WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS LATIN AMERICA BRANCH, ORE, CIA 28 JUNE 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200020013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 28, 1949
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Iheease 2004/09/15
-010
4640200020013-4
Wee.....22n-tributions
Latin -America Milt-17Mo CIA
28 June l9).49
NORTHERN DIVISION: Mexico's new leftist labor federation is quite
capable of disrupting the relative calm of that country's labor picture
(p. 2). An attempt by the Caribbean Legion to invade the Dominican Ps?
public has failed (p. 3).
CENTRAL DIVISION: A Braziliannanganese concessionaire has signed an
agreement with a US company which may point the way for further US parti?
cipation in minerals exploitation (p. 3).
25X1
DOCUMENT NO. 3
NOCHANGEINCLA S. E
XrDECLWARED
C:AS' CHANGED TO: TS S C
DATEN
Approved For Release 2004/09/15 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000200020013-4
se*
Approved FoNR?lease 2004/09/15 : CIA-RDP79-0109e1000200020013-4
SEChET
Weekly Contributions, B/LA
(CIA Working Paper)
28 June 1949
NEXICO: 'New "Central" Threatens Government Labor Control
The7estinTsNiarof a n;'1717,1127617Vderatioirbf labor
unions, though lightly regarded by the Alem6n administration, if
not checked, is quite capable of dierupting the relative calm of
the Mexican labor picture.
The new "Central", Uni6n General de obreroe y Cam inos
(U000), grew out of the "pac17297f6argh-TriFririiitiEnTa
in January 1948 united five of the leading national syndicates as
an implicit protest against Alem4n's firm labor policy, It for-
mally cane into being on 22 June when a constituent congress
united under Agustin Guzmin of the miners' enion-, a group includ-
ine miners, railroad workers, Asociaei6n de ObreromeTeCalpesinos
Llendeanos (A0CM)? other small "Mai.i.n ain-PeagEit groUps. As --E&
petreleig markers and the Communist-oontrolled Confederaci6n Uni-
ca de Trabaled.eyee (CUT), both of whom originalle-Fas
&Min come into thenew federation, the organization is not as
strong as had been originally planned. Although the naN UGOC has
declared allegiance to the Communist-controlled CTAL and WFTU, it
has ignored the CUT (also Communist-controlled) which has publicly
accused the original pact members of a breach of unity in failing
to include the CUT in the constituent congress.
The government's lack of concern (evidenced by the fact
that the Minister of Gobernaci6n delivered a welcoming speech be
the new federation's constituent congress) is probably due to a
considerable extent to the administration's previous success in
controlling labor, and undoubtedly takes into account the fact
that the new "GaiTtra..1" is smaller than was originally planned,
and lacks singleness of purpose.
It is true that the new feeieration does not offer an im-
mediate threat to the government-controlled CTM. It mns
ley organized, however, to reinforce Lombardo Toledanovs waning
influence by furnishing him witha majority or a plurality of
Mexican labor so that he could be its representative at all inter-
national labor gatherings, and there is no evidence that the "Cen-
tral" has changed these objectives in, any may. Further, the new
organization can be expected to become stronger. It will attempt
to attract to itself all the "friendship pact" unions and its
sympathizers; it will endeavor to iron out itsdifferences with
CUT; it will extend its influence to independent unions contrclied
now neither by CTM nor by Lombardo, Any considerable success in
attaining its objectives will make the new UGOC the most serious
threat of recent years to the admini5trationts control of labor,
Approved For Release 2004/09/15 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000200020013-4
Approved For*lease 2004/09/15 : Cli?k;RDP7 - 1096000200020013-4
Weekly Contributions, BiLA
(CIA Working Paper)
28 June 1949
2. DOHINICAN REPUBLIC: The Caribbeanje *on although unsuccessful
12-1717.6-FialTe or to land men and mat4riel
in Leper6n Harbor in the Dominican Republic, will continue to pur-
sue its revolutionary objectives in Central America and the Carib-
bean. Thus far the stability of individual governments in the
area has not been affected, but international relationships will
inevitably become even more strained, Dominican. President Trujillo
is expected to lodge accusations with various inter-American groups,
using the recent incident as proof of the hostile intentions of
Guatemala and Woe in particular.
3. BRAZIL: US-Brazilian anese A eement
X?een1,IiThay poen Tfigway for further partici-
pation of US private capital in the development of Brazil/s min-
eral resources, as well as opening up a promising source of man-
ganese for the US in the 'Western Hemisphere, has been concluded
between the Brazilian concessionaire of the Amapi manganese de-
posits (in Northeastern Brazil near the mouth of the Amazon) and
a major US steel company. Under terms of a preliminary agreement
signed 9 June, the US company is to explore the Amapa deposits at
Its own expense. If results of the exploration prove satisfactory,
a new company (non-profit) will then be formed to develop the mine
and transportation and to conduct the mining operations. Brazil-
ians will hold 51 percent of the stock in the new company, but
the US participants, who mill supply the entire capital needed for
development, will control the technical operations and management.
It is reportedly agreed that diming the life of the mine the new
company will sell at cost (which will include amertization of the
loan capital advarced by the US company) 51 percent of the ore
produced to the Brazilian interests And 49 percent to the US inter-
ests. The Brazilian concessionaire has been negotiating with the
US Federal Bureau of Supply to provide it with manganese for
stockpiling. Eventually it is hoped ore maybe shipped out at the
rate of 300,000 tons a year. However, production an such a scale
is clearly impossible until a railroad is built from the mine site
to an ocean port --- a project not likely to be completed before
1952.
The type of agreement reached, showing a high degree of
comprehension on the part of the US company of Brazilian sensibi-
lities and conditions, should protect the operation from any
widespread charges of "Yankee imperialism". If it proves to be a
workable compromise between the frequently conflicting demands of
Brazilian nationalism and US private enterprise, it may furnish a
useful precedent for participation of US capital in development
of other Brazilian mineral resources.
Approved For Release 2004/09/15 : -RDP79-01090 00200020013-4
SEC