WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS LATIN AMERICA DIVISION, ORE, CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 31, 1950
• Content Type: PERRPT

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%?kar Contributions
Latin me a i sion, , CIA
1
January 1950
3
CURRENT I)EVELOP WTS
NORTHERN AREA: The granting of petroleum Concessions in British Honduras
will intensify Guatemalan claims to that area (p. 2). In British Honduras,
further anti-government demonstrations can be expected (p. 2). In Cuba,
popular resentment over gang killings poses problem for the administration
(p. 2). Panama's President Arias is facing increased opposition (p. 2).
CENTRAL AREA: Sea Article on Venezuelats labor situation (p. 6).
SOUTHERN AREA: Chile's current outbreak of strikes may foreshadow serious
difficulties for the government (p. 3).
SPECIAL SUBJJ TS
The Current Situation in Paraguay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Current Labor Situation in Venezuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. U
,DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS 3 C
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AUTH
DAT~ ? REV-EWER. 25X1
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Weekly Contributions, D/LA 31 January 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
1. GUATEIRIA : The Belize Dispute
she granting or petroleum concessions in British Honduras
has evoked Guatemalan protests and will undoubtedly intensify the
Belies dispute, Guatemalan efforts to force international recogni-
tion of its claims may take the form of dilator-, obstructionist,
or anti-Britieh tactics at international councils in order to maneuver
the US into aoi itting itself or mediating the dispute. It is prob-
abls, therefore, that the Belize issue will be a major factor influ
enoing the alignment of the Guatemalan delegation in the UN and, in
particular, the attitude of - the Guatemalan member of the recently
appointed five-man UN committee on the Eritrea question.
2, tITISH HONDURAS: Situation Still Tense
e recen lopments have diminished the
ve
Tftl
prospect of serious disorders, the situation remains tense. Local
merchants.. who had earlier threatened a general strike,, have now
agreed to modified price control. Another ameliorating factor is
the extensive road construction program recently inaugurated with
emergency funds granted by the UK to relieve unamploymeent,, The
economic position of the colony remains precarious, however, and
further anti :-government and anti-UK demonstrations can be expected.
3. CUR: Priors Tolerance of Gangsterism Ma Lose Him Popular Support
rece series o gang s, endangering the Ives
Innocent bystanders, has for the first time brought considerable
public pressure on the administration to abolish gangsterism, Organ-
ized public efforts include a campaign, strongly supported by the
press, of a student group (Pro-Dignidad Estudiantil) centering around
the University and the secondary schools, traditional cradle and
fortress of Cuban terroristic activity.
It will not be easy for the administration to decide what to
do. If Prio does not act against the gangs he will probably lose
further popular support,
4.
Faced with these alternatives., it is Maly that Prio - despite tho
present killings and his pre-election promises to do away with gang-
sterism - will continue, in effect, to tolerate it.
PANAIR : osition to Arias
opposition to ?resident Arias has increased; recent evidences
include the arrest of several political opponents pending investigation
of rumored revolutionary activities, and the forced resignation of the
Minister of Public Woz3cs who was said to have become too ambitious,
Even more important is the potential opposition from the police, who
reportedly have opposed proposed cuts in the police budget. Arias'
cc.:tinu ncc in office rill depend upon the erbent to which he can
lesson the power of the police (D/IA T kly, 10 Jan 50), who may other-
wise become an important factor in plots against him.
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Weekly Contributions, D/1A. 31. January 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
CBnZ : Strikes Add to Government s s Difficulties
e Curren ou rea o_ s kes, os ns ly a protest among
certain segments of labor to the administration's proposed economic
program, is not likely to imperil the stability of the government,
but will add to the serious problems the Gonzalez Videla regime faces.
Although the government's policy of intervention in the initial stages
of labor difficulties has been a fairly effective. measure to date,
such containment is, of necessity, temporary because the basic problem
-p- continued deterioration of the economic situation ?-- remains unsolved.
Moreover., inasmuch as the divergence of vies among members of the
government coalition will make difficult the implementation of other
than palliative economic measures, the current strikes nay foreshadow
more serious difficulties such as general labor and political disturb-
ances.
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(CMM Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 550
,l January 1950
The Current situation in Param
The political situation., although not stable, has
been-i-a-latively atatle for some time. Efforts to improve the
continuing unfavorable economic situation nay be moderately
effective. No change in the basic situation of the military
has occurred; their concern with political events continues.
Comm mists continue to be an insignificant subversive factor
cempared to arry and Colorado elements, Internationally,
Paraguay's situation has improved recent3y,
- The situation as to US security interests has
not changed within the last few months; new ties between
Argentina and Paraguay do not significantly affect those
interests,)
Political
IM-Political situation, although not stable, has been relatively static
for some time. Reports of revolutionary armor plotting are again board
after three months during which Provisional President Chaves' all-civilian
government appeared to gain in strength and in self-confidence,
Artr
Commaradelr-lnn-Chief General Diaz de Vivar has been especially feared
some Paraguayans as a strong man interested in setting up military rule.
Re not only remains influential in politics but has also been given credit
for the successful negotiation of a Paraguayan--Argentine cc.aasrcial agree-
ment. Reports of anti-government plotting by several other military leaders
have not been confirmed, but previous Paraguayan experience indicates that
they could very well be true, No major change has been made in the per-
sonnel of high government offices, with the exception of the resignation
of Juan Mnuel Frutos as president of the Supreme Court, Greater self-
confidence on the part of the government was indicated by the granting
of amnesty to 145 political prisoners on 2L. December; the state of siege,
however, is still in effect. Presidential elections are scheduled for
16 July with no candidate chosen as yet. Unless military plotting comes
to a head, Chaves should be able to maintain his recent. gains and thus
stay in office until the elections.
Economic
economic situation has not changed substantially, but several
measures adopted within the past three months may aid in bringing about
future improvement. The most important of these measures was the comple-
tion of a three-year commercial agreement with Argentina effective on
4 January - the first such agreement in many years and the result of
a
of the Paraguayan long series of efforts on the part of Argentina and certain sectors
the Argentine economic Colorado
orbit, despite the effort to place cre Paraguay to thhe firmly
app anaQ
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Situation Memorandum 5'-50
of economic Independence by c dealings with Brazil, the US, and other coun-
ies. The Argentine agreement provides for the exchange of goods typical
of the two countries; balances in favor of Paraguay are to be payable in
Argentine pesos that can be transferred for purchases in other countries
only with Argentina's consent; earnings on Argentine investments in
Paraguay are assured most-favored-nation treatment. The arrangements
should facilitate and regularize commerce with Paraguay's principal
customer and supplier.
Other important masuree have been adopted by the Chaves adminit--
tration, which has made a sincere and reasonable effort to improve
economic conditions. A now multiple exchange rate has boon established,
designed to penalize the importation of luxuries and to strengthen the
competitive position of Paraguay's minor products, such as petitgrain
oil, tobacco, limber, and vegetable oils. A commission has undertaken
the search for now European markets for Paraguayan products, and trade
pacts have been completed with Yugoslavia and France as a mans of
opening up such markets. Within the limits imposed by Paraguay's
peculiar, isolated, and undeveloped economy -- as well as by recurrent
political turmoil -- the government's efforts should be moderately
effective,
i milits
is No change has occurred in mot-ale., training, or ' teriel, and the
military are still Involved in political events. For example, in
October it appeared that Army Commnder-:Ln'-Chief. Diaz do Vivar was
considered a threat to the civilian administration and General Caballero
Alvarez became the most likely successor for his job. Three months of
relative calm folic- ad, and now new reports of plots involve both Diaz
de Vivar and General Alfredo Stroessner, either separately or in collu-
sion. Undoubtedly the army, if its top commanders reached an agreement,
could overthrow the civilian government,
Subversive
=ummists continue to be an insignificant factor in FaraguaWan
affairs, as the more important threats to the regime are found within
the government itself. (See Political section.)
International
PERguay's international relations appear more tranquil than at
arw previous time in the last few years. A new link with Argentina is
the commercial agreement mentioned (Economic section); another link is
an agreement signed 5 December 1.9, providing fear an Argentine Technical
Mission to nark with the Paraguayan ri.li.tary Geographic Institute. These
arrangements should be beneficial to Paraguay and to its relations with
Argentina without adversely affecting its relation; with the US, which
continue to be cordial,,
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31 January 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
Article 2-50
T Curren t Labor Situation in Venezuela
The most important single factor in the Venezuelan labor situation is
the continued existence of a large number ofunfederated, independent syndi-
cates, which were formerly united under Accion Democratica control in the
Confederacion de Trabajadorea Venezolanos (CIU), and whose membership comprises
by far the majority of organized workers. From the time of the coup of 24 Nov 48
to the present, these syndicates have constituted a serious problem for the
government and a challenge to the Communist and other political parties eager
to profit by the demise of AD.
The junta has approached the problem of the former AD unions with two
objectives: to eliminate AD labor leaders from positions of control, and to
reduce the threat of united action by decentralizing the labor organizations.
The first objective was effectively attained in the early months of the pres-
ent regime; the second has been achieved in form by the dissolution of the CTV
and Fedepe trol (the petroleum -workers' federation formerly controlled by AD).
In substance, however, the junta's insistence upon decentralization has already
produced unfavorable effects, and is unlikely to promote stability and order
in the labor movement if pursued as a permanent policy.
Decentralization of the former AD or "blue" unions has created a grievance
which the Communists are attempting to exploit. In addition to the very real
advantages -- in terms of collective bargaining -- that the Communists can
offer as an inducement to the "blue" unions to collaborate with their oil
workers' federation, the Communists have made effective use of the symbolic
term "syndical unity" as a rallying point for opposition to the government's
labor policy. Although the "blue" syndicates have been remarkably successful
in maintaining their independence, there has been evidence recently of a weak-
ening resistence to Communist pressure.
During the past two months, there have in fact been actual instances of
collaboration between Communist and independent petroleum workers' syndicates
in Western Venezuela (see L/LA Wkly 29 Nov 49 and 17 Jan 50). Cooperation,
though limited at present to such examples of parallel action as the joint *
issuance of propaganda leaflets, has been reported from an increasing number
of oil producing and refining centers, including Gabimas, where the "blue"
syndicate is particularly strong. Several reasons for the partial capitula-
tion of the "blue" syndicates may be adduced, no one of which appears to be
controlling: 1) the recent appearance of rival syndicates sponsored by the
political parties Union Republicana Democratics (URD) and the Comite 0rgani-
zacion Politics. Electoral Independiente (COPEI); 2) continued failure to
secure government sanction of a plan to revive a federation of "blue" syndi-
cates; 3) tie need for some form of organizational unity in preparation for
negotiations concerning wage scales, salaries, and commissary agreements in
February.
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Weekly Contributions, D/U -? 2 -
(CTA Working Paper)
Article 2-50
31 January 19 50
The Communist objective in promoting cooperation between "red" and "blue"
syndicates is obviously ultimate domination of the labor movement. To this
end they will probably attempt to effect whatever form of merger is possible
under the present circumstances of constant government surveillance and re-
luctance on the part of the "blue" dicates to give up their independence.
One of the more probabld moves is 25X1
25X1 that if the government obstructs a ego
merger, the "red" syndicates wi dissolve and join the "blues", who will
give them representation or the directorates The compromise involved in
such a move would be more apparent than real.
An initial victory must be conceded to the Communists in achieving even
the present limited degree of cooperation. There are, however, certain fac-
tors that will limit exploitation of their initial success. In the first
place, the rank-and-file of "blue" syndicate membership is reportedly opposed
to a merger with the Communists, so that, while parallel action may continue
to be tolerated, a merger might well precipitate large shifts of membership
from the "blue" to the URD or CDPEI syndicates. Furthermore, when normal
political activities are permitted, there is likely to be additional incen-
tive to such shifts of membership, since the UBE can probably offer greater
political advantages than the Communists. Finally, the junta is unlikely to
permit a le ;al merger of the "red" and "blue" unions, and, should Communist
influence increase markedly through a covert form of merger, the government
will probably deal as firmly with the Communists as it has heretofore dealt
with AD. It is therefore highly doubtful whether the Communists can press
their present advantage to the point of dominating the Venezuelan labor
movement.
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