WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS (Sanitized) ORE, CIA 7 FEBRUARY 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 7, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved ~!!f Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79-0 0A000200050006-9
I
2X1
GENF.rAL: Additional ratifications of the QAS Charter, ex r soon,
should stipulate action by other American republics (p. 2).
NCRTHERN AREA: In Mexico, the government's handling of the taxi--
driveerst strike may make future control of labor more difficult (p. 2).
In Martinique, termination of ECA flour shipments will result in Com mr -
nist agitation and increased popular discontent (p. 3). In Guatemala,
the pro-Communist CTAL has made a gain in labor (p. 3).
CENTRAL AREA: In Colombia., Liberal Party collaboration with Conserva-
tives now appears possible (p. 3).
SOUTH M AREA: In Argentina, recent favorable developments do not
necessarily mark any basic change in Peron 'a attitude toward the US
(p. 4). Peru's payments on US commnercial debts will be postponed (p. 4).
SPECIAL SUBJECTS
The Current Sltuation in Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
DOCUMENT NO. _
NO CHANGE IN CLA S. LI
DECLASSIFIED
C AS3. CHANGED r0: I'S 5 C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
State Dept. review completed
Y/eel ' Contributions
70-FE.- CIA
7 February 1950
RUTH: H 0
DATE REVIEWER:
25X1
Approved For Release M-2/10/21 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA000200050006-9
 Approvedr Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79-0'I'Q90A000200050006-9
cCRE
25X1 l eekly Contributions,,
(CIA Viorking Paper)
25X6
7 February 1950
1, GENERAL: Additional Ratifications of OAS Charter x cted Soon
S16ce on y ercan repub ics have ratvI .ed the
Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) up to the
presents it is significant that several Latin American nations are
now either completing ratification or are about to initiate this
process. Brazil and Honduras are expected shortly to c!eposit their
instruments of ratification with the Pan American Union, which would
bring the total number of ratifying states to five; Colombia has conr-
pleted the first steps toward ratification; most of the other Latin
American countries plan to present the Charter to the next session of
their respective legislatures. Inasmuch as the OAS has been function-
ing only on a provisional basis since 1948, each actual 'atlfication
of the fundamental document of the CAS strengthens the irttei American
system. Ratification by most of the major American republics,?par-
ticularltiy by the US, would probably stimulate others to take similar
action,
MEXICO: Taxi Drivers' Strike
e recent s e n Mexico City of Club Unioc de Chcferes
del Distrito Federal, affiliate of Lombardo Toledano e s Communist-
oriented UGOCM illustrates
e manner .ic .. Co'nnunist
a rs a ce advantage of legitimate grievances to further tL it own
ends, The drivers of both Club Unico and the government-?L'por:,sc-ed CTM
had been protesting the same grievances, including the high price of
gasoline and the issuance of an a cessive camber of cab licenses, and
the strike settlement by the government was made in favor of the. taxi
drivers. However, the police had previously used tear gas and rrns
in breaking up an assembly of the strikers (with 2 killed, 22 wr aided,
and over 300 jailed) and had taken over by force the offices of ...1.".
related unions, Such action resulted in public protests against .',e
use of violence by the police,, with countercharges that the dritc~r z
strike was a Communist maneuver, ;'While it is granted that the UrX-'
as wel.1 as other pro-Communist groups took advantage of the situat on
by inciting the strikers and later claiming public sympathy, labe`..Iag
the strike as merely a Communist maneuver would be misleading in z: taw
of both the legitimate grievances involved and the fact that over 2OOO
chauffeurs of Club Unico prior to striking led a pi"llTrirra ? e to the
Shrine of Guadalupe.
'While Communism made no notable gains from the events the
unfortunate police methods have brought public criticism on the gavi.n,-
ment. Future repetitions of such measures may jeopardize the govex'.rr. nt's
ability to keep labor in line.
25X6
Approved For Release 222&UMC TA-RDP79-01090A00020005000G-9
 25X1
Approved Release 2002/10/21 SaW- P79-01 A000200050006-9
Weekly Contributions,
(CIA Working Paper)
7 February 1950
3. MARTINIQUE: PossibleARitation Over Increased Cost of Bread
percent rise in the cost of bread, vhicn appears
25X1
inevitable by the end of March, may provide the Communists with the
means of stirring up considerable popular discontent. The present. low
cost of bread cannot continue because currently substantial ECA flour
shipments to the area will be terminated shortly and because local
bread subsidization funds soon will be exhausted, The local govern-
ment will probably try to mitigate popular dissatisfaction by post-
poning the rise in the price of bread until after the metropolitan
French government has increased the minimum wage under the new
collective bargaining law presently being enacted. estimates,
however, that the Communists can be relied on to ma olitical
issue out of the situation and will probably attack the US for having
stopped EGA flour shipments.
OUATKNALA: Communists Gain in Labor
The recent action oa leftist Federacion Sindical de
Guatemala (FSG) in deciding to affiliate with the CTAL places the
majority of Guatemalan workers within this pro-Communist labor corn
federation led by Lombardo Toledano. (Guatemala's other major labor
syndicate, the CTG , has long been a CTRL affiliate.) The decision
of FSG to join the CTAL was probably designed to unify the forces of
labor in the coming presidential campaign and possibly to secure aid
from the nos nist CTAL.
stimates that the election of a leftist successor to
Arovala, rm expires in March 1951)? who would continue to
tolerate Communists as Arevalo has done, is the most important immediate
Communist objective with respect to Guatemala. Continued tolerance of
Communists in Guatemala --- the country of middle America most friendly
to them - would help to maintain at least some Communist influence in
other countries of that area.
COLOMBIA: Liberal Collaboration With Conservatives Possible
ra ex-pres n A onso ro"pez' political pronounce-
ment on 27 January may well be a trial balloon sent up in collusion
with conservative President-elect Laureano O6mez in order to determine
whether Lopez can carry the Liberal Party with him on a policy of
constructive criticism in return for the lifting of the state of siege.
The Lopez statement, which analyzes political relations
between the Liberal and Conservative parties, is the first important
Liberal pronouncement which the government has allowed to be published
since the declaration of the state of siege. Criticism of the Con-
servatives is sufficiently violent to safeguard Lopez from charges of
having gone over to the opposition. Lopez points out. however, that he
considers collaboration between the parties necessary to peace, at the
,ame time warning against collaboration by only a segment of the Lrt-,tral
,,arty.
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10 P7D 9-01090A000200050006-9
 at
0
ApprovedWr Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79- OA000200050006-9
SECRET
Weekly Contributions,
(CIA Working Paper)
7 Februarq 1950
The Liberal Party directorate has become discredited to some
exten Despite con-
tinued rumors of subversive plans of-Liberal elements he army, the
two months since the presidential election have shown that civilian
Liberals are not willing to engage in civil war. Hence, Lopez may
now be able to secure Liberal acceptance of his leadership. The
Conservative administration, on the other hand, has shown its deter-
mination to maintain the state of siege (and the concomitant suspension
of Congress) as long as the Liberals continue in their intransigent
attitude.
It is possible that, when both parties have weighed the
disadvantages of their respective positions, the Conservatives may
offer, and the Liberals, under Lopez' leadership, may accept an exchange
of Liberal "constructive opposition" for termination of the state of
siege ----- a development which would be favorable to the US interest
in stability and democracy in Colombia.
6. ARGENTINA: Indications of Bid for US Assistance
tees- modification in is ZM-fe Oilfields Administra-
tion) usually antipathetic attitude toward the US petroleum companies
appears to be a move by Peron to ease the adverse situation for US
business in Argentina -- which thus far has been a deterrent to
improved US-Argentine economic relations. YPF's recent approval of
certain sterling purchases of crude, gasoline, and other supplies by
the US companies marks a reversal of its formerly negative reaction
to their urgent requests for supplies. Since this change in attitude
immediately followed a discussion between US Ambassador Griffis and
President Peron concerning petroleum and other problems adversely
affecting US Argentine economic relations, particularly those that
could be relieved without use of dollar exchange, it suggests that
Peron may take action on additional commercial problems to encourage
US collaboration and possible financial assistance. Such a concession,
however, cannot be interpreted as indicating any fundamental improve-
ment in Peron's position vis a vis the US 17kly, 20 Dec 49).
7. PERU: Payment of US Commercial Debts Postponed
A recent decree CL1STd'1.DU43.i1~~_~ing the Lilt profits f;to from the revaluation
profits
of gold and foreign exchange holdings of the Central Bank, in effect,
makes funds available to pay Argentina - rather than to pay US
commercial arrearages as the Klein commission had recommended. The
fact that the government has disregarded a large debt to the US in
favor of a relatively small current debt to Argentina will adversely
affect US-Peruvian commercial relations and is the first indication
that the present Peruvian regime may be less pro-US than previously
appeared.
25X1
Approved For Release 2002TTO CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050006-c~'
 Approved Foelease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79-010000200050006-9
SECRET
Weekly Contributions,
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 6-50
The Current Situation in Cuba
7 February 1950
(Summary -- The PrIo administration remains strong. The
economic outlook is somewhat more favorable, Despite losses
during the past year, the Commnu:ists retain considerable
Influence in Cuba. The armed forces are, as a whole, loyal
to the administration and are strong enough to maintain. the
authority of the state under ordinary circumstances. Military
officials have taken a serious view of recent events in the
Caribbean and are planning to improve Cuba's air potential.
Cuba's foreign policy remains unchanged.
-- US security interests are not seriously affected
by domestic developments in Cuba but the recent reports that
Trujillo is plotting against Frio, coupled with the almost
universal antagonism to Trujillo in Cuba, contribute to
the long standing ill-feeling and suspicion between the
two countries.)
Political
moo administration remains strong. A recent change of cabinet
will not alter the situation. It is true that there is widespread dis-
approval of Prfo due to such factors as his weak leadership; his tolerance
of gang killings; mediocre government officials; mismanagement of public
funds; and his nepotism. Moreover, the alliance between the President's
party (Autantico) and the Republican Party is, in effect, broken. Never-
theless, the Autgnticos have fairly strong support from the Democrats and
Liberals; the registered voting strength of the Autgntico Party has
increased in the past year (the spoils system tends to insure this and
the army's loyalty will tend to render ineffective any plotting Wkly,
10 Jan 50) against the administration in the immediate future. ere ore,
estimates that President Prfo+s administration will remain strong
ng coming months and that the Autsntico Party and its allies have a
good chance to win the congressional and municipal elections of June 1950,
Economic
economic outlook is somewhat more favorable. It is true that
adverse factors still persist., Mang Cuban industries continue to suffer
economic reverses and a radical improvement in this respect is unlikely;
labor troubles are frequent; business interests oppose the government's
equivocal and pro-labor economic policies; and wealthy Cuban investors.,
fearing to invest money in Cuba, continue to send it abroad. Also, govern-
ment revenues for 1949 were about 20 percent below those for 1948; the
mismanagement of public funds continues; and it is possible that government
efforts to obtain a foreign loan will fail. It is encouraging, however,
that there are fairly good prospects for the sale of most of the 1950
sugar crop at favorable prices, and retail tradej, the building trades,
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA000200050006-9
wxffllrl- 5
 Approved Felease 2002/10/22 RDP79-01 A000200050006-9
ECTLET
Weekly Contributions,
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 6-50
-- 2 - 7 February 1950
and some secondary industries may be expected to be fairly prosperous in
coming months. Therefore, it is estimated Cuba will continue to be in a
moderately sound economic position for some time, and that adverse eco-
nomic factors in themselves will not seriously affect the political
stability of the country.
Subversive
he Communists retain considerable influence in Cuba. It is true
that they'have lost some political strength and labor influence during the
past year. The Communist Party (PSP), however, is still an important oppo-
sition element to the Autenticos and has significant influence among sec-
tors of the labor movement, including the port and transport workers. In
addition, Communist propaganda continues to be fairly efficient and
Communist leaders have considerable local influence and prestige. It is
estimated that there will be no substantial decline in the present Commtr-
nist potential in Cuba in coming months.
Two revolutionary gangs, the MSR and UIR,, were declared illegal by
the Urgency Court in November, but the gangs continue to have support from
important official sources and it is estimated that they will continue to
constitute a considerable political factor with possible influence on
governmental stability.
Military
a armed forces are, as a whol.a, loyal to the administration and are
strong enough to maintain the authority of the state under ordinary circum-
stances. It is true that there appears to be some discontent and a feeling
of insecurity among some of the army officers, and the possibility that a
few are plotting a coup cannot be entirely discounted, However, the Prio
government can be expected to invoke measures designed to insure army
loyalty.
Military officials have taken a serious view of recent events in the
Caribbean and are planning to improve Cuba's air potential. Air corps
training has been intensified, all aircraft are to be put in operational
condition, and the air corps wishes to buy radar equipment for defense and
to buy new heavy bombers and near type US fighters. As of 7 October, only
23 out of 67 Cuban military aircraft, including naval, were in operational
condition and the Cubans possessed only 9 tactical aircraft (none in opera-
tional condition) while the Dominican Republic had 24 tactical aircraft,
11 in operational condition. It is estimated that Cuban concern over
preparations for defense will continue as long as reports are circulated
that Trujillo is plotting the overthrow of the Prio government (See
International).
Approved For Release 2002 -RDP79-01090A000200050006-9 6.
 25X1
25X1
Approved FoKelease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79-01 000200050006-9
ZSECRMow-
situation memorandum 6-50
Weekly Contributions
(CIA Working Paper)
7 February 1950
International
u a1s foreign policy remains in general unchanged.
The Cuban government supports the US as against the USSR in inter-
national matters but economic relations between Cuba and the US remain
difficult? Bilateral discussions will be held shortly on matters about
which agreement had previously been impossible, including the proposed
Cuban tariff increase on imports of US textiles, and radio broadcasting
problem r. It is estimated that there will be no substantial change in
Cubans attitude visa via the US regarding economic problems in the
immediate future.
The Caribbean Legion continues to use Cuba as one of its headquarters?
but activities in Cuba against the Dominican Republic are chiefly in the
form of propaganda at present. The Cuban government stoutly affirms its
right to give asylum to exiles but is apparently giving little aid to the
Legion.
Cuban policy toward the Dominican Republic remains unchanged, and the
almost universal public antagonism to Trujillo continues. Relations between
the two countries are somewhat less inflammable than a few weeks ago as a
result of the present OAS investigation of the Caribbean situation. How-
ever'. there are frequent reports in Cuba that Trujillo is actively plotting
the overthrow of the Pro government, and that government is taking a
serious view of Trujillo+s possible menace to Cuba and to the inter-
American system. The Cubans will, of course, continue to regard the
Trujillo dictatorship as dangerous; estimates that the Cuban govern-
ment will try, nevertheless, to adhere to established inter-American
principles in its relations with the Dominican Republic,
Approved For Release 1 : CIA-RDP79-01090A0002000500p6-9