HIGHWAY TRANSPORT IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000100120002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 31, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURiTx INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
Provisional Report No 12
(CIA/RR 1R-12)
HIGHWAY TRANSPORT IN THE USSR
31 January 1952
10012e0g3
22
ati.2
This document is a working paper. The data and
conclusions contained herein dei-ot necessarily
represent the final position of (ER and should
be regarded as provisional only and subject to
revision. Additional data or comment which may
be available to the user is solicited. This
report contains information available to ORR as
of 1 December 1951.
WARNING
THLS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE
MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794 OF THE
U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE-
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UN-
AUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LA
Approved For Releas
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=TM
Summary . 09 404.0090W 0 A ?000000.0 0a 00
I. introduction a. . ? e?e o??eeae ea* e?e a ae
but
1
2
1. Importance . 0?00?90?000004.0
2
2, Historical Development . . . .
2
3. .General Description of Network and Facilities
. ?
3
4, Organisation . a 0 9a a a a a a a a a 0 a
a a a a
3
II.
Volume of Traffic . . . . a 00.00 4.9. ea?0000
3
1.. Motor Freight . a a 0 . . a ?00?00.0 a
0 A GO
3
2, Passenger Ebtor Transport . 09?004,9 to000
5
III.
Capabilities 0. . 0 0000 4.09000,00
900.z.
5
A,
Basic Data .a 0?0009 4, a a 4.0?0900009 AO
5
1.
.2,
Extent and Condition of the Road Network . ? . . . .
Nbtor Vbhicle Inventory o . . . . . 090990000
5
7
3.
Quantity and Quality of Maintenance 4.00990000
10
a. Roads . 0 . . , 0 OM* of. 9.0 a 000w C ?
10
b, Motor Vehicles . . ? . ? . 0 0 e a 9 0 0 ? ? 0
10
4.
Efficiency of Operations 04.9?0 *0 4.?000. q
10
5,
Seasonal Factors . . . . . . . ? 0 A G a ? ? 4> 9 d, 0
11
6.
Animal-drawn Transport 9. a 9.4 ?00004.000 4.*
11
Bo
Present Capacity . . a a ** ,O 0?0 a a 99008.4 .
21
C.
Potential Capacity . a 04?A?0 4 4.00,90900000
22
1,
Diversion of Traffic to Other Means eat& 00 Oa 0
12
do Peacetime . 00000 0 .00900 0 6041000
12
b. Wartime . aa 4,a .94.00 a *04.90090
12
2o
Nov Construction a. . a a a o a . a. 90000009a
12
3.
4.
Expansion of Nbtor Vehicle Park no0 alb 09.0
Effect of Damage by Western Attack 006900000
13
14
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IV. Materials and Manpower Requirements . . . . ? 0 ft 0 ? 0 ? 0 ? 14
Ij. Capabilities, Intentions, and Possible Counteractions . 0 .... 15
1. Capabilitiep . 66 , OOOOOO 0 0 006 0 ? C 0 **? 15
2. Intentions ? OOOOOO . O A OOOOOO 9 lb 9 tb V 15
3. Possible Counteraction 4 ? ? e 4 4 ? ? ? ? 16
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CIA/RR PR-12
SECURITY INFORMATION
11JG ALTRAMMLEMESUBL
ZOE=
Highway transport in the USSR is a supplementary economic service the
main function of which is the short-haul movement of freight. In perform-,
ing this function, Soviet highway transport has in recent years handled a
larger annual tonnage than the railroads and inland waterways combined,
although, because of the short average length of haul, the annual ton-kilo-
meter performance of highway ,rdnsport has not yet exceeded 3 percent of total
inland freight traffic, In the 1950 Flan, highway transport was scheduled to
account for 25.4 billion ton-kilometers or 4.2 percent of the total, but
only 20.5 billion ton-kilametera actually were carried.
Since the planned mission of highway transport has never encompassed long-
distance movements, the Soviet road network has remained largely undeveloped
outside urban areas. The network now includes about 3 million kilometers of
roads of which only 56 percent have foundations and only from 6 to 8 percent
are 11rd-surfaced. The construction of a amall number of paved cross-country
highways was undertaken after 1945, particularly in the European USSR, but
military rather than economic considerations have been paramount in the initia-
tion of these projeets. The terrain, climate, and shortages of heavy equip-
ment, stone, road-binding material, and trained highway engineers all have
retarded the development of the road network.
Estimates of the size of the Soviet motor vehicle park vary widely, but
it is likely that there are now 1.5 million to 2 million motor vehicles in
the USSR, about 90 percent of which are trucks. Although the availability of
fuel has not been a factor limiting motor transport operations, there has been
increasing emphasis recently on the production of vehicles equipped to burn
nonliquid fuels. The extent to which anlizaledrawn vehicles are used in high'
way transport is unknown, but the quantity of traffic carried in this way,
particularly in rural areas, must be substantial.
Motor vehicle production facilities in the USSR have expanded rapidly in
recent years,. The types of vehicles produced since World War' II are well
apted to the operating conditions prevalent in the USSR, Generally in-
adequate maintenance and repair facilities, shortages of spare parts, and in-
efficient vehicle *mating procedures, however, have prevented utilisation
of the motor vehicle park at a level equal to its potential capacity. More-
over, military allocations absorb a large proportion of current production,
thus affecting unfavorably both the quantity and condition of vehicles available
for civilian purposes, Nevertheleas, the Soviet motor vehicle park is believed
to be adequate in terms of the traffic requir;. tts placed upon It, The extent
and condition of the highway not and the traditional dependence of Soviet
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shippers .= rail transport are the major factors hindering Puller development
and more widespread employment of motor transport.
la Introduction.
The term "highway transport" as used in this report includes motor and
animal, urban and interurban, and freight and passenger transport. The report
deals primarily, however, with motor transport.
1.- Isportance.
The primary function of highway transport in the USSR is the short-,
haulatovement of freight between railroad stations, ports, airports, and
industrial installations in cities and the haulage of farm supplies and agri-
cultural produce to and from outlying suburban areas. Except in the suburban
areas of the major cities, there are few modern highways suitable for trucking
operations, a factor which has restricted the development of long-distance
motor transport. On the basis of total tonnage carried, Soviet highway trans-
port in most years since 1937 has handled more freight than the railroads and
inland waterways combined. On the more significant basis of tolometers,
however highway transport probably has not accammted for over 3 percent of
total inland freight, although under the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) the
1950 goal for highway transport was 25.4 billion ton-kilometers annually, or
4.,2 percent of the total inland freight traffic. Only 20.5 billion ton-Ailo-
meters,- however, actually were carried. Generally speaking, therefore, high-
way transport in the USSR is a supplementary economic service, 1/ *
2.
IlatqlratiaNUIRIVAda
The expansion and improvement of highway transport never has had higa
priority in Soviet planning and practice, although it is being given increezirg
emphasis. The facilities inherited from 'Czarist Russia included only a few dis-
connected sections of good road/ which had been built primarily for military.
operations. No large-scale construction of improved roads was undertaken before
1928? and subsequent construction while Improving radial transport in the vicinity
of largo towns has contributed little toward the development of an integrated
nationamdde road system. 2/ Motor vehicle production nonexistent during the
et
first 7 Tears of the Sovi regime, received strong impetus in 1929 with the
signing of a contract with the Ford Motor Company, In 1932 the Goekiy Motor
Vehicle Plant, built under the terms of this contract, began production an a
large scale, and Soviet output increased in that year from 5,000 to more than
20,000 motor vehicles annually. Since.then, production facilities have steadily 25X1
expanded, and output has increased to about 400,000 motor vehicles a year,
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? 3- rianzaLattpalut,iam-aLlisgimuluallwilltipa.
Except in the vicinity of the major cities of the European USSR, there
are fey aneweather highway:: suitable for motor transport. Most Soviet roads
are of primitive construction, and severe weather conditions cause deep ruts
and frost heaves which render many of the roads impassable for motor vehicles
during much of the year. The accelerated motorization of the Soviet Ange in
recent years has: intensified the need for improved? all-weather highway connec-
tions. Although postwar rehabilitation and construction have been directed
toward the development of such a network, certain phynical handicaps have pre-
vented eapansion of the road system at the planned rate. Per example, short-
ages of stone and binding material and the instability of the soil in any
areas of the USSR make initial road construction costly and constant main-
tenance and repair necessary. If The inventory of motor transport vehicles
has been expanding, but production of replacem t parts and construction of
otor vehicle repair and servicing facilities have failed to keep pace
9tgainiet211.
Construction, heavy repair, and maintenance of national highways are
directed by the Main Administration for Highways in the Ministry ,or Interior
(MVD). Responsibility for highway construction probably was given to the IND
becauSe that Ministry has a large labor pool at its disposal, and the USSR has
been heavily dependent on manual labor for road construction and maintenance,
The acute shortage of road-building equipment has boon somewhat alleviated
only recently. With the exception of those transport vehicle pools at the
disposal of various industrial and government organisations throughout the USSR,
the. operation of motor vehicles engaged in transport is controlled mainly by
the Ministries of Motor Transport of the individual Republics, which also.
supervise construction and maintenance of highways of Republic Importance. Each
Ministry directs motor transport operations, such as urban passenger transport
and miscellaneous local trucking, within the boundaries of its own Republic
Highway transport statistics are compiled by the individual Republics, except
for traffic carried in vehicles of the above-mentioned government organimatione.
The Central Statistical Officein Moscow maintains statistics on all highway
transport traffic.
IL 3121m9-2L-TraferIg.
2. Basar.ftgat.
The limited material available on Soviet motor freight traffic is sun-
marised in the renewing table covering the period of the first four Five Year
Flans:
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Soviet Motor Freight Traffic hi
Selected Years from 1929 to 1950
1929
1933
1937
1940
1941 A/
1945
1946
1950
-(Plen)
Freight Originated
kali.T.Z21121
18.0
123.0
799.6
855.2
903.0
316.5
458,9
1,a144)
iseemasosaassereortitorsoi...ossar....asseee
Itarswasbea....
Percentage
of Total Average Length Tnrnover Percentage of
Inland Freight of Haul (Billion Ton- Total Inland
.Al2.9ZedERL Ettight=2127.4r
10.0
29.0
58.0
56.0
N.A,
43,0
N.A.
63.0
1008
10.8
10.0
.10.5
10.4
13.8
13.8
1440
0,19
1.35
8.00
8.98
9.37
4.38
6.35
25.39
0.1
0.7
2.0
1.9
N.A.
1.2
N.A.
4.2
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EstiMated Soviet Motor Freight Turnover
1947-90
V.1.111.11?Malftloyln...........11.M.311??=421312114gLI2t;erlet4SNIAtlaZia
Xsax
1947
11,1
1948
13.6
1949
17,4
1950
20,5
Although the trend in motor freight turnover indicates a mutt=
increase in the anployment of rotor transporty the increase has not been
sufficient to produce any substantial change in the general pattern of Soviet
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inland. freightmovements. No reliable estimates of tonnage originated and
aver e length of haul can be made for the years 1947=50 on the bafti of
infor available, mation currently avaable. However,' gree 25X1
that between 50 and 60 percent of all freidirs transported ((tonnage originated)
is handled at one time or another by motor transport. 2/ Official Soviet
policy regarding motor freight transport has been aimed at the continued
develo ant of short-haul trucking as a supplement to railroad transport and
at increasing the length of truck hauls. In January 1949, some freight rates
were readjusted in order to encourage shorthaul movements by truck. Railroad
freight rates for distances of from 50 to 150 kilometers were "considerable
raised, while motor freight rates wore correspondingly reduced, In January
1950, trucking rates in the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic),
the major (Constituent Republic of the USSR, again were revised, with an
additional reduction of 16 percent on movants for distances of less than
50 kilometers and fro 20 to 25 percent on distances of more than 50 kilometers,
This measure indicates that 80.1110 difficulty has been encountered in diverting
the 50- to 150-kilometer shipments from the railroads to highway transport,
Available evidence reveals that between 70 and 75 percent of total truck
freight is hauled distances of from 10 to 20 kilometers, with a very small
percentage going farther than 20 kilometers.
2. afiesNaggraYakmanimate
Passenger motor transport in
character. Statistics for passenger
age increases over a e base year or
planned levels but have not yet been
/ a
1117
the USSR is almost exclusively urban in
traffic are available in terms of percent-,
in terms of percent o relationships to
analysed in detail by CIA,
gsmik=la.
A. DARAPJAte.
1, t dc2P-diticaaa2f-0.9.22.8e4-112115A.
Considerable diversence of nninInn
the Soviet roadevstem.,
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/mo nvA4trim 4-114es
eualaatice exist ror umi.y, AL -Gaul: Taw, the
over-all length of Soviet highways was 3 million kao sters, including 1.8
million.kilometers of secondary roads and tracks, mhny of which were undefined
country lanes without foundations of any kind, Of the remaining 1,2 million,
kill eters, about 43, kilo eters were surfaced, 2/ I .
11-352-400-1-Emeer.inthat before World War 11 the heludine city streets Ana whilmnnweA dlpt irnmAet A/
25X1 highway network totaled
V 'th
CO
15X1
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The wide variation among these prewar figures, which are claimed
to be based on So let statistics, is difficult to understand, Since there
are numeroue definitions of the various types and classes of roads in the
USSR, however, it is 'likely that the various estimates have been made on
substantially different bases. Therefore, any exact breakdown of the total
network by type should be accepted only with reeervatAone. The figure of
3 million kilometers reported .0 the .prewar network 25X1
appears to be the most all--inUusive.a Ub estimate prepared in 194?
fellows 10/:
Estimated ixtent of the Soviet Road System
Selected Years from 1927 to 1950 '
Year
atailagada
192?
1,252,419
2932
1,270,773
1937
1,3550459
1941 bi
1,545,922
1945
1,522,577
1950, (Plan)
1,596,637
??????
tftdartrie.M.010:111004.00maKNOMMX132Bretatea
AULfaWil
PrigLanalsOmayle
Natural
31,797
1,208
1,219,414
51,359
116,242
1,103,172
87,584
331,016
936,859
1510179.
465,612
929,131
129,927
507,150
885,500
163,737
668,150
764,750
a. Gravel, stone, asphalt, or concrae.
b. As of 1 Jitly, Betsiecn 1939 and 1945, 180,000 kilometers were added to the
Soviet road net through acquisition of the Baltic States and other territory,
The various Five Year Plans have provided for road construction and
repair on a large scale, but the major phasis has been placed on dirt roads,
simply constructed, of poor quality, and generally of only local importance,
Planned goals are shown in the following table:
Planned Soviet Road Construction and Improv en
19276742
eactromansiabooromaramsam="1 comareaadoraneeirscaRmaamworms.aescr.a.amasswaxamerasvosamtercetaassalexamaanclUZLIAIM
agram.
1927-32 360,000
1932-37 210,000
1937-42 210,000
- 12,000
30,000
'0,000
Improvement of
13.950?,
1,400,000
N.A.
N.A.
a. Stone, gravel, or water-bound surface, or apy surface
on a solid foundation,
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The Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) specified simply that "the network of
improved roads firestmiably surface17 under Union and Republic jurisdiction
shall be increased by 11,500 kilometers in the 5-.year period; and the
existing network of arterial roads shall be restored and completely over-
hauled." The degree of accomplishment achieved with respect to these
plans is not known. The total mileage of the Soviet road system prObably
has not increased since World War II or, for that matter, since 1940, The
over-ell condition of the roads probably has improved slightly, and it is
likely that moot of the war damage has been repaited. It is not believed,
however, that surfaced roads yet represent more than 12 to 15 percent of the
total netuetk. Most surfaced roads, in any case, are within cities and toens.
2. liatareighlatImerieZZ.
As in the case of the road network, estimates on the total size
Of Soviet motor vehicle park vary considerdbly. No reliable estimate can
be made without at accurate knowledge of Soviet vehicle production, and this
information is not available at present'. The following table presents
estimated inventories for selected years of the prewar period .11/:
Estimated Prewar Soviet Motor Vehicle Inventory
Selected Years from 1913 to 1941 ?
,pletermerealtinftak,IWRINEM.111?
X at
InakLmslaswal
aelawarAtra. ..Taiel.
1913
1,500
7,400
8,900
1928
7,500
11,200
18,730
1930
18,000
11,800
29,800
1932
54,600
13,800
68,400
1935
201,200
51,400
252,600
1937
474,600
65,069
539,669
1.938
635,100
85,400
720,500
1940
890,500
92,800
983,300
1941
879,100
83,700
962,800
Other coerce; report total Soviet motor vehicle strength in 1937
as 570,000 and in 1940 variously as 4009?000 (839,000 trucks and 170,000
cars) and 1,000,000 to 19100,000 vehicles,
Estimates of the size of the postwar Soviet motor vehicleepark
appear to be particularly uncertain. There is no agreement ong sources as
to. the extent of serviceability within the inventory,- estimates ranging from
50 to 70 percent, and little is known about rat= of retirement or the number
of vehicles allocated emolusively to the military, One estimate has been
g orally accepted as being accurate, that is frag 22 June 1941 to 20 Septem
1945 the USSR received 409,526 Lend Lease vehicles from the US. 12/ The
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following table is presented as illustrative of the prevailing confusion on
the sise of the postwar motor vehicle inv-vtorys
Various Estimates of Postwar Soviet Motor Vehicle Inventory
1945-50
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950 nif
ack
Zugslar=?garg
88,600 14/
55,900 24/
53,200 15/
52 ? 300
987,200 24/
1,067M0 15/
1,118,%0 IV
1,150, ail
1, 292 200 acil
3420 22/
763,600 13/
898,600 14/
1,014 :??? 2.5/
740,000 1,0/
700,000 22/
1,038,100 la/
413519500 15/
40006000 a/
115098,500 2Q/
apoocoo al/
10233,600 29,/
1,200,000 a/
1,296,100 1.4/
1,5170500 314/
1,185,380 22/
2,250,000 24/
5804411 aq2/
120000 a/
4121RITSIMINIMArItt.
a, The Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) stated that the
total inventory-was to be increased to twice that of the
prewar level.
The most recent CIA estimat of the else and composition of the
soviet motor vehicle park for the years 1949-52 was made in the rail of 1949,
The estimate includes only serviceable civilian vehicles, and the inventory
is given for midyear: that is, the average n ber or vehicles operating
throughout the year Although necessarily based upon an assumed 1945 in-
ventory? an estimated retirement rate, an eutimatA serviceability factor,
and an estimated annual vehicle production, all of which are subject to
varying degrees of error, this estimate of the sine and composition of the
Soviet motor vehicle park nevertheless is believed to be the most praCtical
yet mimic It in :marine as follows:
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Estimated Midyear Inventory
of Serviceable Civilian Motor Vehicles in the USSR
1949-52
.11.10,41121111}11.1111?10011110.11a
On01111MM=LTZZLIMICIPIMPaeM"
1949
21-gai...1252
LAIL2221 1.1111X-19,52
Trucks and Buses
4980405
7830405
1,115,655
1,434,405
Passenger Cars
84,500
119,500
159,750
198,500
Total
1024,V.1
XLM,
X,275.405
1632.921
The total number of serviceable vehicles, both civilian and
Military, is estimated as follows: "
Estimated Midyear Inventory,
of Serviceable Civiliaa and Military Vehicles in the USSR
19496-52
1.1111112n
Trucks and Buses 773,500
Passenger Cara 84,500,
Total AoilaZ2
iCIPLIZIM=Sar
4116.?1141191,
2.20x...1222
1.1111L2221
Liammg
illo85;5clo
119,500
1,447,750
1590730
1,796,500
198,500
=LIM
IL212:19=
.141-41M
Despite the variations among the several eetimates? it can be
concluded that the total Soviet motor vehicle park is now between 1.5 pillion
and 2 Million vehicles and that the large majority of these vehicles, probably
at least 90 poreent- are trucks. The park is believed to be adequate in terms
of the traffic requirements placed upon it.
Two other developments should be mentioned with regard to Soviet
motor vehicles,1 In the first place although Soviet dependence on foreign
desi and technical advice has been very great, new postwar models which
started coming into production in 1948 and 1949 show purely Soviet modifica-
tions based on rtime experienee and are aharacterised by a general additional
ruggedness not found in the US-ioullt prototypes. Second, the conversion of
gasoline-powared vehicles to the use of ,as-aeneratore and compressed natural
gas reale has been steadily increasing,
plants indicate that current production a yemuumu uurning nonliqula mous
may in some instances amount to as much as 20 percent of total output.
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ct,, DAR.
Examination of -published material on Soviet reads indicates
that maintenance and repair are constant problems. The rural population is
required to. devote a specified nuMber of days a year to road workr?a practice
abandoned as unsatisfactory in the US before 1900. In the past prisoners of
war also were extensively used for road work. Road-building-machine stations
(Mashine,-dorozhnaya stantsiya MDS)r gli evidently similar in concept to
the well-known machine tractor stationer are being established in increasing.
nesubersr although the nuMber of road-building machine stations now operating
is not known. Each inetallation is allotted mechanized equipment. and is
responaible for the maintenance and repair of roads in its area. As produc-
tion of road-building equipment expends, roa&building machine stations ??
probably will increasingly replace requisitioned. manual 'labor.
b. YiltigLittstagg.
Although the number of basic types of vehicles produced in the.
USSR is relatively limited in order. to facilitate interchangeability of comm.,
nents and parte? etandardisation has not beenfully realized, largely because
local modifications of the basic types have been numeronsr and no industry-
wide program of spire-parts production has been initiated. Mont spare parts?
still are produced by local repair shops as the need -arises. Repair facili-
ties are inadequate, and the demands on. them are increased by thefact that .
vehicle life before capital repairs are required has averaged consistently
.only between 10,000 .and 20,000 kilometers. Major factors shortening the life
of vehicles are inferior quality of gasolineand lubricants, poor condition
of the roads, and haphazard.vehicle servicing practices. afii. Complaints in
the Soviet press concerning insufficient quantities of. spare parts and the
inadequate number of vehicle repair and servicing facilities are numerous..
Despite the fact that these conditions are known, their over-all effect '
apparently has not been published in statistical form, and estimates of the
serviceability of the total vehicle, park, therefore, continue to vary as much
as 20 percent, Most of these estimates are based on the assumption that
serviceability has rezaino4 unchanged since before World War II,
'Items dealing with the inefficiency of Soviet motor transport are
published in the Soviet press with a frequency which suggests that wasteful
operating practices are so numerous as to prevent the achiev ent of planned
traffic goals, despite other press claims to the contrary. The following
it i, published in /948, in of particular interest, since it concerns the
country as a whole:
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"More than 7) percent of all transport expenees in
rurbag trade consists of expenses for automobile and
horse-drawn transportation. The proportion Of such
expenses to trade turnover is one and one-half times that
of 1940. Increase in such transportation costs is prie
marily the redult of inefficient utilization of vehicles;
the fact that too much time is spent waiting at the
suppliers; and because hauling is falsely registered as.
having been perfOrmed . Trucks in the urban trade
wet= are eaployed'in the transport of freight'
only 25 to 30 percent of their total working time. Most
of the trucks make only one, or a maximum of two, tripe
per day instead of the required three or four, At the
same time only 7040 percent of the load capacity, some
tines oven less, la used, .., The total standing tine of
trucks exclusive of that :spent in leading or unloading,
is several times that spent in transit "/
A proper estimate of the efficiency of Soviet trucking operations cannot be
made without accept: to actual operating statistics similar to these filed in
the US with the Interstate Commerce Commiseion. Indexes of efficiency based
on such statistics have not been published by the USSR since before World
liar II.
5e 122M/11,409:?.4! .
A considerable quantity of information, both German and Soviet,
exists on the subject of the effect of the Soviet climate on motor vehicle
operatiOns. These Studies indicate that umAther is a major factor governing
the condition of the roads and that it curtails motor transport in the USSR
for a substantial part of each year. 20/ Spring thaws and summer rains
render the numeroue dirt roads impassable to motor vehicles in entire regions
for as many as 150 days a year. 22/ Although snow immobilizes motor transport
in come areas during much of the winter, a fairly effective technique of
coldeweather vehicle oper tion has been developed by the Soviete, and the
minter season, when the .ground and waterways are frozen is the period when
vehicular mobility reaches its maximum throughout the USSR,
6. halktarmakitmgmtk.
Animal-drawn carts and sleds are known to be used extensively in
the USSR, although no quantitative information on either equipment utilized
or tonnage hauled is available.'
'3) faenteSmanae.
Road traffic capaoity and the capacity of the present Soviet motor
vehicle park to carry traffic cannot be estimated in any detail from available
information. Certain broad limits only can be established.
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CO ratedetelgematier,
1. illIfivetal.pfeelzgetio.12-2.0.5,11Lietana.
a. leacetipee
AnimaI-drawn transport is the only medium to which Soviet
motor vehicle transport might reasonably be diverted in peacetime, since a
fundamental purpose of highway transport in the USSR is to relieve the
railroads of a substantial share of their short-haul traffic burden, Such
diversion is unlikely, however, because of the relative slowness of
animaledrawn transport,' The inland waterways, for the moist part, are not so
located as to permit their use as an alternative form of transport.
According to published Soviet statistics, 12.56 million draft
animals were available in the USSR at the end of 1950. There were 13,7
million horses, including those held by the Soviet Army, but not more than
8 million of this total are estimated to be used for draft perposee. This
estimate is based on projection or a known Prewar ratio. The other 4,56
million draft animals reported are oxen. No figures aro available on the
number .of reindeer, easels, mules and donkeys, nor is the USSR known to
have published statistics permitting an estimate to be made of the number
of wagons and carts in the Soviet Union. On the basis of horsepower
equivalents used in Soviet sources, it may calculated that the 12.56
million draft animals equal approxmately 120,000 trucks (1 horse equals
3/4 horsepower; 1 ox equals 2/3 horse. average horsepoleer per truck equals
75). In addition, there are an estimated 427,000 tractors with an average
power rating of 28 horsepower each currently in UBO in agriculture, In an
eaergency? these tractors also could be used for transport purposes.
mr,032.
In wartime, it is conceivable that Soviet military demands
for trucks might become no great that the railroads again mould take responsie
bility for short-haul mayeents. At the same time, the utilisation of animal
and water transport probably would be increased to the maximum-, It is strongly
suspected that during World War.II only the receipt of US Lend Lease vehicles
by the USSR prevented a complete collapse of the Soviet motor transport seetem.
2, EMSAMELEUQUSID.
. Roadeconstruction projects undertaken in the USSR during the period
of the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) were designed to provide the more me"
tensively developed areas of the country with high-capacity roads equal to
those of Western European standards and to extend and improve the local networks
of secondary roads. These projects wore concentrated in the European USSR,
and several hundred thousand prisonere of war were eqployed on the work during
the first 4 years of the period. These prisoners of war worked almost exole-e
sivoly on roads of all-USSR importance, Increaeing efforts to extol* the use
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of mechanized equipment were made toward the end of the period, when many
of the prisoners of war were repatriated. Strenuous efforts were made to
complete in 1948 the main highways MesconmVanak, MosecessSevastopol? MoscowReeezenKnybyshev? Kharkov-Rostov, andRostovo%khumi=Tbilisi. All of these
roads, however, were under construction through 1948, and Most of them have
been reported as being incomplete through 1949. In 1949, work also was
reported as being in progress on the Eharkov-Kiev? Mosows.Yaroslavl-Vologda,
and MoscousLeningrad-Reval highways.
The slow progress indicated by these reports apparently cannot
be attributed entirely to a shortage of mechanical road-building equipment,
since the Ministry responsible for the construction of such eqnipment claimed
overfulfillment of Plan goals in both 1948 and 1949. 'It is probable, however,
that uch of this road-building machinery was allocated to the construction
of the nueh-publicizod hydroelectric installations and canals, which apparently
had higher priority. It is also likely that the lack of progress on road
construction resulted in large measure frame scarcity of road-binding material
in the European USSR, the difficulties encountered in building batisfaotory
reed foundationeon the unstable soil of the area, and A shortage of experienced
road designers and technically qualified supervisory personnel, which was
accentuatsm by the repatriation of the German prisoners of umrs These short-s
comings also lowered the quality of the work completed, thereby increasing
revirements for maintenance and repair.
Information regarding current ronA mmintliquftf4m1 41,
Far East is snarses
oeme or ;nese reports
ksssoss VA Wift, sonaerucezon program may be to facilitate
the movement of railroad construction materials. If this is true, the roads
may be abandoned as rail connections are extended. ,
3. 142analsaatliataLYakidA2ark
No estimate can be made with respect to expansion of the So iet
motor vehicle park, because figures on actual postwar motor vehicle production
in the USSR are not available. Since the termination of Lend Lease shipments,
Soviet acquisitions of motor vehicles from external sources have not been
numerous, Soviet interest in and dependence upon foreign design and technical
developments is likely to persist, however, and attempts to import small quan-
tities of foreignemade vehicles for experimentation and possible copying
probably will continue. The 'linker of vehicles shipped clandestinely into
the Bloc area from Western Europe and the Far East is difficult to determine.
Vehicle production in the Satellites is not yet sufficiently large to permit'
sizable shipments to the USSR. Is Is kaolin that Soviet shipments of vehicles
to the Satellite countries, on the other hand, have been increasing,
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? It is not possible to estimate quantitatively the potential
effect on Soviet motor transport capacity of war damage that would be in-
flicted in the event of Western attack, Generally speaking, Soviet roads
are relatively invulnerable to attack, other than attack resulting in actual
occupation.
IV. Waretal.ARLMSRMU1'AMMAtCORIBLO7.
The following estimates, made in September 1949; are believed to be the.
best estimates available on, Soviet requirements of materials and manpower for
motor transport.
Principal Raw Materials
Required by Soviet Motor Transport
1949-52
Metric Tons
iailt atm/. si Alara" 2sm2r9sda,
1949 793,800
1950 1,987,800
1951 1,381,800
. 1952 1,381,800
4,423
6,078
7,734
7,734
4,364,352
6,8/3,872
8,698,438
12,423,286
Soviet requirements for now vehicles can be estimated only if the
retirement rate, current strength and serviceability of the park, and
over-all level of traffic are known, which Is not the case, Requirements
for repair parts are believed to be large, 31/ but no specific estimate
of parts requirements can be made without firmer owledge of the number,
present mileage, and annual mileage increment of the vehicles comprising
the total Soviet inventory. Road construction materia/s and equipment
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are in short supply. Specific requirements for theist items depend on the
extent and nature of construction projects and the degree of importance
attached by the USSR to mechanizing road construction, neither of which is
known.
Approximately 4.3 million persons were employed in transportation in
1950 in the USSR, of which about 2 million were employed in forms of
transportation other than rail and water Of the latter number, 140,000
were engineers and specialints. The number engaged in Soviet highway ,
transport alone is a matter of conjecture, but one driver par vehicle.
would account for nearly 2 million employees, with no allowance being made
for other workers such as mechanics, servicemen, and dispatchers. These
figures are not entirely consistent with others reported by the Soviet press
and radio. In general, available information suggests that a shortage of
professionally trained highway construction engineers and vehicle designers
remains a serious problem In the USSR, but the numerical extent of that
shortage and its precise effect are unknown.
P?yb 0=911E.
10 DARGW4114910
There is little information available to indicate in specific quanta-
tive terms the amount of traffic Which could be movc. by motor transport in
a given period of time between any two points in the USSR. It is difficult,
therefore, to estimate the capability of Soviet motor transport to support
various courses of action. In connection with Soviet military planning, the
fact that the highway network of much of Europe is relatively well-developed .
may influence the USSR to make more extensive plans concerning the future
size and use of its rotor vehicle park than would be justified on the basis
of its own undeveleped road system,
In genera/ terms, it in known that the Soviet Union has about 1.2.
million to 1,5 million serviceable trucks, which could, under pressure, carry
traffic at the rate of from 20 billion to 30 billion ton-kilometers a ytar,
The USSR is estimated to be producing about 300,000 to 400,000 trucks a year,
and the supply of fuel probably is sufficient to permit near-capacity opera-
tion of the vehicle park. Although the road network is underdeveloped, and
sustained, year-round motor transport operations between oast cities and
towns of the USSR stillarea physical impossibility, postwar information
indicates that motor transport has improv remarkably since 1945 Prewar
levels of operation and output apparently have been surpassed, The removal
of existing limitations on highway transe.rt capability, however, will depend
largely t n the priority which Soviet planners assign to further highway
and motor vehicle developments,
2. diaatei09M.
At press it, there ?o no indications that the USSR intends to develop.
highway trans rt as an independcit form of trans rtation0 Postwar tre s
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suggest that motor transport is to remain an auxiliary service supplementing
water and rail transport through the carriage of short-haul traffic,
Broader Soviet policies outside the transportation field are not
likely to be revealed in the scanty Information on civilian highway transport
develo ,ents which is now available, Changes in the allocation of vehicles -
to the armed forces and in military requirements for vehicles., if known ?
meetly, might indicate broader Soviet intentions, as would the stockpiling
of vehicles, fuel, and portable bridging equipment or the sudden removal
of substantial quantities of these items from storage, Widespread confisca-
tion of civilian vehicles likewise would be an indicator. Conversely, the
known absence of any of these developments might indicato a lack of immediate
intent to commenc hostilities and would provide a check on other evidence,
3. Lall2141,,Lpta-0(*to.11.
The most obvious peacetime measure which can be taken by the West to
1 it the capability of Soviet motor transport is the rigid enforcement of
comprehensive =port controls and the sealing-off of all non-Bloc sources of
motor transport.equispent, Although the effectiveness of this measure would
not be as far-reaching today as it would. have been several years ago, Soviet
dependence on foreign design and technical develop m ts probably is still
great, delivery of any vehicles, components, or parts to the Bloc would
increase Soviet capabilities both directly and indirectlee, Possible effects
of Western action in wartime are sharply limited, As previously- icat
the Soviet .,,tor transport system probably would prove to be a relatively
unrewarding strategic target. Tactical operations ainet Soviet motor
transportv however, might be considerably more effective, particularlyin con-
junction with attacks on other Soviet transport mile,
?
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