WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS 23-50(Sanitized), ORE, CIA, 6 JUNE 1950

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December 15, 2016
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September 16, 2002
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June 6, 1950
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Approved FoAdlease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79-010911111000200050023-0 Weekly Contributions 23-5O 0 CIA 6 June 1950 Of the developments reported this week, believes that on the 25X emerging trend toward uniformity in recognition policies among the American republics is partioularly important (p, 2). CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS GENERAL? The trend toward uniform recognition policies in the Hemisphere teen important gain for Hemisphere solidarity (p, 2), NORTHERN AREA?, In Mexico, the mine workers' union has withdrawn from the Communist-dominated 000CM (p. 3). See also report on the current situation in Costa Rica (p? 5), CENTRAL ARRA s US-Colombia relations may be troubled by a rate mar between shipping lines.(1% 3). In as119 a aeries of labor-syndicate elections will not seriously affect Brazilian politics (p, )? SOUNERN AREAt See report on the current situation in Peru (p, SPECIAL SUT.J.lriCTS The Current Situation in Costa Rica .....?...... . . . . 5 The Current Situation ill Peru , ,, , . . . 0 0 a C 4 C ? 0 a 0 a g DOCUMENT NO. 3 N HANGE IN CLASS. LI x.?C DECLASSiFIED C, ACHANGED TO: 13 S C NE>: 1- REV:EW DA NZ: AUT H: Hi- r) DATE/ ?r lEViEWER:_ 0.0.210,10f001"ma"..? State Dept. reviewkpornn etecl prala ror Release 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050023-0 25X1 25X1 Approved For002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79-0109M00000050021A Weekly Contributions, 23450 to June lvju (CIA Working Paper) 1, GENERAL: Trend Toward Uniformi in Reco tion re has en no good reason i doubt that the other American republics would be basically aligned with the US in ease of a US-USSR mar, there have been weaknesses in the peacetime materials out of which a structure of perfect collaboration would have to be built in time of war. One such weakness has been the divergence in ideas as to the connection between the quality of a new government and its recognition as a member of the American Dismily of nations. During recent months a trend toward general acceptance of the DS view-- that non-recognition of a possibly undemocratic new regime is not the most suitable method to further the development of democracy within the country -- has signaled an approach toward Hemisphere unity on the leportant matter of recog- nition of new governments brought to power by coups d'etat, and has therefore marked a distinct gain for Hemisphere solidarity. Although the Final Act of Bogot4 laid down certain prin- ciples regarding continuity of relations among American states, no agreement was reached at that time on a common policy relative to the recognition of de facto governments, and subsequent events showed that certaid7caliles -7 particularly Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, and Uruguay ? had reservations even on the Bogotel principle that recognition did not imply approval or disapproval. Recently these countries have become less adamant. All of them have extended recognition to the Arias regime in Panama. alba and Uruguay (the latter being a leader of the "democratic" group upholding non- recognition of de facto regimes brought to power by non7constitu- tional overthrew orWernments) have indicated a willingness to accept, at least as expedient, US recognition policy. Although the recent Haitian coup deetat does not provide a clear-cut test on recognition, it does afford some clues that the trend toward unanimity is continuing. Practically all of the Latin American countries have now recognized the Haitian junta, while Chile in the only country which has insisted that Haiti east show signs of returning to "normal democratic processes" before the new gavern- ment is recognized. There is also the possibility that, of the few countries which have as yet refused to recognize the Peruvian and Venezuelan juntas, some may decide to do so in the near future, The whole problem of recognition of de facto regimes is now being studied by the Inter-American CouncircinEasts. The recent trend toward uniformity may enable the Council in the report it is preparing for the Tenth Inter-American Conference to agree on certain recognition principles, thereby moving toward formally accept- ing, as a matter of principle, the procedure that is now becoming standard practice on recognition of new governments among the Ameri- can republics, 2. Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050023-0 Approved Faik?lease 2002/10/21806111DP79-0100K000200050023-0 Weekly contributions, (CIA Working Paper) 25-50 6 June 1950 2. MEXICO: Miners Re udiate Communism TiMican nine workerTrrepudiation of Communism and their withdrawal from Iombardo's Unin General de Obreros y Caupesinos de mixicio (uoccm), are inline with recent labor trends inspired by administration maneuvere. Firmness of mine workers' adherence to mom had been a quest2on for some time ars 9 Aug 49); their recent action, for owing the petrolj;;;;t0 withdrawal in December, leaves U0001 with no affilivted national syndicate although it still has tb) support of individual sections of important unions. The mine worlurs' action also constitutes a blow to CTAL and TIPTU strength in tits Hemisphere and dins the prospects for the establishment of i WFTU-sponeored Inter-American Miners" Federation. 3, COLOMBIA: Probable Rate Ur Betsy n US and Colombian Shi in Lines riteVaiITTEr7b7pro re 8 ? 0 a announce' withdrawal mithdramal of the Gran Colombia Mcpchant Fleet from the Shipping Conference, The Colombian line's tbject in thin action is to obtain freedom to collect payment for fre!ght in Colombian currency. The Gran Colombia Merchant Fleet had pactously agreed to collect pay- ment for freight in dollars as reqp5:ed by Conference rules, but had apparently believed at that tiny that Grace Line, its chief competitor, mould then agree to divide its cargo with Gran Colonbia, When Grace Line made clear that surh a division les impossible, the Gran Colombia line decided that it could not forego the advantage of collecting payment for freight In Colombian currency, and there- fore should withdraw from the Corierence. This decision is likely to be followed by a rate war, These developments ard expected to have a somewhat adverse effect on US-Colombian relations both because of the probable rate mar and because Gran Colombia 'a alvertising is likely to be highly nationalistic. /4. Mans Labor Syndical Electiory of Minor Political miortanee elections elh in Ce a o e a.sr a ratites on 12 June, the first of such e:ectione since the government took control of the labor unions in 3i,t7, will not seriously affect Brazilian politics. Although at this time only about 5 percent of the syndicates will hold electiots, there seems no good reason to question the government's promisi that all syndicates will hold their elections by the time of too presidential election on 3 October. The Communists, who for almost tree.years have been loud in their demands that these elections be :old, now oppose them, since the regulations mould seem to preven6 the Communists from either holding office or voting. Even should CDmmunist voting be permitted, this Approved For Release 2002/10/21P.Seff-0 090A00020005002,;0 Approved For ease 2002/10/21 6Efikep79-0109616100200050023-0 25X1 Weekly Contributions, (CIA Working Paper) 23-.50 6 June 1950 group, who during the past year have lost =eh of their prestige among the rank and file of labor, would probabl,y make no subetan- tial gains. Vargas' supporters, on the other hand, may yoke some gains. It is not expected, however, that any change in labor leadership resulting from these elections will in ararimgralter the prospecte for an orderly presidential election. Approved For Release 2002/10/2440err79-01090A000200050023-0 40 Approved Forlkelease 2002/10/21 ? CIA-RDP79-01096160200050023-0 gEORET 25X1 Weekly Contributions* 23-50 (CIA. Working Paper) Situation Memorandum 34-50 The Current Situation in Costa Rica 6 Jure 1950 (8 -- The Mate government appears reasonably stable. been no significant change thus far in the un- favorable economic situation, but the outlook for the future is mcce favorable, Communist strength, though small, is a constant problem for the government. The Guardia Civil appears to be loyal to the administration but could not suppress a large-scale subversive attempt. International relations remain unchanged in regard to major matters but lesser refinements in policy appear to be in process of formulation. ? NO development in Costa Rica has significantly affected US security interests.) Political "gb1ate government appears reasonably stable, It is tree that political agitation against administration policies, which has been at a 212131110UM since Mate assumed the presidency, shows signs of increas- ing. For example, there are indications that the Social Democratic Pareqy and ex-junta-president Figueres will offer greater resistance to administration policies. It is not likely, however, that this opposition will threaten the mtability of the government during the next few months. Bconomio 1E31e there has been no significant Change during the last six months in the unfavorable current economic situetion, the outlook for the future is improvwd. The principal unfavorable factor at this time is the difficulty of restriuting imports sufficiently to improve the ocantryus foreign exchange situation. Favorable factore include: the gradual elimination of a large backlogof payments due on past imports; the paynent Of govermnentel expenses from cement revenues; preparation? to renew payments and to refinance portions of the public debtl and the Oonsideration of plans to advance the 'economic develope ? it of the count', partiou/arly by improwtmente in the cattle and eoffee industries and in the fiscal edminintration, The predominance pf favorable domestic factors, together with the fact that world mar- at conditions continue to favor Costa Rican exports, rakes the imme- diem econonio outlook swe favorable than it has been in recent years. It le estimstad? thereforet that unless the Mate administration fang to enforce its strict financial controls, an improved economic situation sill result within acting months, Approved For Release 2002/10/211''rtirV771090A0002000500h-0 Approved Forukelease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79-010g150000200050023-0 SECRET 25X1 Week3y Contributions, 23-50 - 2 ?. 6 June 3.950 (CIA Working Paper) Situation bemorandum 34-50 TE Guardia Civil appears to be loyal to the president, despite some personal dissatisfaction among the officers. This sole military body of Costa Rica is not at present 'adequately trained or equipped to suppress any large scale subversive attempt, and, in spite of some indication>, that the government intends to provide additional arms and training, eill probably rennin of rather law military capabilities, Subversive ---nrnArent Communist political strength in Costa Rica is insignifi- cant, but the potential influence of this group in organized labor is important, and the continual attempts by the Communists to increase their strength constitute a constant problem for the government. Despite two years of suppression, the Commdnists have retained the? loyalty of many of their militant followers (nuebered at 2000 in 1) and have now reestablished provincial political committees in nearly all provinces. In addition they have some eight hundred medbers in local Communist labor unions and are capable of increasing their labor influence still further, because the non-Communist labor federation -- designed to supplant the Communists as the leading labor force of the country -- has not really taken their place as the champion of the lower classes. On the other hand, barriers to the development of Communism exist in the opposition of most Costa Ricans to the inter- national phases of Communieny in the anti-Communist animosities growing out of the 194Scivil war, in the lack of sufficient well-trained local Communist leaders, and in the political isolation and defective disci- pline of the Costa Rican Communists, It is estimated that, ahead the constant geranium:eta (police) action against Communist activities prove inadequate to prevent a further increase in Commuhist strength, the government will take more aggressive measures,, International el"----Thflonal relations remain unchanged in regard to major matters, but important policy refinements appear to be in process of formulation, Unchanged are Costa Ricags friendly attitude towards the US and its support of the US in East-West rivalries. Unchanged, too, are its strained relations with Nicaragua, a situation that caused tempers to flare when it appeared to President Clete that the US EMbassy in Nica- ragua vas unduly favoring Somoza in recent conversations, President Mate continues to enforce the Costa Rican policy of remaining aloof from Riddle American politics and Caribbean Legion adventures, but his task is complicated by the disturbing factor injected into intra-Caribbean relations by the activities of ex-junta-president Figeeros? Activities ouches Figueresg attendance at the Conference itr Demooracy and Freedom 6.. Approved For Release 2002/10/2 : CIA-RDP79-01090A0002000500z3-0 Approved For *ease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79-01090511400200050023-0 SECRET 25X1 Weekly Contributions, 23-50 On Working Paper) Situation Memorandum 54-50 6 June 1950 In Cuba and charges that Figueres sent arms to President Arias of Panama and that he remains interested in Caribbean revolutionary activ- ities, particularly against Somoza, make Mates policy of aloofness from Caribbean squabbles difficult to maintains The most important refinements in policy are: a policy regarding recognition of other American republics closer to that stated and applied by the US, maintaining, hasever, a distinction in favor of the recogni- tion of governments created as a result of revolutions which had, as their purpose the defense of threatened constitutional or democratic institutions; and a policy-- for the announced purpose of encouraging honest elections in other American republics of permitting Costa Mean diplomats to act, together with other Latin American diplomats, as witnesses in electoral proceedings when requested by the countries Involved. Approved For Release 2002/10/01090A0002000501:123-0 SECRET Approved For/Nelease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79-0109110600200050023-0 Weakly Contributions, 23-50 6 June 1950 (Clk Working Paper) Si a stion Memorandum 35-50 The Current Situation in Pert -- The present stability of the Odria regime will be t )11/ ? June. The economic situation has deteriorated sightly? Capabilities of the armed forces have dropped. A:bhough the subversive potential of the Apristas has increased alghtlys they are unable -- independematlar-- to make a major ave9 the Communists do not at present constitute a signifia, ea..% force. Peru's relations with other countries are amicatble. -- The situation as to US interests has been improved by pimulgation of a new mining oode, which is expected to faeiltate the investment of foreign capital tint/11.11G enter- prises with caeca:event increase in availability of strategic minera:30) Political . ------1115-0drit regime, though facing a critical period during June, has continued St:ale up to the aliment, and the balance of gains and losses does not indillte materially changed prospects. Political opposition is , stronger. 04Va has alienated the support of the influential Pedro Beltran leader of the Ilion= Nacional and has been unable to obtain the backing of the straag tairSnRevolucionaria,(U6); his strength in the south has been undermined ty the Lig. Derecratica, which enjoys covert Communist support In addi%ion, ?drift's army support may have been reduced by the fact that a retirel general has been norldnated by UR and the Lisa as opposition presidcatial candidate. Odria has countered these reverses, however, by tightatung his control over the electoral machinery, by obtain- ing limited supper: of labor leaders, by taking firm measures against opposition political figures, and by forming a new political party-to back his candidacy. Fulther? the National Electoral Board has refused to recognize the UR as a legal party, some IR leaders have defected, and the Apristas have been leenfranohieed. The month of Jule will be +=Meal for the regiee. tlhile Odrials handing over of hi ffice on 1 junto to Minister of War, Zen& Noriega, permits him to &mots himself fully to his campaign, the relaxation of his csoutrol over the ;overnmont may encourage disGruntled military or civilian groups to at- ptto unseat him. There are disaffected groups in the army, and contiaual reports of subversive plots among influential officers indicate the Odria maybe exposing his lifg to real danger dur- ing the short time he relinquishes his control. Cdria has, however, reportedly been assured by the army command that the army ag a whole will support him, and any general revolt ZOOM unlikely. If Odria can avoid assassination and continue to command general arnedaTerces support during the critical onemonth period prior to the 2 July elections, his chances of returning to office appear excellent. Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050023-0 8. mtti4 Approved ForRerease 2002/10/21sratteeDP79-01090/41#1)200050023-0 - 2 - 15X1 Weekly Contributions, 23-50 6 Jane 1950 (CL( Working Paper) Situation Memorandum. 35-50 Economic Yorufs economic situation has deteriorated slightly. It is true that the gold and foreign exohango holdings of the Central Reserve Bank increased slightly from February to March; and that on 12 May there wee promulgated a now mining code, whioh is expected to stimulate the investment of foreign capital in mining enterprises and to aid in the restoration of pre-1040 levels of mineral produotion. Nevertheless, little or no progress has been made toward the solution of Pares immediate economic problem, the increase in production for export. Total exports in 1949 seem to have declined both in volume and value as compared to 1948 exports, while imports reached an all time high during the past year. (Figures are not exactly comparable because of changed exchange rates.) Etrals adverse trade balance was about USO14,000,000 in 1969* The general agricultural outlook is new less favorable as a result of a ladk of irrigation waters and production of important export crops, such as (when and sugar, may be adversely affected* The present rice shortage in. Meru is the most serious in recent years* Largely as a result of the absorption of the previous over-supply of exchange certificates, the strengthening trend evidenced by, the Peruvian sol in regard to the dollar in receet months was reversed at the end of Wch. The sol baa continued to depreciate slightly. In general, economic prospects for the next quarter do not appear particularly promising. Alati abilities at the Peruvian armed forces remain limited, particularly in the fume where morale, training, and efficiency are at present at a- low ebb. The resulting disaffection has increased the iaoidenoe of sub- versive plots, though the arey as a whole is believed loyal to Odrla (see Political section). Subversive --TIPPI1-. the most numerous group opposing the present mine has been further disorganized by intensified government repressive measures* It is true that the subversive potential of this outlawed group may have been increased to some extent by attempts by, various military and civilian groups to obtain its support for revolutionary movements. Further, in view of Odriala vylnerability during the pre-election period, the next month appears especially propitious for subversive attempts by any group* APRA has, hoevver, consistently rejected attempts by other groups to gain its revolutionary support in the past and is too weak to make an indeeendent major move at this time. There appears to be little basin to ()dries charges that APR& in attempting to. incite a border incident batman. Para Approved For Release 2002/1040$5715P79-01090A00020005QR23-0 .09ff"*.? Approved For *ease 2002/10/21z.: chik-RDP79-01090%100200050023-0 25X1 Weekly Contributions, 2350 6 June 1960 (CIA liorking Paper) Situation Namorandum 36-60 and Colombia and prevent the holding of the eleotions by creating disorders. Therefore, AfRA's potential for causing difficulty in the next critical month is small and will remain so in the future unless changed policies should lead this party to unite with other subversive groups. Despite the regime's toleration of Communists, there are so few of them that they are unlikely to constiftte a significant force during the coming months. International POITgr?yrelations with other countries are, in general, amicable, though relations with Brazil and Colombia have been someWhat strained because of an extradition ease and the continuing Raya controversy, respeo- tive1y; the Ecuadoran boundary dispute remains a source of difficulty with that natien. Commercial relations with the US have been adversely affected by certain Peruvian trade policies; but US-Peruvian relations, in general, remain on a high level of friendship. Relations with Chile have increased in cordiality. Ties with Argentina and Spain remain extremely olose. Peru's continued interest in the expansion of its trade with Urope is indicatod by its recent signing of a trade agreement with West GermalVo Approved For Release 2002/104 kr!V;rftl,1,7"9-01090A0002000545623-0