WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS LATIN AMERICA BRANCH , ORE, CIA 29 MARCH 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200010012-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 29, 1949
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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'7eekly Contributions
Latin America Branch, OF' Cm
29 :arch 1949
Of the items reported on this week, that on, increased Corrtunist
organizational activity in Latin America (p. 2) is of particular Inter-
est.
G^111EEAL: Communist parties in Latin America, faced with declining in-
f?+*ence, are concentrating on organizational activity (p. 2). Tension
between Peru and Colombia over the safe conduct of Haya & la Torre haw.
ea ed (p. 2).
SOUTIi RIN DIVISIG'J: In :3olivia, labor unrest and violence continue to
threaten the security of the Eertzog regime (p. 2). The belief by r`-rr~-
entine leaders that a US-USSr war is imminent is not sufficiently fixed
to prevent granting of concessions to ?ot UIS econo ^ic assistance (p. 3).
The Current Situation in Surinam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
CLA?3, CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DAZE:
AUTH11 HR 70.
DA E( REVIEWER: 372044
NO CHANGE IN CLA 5
DECLASSIFIED
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SDI rET
Meekly Contributions, B/IA 29 T'.arch 1949
(CIA Working Paper)
1. Gi' FERAL: Communist Organizing Activit n Arrest Part 's Decline
rairn rican omr uz sts$, ace with declining powor
and strength, are concentrating on organizational activity. In
the Communist parties of F.exieo, Chile, and Artnentina, purges and
sloughing off of dissident, ineffcctivo, inactive, and nonmilitant
Party members - a common prelude to increased Communist activity
have been renewed recently. In addition, it is reported than in
Cuba, Argentina, and Uruguay special lists of militants are being
prepared, probably to deterrdne those best suited for underground
activity. A new mertership drive of a Co. mmist-front group for
youths has been reported in Cuba. In "exico, Comrrnmist organizers
are urging members to join local labor unions, probably in an ef-
fort to regain influence in the labor movement. In Xcuador and
Mexico, party reorganization is under may,
This Communist organizational activity may slow down the
general decline in Latin American Cormn niat strength and influence,
and may even improve the Party's position in particular cases
where police repression is absent, or where counter-propaganda is
ineffective. There are as yet, he ver, no signs of a general re-
vorsal of the trend of declining Communist power in Latin America.
2. The tension between Peru and Colombia over the question
o sae conduct or APIZA leader Maya do la Torre has
been easing during the week, Both countries have given further
evidence of their desire to find a nface-?saving" means of soltr-
tion.. Although the Peruvian Government continues to insist that
Haya de la Torre is a criminal and therefore ineligible for the
safe conduct demanded by Colombia, it is taking affective measures
to protect the Colombian Tmbassy in Lima against violence.
Colombia, in B/IA'e opinion, will not take the matter as it now
stands to the COAS. Tbcchangea of notes have bean firm in maintain-
ing differences of opinions but have been conciliatory in tone.
It now seems likely that a period of watchful waiting will be the
policy of both the Peruvian and Colombian govvern rents.
3. BOLIVIA: Labor unrest and violence continlie to threaten the Secur-
ity o the Tiertzog regime although it has taken forceful
measures against agitators and has maintained a state of siege.
The relatively prosperous economic situation has not served to
calm the politically and economically important mine corkers who
have received the greatest benefits from present favorable econo-
mic conditions. VVvorkers of the Patiifo property at Catavi, the
world's largest tin mine, presented dcrands for salary increases,
sr
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t eek.1y Contributions, 13/I:A 29 :.:arch 1'i.9
(CIA corking Pa: er)
} +ezing of commissary rrices and recd rni.tion of two unions said
to be connected with the R. numerous acts of violence have taken
place since the nresentation of thasA deriands. LS :? bassyr observers
feel that the dei ands are litical In nature and renrrsent the ef-
e ,s of an irresr onsible and politically inspired minority, since
?t t workers are satisfied with the highest cranes in 11olivia and
do trot desire affiliation rrith any union. Bolivian officials blame
Lhe unrest and violence on plots by *71P exiles and former ar'.nr of-
ficers resiacnt in Peru and ArPentina (^/LA '.klv for 23 Feb 49). At
the latest outbreak or violence - the beatin-- of radio and nuts
eoriesnonden.vs --- the fertzor re elm acceded to Patio requests for
:,-A- ater protection and sent army units to Catavi. Although the ?ov-
errzment should be able to control this present situation, the conr-
bination of political plottin- with labor unrest --- in the Ara*eayo
and Iloehschild mines as well as Catavi - increases Iiertzo"es diff-
culties, and further weakens his control,
4. AIiGI',I3TI:NA: The Atlantic fact is a prelude to early conflict botween
the US ante USST? in the opinion of Pre is dent Peron
and the majority of the cabinet, according to information given to
?,S Charger 1Jay by Argentine Foreign "inister ~ramu lia, The Peron
government could be expected to estimate that an immediate war
would strengthen Argentina's position economically to the point of
needing to make no concessions to sell its products on advantageous
terms, However, B/LA doubts that Peron's views of war between the
US and the IJSSI are sufficiently fixed to cause him to retreat from
his recent position of bein? willin- to make sonic concessions in
order to secure US assistance, so long as he understands that such
concessions are prerequisite to assistance.
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: ee dy :onfi ri -utions, B/L(t
11Th 17orking Paper)
Situation ] emorandum 16-49
29 ."arch 1949
Atuation in Surinam (Dutch. t?niana }
: uiam, the .are set colony of the, . etherlands Dnpire in the extern
'; i
erd..gphe re,. i?i of ij4portance to the W because that country is the princi-
pal foreign source of bauxite for the US. The continued availability of
bauxite during neaectine or in the event of an emergency seers assured as
ttm colonial naverna-jent is stable, no serious political problems threaten
tA~ visturb the established order, and no subversive groups have gained a
foothold. There are economic and labor problems of considerable import
loca:Lly, but these are not of sufficient magnitude to threaten or impair
US bauxite interests. In the event of the involvement of the US in an in-
ternational emergency, Surinam, as a Netherlands copy, c+auld follow the
policy of the mother country vis-a-vis such a situation; the possibility,
of any independent action is exoe~gly remote. Surinam could not be
counted on to provide any direct military aid for the US. The population
is favorably disposed to the ''S, this attitude being in terms of a closer
economic rather than a political relationship.
Politically, Surinam is in transition because of the rutch govern-
ment's present plans for the radical modification of the constitutional
pattern of the empire. The ultimate position of Surinam in the empire
will not be definitively determined until the relationship of the Indone-
sian possessions to the home government is finally settled. The present
plans are that Surinam will continue to be a colony in the orthodox sense
and will not be made a "coequal partner" with the lletherlands (as will
Indonesia) in the proposed imperial arrangements. Although the ultimate
nature of Surinam's position cannot be described at the nonent, it can be
said that the colony will be given a wreater mQasure of political autonomy.
r.'hatever the new constitutional arrangement shall be, it Trill not be like-
ly to affect adversely any US interests in Surinam. In fact, the contem-
plated expansion of political autonomy may possibly offer the Surinamese
greater opportunities for realizing their desires for closer economic ro-
lations with the US.
The people, as a whole, are politically immature and inexperienced,
but a trend toward political democracy is apparent. The population of
Surinam is a polygot one, the largest racial groups being creoles, and
persons from India, the #dotherlmnds east Indies, and China. The Surinam
Nlational Party, the dominant political group at present, consists lar^:ely
of creoles who do not take kindly to the idea of sharing their political.
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S; ZIMT
Ncokly Contributions, 3/L
(' i Working; Paper)
Situation 1.`e=randum 16449
29 ,arch 19L19
co : ro:i ,rith the other racial ;roans. It is doubtful, horre?rer, that
the c olas will be sth1o much Ion-ver to r.,qintain their favored position
as events are berrinnin to run as*ainst them. The leadlnp political
f i , e in the countr+yt os erschuur. is a creole who en io;,'s the eonfi-
d inc of all the ioczl racial groups as well as that of the hors r-overn-
nefna lie advaaates racial unity and the democratization of the local
G,overnr:ent. Indications are that his efforts in this dirnetion hero the
pr