WESTERN EUROPE BRANCH OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES WORKING PAPER BRANCH WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000400010010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 16, 1949
• Content Type: PAPER

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WESTERN EUROPE BRANCH
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WORKING PAPER
BRANCH WEEKLY
NOTICE: This document is a working paper,
NOT an official CIA Issuance. It has been co-
ordinated within ORE, but not with the LAC
Agencies. It represents current thinking by
specialists in CIA, and is designed for use by
others engaged in similar or overlapping
studies. The opinions expressed herein may
be revised before final and official publication.
It is intended solely for the information of the
addressee and not for further dissemination.
DATE : 16 August 1949
DOCUMENT,ti,O.
NO CHAN:;E !?J
CLASS. Cti. ": is - TO. i C
NEXT p V(Ew [)AT'
MEVIEWER: -21-9944_1
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1
WESTERN EUROPE MUNCH
WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X6A
VOL V - No. 5 Fo~t? week ending
16 August 1949
_I_
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FRANCE
The failure of the French Communist Party to
develop a mass protest emons rat on against Effe- R airy
Assistance Program on the occasion of the visit of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to Pads will convince the French Communist leaders that
the only effective appeal to labor is one based on economic rather
than political grounds. Police precautions, aided by vacation apathy,
summer heat, and the unquestioned popularity of the main target,
General Bradley, proved more than adequate to prevent disturbances
in the area surrounding the U.S. Embasdy, despite little doubt that
the demonstration was ordered by the Kremlin.
The French Communist leaders will probably concen-
trate their principal future efforts on a renewal of the strike offensive
in the fall, and on the question of mounting food costs (due to the pro-
longed summer drought), as well as on social security issues. The
strike offensive will be founded on the essentially economic appeals
of the General Confederation of Labor, and iay have an appreciable
degree of success.
FRENCH AND SPANISH NORTH AND WEST AFRICA
If the Moslem nationalist Tunisian General Union of
Labor (UGTT con nues is new pro- . o mmunist policies, It may well
-6F66 a da most important instrument in North Africa for extending
Communist influence. At the very least, the recent UGTT affiliation
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With the World Federation of Trade .Unions (WFTU) may do much
hirm to France's interests and position In Norte Africa. This affilaa.-
tion with the WFTU is possibly the result of a remarkable change in
the character of the UGTT's membership. For the past few years the
ravel Communist-led Syndical Union, of Tunisian Workers.(USTT) has
4U_making determined but unsuccessful efforts to effect the organic
union of the two labor organizations in the hope of gaining sufficient
luence to direct the policies of the native Moslem union. Success
fn. this endeavor would give the USTT complete control of labor
throughout Tunisia, as well as an important political following. In
1046-7 the two big Tunisian labor unions were about equal in member-
ship, each having approximately 40, - 50,000 dues-paying adherents.
Today a transformation has taken place. The UGTT boasts
of between 70, - 80,000 members as opposed to the dwindling forces of
the. USTT, recently estimated at 12, - 15,000. Many of the USTT deserters
are believed to have joined the UGTT, which, as a result, has apparently
undergone a change of political thought. It should also be observed that
the active and able leader of the UGTT, Farhat Uached, had years of ex-
perience in the former Tuaisiati branch of the Communist-dominated
French General Confederation of Labor.
U.& prestige among the natives of French North and
West Africa will profit from the anticipated establishment of an
ECA mission in FNA/FWA. Grossly misleading Communist anti
U.S. propaganda viall be counteracted, and the handling of ECA
aid will be improved. The office will be set. up as result of com-
plaints by U. S. Consular officials that the French have been prone
to abuse the sub-allocation to Africa of FCA. grants, Furthermore,
the French have successfully concealed the U. S. origin of the
economic assistance rendered by ECA. The projected new office
will closely scrutinize such things as: (1) the disposition of ECA
funds and their effect on the local economies; (2) the soundness of
projects financed by ECA; and (3) the recommendations of FNA/FWA
officials for the re-allocation of funds from Paris.
BELGIUM
The difficulty with which the new Catholic- Liberal
Government was formed n?ia- prevent Its sea ay fall, although ats
reason or existence ~yil vanish if the question of Leopold's status
should happen to be settled. In addition, the Cabinet is afflicted with
internal differences on social and economic policy. The Cabinet, with
conservative members in the majority and composed of nine Catholic
and eight Liberals headed by Catholic leader Eyskens, contains ex-
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treme pro- and anti-Leopoldists, clericals and anti-clericals, and
ministers of divergent economic beliefs which may prevent its stable
functioning. Many Liberals have indicated their disapproval of a
coalition with the Catholics; left-wing Catholics view the new combina-
tion critically; and the Socialist Party may be expected to oppose
strongly in Parliament the Government's measures implementing
economic and financial policy. Some points of the Government's program
already presented by Eyskens -- e. g. a proposed 16% reduction in
direct taxes (the Liberals originally demanded a 30% reduction) --
indicate a desire to return to a greater degree of economic laissez-
faire. A status quo is to be maintained on the school question, but
no mention is made of a possible decision on the return of King
Leopold, although a change in his status Is possible, either through
a referendum or through parliamentary action in the fall.
ITALY
More vigorous efforts can be expected of the Liberals,
Republicans, an m crate S oc ists- tom. e Cabinet minority sties to form a working agreemen or er to prevent their own atrophy and
to. act as an effective opposition to the majority Christian Democratic
Party. Following earlier statements in a similar vein, Premier
De Casperi's recent affirmation that the Christian Democrats might be
forced to govern alone has given the minority groups real cause for
concern, The Liberals and moderate Socialists have. already expressed
disapproval of the Premier's conception of the loyalty required of parti-
cipants in the Government -- the conception that all participants assume
responsibility "without reservations" for Cabinet action. The
charge of certain Liberals that direction of Italian affairs is
gradually becoming an absolute monopoly of the, Christian
Democrats expresses the fears of the other two minority groups as
well. The Republicans assert that they do not envisage "immediate?
contacts with the Liberals and moderate Socialists for the purpose of
forming a coalition, thus suggesting that they are considering such
action at a later date.
Concrete action to form a Cabinet opposition group will
be delayed primarily by the weakness of the minor parties and the
difficult position of the moderate Socialist members. The Socialist
Ministers now derive their limited prestige only by the acquiescence
of the Christian Democrats, and their reiterated theme has been that
the Socialist Party's influence is extended by its participation in the
Government. The mildness of Socialist Vice-Premier Saragat's
protest against De Gasperi's threat of a single-party Government
suggests that the protest was intended more as a sop to the Socialists
than an attack on the Premier. De Casperi, for his part, will probably
avoid further statements which would antagonize the moderate
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Socialists before they have held their September congress to discuss
reunification with other Socialist groups who urge that Saragat and his
colleagues should leave the Government.
Despite these delays in the formation of an opposition
grouping, the passage of time will bring increased impetus toward
concrete action. The tendency toward an alignment of Cabinet minority
parties will be encouraged by the growing resentment of clerical in-
fluence in political affairs, always a latent issue of disagreement be-
tween the minor parties of the Government and the Vatican-oriented
Christian Democrats, and now brought into prominence by the Papal
decree against Catholic support of Communism.
B Discrimination against the Slovene minority in northeast
Italy on the part of the Italian authorities will, If continued, jeopardize
the achievement of closer relations between Italy and Yugoslavia. Not
only have the Italians, as under Fascism, refused to grant administra-
tive autonomy and linguistic, cultural, and religious rights to this
minority, but the local press frequently goes out of its way to criticize
the Slovenes and urge their removal from Italian territory. Italy is
desirous of concluding with Yugoslavia a broad political agreement
(embracing Trieste), but, according to Premier De Gasperi, negotiations
for such an agreement cannot be begun until Yugoslavia guarantees fair
treatment of Italians in territory under its control. A continuation of the
present Italian treatment of the Slovene minority would weaken Italy's
Position in requesting such guarantees from Yugoslavia.
Should Italy take the initiative in approaching
Yugoslavia with a pledge to treat the Slovenes fairly in exchange
for reciprocity with regard to Italians in Yugoslav territory, the
atmosphere would be cleared for negotiating an over-all political
agreement. The emotional and nationalist factors involved in the
minority problem are typical of the serious obstacles which will
make a Political rapprochement between Italy and Yugoslavia much
harder to achieve than the recent trade agreement arising from the
economic needs of both countries.
SPAIN
B Spain's difficulties in securing sufficient wheat imports
make it likely t t t e en ire . m is n C se Ta~caon Bank loan
will be used to purchase U. S. wheat. The Spanish crop this year will
not be more than 75% of last year's inadequate yield and, although
Argentine shipments continue, they are insufficient to make up the
deficit in the domestic production and no reserve has been
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.ccuulated. Import requirements for the year 1949-50 are now
believed to be a minimum of about 600,000 tons. Of this, Argentina
will probably be able to supply no more than about 375,000 tons.
The only certain source for the. remainder is the U.S. Although
efforts will be made to obtain wheat from non-dollar sources, little
success is expected.
Apparently current Spanish stocks are not even
sufficient to meet requirements until completion of the Auggust-
September harvest. The Government, therefore, last month with-
drew $4 million of the Chase loan to purchase wheat in the U.S.
Although it is believed that one of the principal reasons for
obtaining this loan, which was made last February and is secured
with 105% gold collateral, was to provide a dollar fund in case of
an emergency such as the current wheat crisis, the use of the loan
for this purpose will prevent allocation of these funds for the
purchase of basic equipment and raw materials needed to further
Spain's economic rehabilltution.
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