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Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
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April 6, 1999
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December 13, 1951
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4.pdf1.62 MB
=j ,Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 SECURIT! INFORMION C"IAL INTM LIGE CE AGENCY OFF CE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS PROVISICNAL REPO`RT NO. 9 (CIA/ER It-3) RAILROAD GAUGE DIPFERMTIAL AID THE TRUaSLOADING FACILITIES OF THE WESTERN SOVIET rm TIE, 13 Decembcw 1951 This do se is a working paper. The data and alo Au- c: ous or)tai!red herein do not um-easarlly represent the fib. pof it on of ORR and should be regarded as prWJ.- onal only l subject to revision0 Addition ,1 data w c ueut which be avalable to the ua r is so1iei-- t r This report cantain infor cation available to MR as of 1. D bor I95im 27 `1 S DOCWTAM C s4' AINS INPOR ION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE CY TIM, UNITED STATES, THIN THE MEANING OF TITLE I8p, SCION; 793 AND 794 OF THE U.S. CODE,, AS A1$ENDEDo ITS TRA. v ITSSION OR RE ATION OF ITS COi LENTS TO OR RE- CEIP PY A17 U.NAt ORI ? PERSON IS PROHIBITED LAL> t)OCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I : 17LCLASSIFiED r.t 5. "I I.nNfzED TO: TS ' IYT RE' e"-4^' DA I i_: 'A CIA Approved For Rele~h ~FMMT~''MXIMTK 0}09504 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 -%M=ry a o oar s 19 Introduction . ? a ? ? ? a ? ? a a a O ? O ? ? ? * a O O O . e 1 lo Importance of the Complex . ? ? . . . . . . . . . . ? . ? . 1 2. Historical DevelopmentO O . ? tl f a ? ? O ? O e~ ? O ? 6 O 3 3. General Description of the Complex 'a s a e a e a a ? . 4 4o Organization r? . o a a r a o . e o? e o 6 .5. Description of ?roight Transfer operations a a . . . . . 7 a. Tranaloading Methods a ? . ? . f ? . . a . a 7 b. Axle Adaptation Methods .. ? . . . ? ? a . a a ~~ 4 8 11. Volume of Traffic under Variaaas Circumstances . ... . . . . . a 11 to Past Traffic Levels e o . . o a . ? a . . a . . . . . e a o 11 a. Prewar ? e T o a . ? a ? . a ? . . . . . a ? . . . . o e y12. bo Ww1d Wai II Period .. o a... o o? a a a e a e a a ice. e 0 aoaspar O 0 ? ? . ? e O ? a 9 a a ? O O ? ? . 41 O a a e 2. Projected Traffic Requirements . . . . . . ? . ? e e o s . 12 a. Peacetime Eeonomg a . ? . ? e e o a a . . O . . e 12 be Military Traffic ? . .. ? ? o o e a a. a o. o e a 0 12 1110 capacities 000 096*- f? o o e a o a a a a a. o a 12 1. Basic Data on Facilities and Inwt?ail.ations . . a a . a a 12 2a Estimates of Present Capacity . . . . . . . ? . . o . . 0 13 3. Pote~itii 1 Capacity ? . . o o . ? ? . ? a a a C a e . . 13 tao Diversion of Traffic to Other Media o a a . o . e . o o ].3 . N Yard Construction . o o . . . ? . . . . . . . . a a 13 c. Expansion of Present Facilities . . . ? a a . ? ? . . a 13 IV. Materials and Manpower Requirements . . . . . . o . ? a a a o a 3.4 16 Principal Materials . o o a o.. o o a o. o ,. . a. a o a 2. pots a a o... o o. o. o a. e o a o a a a. a a 14 1 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 V. Capabilities,, Vulnerabilities# and Intentions . . . . . . . . 15 1. Capabilities e . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3. Inte$ ices a o e a s o e o a e s a 16 Appendix A. Gaps in Int?11igence on I ansloading Stations . 17 Appendix B. Sakes . . . . . 0 . e . . . . . . . . e C . . o a 18 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 CLVIM FR--9 SEGURITfr 2I 2.2ATIOH UROAD GAdJGE M AID THE TRMWQ IZALI , +a THE WMLM - -Z . "?' R4I~TY D ter pted through traffie by rail is not possible between the USER and Centrr1 P ,hope, ?bocauao Soviet railroads are 3- inches wider in g =go than the at?rndard mean railroads. Traffics therefore, mist, be t anaferr at the stern Soviet frontier from track of one system to tracks of the other. Thirty .fiva especial transloading stations for handling an .h cargo transferee are known to era. t along the western Soviet frontier. The two principal methods used to aecarnpl.ish such-transfers are the followings first uAoading cars of one gat. , and transferring the cargo to other earn of a different age and.. seconds, adapting the running gear of rolling stock so that load. cars can pP-03 from tracks of one gauge to tracks of another without disturbing the load,, though t r a n a l o a d i n g is wasteful o f a o v o r s. time, a n d e A nt, it has not proved a serious obstacle to intra-m.oc rail traffic o Vzdat-Ang, facilities are now handling approximately 110?000 metric tons daily in ; a h direction across the borders and maximum capacity is srmi%hat higher than present traffic levers. The Soviet Moog, moreover,, is capable of expanding facilities to met any foreseeable irrcroaso in traffic capacity of the transfrowbior railroad lines. 1. "Lim. Land cw=nieation between the USSR and Central i rope depends alincsat entirely on rai3roads, but the gauge differential of the lines e rasing the storn Soviet frontier is a ebaractorlnt1c disadvantage almost unique in intar. national rail.rmding. Soviet rails are 5 feet app, ' 3 L inches f * c r apaa than atazsd . uge European tracks, thwi preventing Soviet broad-huge Iwo. motives and rolling stock from passing freely into the Satellite counties,, where railroads are standard-gauge. Although the dif?'erence in gauge is of sow defensive value to the USSR, it is a disadvantage in military ena,n ag at the Neat a in the normal traffic of the olvi, lays ocano7a The- dofonsi.ve value Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 is pow aced on the as sunption that the USSR r1fl thlraw all l oca aotiven in evont of a et: .t, forcing an invader to convert the Soviet railroads to sstalaxd gage in order to u30 them. (Such conversion proved onerous to the Germ Ar , which was unable to use the Soviet railroads for sscne time in 1941.) On the other hand,, converting Eastern European rail lines to broad gauge wed be infinitely more difficult for the Stet Army than converting broad gauge to stdasrd would be for an invader. It might not be naessary,, however, for a v tt ving Soviet arn>y to convert Satellite or Western Buropc n railroads to broad gaugo, because the USSR already controls about 15,000 locomotives and 400,000 freight cars in the Satellite countries. V- di.ff'o? a in gauge, moreover, sharply reduces the atrategits ad- vantage to the USSR inherent in the steadily increa ing density of the rail net frcm the Urals toward the west, which is the result of the requirements of the civilian oconc ny. The increased density would otherwi a constitute a strong military advantage for the USSR, partieviarly in offeswivca actions toward the West, bemuse the facility of supply for an arm corps on a fighting front depends directly on the density of the rail net in its rear area,, A sparse not necessitates a deep rear area, which ec plieatoss supply a d reduoes the effecti"uene of the entire corps.** Three solutions to the gauge-differential problem are opoaa to the USSR, a. To convert the Satellite railroads to Soviet broad gage; bo To fit rolling stock with as which readily Can hit ad- justed to either gauge; and eQ To tranaload freight at change-of-gauge points from cars of one gauge to care of the other. All three of these devices are used, and some in co nb3.natlon, but the major tonnage of freight which crosses the Soviet frontier Is tranal ed , The div &- dvantagea of transioading have military an call. as econcmic sigaaifi? .s :e. The' soot In capital in7estment for transloadi station and the manpowr e11ocatard to the atations arc, burdens on tho econ -, and the tirme lost in 4r los ,ng Impedes civilian and military traffic alike. The vulnerability of the t ? to .ing stations themselves to air attack could have far-reaching co ecjnences, A raiix .d item utt u ally derives s tT atogi.c elaeticlty frcm the density of Its :aotwork because traffic can be rerouted frc ?a a line which may be blocked to other lints which are clear. This flexibility is limited along the Soviet frontier, however, because there is no tra n .border traffic on some lines which erosas the fa ontier and vransloading stations have not been built. Throagh -traffic therefore t be fcinneled through certain points of eonce hi at1on. Footnote rafo ixmces In arable numerals ref to eouroos listed f_n Appendix Uo T'hxa USSR network has i density of about 14 kii.c tors of trek per 1,1000 square kilometers of territory in the Kuban and Caucasus, 45 kilometers per i,OOO ua a kilt o-titers between the Dnieper and the Don, and about 70 kite se ors per 1,1000 aces kilowv tors along the western frontier., 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 E- These targets do not offer a short out to paralyzing Soviet Bloc rail traffic e lately, becauso the simplicity of transloaading station a lla o thew to be readily built., reppaired : aad rebuilt, They are, however, uniquely -vulnerable to traffic interruptions aid delays and to fgaaent reductions in oast rail traffic capacity. ggo& 2. sstol ~ee~leent, The change-of-gauge problem is not now. Russia has carried cn railroad traffic with Central Europe since 1565, when a treaty concluded with Prussia established direct transportation of passe-agora and freight botweean the East, Prussian Railways and the Petersburg-Warsaw Railer Directorate. Between 1865 and World War I, railroad co tnication was established with Germ, Austria- Hungary., the Free City of Danzig? Frame, Belgium, and Sweden. After World War ID international traffic ag f uontaa established direct railroad ecamunica- tion bean the 'Soviet Union and Estonia (1920), Latvia (1921), GermwW via Latvia and Estonia (1923), Finland (1925), Poland (1926), Germ via Poland (1927)9 Austria throw Poland and Czechoslovakia (1925)1, and Turkey (1925). Communication with the Near Eaat tans est?lblished in 1928 and with Rumania in 1935. Reloading of cars was needed for all traffic on all of thews routes ow- cept to Esstonnia, Ltvia, Finland, and Turkey. The economic policy of the USSR following World Mar I restricted rail traffic with-the west to a fraction of its former level. Of the eight major routes via Poland two were eloeds and four were kept open solely for local traffic. The only two kept open for main- line traffic were equipped with aulenging plants at the frontier. Traffic was disrupted by World War II,, and the treaties became void. New treaties were worked out after World War II reestablishing communleations with Poland (23 November 1945) s Czechoslovakia (26 November 1946). Rmumia (1 July 1947 --- provisionally as of 10 September 1945), Hungary 1 December 1947 c-? provisionally as of 31 August 1945), and with Finland (19 December 1947 ? pro- visionally as of 19 August 1945). The treaty with Poland provided for reloaftng of care at the frontier, but It also permitted the transfer of loaded care across the ontier by exchanging wheel-and-axle sets of one gauge for those of.the other. J/ In addition, the treaty provided for direct transport of passengers, baaggago, and freight under one set of papers covering the entire route from the station of departure in one co mtrq to the station of desstina- titn in the others The treaty also aallowasd transit transport across Poland for Soviet-Garman traffic. Similar treaties were -signed by the USSR width Cz?choslav ikia, Hungary, Rumaniap and Finland. Each of these treaties specified the bonder,-crows sg . points where cars were to be reloaded. These border points have two stations each, one in the USSR nor the frontier and another across the frontier in the treaty, country. All traffic was to be tree ioaadedd at the station in the -3- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 covrr;ry of its deft nation. Fifteen stations Ure listed in Poland fcw transsloeading freight, and five of these also ware to serve passenger traffic. One station was listed for Czechoslovakia,, one for wry, and sir for Rumania. Although trsnrsloading is not necessary between the USSR and Finland, because Finnish railroads also operate on the 5 -foot gauge, transleeding van provided for at four border-crossing points betwovn the two countries,, and tranoloading eototimsz occurs. Because the entire length of tho present Soviet frontier is zany miles west of its prewar positions all of the trans loading stations established had to bo newly built. A few transloading sta. tione not covered by, the original treaties have been added to the system. On the other hands some stations have never been activated, others have remained compareative1y un5 portant. and some have been abandoned.. ~. ~~, ~.,B,~,s~ t~ ion of fi~-e As the Satellite economies quickened under thes impetus of the several Five Year Plans, east" mot rail traffic. Increased, and by 1949 all of the . major transload xg points more handling far more freight than the 1945 trans- loading capacity. Theca yards had been ezaa ide d gradually since the war to the point. where,, for zany of them, yard expansion van. apparently no longer the most profitable manner of increasing overall capacity. Additional trans- loading ,st'tions had to be built,, and, because the stations had.to bo located on the major rail lutes, which run east and west, rather than 1an tae Soviet frontiers, transloading-in-depth cane into being. This required a dual-ZmW line (aral iei standard- and broad -gauge tracks) betw3cn the eastern- a westernmost traoaloading stations. Insterburg, Brest, Pr yalg and the oomtplox based on Chop are the most aortenss3ive installations. Brest has developed since 1945 from a simple change. of-.gauge point with perhaps only one transsloading station into the center of a complex of at leant six tranaloading stations' located along 25 miles of dual] gauge track which extends 16 miles into the USSR and 9 miles into Poland. These stations ares from west to east, an follows: I .sazewieze7, Terespo1 Brest-Vest,, Brent antral, Br t .South, Brest mot,, possibly Brzozowkcas and Zabinka. The Insteaburg complex includes Insterburg, Nou In terburg, Birkenfeid, possi.b'1y Klein rye, and Gordaue n. The Br2elnyr l complex includes Zurawicaa Prz sl,p i rka Niz ar 1ce, and possibly Lwow. The Carpathian complex Includes Chop2, possibly Uzho , and Mukaceevo in Soviet Ruthonia, Ceres. in Gz aosaalovakia9 and Zah in Hungary A typical example of a smiler complex is Galata In Rui ia, where three transload1ng stations have been reported to exist, at Galat Biatea=, Gaiats rgas and Reni in the USSR, with the possib laity of other installations at Ge1atz Ne v Port and at Rent-Tranabordorea.. fY 4 r.:s Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 -Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 A list of the tranaloading stations known to be operating in 1950 is given below: Tranaloading Stations in Operation on the Western Soviet Frontier 1950 SSR DQUD $eiligenbeil Gerdauen) Birkenfeld) Neu Inaterburg) Lososna Boreetovitsa Brest.-Main) Brest-East) Brest-West) Zabinka ) Yagodin Rawa Ruska Korazs bunnies. Krinki (Tereapol ( iaszewicze Dorohusk Breberne Nedyka yrze mysl Nizankozrico Zurauica Chop) Mukaecvo) S J-ET Approved For Release 1999/09/U2-:'tTA DP79-01093A000100090005-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000100090005-4 USSR MU =I Va dul Borneati. Ungeni Tani-Socola Read. (Gal atz-Braatesas (Galatz-Larga ~a t The trargsloaadin g stations apparently are not organized am a special branch of Soviet Bloc transportation an ins for example, the Soviet Oanubs Navigation Company but are administered by the separate railroad adminiaatraa tions under rich all railroad operations In. their respective areas are cort. trolled. Thus the Malaszewicze and Terespol stations are administered by the Warsaw Railway Directorate, 1 of the 10 administrative region of the the Polish State Railw ye whereas the Brost and Zab$nka stations are administered by the Brest-Litovsk Railway System of the USSR Ministry of Railways o Trans loa d . iug as such does not appear to have separate administration outside they authority of tho local station masters, who are in turn subject to direction from tho Traffic and Transport Sectors of their Regional Railway Dir torate . headquarters o Nor are tranaloaading yards separated physieally from local station yards. They are fed in with and are under the sane police Burr voillance as the ]-peal station yards. Maintenance Is not an administrative problem: a Qpt at a taatlo s aalong the Soviet-Poliah' border where East German equipment mist be sorviocia At other stations, equipment can be serviced at ay stem-of origin facilities just over the frontier. What appears to be an overlap of authority scour