THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY IN MANCHURIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000400070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 27, 1953
• Content Type: IR

10.
Erskom*****444.11Q41
lease 1999/00/02 CIA-RDF'79-01093A0004a67 Re-7 61
OVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
E ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY IN
,
CIA/RR PR-39
27 November 1953
P40 OP4 NT NO.
It ?
CLASS 0
DECLASS'
CLASS. CHANGED T
- NEXT REVIEktii DATE:
AUTfiHR 7 -2
DATE.'32 RPVIEWEFt.____006514
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
CONI1DENTIAL
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WARNING
This
ThiS material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United Skates
V71thin, the meaning of the espionage laws
Talk18, USC, Secs, 793- and 794, the trans-
ission or revelation of which in any manner
o an unauthorized, person Is prohibited by law.
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oflia;;4:4FZE.4410
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE ETRCTRIC POWER INDUSTRY IN MANCHURIA
CIA/RR PR-39
(ORB Project )-i4.1.1)
NOTICE
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORB and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONTENTS
Summary
Page
1
I. Introduction 2
A. History 5
B. Organization and Administration 8
C. Natural Resources 9
II. Production and Transmission Facilities 10
A. Production Facilities 10
B. Transmission Facilities 12
C. Utilization of Production and Transmission
Facilities 12
III. Input Requirements 14
IV. Capacity and Production Estimates 17
V. Consumption 17
VI. Expansibility 24
Appendixes
Appendix A. Tabulation of Electric Power Plants in
Manchuria 29
Appendix B. Methodology 43
Appendix C. Gaps in Intelligence 45
Appendix D. Sources and Evaluation of Sources 47
Tables
1. Annual Production of Electric Power in Manchuria,
1935-44 7
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2. Capacity and Production of Electric Power in
Manchuria, 1949-57
Page
3. Contracted Capacity and Sales of Electric Power
in Manchuria, 1944 20
4. Consumption of Electric Power in Manchuria,
1944 21
5. Electric Power Plants in Manchuria 31
Map
Manchuria: Major Electric Power Facilities . . Inside Back Cover
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CIA/RR PR-39
(CRR Project 44.1.1)
SECURITY INFORMATION
THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY IN MANCHURIA*
Summary
In Manchuria the Chinese Communists have their best existing base
for the development of heavy industry, and electric power is vital to
this development. Although the Russians removed much industrial
equipment following World War II, the plants which remained consti-
tuted the largest group of integrated facilities anywhere in China.
The importance of Manchuria in the economy of Communist China has
been increasing, and in 1952 this area accounted for over 55 percent
of the total industrial production in the country.
Electric power plants, like most other industrial installations,
suffered from Russian removals of equipment in the years immediately
following World War II. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists had an
estimated installed capacity by 1952 of 1,036,000 kilowatts (kw), of
which 63 percent was in steam plants and 37 percent in hydroelectric
plants. From this installed capacity an estimated 3.9 billion
kilowatt-hours (kwh) were produced. Despite damage during the fighting,
1946-48, the transmission network is presumed to be restored, for the
most part, to its 1944 level. This transmission network is the best
that exists anywhere in Communist China and permits the steam plants
to augment the hydroelectric plants and one another when necessary.
It also permits the hydroelectric plants to supply a maximum portion
of the load.
Industrial use accounts for about two-thirds of the total con-
sumption of electric power. In the immediate future, just as in 1952,
the supply of electric power to all but the most essential consumers
probably will be curtailed.
Although Manchuria has adequate coal and an adequate number of
hydroelectric sites for any probable expansion of the industry, the
problem of procuring new equipment will act as the major limitation
on the expansibility of the industry. There will be a continuing
* This report deals with the area known historically as Manchuria,
plus the addition of Jehol Province. It contains information
available as of 1 April 1953 except for the revised 1953 Plan figures
announced in May 1953.
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restoration of installations, and it is assumed that the USSR will
supply new equipment in quantities sufficient to achieve an installed
capacity of 2.35 million kw by 1957. It is further estimated that the
production from this installed capacity will amount to 10.5 billion
kwh in 1957.
Coal is the most significant input to the industry. In 1952 an
estimated 2.3 million metric tons, about one-seventh of the total
Manchurian production, was consumed by the electric power industry.
There appears to be adequate coal for any probable expansion. Suf-
ficient quantities of replacement parts and new equipment, however,
are not available in Communist China, and, owing to the dismissal of
Japanese and White Russian personnel, there is an increasingly
critical shortage of technical supervisors.
It is concluded that the electric power industry in Manchuria will
expand at a rate 'which will keep pace with the expansion of heavy
industry and that the latter will not be hampered in its development
by a lack of electric power.
I. Introduction.
In the development of the economy of an area the availability of
electric power* is of primary importance because it limits the amount
of industrial equipment which can be operated. The provision of an
adequate supply of electric power is and has been a prerequisite to
the establishment and the expansion of any industrial enterprise.
The total industrial output of Manchuria accounted for the
following percentages of the total industrial output of Communist China:
in 1949, 35 percent; in 1950, 43 percent; in 1951, 52.6 percent; and
in 1952, 55.9 percent. 1/** The significance of Manchurian industry
* The term electric power as discussed herein is limited to the
production and delivery of electric power and to the facilities which
are involved in this production and deliVery.
** Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in
Appendix D.
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in general and of the electric power industry in particular is
vividly reflected in 1953 plans, as announced in February 1953.
Communist China as a whole is scheduled to expand production of
electric power by 27 percent, and Manchuria, which already accounts
for 57 percent of the total production, is scheduled to expand its
production by 44 percent, thus concentrating 93 percent of the
expansion in Manchuria. The 1953 plans for Communist China were
cutback in May 1953 to call for an expansion of only 18.3 percent,
but it is believed that a major portion of the planned expansion will
be in Manchuria.
Another indication of the relative importance of the electric
power industry among the other industries in Manchuria is shown in
the proportion of the total investment that it represented in 1945.
The Japanese had a total investment in Manchuria of 11 billion yen,
of which 640 million yen represented the capitalization of the
Manchuria Electric Company, 2/ thus indicating that this utility
company represented about 5.2 percent of the total investment.
Inasmuch as the Manchuria Electric Company owned about 80 percent of
the total installed capacity*, the facilities for the production of
electric power represented about 7.3 percent of the total investment,
a rather significant proportion.
A preponderance of the mineral resources is to be found in a
single area in southern Manchuria. This area consists of the land
southwest of a line from Fou-hsin to An-tung: that is, the Kwangtung
Peninsula and the area northeast of this line as bounded by Fou-hsin --
Mukden (Shen-yang) -- Ch'ang-ch'un -- Kirin (Chi-lin) -- south to
the Yalu River (Ya'lu Chiang) -- An-tung. This area extends from
Port Arthur (Lu-shun) about 450 miles northeast to Kirin and from
An-tung about 200 miles northwest to Fou-hsin. Included herein is
three-fourths of all of China's known iTon ore and important supplies
of coal, Aluminum, copper, lead, zinc, oil shales, and other minerals
are also mined in the area. The availability of these minerals has
led to the presence of much heavy industry in the area and the
attendant development of other industries.
* Installed capacity is defined as the total of the manufacturer's
intended productive capacities of the equipment concerned. Installed
capacity also is known as rated capacity and nameplate capacity.
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The Fu-shun and Fou-hsin.mines are several times as large as any
other coal mines in Manchuria. The mines at Pei-feng and at Pen-chti
are also important producers. The steel works at An-shan, Pen-ch'il
and in the vicinity of these cities accounted for almost all of the
iron produced in Manchuria and a large portion of the semifinished
and finished steel products. The major cement plants are at An-shan
and vicinity, Dairen (Ta-lien), Fu-shun, and Pen-ch'i and together
account for almost all of the cement produced in Manchuria. By far
the largest concentration of textile plants is in the Mukden vicinity.
The major shale oil plant in Manchuria is at Fu-shun. An important
chemical plant producing ammonia, ammonium sulfate, ammonium nitrate,
nitric acid, and sulfuric acid is at Dairen, as is a soda ash plant.
There are important vegetable-oil-processing plants at Mukden and
Dairensand the largest sugar refinery in Manchuria is located at
Ch'ang-ch'un. Port Arthur provides an tnportant naval base, and
Dairen is quite important as a commercial port. Thus it can be seen
that the area contains a genuine concentration of diversified products.
The electric power industry was developed in order to service
these industries. The major hydroelectric plant at Sup'ung (Suiho)
Reservoir on the Yalu River is centrally located on the southern
border of'this region and is connected by the highest voltage trans-
mission lines in China (220 kilovolts -- kv) to An-shan and to
An-tung and Dairen. From the other large hydroelectric plant,
Ta-feng-man, just southeast of Kirin in the northern portion of the
area, 110-kv transmission lines run to Ch'ang-ch'un and Fu-shun and
from the latter place to Mukden and An-shan. It will be seen by
reference to the accompanying map* that the steam plants were
located at or near the concentrations of load caused chiefly by the
mining, metallurgical, and other heavy industries and that these
steam plants were augmented by the large hydroelectric plants
through a rather adequate transmission network.
This report is limited to a discussion of plants of 1,000 kilo-
watts (kw) and larger because almost all di' the smaller plants are
used as a source of illumination, not of industrial electric power,
and thus do not contribute directly ?to the industrial economy of the
area.
* See the map, Manchuria: Major Electric Power Facilities, inside
back cover.
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A. History. 3/
The development of the electric power industry, like the
development of other Manchurian industries, has been largely a matter
of foreign enterprise. The South Manchuria Railway Company, organ-
ized by the Japanese in 1906, had begun by 1907 to expand some of
the enterprises along its line, including an enlarged electric power
plant in Dairen. Other electric power plants were erected, including
those at Fu-shun, Mukden (Shen-yang), Ch'ang-ch'un, and Am-tung
during the next 4 years. Other new companies and plants were also
established at Harbin (1905), Lu-pin (1906), Kirin (Chi-lin) (1907),
Mukden (1909), and Ch'ang-ch'un (1911).
In 1926 the South Manchuria Electric Company was formed,
taking over most of the South Manchuria Railway Company's electrical
properties. It appears, however, that the South Manchuria Railway
Company retained control of several major electric power plants as
late as 1943. The South Manchuria Electric Company continued to
expand, especially through the construction of a medium-high-voltage
transmission network.
With the seizure of Manchuria in 1931 by the Japanese Kwantung
Army and the establishment of Manchukuo (Manchuria) as a separate
state, development of this area by Japan was expedited. In 1934 the
Manchuria Electric Company was formed at Ch'ang-ch'un with the inten-
tion of unifying the entire electric industry of the country. It took
over the properties of the South Manchuria Electric Company and by
1936 had, with these facilities and other local plants, an installed
capacity of 188,088 kw out of the Manchurian total of approximately
400,000 kw.
Before 1939, almost all generation has been in coal-fired steam
plants. In 1937 a survey was conducted indicating 60 hydroelectric
sites with a potential total maximum capacity of 6 million kw and an
total average available capacity of 3.2 million kw.* The state-owned
Hydroelectric Power Construction Bureau was separately organized to
* The maximum capacity of a hydroelectric site refers to the total
amount of equipment which might be installed in order to utilize the
flow of water during a given period, usually several months, of large
flow. The average available capacity refers to the potential utiliza-
tion of equipment over a period of an entire year as limited by the
varying flow of water.
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construct and operate plants at these sites. This bureau started
several projects, completingI only the smallest one, before it was
consolidated in April 1944 under the reorganized Manchuria Electric
Company.
By July 1945 the Manchuria Electric Company had an installed
capacity of 1,202,698 kw out of a total installed capacity of
1,732,338 kw in Manchuria, had 2,250 kilometers (km) of transmission
lines at 110 kv and up, and had generated in the previous year over
4 billion kilowatt-hours (kwh). It should be noted that even at
this time some of the large electric plants which were part of other
industrial installations, especially the large steel mills, were not
under the control of the Manchuria Electric Company.
Between the years 1941 and 1945, while engaged in a major war,
Japan managed to increase the total installed capacity in Manchuria
from about 900,000 kw to 1,786,000 kw, thus nearly doubling it. Table
1* gives some conception of the success of the Japanese in the use
of these facilities. It indicates that in a period of less than a
decade, the last 3 years of which were those of Japanese participation
in World War II, total production quadrupled. It is interesting to
note that as the cheaper hydroelectric power became available, pro-
duction of electric power at the steam plants of the Showa Steel
Works at An-shan and at the large coal mines at Fu-shun was
curtailed.
In August 1945, almost all Manchurian facilities were turned
over by the Japanese to the Soviet occupying force. Although the
shortage of repair parts for foreign equipment had caused some loss
in operable capacity** late in the war, the facilities were in good
condition.
In 1946 it was estimated that there was a total installed
capacity of 1,786,253 kw, including 300,000 kw for the hydroelectric
plant at Sup 'ung (Suiho) Reservoir on the Yalu River. 4/ The
operable capacity available from this total installed capacity was
estimated at 1,456,260 kw under normal conditions. 5/ It was also
* Table 1 follows on p. 7.
** Operable capacity is defined as the output of which the equipment
is capable as limited by the capacity of all the auxiliaries in-
volved and the age and state of maintenance of all the equipment.
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Table 1
Annual Production of Electric Power in Manchuria g
1935-44
Thousand Kilowatt-Hours
Year
Manchuria Electric Company
Industrial Installations
Total
Steam
Hydro 2/
Pu-shun
Electric Plant
Pen-chti
Coal and Iron Company
An-shan
Steel Works
Other
1935
463,865
408,720
41,429
76,093
88,753
1,078,860
1936
571,874
568,462
53,285
83,794
73,074
1,350,489
1937
663,663
687,936
59,359
71,552
141,430
1,623,940
1938
831,653
976,434
70,989
76,546
177,764
2,133,386
1939
990,311
1,168,616
80,778
112,776
182,000
2,534,481
1940
1,363,412
1,188,168
94,927
126,163
156,000
2,928,670
1941
1,706,056
171,378
1,165,046
131,552
219,144
126,623
3,519,799
1942
1,730,896
978,843
964,600
166,651
142,791
102,531
4,086,312
1943
1,927,700
1,843,639
12/
210,001
123,601
201,453
4,306,394
1944
1,596,075
2,454,119
b/
200,000
130,000
209,344
4,589,538
a. It is presumed that hydroelectric plants were not available as a major source of energy until 1941.
b. It is presumed that as the cheaper hydroelectric power became available in the area, the installed
capacity of this plant was not operated but was held in reserve.
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estimated that, of this installed capacity, the Soviet forces during
their occupation of the area from August 1945 to May 1946 removed
56 percent, or 1,008,300 kw, and also removed 385,000 kw of equip-
ment, which was in the process of being installed. 7/ The remaining
skeletal facilities, stripped of most of their comparatively modern
equipment, were taken over by the Chinese Nationalist government in
1946.
The Chinese Nationalist control of this area from 1946 to
1948 was always tenuous, with their forces quickly being closed into
the larger cities by the Chinese Communist forces which roamed the
countryside at will. The result was continuing damage to the trans-
mission network. Various groups, however, were commended for turning
over the, plants in good operating condition and complete with records
to the occupying Chinese Communists. This is an indication that little
major damage was done during this period, despite numerous Chinese
Nationalist reports to the contrary.
B. Organization and Administration.
Over-all responsibility for management of electric power
plants in Communist China is vested in the Ministry of Fuel Industry.
This Ministry is subordinated to higher Central Government organs,
and the entire governmental apparatus is controlled by the Chinese
Communist Party.
The Ministry of Fuel Industry is 1 of the 13 economic min-
istries established in October 1949. Minister Ch'en Yu, a Communist,
is assisted by three vice-ministers. The Ministry's Electricity
Control Bureau is the Chinese counterpart of a Soviet main administra-
tion and is responsible for the actual management of electric power
plants. The Ministry also has a Hydroelectric Engineering Office,
which may be concerned with hydroelectric power development. 8/
Between the Central Government organs and the electric
power enterprises are three principal units of territorial admin-
istration: the largest regions, such as the Northeast Adminis-
trative Region of Communist China, which for the purpose of this
report is considered as roughly equivalent to Manchuria; the provinces;
and the municipalities. Each of these has an administrative structure
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somewhat similar to that of the Central Government, with electrical
industry bureaus responsible for supervision of electric power plants
under their respective jurisdiction. Many of the larger municipali-
ties, including the seats of the six regional administrations, are
exempt from provincial control. 9/
C. Natural Resources.
Manchuria has both coal for steam plants and good sites for
hydroelectric plants. Coal is considered to be China's most valuable
natural resource. A recent estimate of Communist China's total coal
reserves is 273.114 billion metric tons, of which 11.281 billion
metric tins, or only 4 percent, are to be found in Manchuria. Con-
trasted with this, however, is the 1952 total production of 35 million
metric tons, of which 15 million metric tons, or about 43 percent, were
concentrated in Manchuria. It should be mentioned that Hopeh Province,
just southwest of Manchuria, produced an estimated 7 million metric
tons, or another 20 percent, thus localizing 63 percent of the coal
production in this same general area. 10/ Most of this coal is of a
type roughly comparable with US bituminous or soft coal.
The preceding figures show that an adequate supply of coal
Is in the ground and that the mining facilities are adequate to bring
it out. As evidence of the adequacy of this supply; note that no
expansion of the production of coal in 1953 over 1952 is planned.
There even have been several references critical of the coal industry
because of excess stocks accumulated in 1952 at some installations.
The present government has worked hard on the rehabilitation of the
railroads and has them in quite satisfactory condition to deliver
coal to the electric power plants. Therefore, it is concluded that
there is an adequate amount of coal available in Manchuria for any
expansion of the production of electric power.
China is well endowed with potential hydroelectric power.
Some estimates indicate a total potential installed capacity of about
150 million kw for the country. These same estimates assign a poten-
tial installed capacity of about 6.5 million kw to Manchuria. 11/
A survey of economically feasible sites in Manchuria tabulated 30
sites with a total potential installed capacity of about 4.5 million
kw. 12/ As of 1945, the Japanese had scheduled projects with a total
installed capacity of 3.666 million kw and an average available
capacity of 2.522 million kw. Of these, they had in operation 3
plants with an installed capacity of 0.916 million kw and an average
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available capacity of 0.876 million kw. In addition, they had under
construction 2 projects with a proposed installed capacity of
0.420 million kw and an average available capacity of 0.250 million
kw. 13/
It is evident from these figures that the Chinese can expand
their present total installed capacity of about 1 million kw in
Manchuria by at least 2 million kw average available capacity of
hydroelectric power when they find the capital for these major pro-
jects. Although the equipment costs for steam and hydroelectric
plants are roughly the same, the total cost of a hydroelectric project
may be several times that of a steam plant of the same capacity
because of the cost of the hydraulic structure (dams, canals, and
locks). It is also true that the construction of a hydroelectric
project involves a long period, up to 5 or 10 years, whereas a steam
plant may be completed in 2 to 3 years. These facts may lead the
Chinese to postpone any new hydroelectric projects for at least
several years.
II. Production and Transmission Facilities.
A. Production Facilities.
Appendix A shows that at the end of 1952 the total installed
capacity of plants over 1,000 kw was about 1,036,000 kw. Of this
total, the facilities included as public utility plants account for
86 percent, or 894,000 kw, leaving 14 percent, or 142,000 kw still
presumed to be managed as a part of individual industrial enterprises.
Only 3 hydroelectric projects of significant size exist:
the plant at Ching-po Hu (Lake) with an installed capacity of
36,000 kw; the plant at Ta-feng-man near Kirin (Chi-lin) with
143,000 kw; and the plant at Sup'ung (Suiho) Reservoir on the Yalu
River. The latter plant had an installed capacity of 600,000 kw at one
time but only sufficient transmission lines and transformers to trans-
mit about 200,000 kw to Manchuria, the remainder being intended for
North Korea and as general reserve. Therefore the installed capacity
available at Sup'ung for use in Manchuria is considered to be 200,000 kw,
and the total hydroelectric installed capacity of Manchuria is calcu-
lated to be 379,000 kw, or 37 percent of the total installed capacity.
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There is no record of large internal-combustion engines being
used to furnish electric power in this area. The electric power
produced comes almost exclusively from steam plants, the majority of
which are coal fired. These steam plants total 657,000 kw, or 63 per-
cent of the available installed capacity. Of these steam plants, pub-
lic utilities account for 78 percent, or 515,000 kw, leaving 22 percent,
or 142,000 kw, to other management.
Table 2* shows an accelerating increase in installed capacity
in Manchuria from 1952 through 1955. There are several good reasons for
this trend. China received a large loan from the USSR in 1950 which was
to be used for equipment for electric power stations among other things.
The average time lag between firm orders for major electric equipment
and their delivery in the Soviet Bloc is between 2 and 3 years. Thus
equipment ordered for new power plants in 1950, which was as soon as the
Chinese Communist Party had effective control of China, would be in pro-
cess of delivery in 1953. The most logical place to install this new
equipment would be in the already existing structures which had been
stripped of their equipment by the Russians in 1945, because in this
way the equipment could be operable in only about 1 year after delivery.
Admittedly, the Russians stripped some of the industrial facilities, but
they did not strip them to the extent that they stripped the electric
power production facilities. 14/ Furthermore, there had been a heavy de-
mand for electric power, as is shown by the fact that there was a suffi-
cient number of diverse industrial facilities to have required in 1944
a total production of 4,589,538,000 kwh, 15/ in spite of considerable ma-
terial shortages. Much of this demand for electric power had been cre-
ated by light industry, which the Chinese Communists could restore from
their own manufacturing resources. Thus it is reasonable to presume that
the first new large generating equipment received in Communist China would
be installed in Manchuria. This opinion is supported by a recent report
of a new 20,000-kw unit installed at Fou-hsin 16/ late in 1952. A report
in March 1953 refers to the "Number 170 Power Station, the largest in the
Northeast," recently completed through "the unparalleled friendship of
the Soviet Union, which not only supplied the station with machinery but
also sent a contingent of experts to help with installation" 17/ (no
information on the exact location of this plant is now available).
Another public statement to support the accelerated rate of ex-
pansion was that "in 1953, funds will be invested in the capital con-
struction of electric power enterprises surpassing those invested in
1952 by fourfold." 18/ Presuming that China's international relations do
not change drastically, it is entirely probable that an increasing amount
of electric power plant equipment will be furnished China by the Russians
and that much of this new equipment will be installed in Manchuria.
* P. 18, below.
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B. Transmission Facilities.
A tabulation prepared at Mukden (Shen-yang) in 1948 indicated
that the previous maximum total length of power lines in Manchuria had
existed in 1944, at which time there were at 44 kv and 66 kv a total
of 6,375 miles; at 110 kv, 219 miles; at 154 kv, 1,004 miles; and
at 220 kv, 561 miles. 19/ The Russians removed an unknown but con-
siderable amount of transformer and associated substation equipment
between August 1945 and May 1946. During the period of divided
control in Manchuria from 1946 through 1948 the transmission lines were
?made inoperable at locations where control changed from Nationalist
to Communist hands. Lines were still down in many places in 1950.
In 1950 the most economical way to increase the amount of
available electric power in Manchuria was to restore the transmission
network and thus to permit all equipment to be utilized to the maximum.
It is presumed that by 1952 all that portion of the transmission lines
connecting operable power plants had been restored. In this connection,
the fact that Communist China could supply most of the necessary wire,
insulators, and transformers is important. Some parts had to be
imported, but by and large the restoration of transmission lines could
be managed without use of foreign exchange.
The transmission network is the result of careful engineering
and permits the hydroelectric plants to supply the main load centers.
It also permits the large steam plants to complement one another and
the hydroelectric plants.
C. Utilization of Production and Transmission Facilities.
The production of electric power. in Manchuria in 1952 is
estimated to have been 3.9 billion kwh (see Table 2*). It is
reasonable to presume that here, as in other areas of the world, the
hydroelectric portion of the facilities averaged a somewhat higher
utilization than the steam. The major portion of the cost of oper-
ating a steam plant is the cost of fuel, and there is no comparable
expense in operating a hydroelectric plant. The cost of maintenance
and operating personnel for a hydroelectric plant is also lower. It
is therefore presumed that the hydroelectric facilities were exploited
to a greater degree, and it is estimated that, although comprising
only 37 percent of the total capacity, they produced 42 percent of the
* P. 18, below.
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total production, or 1.6 billion kwh. It follows that the steam
portion, 63 percent of the total capacity, produced only 58 percent
of the total production, or 2.3 billion kwh.
All estimates of electric power production include all station
losses, transmission and distribution losses, and other nonproductive
disposition of power regardless of the administrative control of the
facilities.
With regard to imports or exports* of electric power, no
significant amounts of electric power appear to have been interchanged,
and there is no evidence that facilities for any appreciable inter-
change of power between Manchuria and any other area are now available
or are planned for the immediate future.
It must be recognized that all the electricity generated cannot
be made available to the ultimate users. Some electric power may be
used to drive the auxiliaries in the generating plant itself. These
auxiliaries often include coal-handling, pulverizing, stoking, and
ash-removing equipment; forced- and induced-draft fans; and boiler feed
water, condensate, and cooling water pumps. This equipment may be
operated by steam or electricity. The present trend, however, is to
drive such equipment electrically. In addition to this use of
electric power in the generating plant, every piece of equipment --
every transformer, every voltage regulator, and every length of line --
has some resistance which converts a portion of the electricity
flowing through it to heat which is wasted to the atmosphere, thus
reducing the amount of electric power available at the end of the line.
In a normal system, electricity will go through at least 3 and often
5 and 6 transformers, each of which adds to the losses. The sum
total of these various decrements may range from 20 percent to 30
percent of the electricity generated. An estimate of these total
losses under Japanese operation placed them at 25 percent, and a
more accurate current figure is not availabl. Assuming that 25 percent
of the total 1952 production was accounted for by losses, 2.9 billion
kwh remained for consumption in Manchuria.
* The electric power from the plant at Sup'ung (Suiho) Reservoir
sometimes has been considered as imported. This plant is located
immediately on the Korean border, was built partially from
Manchurian funds, and the portion of the plant that supplies Man-
churia is treated in this report as an integral part of the Manchurian
system.
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III. Input Requirements.
The major input to the electric power industry in Manchuria is
coal. Specific coal consumption -- that is, kilograms of coal consumed
per kilowatt hour produced (kg/kwh) -- varies, depending on the quality
of the coal, the possible efficiency of the equipment, and the skill
of the operators. In the US, this specific consumption, fora com-
posite average of public utility plants, has decreased from 0.644
kg/kwh in 1937 to 0.517 kg/kwh in 1951. These figures are for
generally modern facilities and good grades of coal. Figures for Com-
munist China vary from 0.56 kg/kwh to 3 kg/kwh, 4 kg/kwh, and even
more for small obsolete plants. The government standard in 1950
was 1.37 kg/kwh. For the plants in Manchuria, the use of an
average of 1 kg/kwh for estimating is considered reasonable. Since
the estimated output of steam plants in 1952 was 2.3 million kwh, the
coal requirement would then be about 2.3 million metric tons, or about
one-seventh of the estimated total Manchurian production of 15 million
metric tons. 20/
Whereas the USSR has a real and compelling reason to use the
peats and lignites which are available near the large industrial
centers because the better grades of coal are available only at
considerable distances, Manchuria has comparatively good-quality
coal available in reasonable proximity to almost all the industrial
centers. The Chinese Communists, however, have attempted to emulate
the Russians in the use of low-grade fuels. The result has been that
plants in Manchuria have been experimenting with the burning of
fines and slack that formerly has been considered as waste at the
coal-processing plants. 21/ It was stated in July 1952 that in
Manchuria 70 percent of the electric power plants were using some
inferior-grade coal and 38 percent were using only low-grade coal
and that 4o to 50 percent of the cost of operation was the cost of
fuel, 22/ thus indicating that this use of low-grade fuel was an
attempt to reduce this cost of operation. It is possible that the
lower-grade fuels may be economically used in Manchuria where labor
is a very cheap commodity.
Because of the planned expansion of the electric power industry,
equipment for new facilities Will be a major requirement. Such equip-
ment will be almost entirely a matter of imports.
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There is another class of requirements, that of repair and
replacement parts, which is most important in Manchuria, where almost
all the equipment now in use was manufactured in countries which no
longer maintain normal trade relationships with Communist China. In
all mechanical equipment there are parts which require periodic re-
placement. In an automobile these include tires, oil filter
cartridges, and, less frequently, piston rings and bearing inserts.
In an electric power plant there are many more parts which require
periodic replacement, and, just as is the case with automobile tires,
the frequency of replacement depends on the quality of the original
part, the time it has been in use, and the care which was exercised in
using it. The main equipment in an electric power plant is usually
capable of long service without any major replacement of parts, but the
auxiliaries are not so durable. Stoker parts and other parts of fuel-
and ash-handling equipment require rather frequent replacement.
Boiler tubes are an almost continuing requirement, very much dependent
on the care in treating the boiler feed water, the impurities in the
fuel fired, and the care in operation of the boiler. Bearing
inserts and packing seals for all equipment wear out and require
periodic replacement, and such parts as the turbine blades also must
be replaced from time to time. Thus any new electric power plant is
routinely stocked with quite a store of spare parts, and the require-
ment for replacement parts continues, increasing from year to year
throughout the life of the equipment. Since China's domestic capa-
bility to produce many of these parts is severely limited, a continu-
ing import of a wide range of replacement parts is essential to the
satisfactory operation of the electric power facilities.
The requirement for these replacement parts in Manchuria
at present is undoubtedly much higher than it is in the US because
replacements were almost totally unavailable during World War II and
the period which followed and because failure to replace one part as it
became worn very much accelerated the wear on the other parts. It is
probable that this requirement for replacement parts has been and
will be met largely by imports from the USSR and the European
Satellites.
The electric power industry requires transportation of fuel
from the mine to the plant. In Manchuria this transportation has been
almost exclusively by rail, and most of the plants are within a max-
imum distance of 300 miles from operating coal mines. As mentioned,
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the input requirement for coal was about 2 million metric tons, not
all of which had to be moved by rail, since some large plants are
located immediately adjacent to the mines. Rail transportation does
not appear to be a limiting factor.
The manpower required to operate the electric power facilities
is a factor which varies considerably with the mechanization of the
fuel- and ash-handling equipment. In the US the number, of power
plant employees per 1,000 kw of installed capacity varies from 1 to
2 in steam plants and from 1/3 to 1/2 in hydroelectric plants. A
Manchurian steam plant with a capacity of 8,400 kw had 80 workers and
L. technicians, or about 12 employees per 1,000 kw. Another, with
22,500 kw installed) had 100 workers and 5 technicians, or about
5 employees per 1,000 kw. It is not known what, if any, portion of
the total number of employees in jobs other than those in the actual
power stations are included in these Manchurian estimates. Such
employees as those concerned with the servicing of transmission ana
distribution facilities, those involved in management, and those in-
volved in commercial activities may or may not have been included.
No valid data exist to estimate the total labor requirement, but
it is certainly not a significant fraction of the Manchurian labor
force.
The need for personnel to act as technical supervisors creates
another manpower requirement. The electric power plants were in-
stalled and operated mainly by the Japanese, who used local labor. Many
of these Japanese stayed on after the war, and it appears that the
last significant fraction of them was in the process of repatriation
during the spring of 1953. The Russian emigres after World War I and
their descendents, so-called White Russians, had provided much of the
supervisory personnel. Now the Chinese Communist administration is
returning the last of the Japanese and discharging the last of the
White Russians, presumably because of domestic security considerations.
There is available to the present government a small body of natives
with a technical education received abroad, but they, too, are largely
suspect. The present government, being aware of the shortage of
technicians, has been registering all those with technical education
and ability and reassigning them so as to make maximum use of their
ability. It also has shortened the course of instruction in most of
the engineering schools to expedite the availability of technical
personnel and has opened schools giving both full-time and part-time
technical instruction. For example, at Fu-shun, technical schools
and classes for 1,700 full-time and over 4,500 part-time students
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were recently opened, and electrical engineering is mentioned first
among the courses offered. 23/ It is probable that for at least the
immediate future adequate technical supervision will be a real problem
in the Manchurian electric power industry.
IV. Capacity and Production Estimates.
,As used in this report, in broad definition, capacity measures the
size or extent of facilities available for the making of electric
power, and production indicates the output from these facilities.
Table 2* presents estimates of capacity and production in Manchuria
from 1949, the first full year under complete Communist control, pro-
jected through 1957. In the course of research, only a very few defin-
itive figures were found which could be reasonably supported, and they
have been used with some qualification in constructing the table. Such
figures apply in the period 1949-53. The figures for the succeeding
years through 1957 were reached by making certain assumptions regard-
ing new equipment to be added and the utilization of the total
installed capacity. It is recognized that this method, coupled with
the questionable reliability of the few definitive figures and a
total lack of announced Five Year Plan figures to 1957, may lead to
a rather wide range of error.
The values presented for 1952 are believed to be reasonably
accurate: that is, within a range of error of plus or minus 10 per-
cent. Because of the tenuous information, however, on which they are
founded, the values for 1957 and the interim years are less reliable.
The installed capacity in 1957 may be as much as 0.5 million kw above
or below the stated figure of 2.35 million kw. Production, however,
in 1957 may be as much as 3.0 billion kwh above or below the stated
figure of 10.5 billion kwh. The somewhat greater range for pro-
duction results from a lack of information on the probable improvement
in the rate of utilization of capacity.
V. Consumption.
The consumption of electric power in Manchuria has continually
increased during the last 20 years with the exception of the years
1945-46, when the Russians removed electric generating equipment and
other industrial equipment. Although a general increase in consumption
* Table 2 follows on p. 18.
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Table 2 a/
Capacity and Production of Electric Power in Manchuria
1949-57
Year
Installed Capacity
(Million Kilowatts)
1949
1950
0.90 12/
0.92 25/
1951
?.99V
1952
1.12 17
1953
1.35 EV
1954
1.60 E/
1955
1.85 II/
1956
2.10 h/
1957
2.35 EV
Production
(Billion Kilowatt-Hours)
1.4 24/
2.0 7
2.7 "g/
3.9 -g/
5.1 if
6.4 -3/
7.7 7/
9.1 7.1y
10.5 .3y
a. Tabulated figures have been rounded to the nearest tenth and
hundredth.
b. Extrapolated.
c. Manchurian output during the first half of 1950 was 954 million
kwh 26/; the 1950 Plan was 2 billion kwh 2://; the production in 1950
overfulfilled the production target. 2.?./
d. Interpolated.
e. The 1951 production was 134.1 percent of that of 1950. 29/
f. This figure includes the 1,036,060 kw of installed capacity
tabulated in this report (see Appendix A), plus an allowance for
plants of less than 1,000-kw installed capacity and a larger allow-
ance for recently completed and unreported plants.
g. The output in 1952 will be near the highest prewar levels 30/;
electric power production in Manchuria in 1952 exceeded 1951 output
by 45 percent. 31/
h. Capacity figures for 1953 and subsequent years have been arrived
at by arbitrarily estimating 225,000 kw to be added to the installed
capacity in 1953 and 250,000 kw to be added each year from 1954 to
1957. The basis for these estimated increments is presented in the
section on expansibility.*
* See VI, p. 24, below.
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Table 2
(Continued
i. In February 1953, announcement was made that for the whole of
Communist China during 1953, electric power production was planned to
be 27 percent greater than in 1952. 32/ At about the same time, it
was announced that the increase in production in Manchuria alone for
1953 over 1952 was to be 44 percent. 33/ In early May 1953 a dif-
ferent National Plan was announced,which called for an increase in
1953 over 1952 of only 18.3 percent j rather than the 27 percent
as noted previously. Because the electric power produced in Manchuria
in 1952 was more than half the total production of the country, it is
obvious that the 1953 planned production in Manchuria has also been
revised downwardIsince an increase in this area of 44 percent would
be more than the total planned national increase. No new information
on planned increase in Manchuria, however, has become available. It
is estimated that the Manchurian Plan will be reduced in the same
proportion as the National Plan. Thus the planned increase for
Manchuria is estimated to be 29.8 percent.
j. The methodology used in arriving at the production figures for
1954-57 is explained in Appendix B.
of electric power has been world-wide, it is surprising that this
increase has occurred in Manchuria, an area continually under strife.
First, the Japanese seized the area from China and set up a puppet
state. Then, as a Japanese-occupied territory, Manchuria was a
target of air attacks during World War II. Following World War II,
the Russians occupied the area for several years before withdrawing,
leaving the Chinese Nationalists and Communists to fight among
themselves. It is a safe presumption that, with the emphasis on
heavy industry in future plans, the use of electricapower by this
sector of the economy will continue to increase and represent an
important portion of the total consumption. It does not appear
likely that for some time to come the electric power facilities will
expand at a rate which would permit relaxation of present restrictions
on use. In the future, just as in 1952, the supply of electric
power to all but the most essential users probably will be curtailed.
No recent information is available on the breakdown of the use
of electric power between the various classes of consumers. Tables
3* and 4*, however, reflect the use pattern for 1944. No attempt has
* Table 3 follows on p. 20; Table 4, on p. 21.
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Table 3 35.1
Contracted Capacity and Sales of Electric Power in Manchuria
1944
Contracted a/
Capacity
Total Sales
Type of Consumption
(Kilowatts)
(Kilowatt-Hours)
Electric Lighting (6,873,892 Lights)
354,312,144
Electric Heating
85,741
48,239,469
Industries Using Electric Power
Spinning
38,334
64,526,538
Flour Milling
23,965
24,590,452
Machine Tool
96,962
123,469,233
Chemical
105,950
295,558,989
Mining
214,339
833,402,272
Metallic
213,031
941,596,733
Ceramic
44,756
104,360,625
Agriculture, Forestry, and Marine
Products
7,935
15,442,861
Printing and Publishing
5,051
2,517,046
Food Processing
57,678
50,391,323
Lumber and Woodworking
35,887
21,407,057
Electric Installation12/
18,760
43,923,857
Other
75,973
229,188,380
Total
15024,362
3,152,926,979
a. Contracted capacity is the maximum demand estimated by an indus-
trial establishment when it makes its contract with the electric power
plant.
b. This term is presumed to refer to the manufacture of electrical
equipment.
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Table 4 36/
Consumption of Electric Power
1944
in Manchuria
Million Kilowatt-Hours
Industrial Use
Industry
Coal Mining
Aluminum Refinery
Magnesium Refinery
Iron and Steel Manufacturing
Special Steel Manufacturing
Fuel Liquefaction
Nitrogen
Carbide
Soda
Miscellaneous
Total
Location
Fu-shun, Fou-hsin,
Pei-feng, Pei-pliao,
Chiao-ho, etc.
Fu-shun
Ying-k'ou
An-shan a/
Pen-ch'f-(Pen-chi-hu)
T'ung-hua
Chin-chou
Dairen (Ta-lien)
Fu-shun
Fu-shun
Ssu-p'ing-chieh
Dairen (Ta-lien)
Kirin (Chi-lin)
Dairen (Ta-lien)
K'ai-yuan
Mukder'l (Shen-yang)
Amount
600
48o
36
170
120
18
2
16
88
30
16
116
35
13
lo
14
350
2 114
a. The consumption of 320 million kwh in normal times has been re-
duced to 170 million kwh because of bombing damage.
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Table 4
(Continued)
Million Kilowatt-Hours
Industrial Use
Domestic Use
Electric Lighting (6,870,000 Lights)
Electric Heating
Total
Commercial Use
Total
Grand Total
Location Amount
358
43
4-01
684
3,199
been made to reconcile these tables, because many of the categories
are ambiguous and it is not known on what basis the figures were
compiled. They are, however, in quite close agreement as to the
total use of electric power and as to the amount for lighting and
heating. In both tables it appears that the industrial categories
accounted for about two-thirds of the total, a proportion which
approximates that found in nations having preponderantly industrial
economies.
It is believed that these tables for 1944 approximately represent
the conditions in 1952. This belief is rationalized as follows:
Peiping announced in September 1952 37/ that the total industrial out-
put of Manchuria would in 1952 amount to 10 percent above the 1943 out-
put, which was said to be the prewar. maximum. It was stated that in
Manchuria the production of steel, machinery, electrical appliances,
chemical products, textiles, rubber, paper, and glass would exceed
the highest levels of prewar years and that the production of coal,
iron, and electric power would be near the highest prewar totals.
Thus because the total industrial output appears roughly equal to
the maximum prewar output, and' with this apparent equivalence extended
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to the various components, it may be presumed that the electric power
furnished the various industries in 1952 was about the same as in
1944.* If this reasoning is accepted, it leads to the conclusion
that electric power for nonindustrial uses must have been sharply
curtailed in 1952 because the total amount sold to all consumers in
1952 is estimated to have been 0.3** billion kwh less than in 1944.
The validity of this conclusion is supported by the various published
regulations restricting uses, which are discussed subsequently in
this report.
Another indication of consumption is seen in the data on per
capita production of electric power in Manchuria which in 1952 was
about 91 kwh, based on an estimated population of 43 million. This
is to be compared with the following 1951 per capita production
figures: Egypt, 60 kwh; Spain, 255 kwh; USSR, 475 kwh; Australia,
1,619 kwh; US, 2,850 kwh; and the world average, 438 kwh. 38/
The Chinese Communist government in general and the administration
of Manchuria to an even greater degree have been using every known
device to increase the utilization of existing facilities: that is,
to get more production per year out of the installed capacity. One
statement, published in the spring of 1952, on the techniques intended
to achieve this aim contained the following seven regulations 39/:
1. All two-shift factories which consume electric power are
requested to reschedule production so that the shift from 6:00 p.m. to
12:00 p.m. is changed to 12:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., when the demand
for electric power during the former period is high.
2. In factories which consume electric power, the equipment which
does not have to be operated continuously should be stopped from
5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., the period of peak consumption.
3. One-shift factories are requested to schedule production
earlier in the day to avoid working in the evening, when electric
power is most needed for lighting purposes.
4. Because private factories have very little equipment which
must be operated continuously, their electric power supply is cut
off during the period of peak load, 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
* According to all available information there was very little
change in industrial production from 1943 to 1944.
** Production in 1952 as shown in Table 2 was 3.9 billion kwhiless
25 percent losses. Thus a total of 2.9 billion kwh was sold ?in 1952,
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5. Factories with three shifts working day and night continuously
are requested to rearrange schedules so that the part of the pro-
duction process which consumes the least electric power occurs between
5:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m.
6. Static condensers are installed to improve the transmission
system and to stabilize the electric power transmitted.
7. Electric equipment at factories is to be inspected and re-
paired to increase efficiency and to reduce waste.
In July 1952 the same restrictions were republished in somewhat
different form. 40 Another effort to increase the electric power
available to industry is seen in the restrictions on domestic use. No
bulbs bigger than 25 watts are permitted, only 1 bulb to a room is
allowed, and no electric appliances may be used. It is obvious that the
cumulative effect of these measures is to spread the load more evenly
through the 24 hours of the day and the 7 days of the week. It was
further stated in July of 1952 that these measures during the pre-
vious winter had prevented the need for installing 30,000 kw of new
capacity. From this small saving it may be concluded that the regu-
lations had not been stringently enforced and that a determined effort
to tighten the enforcement of these restrictions may well permit much
of the gain in the planned 1953 output to Come from the existing
facilities in Manchuria.
VI. Expansibility.
The Chinese Communists are now short of electric power, but they
intend to expand their power production facilities. This subject
oS expansibility is presented :for Communist China as a whole rather
than with reference only to Manchuria because, without detailed in-
formation of the present government's ihtentions, it is not possible
to segregate from total plans and capabilities the portion which will
be assigned to Manchuria, although it apparently will be a major
portion.
To place primary emphasis on the building of an adequate supply
of electric power as a prerequisite to the building of the Communist
industrial economy in general is in accordance with Lenin's writings.
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The Soviet emphasis on electric power in the early Five Year Plans
further emphasizes to the Chinese planners the primacy of this sector
among the other sectors of their planned economy. As early as 22
July to 9 August 1950, the Ministry of Fuel Industry conducted in
Peiping a national hydraulic engineering conference to discuss and
develop a Five Year Plan for hydroelectric power development through-
out the whole of China. 41/ In the report on the State budget for
1953 at Peiping on 16 February 1953, Finance Minister Po I-po states
that 9 steam plants will be built and that 3 hydroelectric and 12
steam plants will be expanded. He further stated that electric
power production will be expanded by 27 percent in 1953 over 1952
and that 20 percent of this expansion will come from the increased
use of the present facilities, thus implying that sufficient new
installed capacity will be available in 1953 to produce 7 percent of
the power produced in 1952. 42/ The goal for 1953 was cut back in
May 1953 to 18.3 percent, and it is probably intended to achieve much
of it through increased utilization of existing facilities.
The Chinese Communists have limited facilities available for the
manufacture of equipment for electric power plants. It has been
estimated that they can manufacture over 50,000 kw in a year but
that they must import certain essential parts and auxiliary equip-
ment required for the installation of even this limited capacity. 43/
With an installed capacity of about 2 million kw in Communist China,
it is obvious that the addition of 50,000 kw will not increase
production appreciably. This leads to the conclusion that an
appreciable import of generating equipment is necessary to permit
fulfillment of the plan.
Since the Chinese Communists took over the country, they have
imported boiler tubes in quantities amounting to hundreds of tons a
year. They also have imported other parts essential to the rehabili-
tation of the facilities over which they took control. This is in
accord with the practice in the Soviet Bloc, of repairing and re-
building an item, even though it might be cheaper to replace it.
Frequent references have appeared in the Chinese Communist press
citing groups for their achievement in reconditioning equipment which
has been inoperative for years. The much smaller requirement for
machine tools in the rebuilding of electric power equipment as
compared with the requirement for the initial manufacturing of the
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same pieces of equipment is important. The initial fabrication of a
large turbine and generator calls for very large lathes, boring
mills, and like equipment which are available in only a few places
even in the US. This electric power equipment, however, can fre-
quently be totally rebuilt and reinsulated, thus restoring it to its
original capacity or better, without removal from the building in
which it is installed and with no machinery requirement other than an
adequate crane and adequate hand tools. It may be presumed that
after 3 to 4 years of concentrated effort, most of the electric power
equipment was operable at or near capacity by the end of 1952.
It is doubtful that in the immediate future many plants will be
erected at new locations in Manchuria. There still remain the struc-
tures erected for about 700,000 kw of hydroelectric and 700,000 kw of
steam equipment, a total of 1.4 million kw, of which 0.4 million kw
was in process of erection in August 1945. In the same year the Russians
removed equipment from the structures on these locations which had been
tied into the transmission network. Because there is real emphasis on
speed and economy in this effort to expand the production of electric
power, it is logical that this equipment will be replaced before any
number of new plants requiring new buildings, new roads and railroads,
and additional transmission and distribution facilities are started.
There has been a considerable emphasis on the application of
Soviet methods of maintenance in order to increase the availability
of equipment. There have been many commendations in the Chinese
Communist press citing teams for performing overhauls in a small
fraction of the time formerly required. This may, in part, represent
increased efficiency, or it is more probable that it represents a
less complete job. It is certain from the amounts of time cited
that in some cases they are not doing irhat would be called a thorough
job by US standards. Such maintenance will eventually lead to ad-
ditional breakdowns.
Plant efficiencies in terms of kilograms of coal per kilowatt-
hour of output have received considerable attention, but, although an
improvement in efficiency may reduce the requirements for railroad
transportation and fuel, it will not increase importantly the total
output of electric power. Work on the Improvement of the trans-
mission and distribution system has been continuing, however, and the
amount of power available to customers undoubtedly has increased.
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The principal deterrent to expansion of the electric power industry
is the difficulty of procuring the equipment required. This equipment
is not plentiful anywhere, and most of the members of the Soviet Bloc
can, themselves, use more than they can produce. This means that
even though Communist China may have the foreign exchange, it can
procure equipment for major electric power stations only in accordance
with whatever priority is granted by the Russians.
In summation, more than ample good coal is available in Manchuria
as are numerous satisfactory hydroelectric sites. A large portion of
the equipment required for any new plants must be imported, and the
willingness of other nations to furnish it is a controlling factor.
Little can be gained from additional work on present generating facil-
ities, but continuing work on the transmission and distribution system
will increase the power available to various customers.
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APPENDIX A
TABULATION OF ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS IN MANCHURIA
All plants of 1,000 kw capacity and larger believed to exist in
Manchuria at the end of 1952 are listed in Table 5.* Only plants
whose existence has been reasonably confirmed have been included,
and the intention has been to preclude any duplication of listings
because of varying names and dates of information.
The locations of plants listed in Table 5 are cross-referenced
to the accompanying map, Manchuria: Major Electric Power Facilities)**
through serial numbers, geographic coordinates, and place names.
The serial numbers are assigned by letter (indicating province) and
by number (serially assigned within individual provinces). The geo-
graphic locations are indicated either by approved Board of Geographic
Names (BGN) or by approved conventional names. The column entitled
Plant Name or Alternate Name includes specific plant or locality
names that have appeared in the majority of sources used for this
study. The current usage of the listed titles is uncertain. The
coordinates in Table 5 are, in most cases, those of the locality as
given by BGN in the Preliminary NIS Gazetteer. The capacity figure
tabulated is the total installed capacity of the generating equipment
in the plant. The source given is the most complete and authoritative,
although not necessarily the latest source used in the preparation
of the table. The year of information is as given in the cited
source. All plants have been indicated as either public utility
plants or captive industrial plants, although it is quite possible
that some of the plants indicated as captive industrial plants
are now operated as public utility plants. All plants in this
tabulation are steam plants except for three which have been indi-
cated as hydroelectric.
* Table 5 follows on p. 31.
** Inside back cover.
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? ? ?
The Industrial Register (IR) number is the number under which
information relative to the installation is filed by the Industrial
Register of CIA.
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Table 5
Electric Power Plants in Manchuria
25X1A2g
Province
Serial
Number
Place Name
Plant or Alternate
Name
Coordinates
Antung
A 1
An-tung
Manchuria Electric
40?06'N-124?22'E
Company (NEC), South
Manchurian Railway
Company
A 2
An-tung
An-tung Cement Company
40?08N-124?24'E
A3
Sup'ung (Suiho) Reser-
voir (Hydroelectric)
Sup'ung-dong Plpnt,
Shui-feng Plant,
Sulho Plant
40?30,N-125?05 ,E
A 4
Tiieh-chlang-tzu
NEC Plant
41?40,N-126?12E
A 5
Erh-tao-kou
Eth-tao-chiang Plant,
NEC Plant
41?44,N-126?02,E
Heilungkiang
B 1
Pei-an
NEC Plant
48?16,N-126?36'H
B 2
Sun-wu
NEC Plant, Sun-vu New
49?25,N-127?22'E
Plant
B 3
Sun-vu
NEC Plant, Sun-vu Old
1:9?25'N-127?22'E
Plant
Hokiang
C 1
Chia-mu-ssu
NEC Plant
46?50,N-130?21,E
C 2
Ch'ien-chen
MEG Plant
46?15,N-130034,E
Installed
Capacity
(kw)
22,0001212/
5,800115/
1,000 142/
55,000 _2/
3,900 21/
4,500 22/
2,100 2L/
22,500 2Y
3,300 22/
Year
of
Information
PU a/
or
CIP
Industrial
Register
Number
1945
PU
8017705
. 1946
CIP
9062452
1950
PU
9063586
1945
PU
8017648
1952
PU
9066174
1946
PU
8017498
1946
PU
1945
PU
8017824
1948
PU
8017624 ?
1945
FU
8017626
Remarks
Possibly all equipment re-
moved by the Russians in
1945-46.
Originally installed: six
100,000-kw generators (two
60-cycle, two 50/60-cycle,
two 50-cycle). Two 50-cycle
generators removed by the
Russians in 1945-46. Less
than 200,000 kilovolt-
amperes (kva) can be trans-
mitted to Manchuria.
One 1,000-kw generator. 48/
Two 15,000-kw generators, 50/
one 25,000-kw generator.
One 4,500-kw generator. 53/
One 500-kw generator, 55/
two 800-kw generators.
Supplies': C'obal mines, Hao-
kang, I-lan, Chia-mu-ssu,
and T'ang-yuan. .22/ One
hundred workers including
five technicians. ,51/
Two 1,500-kw generators, 60/
One 300-kw generator.
a. Public utility (PU) or captive industrial plant (CIP).
b. World aeronautical chart (WAC).
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Table 5
(Continued)
25X1A2g
Province
Serial
Number
Place Name
Plant or Alternate
Name
Coordinates
Installed
Capacity
(kw)
Year
of
Information
PU a/
Or
CIP
Industrial
Register
Number
Hokiang
C 3
Chi-hsi
Chi-ning Plant, NEC
45?18'N-130?58'E
30,000 ?1/
1946
PU
8017665
(Continued)
c4
Hao-kang (Railroad
Plant
Station)
NEC Plant
47?21'N-130016'E
7,300 L/
1945
PU
8017617
C 5
Ti-tao-sham
NEC Plant, Titao Plant
45?22'N-130?48'E
5,880 .,2/
1946
PU
8017717
Hsingan
D 1
Cha-lai-no-erh
NEC Plant, Coal Nine
49?27'N-117?42'E
5,850 ?://
1946
PU
8017591
Power Plant
D 2
Hailar (Hai-la-erh)
NEC Plant
49?12'N-119?42'E
3,640 12/
1945
PU
D 3
Lu-pin
Nanchouli Plant
49?36'N-117?26'E
1,000 /1/
1946
PU
D 4
Ya -1u
Cha-lan-tun Plant,
MEC Plant
48000'N-122?43'E
2,800 12/
1948
FU
8017575.
Kirin
El
Ch'ang-ch'un
NEC Plant
43?55'N-125?21'E
37,000 ill/
1947
PU
8015131
E2
E3
Chiao-ho
Kirin (Chi-lin)
NEC Plant
Ta-t'ang Cement
4322'N-127?19'E
43 51'N-126?33E
10,;40 2;(
8,240 z_/
1945
1945
PU
CIP
8017727.
8017593
Company
E 4
Ta-feng-man
Ta-feng-man, Kirin
43?43'N-126?41'E
143,000 II/
1946
PU
9063434
(BYdroelectric)
Hydroelectric Plant,
NEC Plant, Yungchi
Plant, Haisofengman
Plant, Sangari Plant No.
2
Remark
Two 15,000-kw 50-cycle
generators. ?2/
Three 1,500-kw generators, 64/
one 2,800-kw generator.
One 880-kw generator,
one 5,000-kw generator.
One 3,600-kw generator, f?/
one 1,250-kw generator,
one 1,000-kw generator.
Interconnected with plant at
Lu-pin, probably at 3,300
volts (v).
Supplies only ocal area.
Supplies the town of 200 12/
and oil pumps and electric
cranes at railroad transfer
point (change of gauge).
Uses Fu-shun and Pei-feng coal.
Possibly all equipment removed
by the Russians in 1945-46.
Transmission lines to Ch'ang-
ch'un, 113 km of line at 154
kv using aluminum cable steel
reinforced (ACSR) 37/2.9-mil-
limeter (td) wire; Harbin,
265 km, 154 kv, ACSR 37/2.9-
mm wire; Kirin, 27.7 km, 44 kv,
hard-drawn copper 7/2.6-mm
wire; Fu-shun, 350 km, 220 kv,
ACSR 61/2.9-mm wire. 78/
a. Public utility (PU) or captive industrial plant (CIPT7
b. World aeronautical chart (VAC).
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Table 5
(Continued)
Province
Serial
Number
Place Name
Plant or Alternate
Name
Coordinates
Installed
Capacity
(kw)
Year
of
Information
PU 2/ Industrial
or Register
CIF Number
Kirin
(Continued)
E 5
Tun-hua
Nickimsn Pulp Company,
43?21tN-128?131E
1,000 22/
1946
CIP
8017673
Tunhua Pulp Fabtogy,
Japan-Manchukuo Pulp
Manufacturing Company,
CCF Arsenal
Liaoning
F 1
An-sham
Anshan Steel Works,
Showa Steel Company
41?07tN-122?57'E
32,500 g9/
1947
CIP
8017891
F 2
Chin-chou
Manchu Asano Cement
4207,N-121?o6,E
6,000
1946
CIP
Company, Chin-hsien
Cement Works
F 3
Chin-chou
Synthetic Fuels
41007'N-121?06'E
5,000 gy
1946
CIP
Company, Synthetic
Oil Refinery, Chin-
hsien Refinery
F 4
Lien-sham (Chin-
hsi)
Army Fuel Depot
40?54N-120?36'E
15,000 Li/
1945
CIP
9062461
F 5
Lien-sham (Chin-
hsi)
Manchuria Asano
Cement Company
4o?54T-12o?36 , E
1800 L/
,
1946
CIP
F 6
Fu-shun
Fu-shun Electric Plant,
MEC Plant, Taikanton
41?51'N-123?50E
95,000 gg
MT
8017402
Plant (two adjacent
but separate plants)
Remarks
Equipment presumed to be two
10,000-kw 25-cycle generators, one
12,500-kw 50-cycle generator, two
18,000-kw generators, two 25,000-
generators. Two 18,000-kw and two
25,000-kw generators removed by
the Russians in 1945-46. Supplies
oUy the steel plant. Power of
25 cycles is probably for the
electric railroad to mines.
One 5,000-kw generator and three
30-tons-per-hour boilers.
One 15,000-kw generator. gLV
Two 25,000-kw generators, 87/
two 12,500-kw generators.
Other generators totaling
20,000 kw. Four 18-
tons-per-hour boilers, seven
50-tons-per-hour boilers,
two 100-tons-per-hour boilers.
a. Public utility (PU) or captive industrial plant (CIP).
b. World aeronautical chart (wAC).
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Table 5
(Continued)
Province
Serial
NUMber
Place Name
Plant or Alternate
Name
Coordinates
Installed
Capacity
(kw)
Year
of
information
PU 1/
or
CI?
Industrial
Register
Number
Liaoning
F 7
Liao-yang
Manchuria Cement
41017'N-123?11'E
4,400 88/
1946
Cap
8017596
(Continued)
Company, Manchu Iwaki
Cement Company
F 8
Penchi
Manchu Iron Works No.
41?20'N-123?45'E
28,500 21/
1946
CT?
8015170
2, Pen-chi-hu Coal
and Iron Works No. 2
F 9
Pen -ch'i
Pen-ch'i-hu Plant,
Manchu Iron Works No.
41019'N-123?46'E
7,000 92/
1946
CI?
8015453
1, Pen-ch'i-hu Coal
and Iron Company
Plant No. 1.
F10
T'ien-shih-fu
NEC Plant
41017'N-124?22'E
3,000 22/
1946
Pu
F 11
Mukden (Shen-yang)
Mukden Arsenal
41048'N-123?29'E
10,000 22/
1946
CI?
8017562
F12
Mukden (Shen-yang)
Mukden Cotton NI11,
Mukden Cotton
41?48'N-123?27'E
1,250 9Y
1946
CIP
8017560
Spinning Company
F 13
Ying-k'ou
Yingkou Spinning
40?40'N-122?17'E
1,000 9/
1946
Cu
8017669
Company
Liaopeh
G 1
Mu-shih
NEC Plant
43?48'1.1-123?31'E
3,00692/
1946
PU
G 2
Pei-feng
Hai-an Plant, NEC
42?55 'N-125?09 E
30,000 22/
1946
PU
8017439
Plant
G 3
T'ao-an
NEC Plant, Pal-ch'eng-
tzu Plant
45?37'N-122?49 :E
1,500 122/
1945
PU
8017630
a. Public utility (PU) or captive industrial plant (CII').
b. World aeronautical chart (WAC).
Remarks
Two 2,200-kw generators. 89/
Supplies cement plant and
Fang-man Hemp Textile
Company. 90/
One 1,500-kw generator,
one 2,500-kw generator,
one 3,000-kw generator,
two 4,000-kw generators,
two 14,000-kw generators,
two 20,000-kw generators
(the two largest units and
several smaller ones re-
moved by the Russians,
leaving an operable capac-
ity as shown)
One 1,500-kw generator,
one 2,500-kw generator,
one 3,000-kw generator.
Two 1,500-kw generators.94/
Two 1,500-kw generators.
Supplies Mu-shih and
Pang-ch'ui-kou.
Two 15,000-kw generators.
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Table 5
(Continued)
Serial
Plant or Alternate
Installed
Capacity
Year
of
PU a/
or
Industrial
Register
Province
Number
Place Name
Name
Coordinates
(kw)
Information
CIP
Number
Liaopeh
G4
T'ung-liao
NEC Plant, Payintala
43?37'N-123?16'E
2,100 121/
1946
PU
8017702
(Continued)
Nunkiang
111
Ch'i-ch'i-ha-erh
Tsitsihar plant, Lung-
chiang Plant, NEC
47?221N-123?571E
8,400 103/
1947
PU
8017507
Plant
SunGkiang
31
Harbin (Ha-erh-pin)
NEC Plant at Pinchiang,
Na-chia-kou Plant
45?45'N-126?39'E
38,000 122/1946
PU
8017819
32
Hai-lin
Manchu Pulp Company
44?351N-129?25'E
3,000 107/
1946
CIP
8017522
33
Hun-ch' un
NEC Plant
420521N-130021'E
5,600 12L/
1946
PU
9062445
34
K'ai-shan-t'un
Taman Pulp Company,
Kaishantung Plant
420431N-129?431E
1,800 112/
1946
CEP
8017598
35
Lung-ching-ts'un
Lrng-ching Plant,
NEC Plant
42?46,N-129?24'E
11,000 111/
1946
Pu
8017090
j6
MU -tan-chiang
NEC Plant
44035,N_129036,E
13,320 113/
1945
PU
8017495
37
Shis-hsien
Oriental Pulp Company
43?051N-129?471E
2,700 lliV
1946
CIP
8017554
J 8
Sui-fen-ho
NEC Plant
44?24'N-131?10'E
1,600 12,/
1946
PU
8017763
39
Pu-hal
NEC Plant
43?551N-131?01'E
2,700 111/
1946
PU
8017644
J 10
Ching-po BU (Take)
Ching-po HU (Lake)
44?09'N-129?07'E
36,000 112/
1946
PIT
9062446
(Hydroelectric)
Plant, Filting Plant,
Tung-ching-ch'eng
Plant
J 11
Wang-ch'ing
Toyo Pulp Company
43?181N-129?47'E
2,000 120/
1946
CIP
KWantung Leased
Ki
Dairen .(Ta-lien)
Kan-tzu Plant
38?55'N-121039'E
23,000 121/
1949
PU
8015437
Territory
Remarks
One 1,400-kw generator, 102/
one 500-kw generator,
one 200-kw generator.
Three 2,800-kw generators.
104/ 80 workers and 4
technicians. ,
Two 2,000-kw generator, 106/
one 6,000-kw generator,
two 14,000-kw generators.
Two 2,800-kw generators. 122/
One 7,000-kw generator, 112/
one 4,000-kw generator.
One 1,000-kw generator, 114/
one 2,320-kw generator,
one 2,800-kw generator,
one 3,000-kw generator,
one 4,200-kw generator.
One 2,700-kw generator.
One 1,600-kw generator.
One 1,200-kw generator, 118/
one 1,500-kw generator.
Two 4,000-kw generators,
one 15,000-kw generator.
Interconnected with city
at 22, kv and 66 kv. 122/
200 employees. 123/
a. Public utility (FU) or captive industrial plant (CIP).
b. World aeronautical chart (WAC).
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Table 5
(Continued)
Installed
Year
PU a/
Industrial
Serial
Plant or Alternate
CaPacitY
of
or
Register
Province
Number
Place Name
Name
Coordinates
(1w)
Information
CIP
Number
Kwantung Leased
K 2
Dairen (TA-lien)
Amanoggara. Plant of MEC
38?55'N-121?39,E
15,000 2.221./
1949
PC
9062841
Territory
(Continued)
K 3
Dairen (TA-lien)
Onoda Cement Company,
Kwantung Cement Plant
38?55'N-121?39'E
5,200 12g
1946
ma,
8017579
Jehol
L 1
Fou-hsin
_Plant
42?06'N-121?421E
22,000 12?/
1952
PU
9063660
L 2
Pei-p iso
NEC Plant
41048'N-120?44'E
15,000 122/
1945
PU
8015455
L 3
Luan-pling
NEC Plant, ShuRng-t,ou-
Ahan Plant
40?56'N-117942'E
6,000 D2/
1946
FU
Remarks
One 15,000-kw generator.
Interconnected with city at
22 kv and 66 kv. 125/
One 1,600-kw generator, 127/
one 3,600-1w generator.
One 15,000-1w generator. Sup-
plies coal mines, Pei-p'iao,
and Ch'ao-yang.
Two 1,500-kw generators,
one 3,000-1w generator.
a. Public utility (PU) or captive industrial plant (CIF).
b. World aeronautical chart (WAC).
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APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY
The estimates of installed capacity were arrived at by establishing
the best available list of generating facilities and comparing it with
published totals. This installed capacity and various statements of
production were used in conjunction with world-wide data on utiliza-
tion to arrive at production figures. Consumption estimates were
made by comparing 1944 figures relative to consumption under Japanese
management with present consumption on a base of the announced com-
parison of production in 1952 with "preliberation" production for
various classes of products.
The estimates presented for future production are on an extremely
tenuous base. An estimate was made of China's domestic capability
to produce the equipment required for an expansion, and to this was
added a rough estimate of the quantity of such equipment China will
probably be able to import. This total amount of equipment available
to increase installed capacity was then apportioned between China
proper and Manchuria. The efforts being made to increase the utili-
zation of equipment were appraised, and an estimate of the increased
rate of utilization during the next several years was made. This new
rate of utilization was then applied to the total facilities estimated
to be available, and an annual production figure for the next several
years was calculated.
In order to arrive at the rate of utilization of the equipmentx
an average installed capacity was estimated for the years from 1949
to 1952 and, in conjunction with the annual production figures, was
used to calculate a figure representing kilowatt-hours per installed
kilowatt of capacity per year. This figure, given in hours, is an
indication of the rate of utilization of the equipment. It ranged
from about 1,500 hours in 1949 to about 3,800 hours in 1952. This
factor for electrical utilities in the US was about 5,000 hours in
1950, and no record exists of appreciably higher factors. It was
estimated that in Manchuria this factor would reach 4,700 hours by
1957, with progressively smaller increments. Factors for the inter-
vening years were interpolated, and average annual installed capaci-
ties for the years to 1957 were estimated. The production given is
the product of these two factors.
Detailed methodology has been included in the text where pertinent.
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APPENDDC C
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
The absence of any source of complete data since 1944 naturally
characterizes the conclusions in this report as tentative. The
following broad gaps exist in reasonably confirmed information about
electric power in Manchuria.
1. Complete listings of the electric generating equipment
operated as part of Industrial facilities by municipality, province,
and area, as of any date.
2. Information on removals by the Russians from southern
Manchuria in 19 45-46.
3. Information on specific lines and the total transmission net-
work since 1944.
4. Information on the present condition of the electrical
equipment presumed to have remained in place.
5. Information on new equipment and plants installed since 1950.
6. Information on domestic manufacture and import of electric
generating equipment since 1950.
7. Concrete data since 1944 on total capacity, production, and
use pattern.
8. Information as to the absolute magnitude of the "preliberation"
base as used by the present government for announced percentage
achievements.
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APPENDIX D
SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES
1. Evaluation of Sources.
In preparing this report, the following sources were found to be
the most important.
The report prepared by E.A. Locke, Jr., Principle Electric Power
Facilities of Manchuria as of July 1945, Army Map Service, March 1946,
mainly from sources in Japan, during late 1945 provided what Is be-
lieved to be a complete list of public utility plants in Manchuria
as of late 1944, and a series of maps which indicated the status
of the transmission network as of June 1944. This report also In-
cludes a tabulation of most substation transformers. The only errors
which may exist in this report would have resulted from inaccuracies
in Japanese records or accidental mistakes.
The Pauley Report -- Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to
the President of the United States, July 1946 -- prepared by Edwin W.
Pauley and compiled between 17 May and 15 July 1946, was an effort to
assess tile Soviet removals from Manchuria during late 1945 and 1946.
Personal inspections were made of the facilities in Chinese Nation-
alist control and of some northern Manchurian properties. Japanese
records and interviews were also used. Time was not available for an
extremely careful report, and the sources of information relative to
southern Manchurian properties were all subject to rather strong bias.
Subject to possible inaccuracies as noted, this report provides a
complete list of public utility plants and a fragmentary list of
captive industrial plants, with information on the equipment and
condition as of early 1946.
More recent information was found in translations of the Chinese
Communist press and in interrogation reports. This information was
fragmentary when pertaining to individual installations and vague
when referring to over-all achievement and planning. Therefore, it
was subject to varying interpretations.
Following is a brief statement in regard to other research on
the electric power industry in Communist China.
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? _ _ _
US Army, Corps of Engineers, Engineer Strategic Intelligence
Division (ESID), maintains records on electric power plants which
include the location, size, and other data. Section 62, Ilectric
Power," of National Intelligence Survey (NIS) 39, China, was in
process of compilation in the spring of 1953, but, as the work was
coincident with that on this report, it was felt necessary and
advisable not to make these efforts interdependent but rather to
have the ESID contribution to NIS 39 serve as a cross-check upon
completion.
US Air Force, AFOIN, Air Targets Division, Fuel and Power
Branch, is currently preparing Air Targets Sheets on certain large
electric power installations in China and is issuing them as they
are finished. These sheets also should provide a valuable cross-
check with the plant list of this report.
Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (OIR) has
from time to time issued brief papers on the total electric power
capacity and production as significant information has become
available, but it is understood that no effort is made to maintain
detailed records of plant installations.
2. Sources.
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Source of Information
A - Completely reliable
B - Usually reliable
C --Fairly reliable
D - Not usually reliable
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
Information
1 - Confirmed by other sources
2 - Probably true
3 - Possibly true
4 - Doubtful
5 - Probably false
6 - Cannot be judged
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this
report. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the
evaluation of the cited document.
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1.
2. Edwin W. Pauley, Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the
President of the United States, Jul 1946. U. Eval. RR 2.
3. This section has been drawn largely from the following reports
which present the story in somewhat greater detail, especially
with regard to the financial organization, the dates of com-
pletion, and the ratings of the individual installations:
JANIS 74, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Manchuria,
Chapter IX, "Resources and Trade," Feb 1946. R. Eval. RR 2.
E.A. Locke, Jr., Principal Electric Power Facilities of
Manchuria as of 71T177745, Army Map service,-MgT-15477
R. Eval. RR 2.
Pauley, op. cit.
4. ECA, China Tientsin Regional Office, TRO-300, 9 Sep 1948
(CIA 461182). R. Eval. RR 2.
5. Pauley, op. cit.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. CIA FDD, Materials on the Economic Organization of China
(1949-April 1952)(Working Paper), p. 45. S.
Foreign Languages Press, A Guide to New China, 1952. U.
9. Foreign Languages Press o. cit.
CIA RR 12, Economic Organization of Communist China,
21 Oct 1952. S.
10. CIA ORB Project 5-52-II (WP), Solid Fuels in China, 10 Feb
1953. S. Eval. RR 2.
11. CIADiiiimimil.FDummarNo.28Ar12. C. Eval. RR 3.
12.
13. Locke, op. cit.
14. Pauley, op. cit.
15. ECA, China Tientsin Regional Office, op. cit.
16.
Air, FEAF, 6004th AISS, Report No. C-1284, 13 Jan 1953
(CIA 1211595). C. Eval. RR 3.
17.
18.
19. ECA, China Tientsin Regional Office, op. cit.
20. CIA ORR Project 5-52-11 (WP), op. cit.:-
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21. Air, China Project Category No. 42 00000, Serial No. 1138
FOIAb3b1 (Shanghai newspaper, 15 Jan 1952). U. Eval. RR 3.
22.
25X1A2g
FOIAb3b1
FOIAb3b1
FOIAb3b1
25X1A2g
FOIAb3b1
25X1A8b
23.
24. State, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of
China Mainland Press, 23 Aug 1950. U. Eval. RR 2.
25. State, Hong Kong, Despatch No. 1797, 21 May 1951. U. Eval. RR 2.
26.
27. State, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of
China Mainland Press, 23 Aug 1950, op. cit.
CIA FDD, Summary, No. 69, 2 Sep 1950. S7--Eval. RR 2.
28. State, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current
Background, No. 163, 5 Mar 1951. U. Eval. RR 2.
29. State, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of
China Mainland Press, ID Apr 1952. U. Eval. RR 2.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36. Locke, o . cit.
37.
38.
ECA, China Tientsin Regional Office, op. caT.
Federal Power Commission.
39. Air, China Project Category No. 42 00000, Serial No. 1138
(Tientsin newspaper, 19 Apr 1952). U. Eval. RR 2.
4o.
41.
42.
43. CIA estimate.
44. Locke, op. cit.
45. Paule o.. cit.
46.
C. Unevaluated.
47. Locke, 2E. cit.
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48. Ibid.
49. Army, ID EUCOM, RS-1115-52, 3 Nov 1952 (date of information,
Oct 1952) (CIA 1018597). C. Eval. Field C (RR 3).
50. Ibid.
Locke, op. cit.
51. Pauley, op. cit.
52. Ibid. -
53. Locke, op. cit.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Pauley, op. cit.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Locke, 2E. cit.
6o. Ibid.
61. Pauley, op. cit.
62. Locke, op. cit.
63. Ibid. -
64. Ibid.
65. Pauley, op. cit.
66. Locke, op. cit.
67. Pauley, op. cit.
68. Locke, op. cit.
69. Ibid. -
70. Ibid.
71. Pauley, op. cit.
72. Army, AA, Australia 8 Jan 1 date of information,
Oct 1952)
73. ECA, China ilentein Regional Office, op. cit.
74. Army, ID-HQ-FEC, Report No. 66960 (G-2 No. 1040532), 26
Oct 1948 (date of information, 1 Oct 1947). S. Eval. F-6.
75. Locke, op. cit.
76. Ibid. -
77. Pauley, op. cit.
78. Army, AMA, Mukden, Report No. R-554-46 (date of information,
19 Nov 1946). R. Eval. A-1.
79. Pauley, op. cit.
80. Army, ID:171Q-TET", Report No. 82027 (G-2 No. 1075599), 8 Nov
1947 (date of information, Sep 1947). S. Eval. F-6.
81. Pauley, op. cit.
82. Ibid.
83. Locke, op. cit.
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84. Army, FEC, ID, Report No. 73397 (ID No. 1046969),
1 Sep 1948. S. Eval. F-6.
85. Pauley, op. cit.
25X1A8b 86. Ibid.
87.
88. Pauley, op. cit.
89. Locke, op. cit.
90. Ibid.
91. Pauley, op. cit.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Locke, op. cit.
95. Pauley, op. cit.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. Locke, op. cit.
101. Pauley, op. cit.
102. Locke, op. cit.
103. Army, FEC, ID, Report No. 611133 (ID No. 1035005), Jun 1914.8
(date of information, 1947)
104. Ibid.
105. Pauley, op. cit.
106. Locke, op. cit.
107. Pauley, op. cit.
108. Ibid.
109. Locke, op. cit.
110. Pauley, op. cit.
111. Ibid.
112. Locke, op. cit.
113. Ibid. -
114. Ibid.
115. Pauley, op. cit.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Locke, op. cit.
119. Pauley, op. cit.
120. Ibid.
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121. Air, 6004th AISS, Report No. 2429-B, 18 Jul 1951 (FP 002781).
S. Eval. B-2.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
126. Pauley, op. cit.
127. Locke, op. cit.
128. Ibid. --
129. Paule o?. cit.
130.
? CONFIDENTIAL
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 ArrelreePIMPIRMEI.M.SPOPIPB?1110PRI5 P 79 -0 1 wAuuustwou tow -t
118 120 122
128 130 132
boundaries on this map are
eseaTh _ / .1
e ftWOgraftoJ by the
MANCHURIA*
MAJOR ELECTRIC POWER FACILITIES
POWER PLANTS
AHydroelectric power plant
Steam power plants
TRANSMISSION LINES
? 10,000 to 75,000 kilowatts
? 1,000 to 9,999 kilowatts
220 kilovolts
154 kilovolts
110 kilovolts
66 kilovolts
44 kilovolts
33 kilovolts
Less than 33 kilovolts
Plant designations, red letter and number, refer
to Appendix A of the accompanying report.
?..? International boundary, ?x? International boundary, ? ? Province boundary
demarcated indefinite or in dispute Nationalist, 1948
Aihun
Chiu-ai-hun
19.1/4,
Sun-wu
Scale 1:4,000000
50 100 150
Statute Miles
100 150
Kilometers
Including Jebol province
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