FAR EAST/PACIFIC DIVISION OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WORKING PAPER WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 81

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000500030005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 20, 1949
• Content Type: PERRPT

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FAR EAST/PACIFIC DIVISION
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WEEKLY INTMLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS
NO. 81
DATE: 29_. December 1949
't
NOTICE: This document is a working paper, not an official CIA
document. It has been co-ordinated within ORE, but
not with the IAG Agencies. It represents current
thinking by specialists in CIA, and is designed for
use by others engaged in similar or overlapping studies.
The opinions expressed herein may be revised before
final and official publication. It is intended solely
for the information of the addressee and not for further
? dissemination.
MENT NO.
I D[ CLA,^.
CLASS. CHANGE[%
AUTH: A 12
DATE ? ? EVIEWEf: 3720
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s.Q~a
FAR LAST/PAClFIC Dim-,
INTELL,IG11W HIM'1LIM S IO. 82.
14 D E B1'c to 'A M' ,F: 3&:t 19! 9
S .,TION L $ W WRY (V FAR EAST TRENDS MJ IY? ~J6 p' TS
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Eotah1ishmeft of nat:1sfactory treaty re3 .tk betJvsen ChIn arid
the lest in made improbable by the Garmu !ist?J view that a Similar ,,c$-,iota
is "friendliness" on the part of the USSR but. 11i eriaiiss " on the; o art
of the %iast (p. ' 3) . In this connection., h{.owovev, a recent Gcmmun: of
economic report on Mane curia malts & `l re#'ere ce to USSR influen =
there (P. 3),
In view of recent political. dJz ;urbax es in Viotnam, the Fr eancsh
attitude of optimii'sn ov*r Indachinss.v aflaive seams uu alistic ("w 5)
- Ire
Althouo,h colored in part b7
nit,' on of the Chime o Caar;pAr: '_st a ? ~s a pr~et r s pr3_;t ~.g d Lct t d by
hard political re al tieh. (po 5).
P1aak3 for a e.zzmmiiga against P'~ir t3 `( J?v 4 dJ y. i.?ac aate3 and for th
pol clrf of Batavia d- lag Free dsata Fukarano?ra insa,g;u-%! nark the
first stenos of the BSI toward e tab i hing i.a $ an. order (p- 6).,
I1 enmt meaaeures to end the s i f v,,r b e balance of . hiiIppir -'
tr4sdo have not lesseacc;d rumors of a po sihie pa.ao dev ,L viatio z (p, 7).,
The ! I' " a2 notatior'.w unedi ... n t uccae"ding s AC A o;i, of thin s ~x
flr r' ' Bt! Or t@Cn) ind .e' to the. of thy in Df s'Jf
~,,gg'R; ;I ~r~e1 yeyys w ~~~ fit" ~L`t R b
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two areas is particularly vexatious. The Cambodian Assembly, before dis-
solution, had demanded border adjustments as well as various waterway and
port guarantees in South Vietnam, concessions which France has found im-
possible to grant. Economic difficulties also plague the Kingdom, business
is poor and the cost of living has risen almost to Saigon extremes.
These difficulties, in combination with a reported resurgence of
Khmer Iasarak (Free Cambodian independence movement) activity, will serve
to prevent restoration of internal security in Cambodia.
THAILAND
Tension continues in Thailand-Accelerated Chinese political activity, in "A"
combination with possible changes in Thai political alignments, is boosting
tension in :ang;kok. Prompted by rumors of Chinese plans for demonstrations
in celebration of the newly-established Communist regime in China, Premier
Phibul last week cautioned all Chinese in Thailand to abstain from undue
political activity and warned that the Government was prepared to take any
necessary measures to preserve peace and order. Subsequently, the Thai police
raided the leading Chinese Communist newspaper, arrested its editor, and con-
fiscated quantities of Chinese Communist flags and pictures of IMO Tse-tung.
Currently, reports that the Chinese are planning a series of strikes, parti-
cularly among the Communist-controlled rice mill laborers, have stimulated
increased security measures and may result in a general roundup of known
Communists.
In addition to the problem of minimizing Communist activity, Phibul is
faced with the difficult task of buttressing his political position in Parlia-
ment, strengthening his cabinet and overcoming disunity in the armed forces.
By attempting the merger of all pro-government elements into one party, Phibul
hopes to insure successful passage of government-sponsored legislation. He
is believed to be making a serious effort to attract opposition politicians
to his Cabinet, thereby broadening its support. Phibul's expansion of the
police, both for security and political reasons, however, is only aggravating
the ill feeling between the 'Thai IIdavy and police and is arousing jealousies
in the Army.
7dhatever his success in these maneuvers, P hibul probably will not succeed
in altering the basic alignments and schisms in Thailand which, by their very
existance,contribute to that nation's political unstablity. while the Phibul
regime may continue genuinely to oppose Communism, moreover, the susceptibili-
ty of Thai officialdom to corruption and the general Thai facility for accomo-
datioti will seriously undermine the Thii government's attempts to halt the
expansion of Chinese Communist activity,
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ItNDON _SIA
Indonesian intentions at The :ta e---After more than a Month. Of detailed "B"
discussion, Republican, Federalist and Dutch delegations at the wound Table
Conference have reached no final agreement on any major point, although con-
siderable progress has been made regarding the statute for the proposed
Union. Economic and financial negotiations, in par-
petherla
ticular, are proving to be extremely difficult, Both Republican and Federal-
ist leaders at The ;la;ue and in Indonesia have been anxious to expedite dis-
cussions and conclude the conference by the and of October,, `Whey threaten
that if this Ls not accomplished, they will break off negotiations, return
immediately to Indonesia, submit the problem to the UN General Assemlblyjy for
discussion, and begin preparations for the assumption of sovereignty in Indo-
nesia regardless of the Dutch. Cochran, US Delegate to the UN Commission for
Indonesia, now feels that the key to the situation is for the i~:theriands to
approve a financial settlement bearable to the Indonesians. lie believes that
such a step vould make it possible to conclude the conference in a compara-
tively short time and thus avoid the obviously grave consequences of failure',
{owever, it is believed that Cochran himself is the actual key to the situa--
tion and that his great influence on the delegations and genius in effecting
compromise represent the only hope for a successful conclusion of the confer-
ence.
PiiILIPPINI'
us interests at stake in presidential election---The very slight lead which "Alf
pro-US President Quirino appears to possess over his chief rival, the strong
nationalist Jose Laurel, has significant implication for US interests in the
Philippines as the 8 t.overnber presidential election approaches.
In his efforts to maintain his popular position, Quirino relies largely
on his claim of credit for current US rehabilitation expenditures is the Philip-
pines and his contention that he alone is able to obtain an increase in US
aid. He also has the realistic political advantage in the coming election of
holding control of the Government machinery as cell as patronage and the "pork
barrel." Quirino's chief weakness is that his administration has been notori-
ously corrupt and inefficient and has been unable to solve the problem of law
and order presented by continuing Huk guerrilla activity. He is also weakened
by the split within his Liberal Party and the resultant presidential candidacy
of the former Liberal Party boss, Senate ex president Jose xelino,
The principal strength of Jose Laurel, Quirino's most dangerous opponent,
derives from his stron personality and the eloquent campaijn oratory by which
he is able to away the masses and exploit his adversary's manifest weaknesses.
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Laurel's extremely clever car.qpaign stresses that he is not "really" anti US
but rather pro-Filipino and that, as President of the puppet kepublic. under
the Japane o, he protected the Philippine people front the ruthless conquer-
ors. Laurel also claims that he will form an honest and. efficient govern-
ment that will warrant the people's confidence and will vigorously attack the
country's economic and social problems. Laurel's primary weaJ,.ness is his
well-known anti-US record, which generates fear that US aid will be reduced
or withdrawn if he is elected. Laurel can also expect opposition from many
ax-guerrilla and anti-collaborator groups who were active in the resistance
::Lovement, during the Japanese occupation.
If Quirino is re-elected, present close US-Philippine ties would be
.maintained and future cooperation would be assured, donne slight attempt to
reduce ;;raft and corruption would probably be imde. On the other hand, the
election of Laurel- adistinct possibility -- would indicate weakened US influ-
ence in the Philippines and would injure US prestige in the Far East. Laurel's
long record of antipathy toward the US suggests that, although he would be
forced to maintain the basic Philippine orientation toward the US for the pre-
sent because of the country's need for financial aid, he would be much less
cooperative than Quirino and would tend to be more independent and unpredic-
table in both foreign and domestic policies.
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8Ec,TION VIII. POPULATION PRESSURES IN (D/) MR CAST
According to a recent publication of the UN Secriat, the pressure
of population has always been acute in the Far East. 1 The discussion
goes on to point out that the rate of natural increase, which in some
countries is as high as 1.5 percent per annum, has been maintained by a
high fertility rate.
It is not the function of this estimate to criticize the statistical
data appearing in any UN publication; that is very clearly the responsibility
of I0/Gr. On the other handy it does seem appropriate merely to criticize
the statistical data appearing in the UN Publication. It is noted that the
UN indicates that the rate of population increase in the Far East is "as
high as 1.5 percent per annum." This is orecisel the statistical data (or
rather datum) that should be subjected to examination. As a matter of fact,
considerable suspicion. should arise from the UN's description of ite datum
as being "precise." Of all the datum (or rather data) on the Far East,, the
fertility rate is perhaps the least precise.
Fortunately there is a device that is available for checking this
fertility rate. I The Division of the Far East, representing as it Joes,
complete coverage of all the countries in the region, permits a precise
sample with which to test the validity of the UN's approximate futility
rate.
Before proceeding any further with this discussion, it should be pointed
out that the Far Fast is of strategic importance to national. intelliaonce.
In the past year precisely 8 births occurred in the (D/) Far East. The
exact average of the population in the (D/) Far East during, this period was
approximately 40 persons. The followi!ig table presents these data in more
simple form.
Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1J13 1945,, page 7 ff.
In this context, "checking?0 is used in the sense of "checking up on.
VATS
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Table I ---- Number of Births and Avera a Number of Individuals
Residing in D Far East During the 12 month es iod October 194a -
October 19 9.
No. of Birth4
40
aver-
From this table it is apparent that there has bsen 1 birth per a
the rate
age populations. By applying a complicated statistical formula,
of increase is not "as much as 1.5%" but rather 24&~: if the menibera of the
population who have not been cleared for reproduction activities are ex-
cluded., the rate of population growth during the past 12 months, is precisely
8 This statistic certainly is a grave threat to the comparative produc-
tion of national intelligence.
An examination of the distribution of births by sex will be instructive,
if not decisive. Of the 8 births noted above, 5 have occurred among the
male population of the (D/) Far East and 3 among the female population.
Table II below presents these data in simple form:
Table II -- Distribution b Sex of Births Occurring in the (U Far
East During the Perms October 1948 - October 949.
No. of Births
Sex of nin DIE
we
Female
Other
It is clear that precisely 62.5% of the births occurring In the (D/)
Far ve been to male members of the population and 37.5 to female
members`
For the benefit of the more mathematically inclined readers this formula
P (Population)
a (5 (% increase)
! As Table II indicates, other members of the population gave no birth.
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The question that arises in the light of this peculiar distribution
is obvious: a'hy wasn't the distribution equally divided among the males
and the females of D/FE? If the statistical data on which this distri-
bution is based are valid, this is clearly just another example of the
stresses and strains the population of the (13/) Far East are experiencing
as a result of Communist pressure. But the statistical data are assumed
to be precise; thus this is a matter for D/EE and I & S to investigate and
this discussion will pursue the point no further.
This is an intelligence estimate and as such should not get into
policy problems. It seems pertinent to point out, however, that unless the
Chief, D/FE takes a firm hand in this whole demographoc situation (perhaps
by insisting that a project proposal form be submitted through channels
justifying any further population increases) the consequences of the present
laissez-faire attitude will be extremely serious.
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