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December 12, 2016
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May 7, 2002
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September 26, 1950
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Approved For ReleasLIP1002/06/11-: CIAA-R79-01090A00050039-3 424674 Weekly Contributions Latin America ion, +, CIA 26 September 1990 Of the items published this week,, D/L& finds that on the excellent chances of Brazilian presidential candidate Vargas (p. 2) of particular interest, CURRENT DEVEL PMJ! ITS CENTRAL AREA: Brazil's ex-dictator,, Vargas,, seems to have an excellent chance of being that country's next president (p. 2). The Venezuelan government is taking precautions against reported plots for armed re- bellion (p. 2). SPECIAL SUBJECTS The Current Situation in the Dominican Republic . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Current Communist Situation in Latin America. . . . . . . . . . 6 DOCUMENT m O vbfriED LASS. CHANNEL) TO: TS EXTRSVfc4VD,vTE: C UTfi; f;i?~ -~p.~ - DATC ~./~: rA NO CHANGE . -4-00 7N CLASS. I DECLRO 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/06L gg-ITDP79-01090A000200050039-3 Approved For Rase 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-010900200050039-3 SECR E T Weekly Contributions, D/LA, 39-50 26 September l;50 (CIA % orking Paper) 1. GENERAL: BM e Lby be Elected President on 3 October The race for press. cy in the 3 October elections in Brazil appears to be between ex'-dictator Getvlio Vargas and the government-sponsored Cristiano Machado` The third major candidate, Air Lieutenant General Eduardo Closes,, seems to have insufficient support to be considered a threat either to Vargas or Machado. The political situation, hover, remains as completely in turmo:D, as it has been for many months with the major factor of confusion being the multiplicity of local,,, state, and national "deals" among the political parties. Meanwhile, Vargas seems to have gained cox- siderable support in the past fever weeks as a result of his energetic campaign throughout Brazil. Barring last moment President Dutra'a followers or Gomes throwing his support to Machado, Vargas appears to be the candidate most likely to win the elections next week. 2? VEUElAt Threat of Armed Uprising Believed Not Serious Anew series of rumored plots or an arms uprising in bastern Venezuela is believed to present no serious threat to the stability of the government. It is evident, from the sending of the minister of the interior to supervise precautionary measures, that the junta regards the situation with some concern. Although it is doubtless true that Accicin Demacratica and possibly Communist elements have been able to smuggle in quantities of small arms, nevertheless, it is still believed that while the army remains uni.ted,.. as it currently appears to beg there is little likelihood that an armed uprising could succeed in overthrowing the government. It is probable that clandestine groups will continue to engage from time to time in relatively isolated acts of violence in an effort to keep alive a spirit of militant opposition, but that unless and until dissension within the army becomes serious no corn certed revolutionary attempt will be made,, 25X6 Approved For Release 2002/1 RDR79-01090A00020005QPe39-3 Approved For ease 2002/06/11,: CIIAA--RDP79-01090 00200050039-3 Weekly Contributions, D/IA, 39-50 (CIA Working Paper) Situation P orandum 57-50 26 September 1953 The Current Situation in the Dominican Republic (Summary -r- Unujillo continues to exercise full political control . The economic situation is favorable. Co=nu ist activity remains negligible. The armed services are being reoriented for greater mobility and efficiency. The new Dominican conciliatory position tovrards its neighbors and the contemplated reorientation of the armed forces serve to strengthen US security interests.) Political political situation remains calm with President Trujillo as corr- pletely in control as ever. The 1952 presidential campaign has been officially opened. Along with inspired demands that the Benefactor" re- consider his decision not to seek re-election, an aura of "democracy" has been created by the emergence, with official permission, of two fictiti.ou opposition parties. There h been extensive shifts of top government officials, but these changes merely reflect Trujillo 'a policy of rotating his subordinates periodically to ensure that none acquires sufficient authority to detract from his own prestige. It is possible that the fol- lowing nay shortly be made cabinet ministersa Ramfis Trujillo, 22-year old son of the president, who has recently received great publicity, possibly as a build-m for his designation as his father's political heir; Frederico Fiallo, former lieutenant general who was recently dismissed as Trujillo's chief military advisor to provide a scapegoat when news of a brutal political assassination leaked to the public; and Anselino Paul:i.no, who was responsible for Dominican complicity in the plot to overthrow the Haitian government last December (D/IA Wkly, 4 Jan 50). None of the cur- rent developments indicates any immediate change in the present political situation. Economic The general economic situation continues favorable. Primarily this is due to a firm export trade which, during the first six months of 1950, totaled .2 million, a slightly greater figure than that for the com- parable 199 period. It is true that there has been a decline in tobacco and sugar exports due to smaller harvests and delays in shipment. Good cacao and coffee crops, hcrever,selling at high world market prices, have produced an increase In the value of exports. An increase over the 1949 figure in the total value of exports will be clearly indicated at year's end when over $30 million worth of sugar, already sold to the UK, will have been shipped. The demand for Dominican products remains firm and prospects for the disposition of crops currently being harvested are excellent. Imports totaling $17,.3 million were $6.3 million less than in the first six months of 1949. Higher retail prices and increases Approved For Release 2002/0~611 ZMWdWM79-01090A00020005gQ39-3 Approved For Rase 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-01090200050039-3 SECRET Weekly Contributions., D/LA, 39-50 - 2 (CIA Working Paper) Situation, Memorandum 57?50 26 September 1950 in corporate and personal income taxes discouraged the purchase of irrr? ported goods. Fiscal operations have been fairly satisfactory. Despite a record budget of p72 million, receipts have been sufficient to meet current expenditures and to provide asurplus of 01 million. It is expected that during coming months the general economic situation wilt. continue to be favorable. Mmta a armed forces, still completely loyal to Trujillo, continue in an advanced state of effectiveness in relation to those of other Carib- bean republics. Changes have been made in the organization of the arrw -?- disestablishment of the small engineering corps and reorganization of the artillery - to increase its mobility and efficiency. Fur her changes may be in prospect because the government recognized that the armed feces as presently constifiuted cannot effectively conioat sub- marine activities; naval personnel probably will be trained for this service and additional naval patrol aircraft may be acquired while some of the present active surface units may be placed in "Troth balls". Similarly, the air force is to concentrate on fighters for in-shore patrol and submarine attack operations. In this connection, it is note- worthy that maintenance difficulties and marked deterioration by the effects of tropical climate have made British Iffosquitos and Beauforts increasingly unpopular so that they may be scrapped and replaced by US planes, The Dominican defense budget for calendar 1950 totals >1&.5 million -??the largest in Dominican history, representing an increase of 26 percent over last year and constituting 25 percent of the total budget. The government is cooperating with the US In plans for the coordinated defense of the Caribbean, partly because such cooperation may mean US equipment and technical assistance. The first evidence of increased cooperation since the. outbreak of the Korean vmr has been Dominican acceptance of the US position in negotiations leading to a L .litary Air Transit Agreement,, Subversive The 'few Communists in the country operate underground and have neg- ligible influence. Trujillo'a internal security system precludes the development either of a strong Comaninist movement or of any important nom-Com?minist threat to his control, International T:a`tions of the Dominican government vrith its neighbors have improved, due largely to the action of the OAS Investigating Committee last spring (D/LA lYkly, 21 Mar 50). The government has not only follcved Approved For Release 2002/06LM@nr-V6P79 01090A0002000 039-3 Approved For ReTease 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-01090A0200050039-3 SECRET Weekly Contributions: D/ IA,, 39-50 3 26 September .(; -$0 (CIA Working Paper) Situation Memorandum 57-50 the com i.ttee is recd it ndatians, but has also initiated additional coy}-- ciliatory measures such as granting amnesty to political exiles and permitting oppositionists to leave the country unmolested. Sttecessful negotiations for the return of the .4ngalita (D/LA Wk],y! 2L Jul 50) indicates a desire to move toward improve relations with Cuba. F'- ther proof of the new Dominican conciliatory position is evidenced in the resumption of normal diplomatic relations with Haiti and the immm i- nent resumption of relations with Costa Rica. President Tru an's statement on the position of the United State::: in the Korean conflict brought an immediate declaration of support and offer of assistance from the Dominican government,, illustrating the sincerity of Txujillo's frequent pro-US, anti-Cox mmist statements. Dominican interest in the Korean situation is intense and the govern- ment is certain to uphold az r action which may be taken by the United Nations and the United States on the matter. The countay's interest in the activities of the United Nations is evidenced by its desire to secure reelection to the Trusteeship Counc-il, and by its support for the modification of the 1946 UN resolution con- Corn g Spain, Approved For Release 2002/ -RDP -01090A00020(950039-3 Approved For ease 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-01090000200050039-3 SECRET Weekly Contributions, D/M, 39-50 (CIA Working Paper) Situation Memorandunn 5"0 26 September 1950 The Current Co unist Situation in Latin America (Summa - "Peace" propaganda, the principal Communist ac- tl1uring recent months,, has shifted its line to specific attacks against the US for "aggression" in Korea. The clos- ing of the Havana Communist daily Hoy resulted in a reduction of Communist newspaper propaganda. Despite Communist activity in numerous strikes,, Communist strength in organized labor has increased but little. During the past three months Comunist losses slightly exceeded gains. During the rest of 1950 little overall change in Communist influence is expected.) Current Activities ur3ng past three months.. "peace" propaganda was the principal Communist activity. After the start of the Korean war, Communist propa- ganda shifted its emphasis from a general "peace" line to specific anti US attacks such as "hands off Korea" and"stop US aggression in Korea". Communists were particirly successful in gathering "peace" signatures in Mexico.. Cuba,, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. In all of these countries, except Ecuador, effective counter-propaganda, and the ex- posure of Communist hypocrisy as regards Korea offset much of the Conwu-- nist effort to produce anti-US continent. Communist newspaper propaganda has decreased notably as a result of the closing by the Cuban government of the Habana Communist daily .Toy, -which had about 29,,000 circulation. Together with the recent change from pro-Communist to non-Communist of El Nacional of Venezuela (which has a daily circulation of about 55,,000), there has been a decrease of nearly three quarters of the Communist oriented daily newspaper circulation in Latin America,, The largest remaining daily paper of Communist orientatio i in Latin America is El Popular in Mexico., with about 25..000 circulation. Communist labor activities have influenced strikes in Mexico, Chile,, and Uruguay,, causing increased unrest or slowing up settlement of labor disputes. Although such agitation has been somewhat embarrassing to the governments concerned and although the Communists may have been helped indirectly by their exercise of leadership during the strikes, their strength in organized labor has not been increased notably. Communists lost ground in Cuba, Mexico,, Costa Rica,, Venezuela, Guate- mala,, and Parma, but registered some gains in Chiles Ecuador,, Bolivia and Peru. Although these trends in Communist influence were divergent, on balance a slight overall lose resulted. In Cuba,, after gaining during the pre-election and election period, the Communists during recent months have lost influence, largely because Approved For Release 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA000200050039-3 vsffiel!MTr"~ 6. Approved For ease 2002/06/11: CIA-RDP79-01090V00200050039-3 SECRET Weekly Contributions, D/lAs 39-50 - 2 26 September 1950 (CIA Working Paper) Situation .Pmorandum 59-50 of anti-Communist action by certain labor unions and by the government ; and because of generally stepped up anti-Communist propaganda since the beginning of the Korean near, This change in trend of Communist influ?" once mays however, be only temporary In the struggle between Conmmu- nists and anti-Communists for control of Mexican labor unions, the Communists have lost ground as a result of the disaffection of severa.5. important unions of the Communist bloc (UGOCM, CTRL, U) and successful organizational activity of the non?Communist CTU. In Costa Rica, the government made soma preventive arrests of Communist leaders to fore s? ali. a possible plot and stopped, at least temporarily, Communist collabora- tion with elements opposing the government? Venezuelan Co imnxnists con- tinned to suffer from the effects of govornx nt suppression of the PCB and of the Communist unions, resulting from the petroleum strike in May. There were also slight withdrawals of labor support, increased anti -Commurni , . feeling as a result of the Korean war, and decreased effectiveness of the Communist propaganda machinery. Further precautions against possible sabotage of oil installations by the Communists adversely affected their capabilities in this direction. In Guatemala, Communists lost three fluential governmental positions: editor of the official daily nawsp,per., radio propaganda chief, and member of the national electoral board. In addition, a new labor syndicate is beginning to compete with unions under Communist leadership. The recognition of the new CIO local union by the Panama Canal Zone authorities has further decreased the influence of the Panamanian Communists, In Chile, due largely to the advent of a more leftist and tolerant cabinets Communists improved their position during the quarter by par- ticipating in two different groups of labor syndicates, by taking an active part in developing strikes,, and by taking more overt and militant political and propaganda action. In Ecuador, Communist propaganda for "peace" and against the use of the atomic bomb succeeded in gaining sup- port fiw many people in various sectors of the population and has not yet been slowed up by effective counter-propaganda. In Bolivia, the crit?.cal economic situation and unrest among miners has made the situation there slightly more vulnerable to Communist agitation, In Peru, a number of Communists or dissident Communists gained political office by riding the .(dr4a bandwagon in the last elections Probable Future Develo sots Communist u~ence is expected to decline further in Mexico and Guatemala, but in Brazil and Chile it may increase prior to the national elections. Such divergent trends are expected to continue in Latin Axjerica during the next quarters with -little over-all change in CommIst strength, except a possible slight loss of Communist influence in organized labor, Approved For Release 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA000200050Q39-3 7.