SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000300020008-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 29, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 19, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CON Fl iTIAL
SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
upsR
19 September 1950
1, Tmain Objectives of the Soviet Unibn at th22.2
goma_ALLumbjz will be to-77-split the Asian countries from
the West and (2) promote discord among the NAT Powers and deter
the rapidly mounting Western defense effort.
(Page 3 )
2. The_incalLaion of Kazakh .and.Uzbek.members in the
Soviet del2gation,to the:ON general Assemb],z2arks_the_latest
stex_ILL,tbecuKrent -soviet_cmpalan to promote pro-Soviet
sentiment in the Near East and Asia by presenting the USSR as
a non-colonialist, semi-Asiatic power.
EASTERN puRcrE
GENERAL
(Page 4 )
3. &pats of tranuatatiop sIllootagalp Eastern
Emaamsountries are emgmrat9de
(Page 5 )
FINLAND
4, Tho_Finnish Social Democraqc. Pq.2tL.doep not now
wish to force an entri.into the gRernpent and believes that
it will be better tactics simply to publicize the current
strike situation as another "achievement" of the Kokkonen
Government, according to Party Secretory Leskinen.
IF+0
r-1 KVA:5P
CON Fl cuks.spHAt,m
IfEr, fagyiew CIATE;
ZjaN2 7Q-2
(Page 6
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POLAND
5. The Polish Govqrnment_has:promuloted a now Land
Tax aw the effect ofwhich will le to pncauraga_more collec-
tiyo_farmipa.
It is likely that the Government Win: achieve
some measure of success through this new law,
(Page 7 )
RUMAN.1k
Rumanitals Communistsaplaardonficlent
stage has beep set_for.....a,natiopalp0 Roman Catholic Church,
despite the opposition of Bishops and vicars. To put through
their proposal for a national Church, the Communists Will
sponsor a Congress of picked Catholics who will accept the
Goyernmentts proposals.
(Page 8)
YUGOSLAVIA
7. The epenomic_predigapent of_the_Kugpslo.v Goyergam&
ISOrious.apd if .1. owed to_dqvqmcqulq_constituto t4e.
Era7P0t1211-ticql threat-7i? it,s, existElpce since,thqAminform
breaks.
(Pago 9 )
SPECIAL ARTICLE
8. Egoaganda.fp_atilr9s of....praosed hRge Suiet_hygro-
electElg-arAlec:tAl.
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likt\
N EUROPE
USSR
Soviet tactics in the UN General Aoselliblv
"A"
Tho main objectives of the Soviet Union at the
UN General Assembly will be tot (1) split the Asian countries
from the Wont and. (2) promote discord among the NAT Powers
and deter the rapidly mounting Western defense effort.
In order to facilitate further expansion of
Communism in Asia, the Soviet Union will attempt to woaken
the unity of Asian nations and Western Powers which resulted
from Soviet?sponsored aggression in Korea. The Soviet Union
will attempt to play upon Asian fears of revived Western
11 colonialism" and assort that the United States is attempting
to crush the "national liberation" movements in Asia and
colonial areas by its illegal intervention in Korea and its
aggression in Formosa. In partial preparation for this
campaign the USSR has designated the Foreign Ministers of
the Uzbek and Kazakh Central Asian Republics as members of
the Soviet GA Delegation. Their presence will be utilized
as evidence of the autonomy, progress, and racial equality
possible under the Soviet system. (Sue article immediately
following for more detailed summary of Soviet tactics in
attempting to influence Asians).
The overall purpose of the Soviet Union will be
to doter the newly increased Western defense effort in both
Europe and Asia. The USSR will maneuver to promote discord
among the Western Powers in regard to such questions as the
settlement of the Korean war and the future status of
Formosa. The issue of Communist Chino not only presents an
opportunity to aggravate disagreements among the Western
Powers but also the throat of Chinese Communist intervention
in Korea and elsuwhere can be exploited in an effort to
gain concessions from the West by intimidation,
caw
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As part of its propaganda campaign to destroy
popular support of Western governments, the USSR will play
upon fear of the revival of German armament and of the
"inevitability of World War III" if Western governments
continue their present policies. The Soviet delegation will
utilize the Stockholm "peace" appeal as evidence of world-
wide support of its policies, including its proposals for
disarmament and the outlawing of the atomic bomb. (CONFIDENTIAL)
USSR stellajap omp.,a120 to apaal toAsians
The most recent stop in the Soviet campaign to
promote pro-Soviet sentiment in the Near East and Asia is
the appointment of the "Foreign Ministers" of the Kazakh and
Uzbek Soviet Republics as members of the Soviet delegation
to the UN General Assembly. Their presence as deputy delegates
is calculated to demonstrate to other Asians the autonomy and
progress of Soviet minority peoples and to present the USSR
as a non-colonialist, semi-Asiatic power, willing and able to
assist backward nations to attain "independence" and industrial-
ization.
Soviet efforts to attract Asians have been strongly
evident in 1950. Most recently, the USSR has been pursuing a ?
conciliatory policy toward Iran; it proposed a trade agreement,
the establishment of a commission for frontier rectifications,
and the settlement of other long-standing problems. Previously,
the USSR had effected closer diplomatic relations when it:
(1) recognized Indonesia and HO's regime in Viet Nam; (2)
agreed to exchange ambassadors with Burma; (3) dispatched the
first Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan; and, (4) filled the
Cairo post which had been vacant since early 1947,
Soviet cultural relations with the Near East and
Asia have boon especially promoted? ARussian Orthodox mission
visited Orthodox communities in Syria and Lebanon; a Soviet
cultural delegation to Pakistan, and one scheduled for Ceylon,
included Central Asian and Caucasian representatives. Soviet
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films, publications, and broadcasts are increasingly reaching
the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and are being issued in a
greater number of languages.
India, especially, has been cultivated by the USSR.
Nehruts proposals for the settlement of the Korean issue were
welcomed by Stalin and widely hailed by Communist propagandists.
Indian diplomats have been the recipients of marked social
attention by Soviet and Satellite officials. A prominent left-
wing Indian Socialist is now visiting the USSR under the
auspices of VOHS (Soviet society for cultural relations abroad),
and is oven touring Uzbekistan, usually tightly closed to
foreigners.
The present acceleration of Soviet political and
cultural activity in the Near East and Asia was preceded in
1949 by special sessions in Moscow and Tashkent of important
oriental academic groups. Even further stress on Soviet
relations with the East is indicated by the recent amalga-
mation of all oriental study groups into one "Institute of
Oriental Science of the USSR Academy of Sciences" with its
emphasis on the "national liberation" struggles of the East
and the study of eastern lanc,uagos, including the various
languages of India, (SECRET)
GENERAL
app.rts of transamtlytion sabattlos jai
Eastern European_countries aro exmg2rEbed
An increased number of reports of anti-Communist
transportation sabotage in Eastern Europe have been made
recently. In Rumania, rail lines have been reported cut: In
Hungary and Yugoslavia, plant machinery has boon "sabotaged":
Czechoslovak truck drivers are reported to have fled into
Germany, taking their vehicles. Earlier in the year, trains
were reported ambushed so frequently in eastern Poland that
reparations shipments had to be rerouted. A full list of the
Hon
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incidents would appear. to present a condition fairly serious
for Eastern European governments. It is significant that in
no single first hand report from Western observers have any
attacks boon made on trains in which the observers were
riding, although Westerners make frequent rail trips?
It is thought much sabotage is sabotage in name
only. Negligence and imcampotence in industry are often
represented as sabotage and equipment failure, duo to over?
utilization and superannuation, is also explained away as
sabotage. In addition, expatriate East European nationals, who
regard themselves as democratic leaders in exile, sometimes
exaggerate reports to gain support for their "movements."
(SECRET)
Spcial Deulocrats_avpid
myoking_Government_crigis
The Finnish Social Democratic Party does not now
wish to force an entry into the Government and believes that
it will be bettor tactics simply to publicize the current
strike situation as another "achievement" of thn Kokkonen
Government, according to Party Secretary Leskinen. Leskinents
remarks are probably a reliable statement of present Social
Democratic intentions, although the Social Democrats and
Kekkonen, himself, have spoken of new elections as the only
solution to the Government's dilemma,
The imminence of communal elections in early
October would be one factor in the Social Democrats? decision
to avoid provoking a Government crisis at this time. Further?
more, successful settlement of the strikes would improve the
Social Democrats? prospects in the communal elections and
increase their present slight majority in the Metal Workers ?
Union -- both at the Communists? expense. If, at thu same time,
they succeed in putting the Kokkonen Government in a bad light
because of its inability to handle labor troubles, they will
again come out on top of the political heap. An excellent
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Van.
weapon for the Social Democrats in the strike negotiations will
be tho. throat that, if -a settlement is made which the rank and
file could consider favorable to the employers, the Communists
could move quickly to continue labor unrest through wildcat
strikes.
Both Leskinen and the vice-chairman of the Employers
Federation agree that settlement of the metal workerst strike
will lead to industrial peace. Kokkonen and his government,
however, predict disastrous effects on Finlandts economic life
if the settlement raises wages still higher than the 15 percent
of the Fagerholm agreement. The predictions include either
widespread unemployment, resulting from increased, non-competit-
ive export prices, or another devaluation of the Finnmark (thus
boosting domestic prices) plus heavy reparations penalties.
This forecast is overly pessimistic. At the opening of the
strikes (1 Sept) Finland was about three months ahead on
reparations deliveries: at the same time, all parties are
fully aware of the effect of such penalties on the already
heavily burdened Finnish economy. Furthermore, Finnish pro-
ducers of timber and timber products have been unable to meet
the demand. This situation, plus the effect of Korea and
Western rearmament on world commodity prices, will partially
counteract the initial production cost increases which would
result from settlement of the strikes on Lerms favorable to
SAK. It would thus appear that the Social Democrat-led trade
federation has a good chance of achieving both its political
and economic objectives. (SECRET)
POLAND
Now Poliah tp,x i.a.urs_coaperptiv.eyeants
To encourage and support collective farming and
certain other branches of the agricultural industry, the
Polish Governmont has promulgated a now Land Tax Law which
in effect will act as another subsidy for agricultural
collectivization. An additional result will be to encourage
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the production of crops essential to Polandts economic plans
as well as stock and poultry brooding. The growing of indus-
trinl crops as well as live stock and poultry brooding will
not be subject to special taxation as was formerly the case.
Specific provisions of the law are: (1) tax
rebates to farmers based on the number of children in the -
family, (2) tax rebates for taking over and using idle lend,
(3) reduction of taxes for peasants who are members of land-
cultivating associations, and (4) no taxes of any kind for
farmers who are members of production cooperatives.
It is likely that Government will achieve some
measure of success through this now law inasmuch as more and
more owners of small farms will be unable financially to
continue independent farming. (RESTRICTED)
RUMANIA
alimo_to sot up National Rumanian
Catholic Church nears culmination
The campaign of the Rumanian Communist regime to
nationalize the National Rumanian Catholic Church has made
notable progress since the conference of fellow-travelling
Catholics last May, which called for the integration of
Church and Stato. Inasmuch as during the summer the press
contained almost daily lists of priests who signed - willingly
or under duress - the integrationresolutinn, it is now estimat-
ed that over three-fourths of Rumanian Catholic priests have
been identified with the reorganization drive. This success iss
in large measures the result of the skill with which the Action
Committee sponsoring the movement linked the call for integra-
tion with the Stockholm nbace" Appeal. This device made it
easier for the Committee to got signatures for the integration
appeal: Those who expressed hopes for peace wore made to
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appear to favor the Communist scheme to reorganize the Church.
Meanwhile the regime supplemented the activities of
the Action Committee by enlisting in its support the traditional
organization called "Status." In the prewar period, "Status"
was a semi-autonomous assembly of clergy and laity exercising
extensive powers in Church administration in Transylvania, where
most of Rulaniats Catholics are concentrated. In early August
the Government grantod a group of Catholics who had taken over
the leadership of the organization the title to "those movable
and immovable properties which help the free activities of the
Raman Catholic Church in Rumania," i.e., church buildings and
monies
Emboldened by the success of its summer operations,
the Communist regime now appears confident that the stage has
boon set for a nationalized Rumanian Catholic Church. To cir-
cumvent the recalcitrant Bishops and their vicars who refused
to accept the Governments statute for a Church, the Government
is taking stops to fabricate a dummy organization to act on
behalf of the Catholic community. On 10 September, a group of
Catholics met in the town of Ghorgani? expressed regret for the
failure of Church leaders to cone to terns with the state
authorities, and agreed to make preparations for "a statute
Congress." Such a congress will probably be composed of repre-
sentatives of Catholic Action and the new-style "Status" organi-
zation, as well as unattached but cooperative priests and lay-
men. Once the Congress accepts the Governmentts proposals,
the Communists will have achieved their goal of establishing
a nationalized Catholic Church, led by excommunicates and
serving the regime as a pressure group supporting Communist
as, (RESTRICTED)
YUGOSLgIA
Ficonemic sot-bacl-s a rotential throat to Tito "A"
The current purge of Croatian Communist officials
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on charges of Cominfornisn, together with the widespread hard-
ship and discontent among the Yugoslav people, has given rise
to considerable speculation regarding the degree of political
throat to the Tito Government implicit in the situation. It
is estimated that the economic predicament of the Yugoslav
Govornmont is serious, and if allowod to develop, could con-
stitubo the gravest throat to its existence encountered since
the Cominforn break. It is not believed, however, that the
arrests in Croatia are symptomatic of any substantial increase'
of pro-Coninforn sentiment within the Yugoslav Communist Party,
even though the recent setbacks to Yugoslav economic progress
would suggest a possible divergence of opinion among Yugoslav
Communists over thoir ability to "build socialism" outside of
the Soviet orbit and in isolation.
The recent trial of seven Cominform agents in
Nis may bo cited as some evidonco that the USSR is continuing,
if not increasing, its efforts to infiltrate espionage and
subversive agents into Yugoslavia. A reliable source has
indicated that the group was instructod to confine its activi-
ties to the establishment of a fifth column in Yugoslavia.
Taken in conjunction with the Croatian affair, it might appear
that the Cominform has achiovod some success in establishing
such a network within the CPY. However, although the Croatian
deviationisto were accused of sabotage and propaganda acts on
behalf of the Cominform, evidence now available indicates that
their acts of criticism and obstruction wore probably due to
their Sorbian origin and represented a protest of .the Sorbian
minority in Croatia against economic discrimination by the
dominant Croatians. In charging "Cominformism, " the Belgrade
Government probably sought to divert attention from tho
nationality question with its dangerous implications for Yugoslav
unity whilo warning Yugoslav Communists generally that disapproval
of Tito's intornal and foreign policy could be taken as evidence
of pro-Cominform sontinonts.
The strength and efficiency of Tito's security forces
are so impressive that revolt is unlikely to occur except in the
remote regions where control is difficult. Although a few-
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violent outbreaks of peasant unrest occurred during the summer
in some poverty-ridden areas, they were put down with dispatch,
and steps were reportedly taken to remedy the causes. As a
result of the drought-induced food shortages, regional and
national antagonisms are likely to increase. Peasant fears of
prospective food shortages are growing, and it is expected
that the Government will be faced by greater peasant resistance
to the forced collection of foods. US observers report no
signs of disorder throughout the country, but there is evidence
that the declining standard of living is adding to popular
discontent, not only among the peasants but within the labor
force RS well. If this condition worsens, the resultant effects
on Yugoslav morale, national cohesiveness, and loyalty could
seriously undernino the Government and weaken its ability to
resist any intensification of Soviet pressures. (SECRET)
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Pr?12aEanqP- font-W.0s of IXQ19-Qedliu'o
Soviet_hydroelectKis_ao12912
The Council of Ministers of the USSR has announced,
with much publicity, Its intention to proceed immediately with
the construction of two huge dans on the Lower Volga, one near
Kuibyshav, and the other about 400 miles downstream near Stalin-
grad, These projects involve the development of the Lower Volga
as the producer of tremendous quantities of electric power and
as the center of a vast irrigation system.
On 21 August, announcement of the Kuibyshov project
was made. This was followed ton days later by the announcement
of plans for the Stalingrad dam. The former is to be completed
in 19550 and the latter in 1956. The 2,000,000 KW Xuibyshev
plant could rightfully be claimed as the worldts largest. The
1,700,000 KW at Stalingrad would bealcond only to US Grand
Coulee. Each would be more than three times the size of the
Dnieper Dam, largest in the USSR and the "show-piece" of Soviet
electrification.
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Tho motivation of tho Council of Ministers in
making two such momentous announcements at this time is subject
to question. It is admittod that both projects are desirable
and of great advantage to tho electrical, industrial, and agri?
cultural economy of a large sector of the nation. The addition?
al electric generating capacity, equivalent to about ono?sixth
of tho present total of the Soviet Union, will not only serve
the Lower Volga region, but will also provide an important
link botwoon the electric systems of the Central Industrial
Region and of the Ural Region. At the same time it would send
61 percent of the Kuibyshev output of hydro power to Moscow and
would supplement or replace more costly thornal power. The
irrigationbaturos of the program are also drawn on a largo
scale, with prospective benefits to immense areas now subject
to drought,
It is not difficult for Soviet propagandists to
point out the advantages of such projects and to appeal to
national pride in the accomplishment of public works of such
record?making size, The Kremlin has evidently taken groat
pains to publicize theso projects and tho impression given is
that the completion of tho dams in 1955 and 1956 can be achieved,
Much has boon made of the "largest?in?tho?world It
and "blossoning?of?tho?dosert" motifs, and odious comparisons
have been made as to speed of construction compared to such US
projects as Grand Couloo and Hoover Dans. The USSR appoars to
be glossing over tho tremendous outlays of labor, matorials,
transportation, and manufacturing facilities roquirod,as well as
tho need for qualified technicians to administer and supervise
such groat works. Apparobtly the Kremlin has forgotten that
Amorican engineering skill made the Dniopor Dan a reality, and
that on other sizeable hydro projocts foreign equipment and
technical assistance woro large contributing factors. Despite
the ability of the USSR to reproduce the designs of othors, and
the fact that Soviet tochnical capabilities hove advanced in
recent yoars, the completion of either of thus? projects in any
five year period, much loss simultaneously, appears as highly
improbable.
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Double-barrelled propaganda seems a likely answer
at least in largo measure for the real motive behind this dual
announcement. Projects of this typo arc readily understandable
by all classes of people and make a strong appeal to their
pride and patriotism. For external propaganda, they provide a
perfect staging for the claim that the USSR builds for peace
while US and other capitalist nations build for war. For in-
tornal propaganda they furnish a prime rallying point for the
expected Fifth Five Year Plan. In lact, these announcements may
indicate that the draft of the 1951-56 Plan has boon completed.
It may also indicate a declining emphasis on the policy of dis-
persal of industry to the Urals and eastward.
The possibility of failure to complete those develop-
ments by 1956 should cause the Kremlin no groat concern. It has
failed before to fulfill promises on similar grandiose hydro-
electric and irrigation programs. Those proposals are more
feasible than several others included in previous Five Year Plans,
but they are not so critical as to require completion in five
years. (SECRET)
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