. It is also pro- bable that the President believes that the popular appeal of the administra- tion's anti--Communist crusade has been weakened considerably. 7. President Truman's inaugural offer of US assistance to undeveloped areas has been seizedon by President Go:1za ez Videla in an enthu- siastic bid for participation in the program. By offering a number of re- assurances concerning security, taxation, and remittance rights, Conzalez apparently hopes to attract private US capital to supplement the 3 8 mil- lion already obtained from the Import-Import Bank and the ' s16 million bor- rowed from the :gorld Pink. SAL Approved For Release 1999/Q,4 `CI'i tDP79-0I090A000200010005-4 Approved For Reuse 1999/09/ Weekly Contributions B11 A., C IN Article 6-49 10A000200010005-4 C February 1949 The Third vest Indian Conference The Third Vest Indian Con :'erence met in Guadeloupe, French ;' est Indies, 2-13 December 1945 with delegates present from the Caribbean col- onial territories of the US, UKi Netherlands, and France. The Conference adopted a series of resolutions, which, in turn, wre submitted to the Caribbean Commission for consideration. The resolutions recommended the creation of machinery to coordinate loan applications made by the local governments to the International Bank, the study of territor- ial tariffs with a view to their reduction, and the establishment of a permanent Caribbean Committee on Tourism. The Conference also requested the Caribbean Commission to work for the removal of all forms of discrim- inatory restrictions affecting; shipping, air travel, and air freight; the reduction of telegraph tariffs; and the convocation of meteorological experts to study the possibility of establishin,- an efficient hurricane- warning system. Following the conclusion of the Conference, the elected representa- tivesof the British Caribbean territories met in private session and adopted a resolution protesting the April 19!40, fogota decision to set up an American Committee on Dependent Territories. The resolution stated in part that "the social, economic, political and all other affairs of the British territories are the concern solely of those territories and their metwonolitan country". A similar resolution had been transmitted to the President of France in June 1 5 by the General Council of Martinique solenr ],y "protesting against arry attempt to include Martinique, French territory in the Caribbean Sea, in the territories to be considered" by the American Committee. B/LA believes that both resolutions reflect the sincere senti- ment of the elected representatives of the colonial peoples involved. No amount of pressure from the UK Colonial Office could have forced such a declaration from the British '..`est Indian delegates the would have resented any attempt to restrict their independence of actions In the case of Martinique., the General Council, elected by universal suffrage, appeared to articulate the natives= genuine pride in their status as full-fledged citizens of the French Republic. I IAL Approved For Release I 999f IA-RDP79-01090A00020001 6905-4 5X6A1 09 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA000200010005-4 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA000200010005-4