WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS 18-50 (Sanitized)ORE, CIA 2 MAY 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050018-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 2, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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25X1
25X1
I Ibelieves that the item on Bolivia's proposal for a meting
of Sou merican foreign ministers (p. 3) is of particular interest.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
GENERAL: The pro-Coaaaunist OTAL has passed a resolution reportedly de-
signed to derv shipment of essential materials to the US in case of war
(p. 2).
NORTHERN AREA: In Panama, the Comiumiet Party has been outlawed (p. 2).
SOUTHERN AREA: -In Argentina, the situation of US oil companies may be
improved (p. 2). In Per~u3 elections may be postponed because of the
growing opposition to.Odrie (p. 3). Bolivia's latesta ttempt to focus
attention on its"Communist problem" has been a proposed meeting of
South American foreign ministers (p, 3)., In Chile, labor disturbances
msW further aggravate the already deteriorating political and economic
situation (p. 3).
SPECIAL SUBJECTS
The Current Situation in Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
State Dept. review completed
NEXT f EVIEW DATE:
le
X 0 CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
I DECLASSIFIED
1_ SS. CHANGED TO: TS S C 25X1
AUTH:
DATE, NM EVIEWER:
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Weekly Contributions,nlffi5O 2 May 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
1. (MNERAL: Reported CTRL Resolution to Prevent Sh3 eat of Essential
Bator -~a Case ,0 A
reports a op on a e CT'AL's recent Montevideo
meting Wkly, 11 Apr 50) of a resolution to prevent the shipp-
msnt of essen Ia]. materials to the US in case of ear represents, if
tam, a Communist objective, but not a present Conmunist capability.
The Communists do not now have the capability of carrying
out a coordinated strike throughout Latin American ports at a given
time - even for a short period, Thera are p h girt or l CTAL-
influenced transport and port workers in many Of pprincs as
Latin American ports who could instigate prolong s s one port or
labor grievances arise and thereby tie up activity
another at various times. This limited capability the Communists
are attempting to build up by convincing the port workers that a
strike to prevent shipwnt of essential materials to the Q~ that
d
be worth the sacrifices involved.
the Co monists will not be able to ma notable progress toward
this objective in the foxeaseab]ce future.
2, PANNAY&: Communist Party Outland
T ?caab et reslution of 29 April outlawing the Communist
Partido del Pueblo and "all propaganda, activity, or agitation of
Communist character" was represented as an effort to defend "Pana-
manian sovereignty and the-fulfilimmt of the obligations relating
to the defense of the Canal". Full results of the action will
become more apparent in time but the measure, if properly enforced..
could retard the Communist campaign to create ill will for the US
an1~k3,g, 1S Apr 50) and to discredit the Arias administration,
' will definitely inhibit Coimnimist development in Panama.
AR=TINA: situation of US oil niesto Improved
The Critical-situation or US ocompanies operating
in Argentina will be eased at least temporarily as a result of individual agreements providing for crude supplies. The agreements -
negotiated with Finance Minister Cereijo during his stay in the US
- provide that during the next year the US companies in Argentina
will be supplied stipulated amounts of crude oil for which payment
will be in dollars over a two-year period, and that negotiations
for a longterm agreement will conance at an early date. While
these agreements do not resolve all of the companies a immediate
problems, they will enable the companies to resrmee at a higher
level of operation their refining and distributing activities,,
which, in recent months, have been drastically curtailed. Also,,
the provision for negotiations for a long-term agreement furnishes
at least the basis for possible resolution of one of the obstacles
to improved US-Argentine economic relations,
25X1
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25X1 Weekly ~ n but3ons 1 5O
Paper) 2 May 1950
4. P2RU: Possible Post
wont of Election
presidential election echedpos ion may force Odris to
mPPeared ed for 2 Postpone the
, mottle d Januarys it
b t 1 In rigging thethateleactionthe sogoverthatt would have
h r in
Od'A owever, the largest loyal a could become p resident.
ho its backing. pa Y, Union Revolucionaria Later,
the a? break with Mused
25X1 The L an mf stica Pedro Be p leader of
Apr 50) also o lost him au
in the South of Peru eional cont Disaffection inues also appears undermine his etr;nggth-
,
among the armed forces, Asa resultof allptth creasing
Oven though Odr ee control of the
bar satov8rrsmcsntal 8ese developments
appears to be
of pro quat'e "' might not be able topob stil
is tea necessary for ehelectio,
tmin thenumr
Possible that the In v10V of this situations
to create a border government's "discovery" of Aprista plans
aving create
to incident with Colombia could provide a face-
election. Pose or alter the conditions of the scheduled
5. BOLIVIA: Pr sad South
ho Be American AntimCo?aunist Conference
tics on its n 11
ivian governmen a fast at MP ocu Coam !i et problem? is its
nist activities recent that a South
American conference be hold in L$ Paz this month tosdithat a S in the southern continent, to discuss Comm,.
Communist threat, Bolivia By emphasissing the
'will economic aid eat, be Probably hopes that its request for US
of State (in given more consideration. The
against a reply to Bolivia as request for its views) aaddviedent
verse,tiOns b
general etween conference Bolivi livi and suggeS d instead bilateral ral con-
a and the
Despite this, other South American republics
the Bolivian ove
conteinix ; the Proposal for the cvre:nce out the coMmunication
hoeve~r, that it will l f or Bolivia maintains,
and has explained it tot satisfy itself with bilateral
not the
a~icepla wag that thencirctations,
invitation ~to a conferen ular
means of sounding out the vi mm but only a
25X1 ~bal3evQS that of other governments,
not be he and liv a the proposed conference M
ol talc
the form of consttat any action which restede antiai d 5 Pa~mill tames
I t
s.
5 CHID: governments.
. Labor Disturbances
Gapected to s ur noes, many of them Communist
Bur beyond the,
he traditional May Da insPirad, are
president's return to Santiago on 4 may.
y Period after the
non-Communist workers over the failure of thesaovefaction among
moist basic economic legislation (according t Cement to 3mpZe-
.n the settlement of the January strikes to the term a
is ono reason for~theu~n
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Weekly Contributions,
(CIA Working Paper)
19.50 2 My 1950
current labor discontent. The Conwmiste, always quick to take
advantage of any situation to create disturbances and to embarrass
the government, can be relied upon to support and to foment anti-
government demonstrations. While it is likely that the government
can control any attempted violence, there is the danger that a
larger scale strike movement could be touched off, aggravating
the already deteriorating political and economic situation.
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Weekly Contributions.,
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 2&50
18-30 2 May 1950
The Current Situation in Cuba
(SUM The Frio government is stablay. The economic
a oo remains favorable. The Communists have gained in
strength. The armed forces are, as a whole, loyal to the
administration and are strong enough to maintain the
authority of the state. The Cuban government has indi-
cated its intention to follow a policy similar to that of
the US toward Latin American dictatorships. US-Cuban rela-
tions remain unchanged.
An unfavorable factor from the standpoint of US
security interests is the Cuban practice of modifying its
antiiCommnmist policies and attitudes when necessary in the
interests of domestic political expediency.)
Political
MR- Frio government is stable. Election activities., which dominate
the political scene, have had no adverse effects upon the governentva
control. Interest now is centered on the June bi-eleeticn, which is
the first test of Autentico and opposition strength before the lq
presidential election, and may indicate the trend of political events
during the remainder of President Mots term. The president to pbrty
(Autentico) is aware of this and is making an an-out effort - in-
oluding the usual distribution of jobs and other rewards - to win
the election, and, although it has a good chance of winning a majority
of posts in the country as a whole, it may lose the important Habana
mayoralty and senatorial contests where "Coincidentes" (backed by (Iran,
Batista, Pujol, and the Ccmrauni.sts) and Eddie Chiba'so Ortodoxos (Partido
del Pueblo) are strong contestants,
.In the Habana campaign, opposition charges have made governmental
corruption an important issue des its President Prio's announced new
policy of honest government YPkly,, 21 eb 30). Path Autenticos
and the "Coincidentes" are connec d with the spoils system under which
politicians have robbed the Cuban treasury, but Eddie Chibas' Crtodoxos
are generally regarded as proponents of honest government. In the effort
to limit the Ortodoxo appeal to the voters, the government has made some
improvements in financial administration, but these are likely to be
only temporary as the reforms have cut into the revenues of powerful
gambling and prostitution interests who control many votes and who sub-
sidize influential politicians.
estimates that even the possible loss to the administration of
nHabana posts in the forthcoming elections would not immediately
affect the stability of the government. Such a loss, however, might
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Weekly Contributions,
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 2&'50
19-50 '- 2 -- 2 gay 1950
weaken the administration during the period prior to the 1952 presiden-
tial election and could improve opposition chances in that election.
Economic
a economic situation remains favorable. It is true that reforms
in the ; 3inistry of Finance will probably be temporary. Congress may
pigeonhole the 1950-51 governmental budget;the president+s economic
policies continue to be based almost entirely on political expediency;
wealthy. Cubans continue to fear to invest money in Cuban projects; and
current economic activity is being retarded by frequent strike threats
(see Subversive). It is encouraging, however, that governmental reve-
nues have increased in recent months and that the 1949-50 fiscal year
may close 30 June with a small budget surplus; there are fair prospects
for the sale of most of the 1950 sugar crop at favorable, prices; the
textile industry is more prosperous than it was a year ago; and minor
industries are moderately prosperous. Other encouraging developments
are the progress of Cuban cane and US beet sugar producers toward the
formulation of a united sugar policy; the widespread public desire to
solve economic problems connected with the. diversification of domestic
production; the government as authorization of the partial mechanization
of the cigar industry; and the work toward the development of barter
exchange formulae and other methods for increasing cigar and tobacco
exports. It is estimated that there will be no substantial change in
the favorable economic situation in the next three months.
Subversive
. We Gommureists have gained in strength during the hot election cam-
paign. Factors i t is gain are the Communist. electoral pact with the
"Coincicentest? ly, 114 Mar 50) and the equivocal attitude of the
Catholic Church oward this pact. In addition, local sections of vari-
ous political parties have dickered for Communist votes; the governments
in a move to split the Communist vote (registered at 127,000), has
greatly decreased its former repressive measures; and non-Communist
labor leaders have (in part, unwittingly) followed the Communist Party
line in recent labor disputes. As a result of these various maneuvers,
the Communists now feel strong enough to revival openly their international
orientation toward dbscow despite the strong anti-USSR attitude of most
Cubans, and have greatly increased their labor activities. Agitation
in key industries (sugar, maritime., and port) has increased in recent
weeks to the point where the Minister of Labor calls the strikes a dan-
gerous weapon that is leading toward "anarchy". It is believed that
labor troubles Yrill continue to pose a serious problem. The Communists
will continue to take advantage of their improved political and labor
position during coming months and will probably be an important factor.
in Cuba for a considerable time to come despite any repressive meas-
ures taken against them , because low income groups largely fail, to
recognize that basic Communist objectives are a threat to them and to.
the economic lira of the country.
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Weekly Contributions
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 2Er-50 .
18-50 - 3 2 May 1950
e armed forces are
, as a whole, loyal to the administration and
.
are strong enough to maintain the authority of the State under ordinary
circumstances. Since the Caribbean situation is not now acute, military
officials are somewhat less concerned over preparations for defense than
previously "s 7 Feb 50). During coming months, no change in
the loyal or s rrength of the armed forces is expected,
International
?~ he