WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS 39-50 LATIN AMERICA DIVISION, ORE, CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050039-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: September 26, 1950
• Content Type: PERRPT

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424674
Weekly Contributions
Latin America ion, +, CIA
26 September 1990
Of the items published this week,, D/L& finds that on the excellent
chances of Brazilian presidential candidate Vargas (p. 2) of particular
interest,
CURRENT DEVEL PMJ! ITS
CENTRAL AREA: Brazil's ex-dictator,, Vargas,, seems to have an excellent
chance of being that country's next president (p. 2). The Venezuelan
government is taking precautions against reported plots for armed re-
bellion (p. 2).
SPECIAL SUBJECTS
The Current Situation in the Dominican Republic . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Current Communist Situation in Latin America. . . . . . . . . . 6
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Weekly Contributions, D/LA, 39-50 26 September l;50
(CIA % orking Paper)
1. GENERAL: BM e Lby be Elected President on 3 October
The race for press. cy in the 3 October elections in
Brazil appears to be between ex'-dictator Getvlio Vargas and the
government-sponsored Cristiano Machado` The third major candidate,
Air Lieutenant General Eduardo Closes,, seems to have insufficient
support to be considered a threat either to Vargas or Machado.
The political situation, hover, remains as completely in turmo:D,
as it has been for many months with the major factor of confusion
being the multiplicity of local,,, state, and national "deals" among
the political parties. Meanwhile, Vargas seems to have gained cox-
siderable support in the past fever weeks as a result of his energetic
campaign throughout Brazil. Barring last moment
President Dutra'a followers or Gomes throwing his support
to Machado, Vargas appears to be the candidate most likely to win
the elections next week.
2? VEUElAt Threat of Armed Uprising Believed Not Serious
Anew series of rumored plots or an arms uprising in
bastern Venezuela is believed to present no serious threat to the
stability of the government. It is evident, from the sending of
the minister of the interior to supervise precautionary measures,
that the junta regards the situation with some concern. Although
it is doubtless true that Accicin Demacratica and possibly Communist
elements have been able to smuggle in quantities of small arms,
nevertheless, it is still believed that while the army remains uni.ted,..
as it currently appears to beg there is little likelihood that an
armed uprising could succeed in overthrowing the government.
It is probable that clandestine groups will continue to
engage from time to time in relatively isolated acts of violence in
an effort to keep alive a spirit of militant opposition, but that
unless and until dissension within the army becomes serious no corn
certed revolutionary attempt will be made,,
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Weekly Contributions, D/IA, 39-50
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation P orandum 57-50
26 September 1953
The Current Situation in the Dominican Republic
(Summary -r- Unujillo continues to exercise full political
control . The economic situation is favorable. Co=nu ist
activity remains negligible. The armed services are being
reoriented for greater mobility and efficiency.
The new Dominican conciliatory position tovrards
its neighbors and the contemplated reorientation of the armed
forces serve to strengthen US security interests.)
Political
political situation remains calm with President Trujillo as corr-
pletely in control as ever. The 1952 presidential campaign has been
officially opened. Along with inspired demands that the Benefactor" re-
consider his decision not to seek re-election, an aura of "democracy" has
been created by the emergence, with official permission, of two fictiti.ou
opposition parties. There h been extensive shifts of top government
officials, but these changes merely reflect Trujillo 'a policy of rotating
his subordinates periodically to ensure that none acquires sufficient
authority to detract from his own prestige. It is possible that the fol-
lowing nay shortly be made cabinet ministersa Ramfis Trujillo, 22-year
old son of the president, who has recently received great publicity,
possibly as a build-m for his designation as his father's political heir;
Frederico Fiallo, former lieutenant general who was recently dismissed as
Trujillo's chief military advisor to provide a scapegoat when news of a
brutal political assassination leaked to the public; and Anselino Paul:i.no,
who was responsible for Dominican complicity in the plot to overthrow the
Haitian government last December (D/IA Wkly, 4 Jan 50). None of the cur-
rent developments indicates any immediate change in the present political
situation.
Economic
The general economic situation continues favorable. Primarily this
is due to a firm export trade which, during the first six months of 1950,
totaled .2 million, a slightly greater figure than that for the com-
parable 199 period. It is true that there has been a decline in tobacco
and sugar exports due to smaller harvests and delays in shipment. Good
cacao and coffee crops, hcrever,selling at high world market prices,
have produced an increase In the value of exports. An increase over
the 1949 figure in the total value of exports will be clearly indicated
at year's end when over $30 million worth of sugar, already sold to the
UK, will have been shipped. The demand for Dominican products remains
firm and prospects for the disposition of crops currently being harvested
are excellent. Imports totaling $17,.3 million were $6.3 million less
than in the first six months of 1949. Higher retail prices and increases
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Weekly Contributions., D/LA, 39-50 - 2
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation, Memorandum 57?50
26 September 1950
in corporate and personal income taxes discouraged the purchase of irrr?
ported goods. Fiscal operations have been fairly satisfactory. Despite
a record budget of p72 million, receipts have been sufficient to meet
current expenditures and to provide asurplus of 01 million. It is
expected that during coming months the general economic situation wilt.
continue to be favorable.
Mmta
a armed forces, still completely loyal to Trujillo, continue in
an advanced state of effectiveness in relation to those of other Carib-
bean republics. Changes have been made in the organization of the arrw
-?- disestablishment of the small engineering corps and reorganization
of the artillery - to increase its mobility and efficiency. Fur her
changes may be in prospect because the government recognized that the
armed feces as presently constifiuted cannot effectively conioat sub-
marine activities; naval personnel probably will be trained for this
service and additional naval patrol aircraft may be acquired while some
of the present active surface units may be placed in "Troth balls".
Similarly, the air force is to concentrate on fighters for in-shore
patrol and submarine attack operations. In this connection, it is note-
worthy that maintenance difficulties and marked deterioration by the
effects of tropical climate have made British Iffosquitos and Beauforts
increasingly unpopular so that they may be scrapped and replaced by US
planes,
The Dominican defense budget for calendar 1950 totals >1&.5 million
-??the largest in Dominican history, representing an increase of 26
percent over last year and constituting 25 percent of the total budget.
The government is cooperating with the US In plans for the coordinated
defense of the Caribbean, partly because such cooperation may mean US
equipment and technical assistance. The first evidence of increased
cooperation since the. outbreak of the Korean vmr has been Dominican
acceptance of the US position in negotiations leading to a L .litary Air
Transit Agreement,,
Subversive
The 'few Communists in the country operate underground and have neg-
ligible influence. Trujillo'a internal security system precludes the
development either of a strong Comaninist movement or of any important
nom-Com?minist threat to his control,
International
T:a`tions of the Dominican government vrith its neighbors have
improved, due largely to the action of the OAS Investigating Committee
last spring (D/LA lYkly, 21 Mar 50). The government has not only follcved
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Weekly Contributions: D/ IA,, 39-50 3 26 September .(; -$0
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 57-50
the com i.ttee is recd it ndatians, but has also initiated additional coy}--
ciliatory measures such as granting amnesty to political exiles and
permitting oppositionists to leave the country unmolested. Sttecessful
negotiations for the return of the .4ngalita (D/LA Wk],y! 2L Jul 50)
indicates a desire to move toward improve relations with Cuba. F'-
ther proof of the new Dominican conciliatory position is evidenced in
the resumption of normal diplomatic relations with Haiti and the immm i-
nent resumption of relations with Costa Rica.
President Tru an's statement on the position of the United State:::
in the Korean conflict brought an immediate declaration of support and
offer of assistance from the Dominican government,, illustrating the
sincerity of Txujillo's frequent pro-US, anti-Cox mmist statements.
Dominican interest in the Korean situation is intense and the govern-
ment is certain to uphold az r action which may be taken by the United
Nations and the United States on the matter.
The countay's interest in the activities of the United Nations is
evidenced by its desire to secure reelection to the Trusteeship Counc-il,
and by its support for the modification of the 1946 UN resolution con-
Corn g Spain,
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Weekly Contributions, D/M, 39-50
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandunn 5"0
26 September 1950
The Current Co unist Situation in Latin America
(Summa - "Peace" propaganda, the principal Communist ac-
tl1uring recent months,, has shifted its line to specific
attacks against the US for "aggression" in Korea. The clos-
ing of the Havana Communist daily Hoy resulted in a reduction
of Communist newspaper propaganda. Despite Communist activity
in numerous strikes,, Communist strength in organized labor has
increased but little. During the past three months Comunist
losses slightly exceeded gains. During the rest of 1950 little
overall change in Communist influence is expected.)
Current Activities
ur3ng past three months.. "peace" propaganda was the principal
Communist activity. After the start of the Korean war, Communist propa-
ganda shifted its emphasis from a general "peace" line to specific anti
US attacks such as "hands off Korea" and"stop US aggression in Korea".
Communists were particirly successful in gathering "peace" signatures
in Mexico.. Cuba,, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. In all of these
countries, except Ecuador, effective counter-propaganda, and the ex-
posure of Communist hypocrisy as regards Korea offset much of the Conwu--
nist effort to produce anti-US continent.
Communist newspaper propaganda has decreased notably as a result of
the closing by the Cuban government of the Habana Communist daily .Toy,
-which had about 29,,000 circulation. Together with the recent change from
pro-Communist to non-Communist of El Nacional of Venezuela (which has a
daily circulation of about 55,,000), there has been a decrease of nearly
three quarters of the Communist oriented daily newspaper circulation in
Latin America,, The largest remaining daily paper of Communist orientatio i
in Latin America is El Popular in Mexico., with about 25..000 circulation.
Communist labor activities have influenced strikes in Mexico, Chile,,
and Uruguay,, causing increased unrest or slowing up settlement of labor
disputes. Although such agitation has been somewhat embarrassing to the
governments concerned and although the Communists may have been helped
indirectly by their exercise of leadership during the strikes, their
strength in organized labor has not been increased notably.
Communists lost ground in Cuba, Mexico,, Costa Rica,, Venezuela, Guate-
mala,, and Parma, but registered some gains in Chiles Ecuador,, Bolivia
and Peru. Although these trends in Communist influence were divergent,
on balance a slight overall lose resulted.
In Cuba,, after gaining during the pre-election and election period,
the Communists during recent months have lost influence, largely because
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Weekly Contributions, D/lAs 39-50 - 2 26 September 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation .Pmorandum 59-50
of anti-Communist action by certain labor unions and by the government ;
and because of generally stepped up anti-Communist propaganda since the
beginning of the Korean near, This change in trend of Communist influ?"
once mays however, be only temporary In the struggle between Conmmu-
nists and anti-Communists for control of Mexican labor unions, the
Communists have lost ground as a result of the disaffection of severa.5.
important unions of the Communist bloc (UGOCM, CTRL, U) and successful
organizational activity of the non?Communist CTU. In Costa Rica, the
government made soma preventive arrests of Communist leaders to fore s? ali.
a possible plot and stopped, at least temporarily, Communist collabora-
tion with elements opposing the government? Venezuelan Co imnxnists con-
tinned to suffer from the effects of govornx nt suppression of the PCB and
of the Communist unions, resulting from the petroleum strike in May. There
were also slight withdrawals of labor support, increased anti -Commurni , .
feeling as a result of the Korean war, and decreased effectiveness of the
Communist propaganda machinery. Further precautions against possible
sabotage of oil installations by the Communists adversely affected their
capabilities in this direction. In Guatemala, Communists lost three fluential governmental positions: editor of the official daily nawsp,per.,
radio propaganda chief, and member of the national electoral board. In
addition, a new labor syndicate is beginning to compete with unions under
Communist leadership. The recognition of the new CIO local union by the
Panama Canal Zone authorities has further decreased the influence of the
Panamanian Communists,
In Chile, due largely to the advent of a more leftist and tolerant
cabinets Communists improved their position during the quarter by par-
ticipating in two different groups of labor syndicates, by taking an
active part in developing strikes,, and by taking more overt and militant
political and propaganda action. In Ecuador, Communist propaganda for
"peace" and against the use of the atomic bomb succeeded in gaining sup-
port fiw many people in various sectors of the population and has not yet
been slowed up by effective counter-propaganda. In Bolivia, the crit?.cal
economic situation and unrest among miners has made the situation there
slightly more vulnerable to Communist agitation, In Peru, a number of
Communists or dissident Communists gained political office by riding the
.(dr4a bandwagon in the last elections
Probable Future Develo sots
Communist u~ence is expected to decline further in Mexico and
Guatemala, but in Brazil and Chile it may increase prior to the national
elections. Such divergent trends are expected to continue in Latin Axjerica
during the next quarters with -little over-all change in CommIst strength,
except a possible slight loss of Communist influence in organized labor,
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