INPUTS FOR THE PEACETIME PRODUCTION OF SMALL ARMS, MORTARS, AND ARTILLERY PIECES IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000400160002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 29, 1954
• Content Type: IR

CONF1ENT1AL
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INPUTS FOR. THE PEACETIME PRODUCTION
OF SMALL ARMS, MORTARS,
AND ARTILLERY PIECES
IN THE USS
CIA/RR PR-47
29 January 1954
DOCUMENTNO. {
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CENTRAL,, INTELLIGENCE AGE,,N,CY
OFIIC-E OF. RESEARCH AND REPORTS
RETURN TD ARCHIVES & RECORDS CENTE
1V%UNFIDEW
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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INPUTS FOR THE PEACETIME PRODUCTION
OF SMALL ARMS,, MORTARS, AND ARTILLERY PIECES
IN THE USSR
CIA /RR PR-47
(ORR Project 108-51)
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
I E-
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The primary purpose of this report is to determine the quantities
of productive services, or inputs, consumed annually in the peacetime
production of small arms, mortars, and artillery pieces in the USSR.
The report also attempts to describe the past development of the
Soviet weapons industry, its organization, and its annual output.
No reliable Soviet information is available which can serve as a
basis for a study of weapons input or of weapons production. Input
estimates have therefore been derived from US analogy and from an
interpretation of Soviet weapons requirements based on Army, Navy, and
Air Force production estimates in addition to data obtained from other
intelligence sources.
This methodology, even when employed with caution, is obviously
not exact. It is, however, the only practicable technique to employ
in this study and produces results which can be considered reasonable,
if not firm, estimates.
Industry-wide estimates of inputs are ordinarily derived on the
basis of a summation of individual input requirements for each end
item produced by the industry. For an industry producing as many
different items as does the weapons industry, the determination of in-
puts for each item in the usual manner would involve an almost pro-
hibitive number of computations and would vastly increase the total
margin of possible error.
To avoid these limitations, a unit of output representative of the
weapons produced in the weapons industry of the USSR was constructed.
The unit of product to which the inputs are related is termed a
"bundle" of weapons. Once the number of these bundles produced is
established, the inputs consumed by the industry are easily computed
as a simple multiple of the inputs per representative unit of output.
The bundle of weapons consists of all types of small arms, mortars,
and artillery pieces in direct proportion to their requirements as in-
dicated by the equipment tables of the Soviet armed forces and the
estimated annual production of aircraft and naval vessels in the USSR.
Adjustments in these peacetime requirements are made to account for
different rates of attrition and for the introduction of new models.
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The further development of the concept of the bundle of weapons
to include all items of munitions would provide a working tool for
analysts dealing with the production of munitions comparable to the
division slice used by military planners. It promises to be useful
in appraisals of the wartime resource requirements of an economy
and of the capabilities of that economy to produce munitions. In
short, the bundle of weapons is a first attempt to measure the balance
in a munitions mix.
CONFIDE'
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A. Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1. Small Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Mortars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Naval Guns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
B. History and Organization of the Soviet Weapons
Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
II. Coefficients of Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A. Unit of Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6
B. Computed Coefficients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Steel, Aluminum, and Copper . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. Coal; Petroleum, Gas, Lumber, and Electric
Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. Rubber Tires and Antifriction Bearings . . . . . 16
4. Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Capital Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6. Capital Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7. Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
III. Output and Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A. Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
B. Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1. In Real Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2. In Rubles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . 34
IV. Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
V. Export and Import . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
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Appendixes
Page
Appendix A. Soviet Weapons Plants with Estimates of Size and
of Labor Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.
Appendix B. Coefficient Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,j'
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1. Representative Unit, or Bundle, for Measuring Weapons
Output in the USSR, 1953 . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . . .
8
2. Inputs of Steel, Aluminum, and Copper per Bundle of
Weapons, 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
13
Input per Weapon and Input per 1,000 Pounds of Output for
Eleven US Weapons, 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17
4. Inputs of Coal, Petroleum, Natural or Producer Gas,
Electric Power, and Lumber per Bundle of Soviet Weapons,
1953 ..........................
20
Direct Man-Hour Requirements for Eleven US Weapons,
1953 ..........................
23
6. Direct Man-Hour Requirements per Bundle of Soviet Weapons,
1953 ..........................
24
7. Transportation Input per Unit of Weapons in the USSR . . .
29
8. Production of Guns in the USSR, 1929-52 . . . . . . . . .
30
9. G-2 Estimates of Soviet Production of Weapons and Weight
of Weapons, 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32
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10. Inputs per Bundle of Weapons and Quantities of Input of
the Soviet Weapons Industry, 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
11. Ruble Value of Inputs at 1950 Prices Required for Soviet
Weapons Production in 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
12. Procurement in the Soviet Defense Budget, 1949-53 . . . . 36
13. Estimates of Floor Space and Labor Force for Soviet
Weapons Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
14. Soviet Weapons with the US Equivalent Used for Estimating
Meta.l Inputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Following Page
USSR: Armament Plants -- 1952 (Excluding Armored-Vehicle
Plants) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
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CIA/RR PR-47
(ORR Project 108-51)
INPUTS FOR THE PEACETIME PRODUCTION
OF SMALL ARMS, MORTARS, AND ARTILLERY PIECES IN THE USSR*
Summary
The production of small arms, mortars, and artillery pieces by the
Soviet weapons industry during 1953 was concentrated in 22 plants. The
majority of these plants are dispersed throughout the USSR, but the
largest groups of plants are located in the industrial area surrounding
Moscow and in the newly developed industrial areas east of the Urals.
The peacetime production of the 22 plants in the Soviet weapons in-
dustry represents about 78,000 short tons of equipment. According to
Army G-2 estimates, Soviet production for 1952 was 317,500 small arms,
6,000 mortars, and 22,500 artillery pieces and tank guns. It is assumed
that the 22 plants also produce the weapons required to meet the annual
needs of the Soviet air and naval forces. The requirements for these
forces are 27,000 aircraft cannons, 230 naval artillery units, and
400 naval and antiaircraft artillery units.
The inputs required to produce the indicated quantities of weapons
are as follows:
Labor 43,000 Man-years
Steel 202,000 Short tons
Aluminum 620 Short tons
Copper 2,000 Short tons
Coal 472,000 Short tons
Petroleum 4.6 Million gallons
Lumber 3.9 Million board feet
Rubber Tires 35,000 Units
Antifriction Bearings 227,000 Units
Electric Power 218 Million kilowatt-hours
Natural or Producer Gas 1.4 Billion cubic feet
Machine Tools 376 Units
Capital Equipment and Construc-
tion 17,600 Short tons
Transportation 546 Million short-ton-
kilometers
*,,:This report contains information available as of 1 December 1953.
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The value of all input services for the Soviet weapons industry
in 1952 prices is about 1.9 billion rubles, which is almost 3 percent
of the estimated allocations to munitions procurement in the Soviet
defense budget. The value of inputs would represent approximately
the same proportion of such allocations in the 1953 defense target.
The annual productive capacity of the 22 plants in the Soviet
weapons industry is about 395,000 short tons of.finished weapons, or
about 5 times the current peacetime output. It is probable that the
wartime capacity of the weapons industry is in excess of this amount
because new plants may be built and other plants converted to weapons
production. Limits to the production of weapons would depend on the
amounts and relative priorities of other goods produced.
In the event that the Soviet weapons industry were placed on a
wartime production schedule, the ratios of inputs to peacetime output
implicit in the estimated figures in this report would probably remain
stable enough to permit their use in making labor and resource cost
estimates for the production of a given volume of Soviet weapons during
wartime.
I. Introduction.
The Soviet weapons industry, for the purposes of this report, in-
cludes those plants primarily concerned with the production of small
arms, mortars, and artillery pieces, as well as weapons produced for
use in armored fighting vehicles and in aircraft.
The term "weapons" includes all forms of small arms, mortars, and
artillery. All weapons with bore measurements less than 20 mm in
diameter are treated as small arms, whereas weapons of a larger bore
diameter are considered artillery pieces, or guns. Mortars are not
generally placed in either of the two classes but are treated
separately. The term "gun" as used in, this report applies only to
artillery pieces.
Soviet weapons can be characterized in general as simple, rugged,
and effective, although not particularly impressive when compared with
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their US counterparts. All models now standard are well suited both
to mass production and to ease of handling and maintenance. Their
simplicity of design and relatively wide tolerances enable them to
function well even under extremely adverse conditions., /*
A. Products.
1. Small Arms.
The small arms currently in use in the USSR are
essentially those developed and used during World War II. A few
changes have occurredy such as the replacement of the Maxim heavy
machine gun by the light machine gun M1946. J
The small arms in military use in the USSR J during 1953
were as follows:
Tula-Tokarev M1933 Pistol Standard side arm
PPsh-1941 and PPS-1943 Submachine guns
m1944 Carbine Standard shoulder arm
7.62-mm Degtyarev Series Light machine gun and tank
machine gun
7.62-mm Guvyunov Heavy machine-gun
7.62-mm m1946 Light machine gun, replacing
the 7.62-mm Guvyunov
12.7-mm Degtyarev-Shpagin M1938 Heavy machine gun and anti-
aircraft (AA) machine gun
2. Artillery.
Soviet artillery weapons are generally equal in effectiveness
to those of the Western powers, although some refinements and
characteristics making for maneuverability are lacking in the large
sizes. Deficiencies of modern fire control have been overcome by detailed
tactical preparation and the use of additional pieces. Emphasis is
placed on dual-purpose, high-velocity, direct-fire pieces.
The guns in military use in the USSR during 1953 J were
as follows:
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76-mm Divisional Gun M1942
85-mm Gun m1945
100-mm Field Gun m1944
122-mm Howitzer M1938
122-mm Gun M1931/37
152-mm Howitzer M1943
152-mm Gun Howitzer
152-mm Gun M1935
203-mm Howitzer M1931
210-mm Gun M1939
280-mm Howitzer M1937
306-mm Howitzer M1940
57-mm AT Gun m1943
37-mm AA Gun M1939
57-mm AA Gun
85-mm AA Gun M1939 and M1944
100-mm AA Gun
85-mm Gun
100-mm Gun
122-mm Gun
100-mm Gun
152-mm Gun
132-mm Rocket Launcher M13
82-mm Recoilless Rifle
23-mm Aircraft Cannon
37-mm Aircraft Cannon
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Dual-purpose, antitank (AT; and
field gun
Dual-purpose, AT and field gun, re-
placing the 76-mm gun
Dual-purpose, AT and field gun
Divisional field artillery
Corps artillery
Standard in the artillery division
Used for counterbattery and long-
range interdiction fire
Heavy artillery
Standard heavy howitzer
Super--heavy Skoda-designed weapon
Short--range heavy howitzer
Used in army group support
Divisional AT gun
Standard divisional AA gun
Replacing the 37-mm AA gun
Standard heavy AA gun
Replacing the 85-mm AA gun
Mounted on the medium tank, T-34 (85)*
Mounted on the medium tank, T-54*
Mounted on the heavy tanks, JS-2, JS-3*
Mounted on SU-100*
Mounted on JSU-152*
Found in tank and mechanized divisions
Probably standard in the division
Used by MIG-15, IL-28, Type 35, TU-4
Used by MIG-15
3. Mortars.
There are 3 models of mortars currently in use in the USSR,
the 82-mm, the 120-mm, and the 160-mm. 5i/
4. Naval Guns.
The naval guns in military use in the USSR during 1953 were
37-mm AA Single Gun
37-mm AA Twin Gun
0 and modified 0 destroyers
Sverdlov cruisers
Only the guns, as distinguished from the self-propelled unit, are
considered in this report.
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45-mm AA Single Gun' Submarines and merchant vessels
3-inch 55 Single Gun Subchasers
3-inch 55 DP Twin Gun 0 and modified 0 destroyers
3.9-inch 51 Wet, Single
Gun K class ocean-going submarine
3.9-inch 56 DP Single
Gun
3.9-inch 56 DP Twin
Gun
4.8-inch 46 Twin Gun
6-inch 50 Three-Gun
Turret
Main battery of coastal destroyer
Secondary battery, Sverdlov cruiser
0 and modified 0 destroyer
Chapayev and Sverdlov cruisers
B. History and Organization of. the Soviet Weapons Industry.
In 1940 there were 12 gun factories and 30 small arms
factories in the USSR. J The most important plants were in Tula,
Izhevsk, Nizhniy Tagil, Kovrov, Zlatoust, Podlipki, Leningrad,
Stalingrad, Molotov, and Sverdlovsk. The German invasion of 1941 and
the consequent evacuation of factories from the western part of the
USSR resulted in a net decrease in the total number of weapons plants
as well as in a general shift of the industry. In 1942 the number of
gun factories had been reduced to six. By 1944, however, 2 new gun
factories had been added, bringing the total to 8.
In spite of the evacuation, the production of artillery in
December 1942 was 1.8 times greater than in December 1941. J By 1944
the production of guns had reached the high level of about 120,000
pieces as compared with an output of 25,000 guns in 1940. Similarly,
the production of rifles and machine guns expanded rapidly. The average
yearly production of rifles during the last 3 years of World War II
was approximately 3 million J as compared with an estimated peacetime
production rate of 600,000 in 1940. J The production of machine guns
increased from about 72,000 in 1940 -LO/ to an average annual output of
about 450,000 during the last 3 years of the war. ll
Following World War II, Soviet weapons plants were converted to
peacetime production. Many gun and small arms plants, particularly the
larger ones, however, continued to produce weapons but at a rate much
lower than wartime levels. The plants which converted to complete
peacetime production were, in the main, small arms plants.
See footnote on p. 31.
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These factories could be readily reconverted to wartime production in
case of a new national emergency.
Until the latter part of 1936, all gun production was directed
by the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry. From the end of 1936
until early 1939 the responsibility for gun production fell to the
People's Commissariat for Munitions. From 11 January 1939 until the
reorganization of March 19+6, which involved not only a change in
structure but also a change in titles from People's Commissariats to
Ministries, the People's Commissariat of Armaments was responsible for
the production of all guns 37 mm and upward. Since then the Ministry
has been responsible for small. arms as well. 12/ On 15 March 1953
the Supreme Soviet created a new Ministry of Defense Industry, which
assumed the functions of the former Ministry of Armaments.
II. Coefficients of Production.
The major purpose of this report is to determine the peacetime
inputs of the Soviet weapons industry? This section is devoted to an
examination of the proper unit for measuring the output of the weapons
industry and to the computation of the various production coefficients.
A production coefficient is defined as the quantity of an input
necessary to produce one unit of output, given the appropriate amounts
of cooperating inputs or services. The discussion is limited to the
following inputs: steel, aluminum., copper, coal, petroleum, lumber,
rubber tires, antifriction bearings, electric power, man.-hours, gas,
machine tools, capital equipment, and capital construction.
A. Unit of Output.
The value of production coefficients, relating inputs to out-
puts, is affected by the size and nature of the units in which both
input and output are expressed. The snits adopted for measuring inputs
are widely used units such as 'tons and. gallons. There are 33 types of
weapons currently being produced or used in the USSR, and, consequently,
there are 33 units for measuring output. Treatment of each weapon
separately would involve considerable detail and would at times become
unwieldy. It is desirable, therefore, to construct a representative
unit of output in order to facilitate computations and simplify
presentation.
The proportions in which the various weapons are produced are
known only to a very limited degree. Thus representativeness must
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be based on the next best alternative to the known composition of
supply -- the composition of demand. This report is concerned with
establishing a level for peacetime demand as contrasted with two other
demands -- mobilization demand and wartime demand. Obviously, peace-
time demand stems from conditions and requirements different from war-
time or mobilization demand. The principal difference is a change in
the attrition rates for each type of weapon in use.
In this report,. Soviet production schedules for weapons will
be established in accordance with peacetime demand for weapons in any
given year. Peacetime demand for weapons will reflect (1) maintenance
of existing weapons inventory and (2) replacement of obsolete models
with new models. This statement assumes that there will be no in-
crease in the size of the weapons inventory. The inventory has been
built up over a period of years and does not necessarily contain a
complete stock of new models. New models are being produced
continually to replace old models, but replacement is spread out over
a number of years. Not all weapons in existence are in the hands of
troops; approximately 60 percent are in storage. 13 Because the
attrition rate on stored weapons is relatively small, it is ignored.
It is also assumed that exports consist entirely of obsolete models
not subject to replacement. The exceptions to this assumption are
discussed in the footnotes for Table l.*
In addition to ground weapons, it is necessary to include air-
craft and naval guns in a unit which represents peacetime demand.
Peacetime demand for naval guns, however, stems from a different use
pattern from that for ground and aircraft weapons. Therefore, two units
representing peacetime demand are established. One unit provides a
measure for naval guns, and the other combines ground and aircraft
weapons in a single unit. Aircraft weapons are produced by the same
establishments as other weapons, which justifies their inclusion for
input purposes. Table 1 illustrates the two representative units, or
bundles of weapons. In the case of Bundle 1, ground force and air-
craft weapons, total peacetime weapons demand per year is divided by
100, and for Bundle 2, naval weapons, total peacetime demand per
year is equal to 1 bundle. The footnotes for Table 1 explain the
detailed method for establishing the peacetime demand for each weapon.
* Table 1 follows on p. 8.
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Representative Unit, or Bundle,
for Measuring Weapons Output in the USSR
1953
Bundle 1, Ground and Aircraft
Weapons
J*
Type of Weapon Number of Weapons
Rifles and Carbines
970.0 J
Pistols
230.0 J
Submachine Guns
291.0 J
7.62-mm Machine Gun
32.4
12.7-mm Machine
Gun
14.8 J
57-mm AA Gun.
23.5 J
100-mm AA Gun
44.1 J
57-mm AT Gun
11.7 J
132-mm Rocket La
uncher
2-59
82-mm Recoilless
Rifle
8.2 J
82-mm Mortar
3.4 J
120-mm Mortar
6.7 b/
160-mm Mortar
3.2
85-mm Gun
3.7 J
122-mm Gun and H
owitzer
7.7 J
152-mm Howitzer,
Gun, Gun Howitzer
5.0 J
203-mm Howitzer
0.3 J
100-mm Tank Gun
(T-54)
63.0 cf
122-mm Tank Gun
(JS)
14.6
100-mm SP Gun M
-lO0)
11.0
152-mm SP Gun (J
SU-152)
U
21.9
23-mm Aircraft C
annon
212.9 J
37-mm Aircraft Cannon
58.3 J
2, 039.9
Footnotes for Table 1 follow on p. 9.
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Table 1
Representative Unit, or Bundle,
for Measuring Weapons Output in the USSR
1953
(Continued)
Bundle 2, Naval Weapons J
Type of Weapon
Number of Weapons
37-mm AA Single Gun
266.0
37-mm AA Twin Gun
78.6
45-mm AA Single Gun
60.0
3-inch/55 Single Gun
50.0
3-inch/55 DP Twin Gun
18.0
3.9-inch/51 Wet, Single Gun
40.0
3.9-inch/56 DP Single Gun
40.0
3.9-inch/56 DP Twin Gun
26.1
4.8-inch/46 Twin Gun
36.0
6-inch/50 Three-Gun Turret
17.4
632.1
a. The weapons included in Table 1 are those believed
to be in current production in the USSR. The 100-mm
Gun and various types of heavy artillery pieces are
probably manufactured in very small quantities, but the
total input for these weapons is negligible. These
weapons, therefore, are not listed in the bundle of
weapons.
b. Peacetime demand per year for all weapons in this
category is calculated on the following basis -- the
number of weapons needed to maintain existing inventory
plus the number of weapons needed to replace obsolete
weapons.
The maintenance factor is equal to the weapons in
use by troops on active duty multiplied by the peace-
time attrition rate. The total weapons being used by
troops is equal to 40 percent of the total mobiliza-
tion requirements as estimated by the Department of the
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Representative Unit, or. Bundle,
for Measuring Weapons'Output in the USSR
1953
(Continued)
Army in NIS 26, dated March 1951. 'The total mobilization requirement
is equal to 420 field division:, plus 100 divisions in the process of
training. The 40-percent factor includes the estimated 175 active duty
divisions (33 percent) plus 7 percent for various supporting troops on
active duty. Department of the Army training attrition factors are used.
as the peacetime attrition rates.
The replacement factor allows for the introduction of new models in
the Soviet weapons system. Replacement per year is equal to the total
number of weapons needed for full mobilization requirements multiplied
by a factor of 20 percent. The 20-percent factor is based on known
Soviet practice in the tank industry which introduces the new model
T-54 medium tank over a period of approximately 5 years. This tank re-
placement rate is assumed correct for other categories of weapons.
For the 100-mm AA Gun the replacement rate is based on a total
weapons inventory estimated by the Department of the Army. A new and
heavier AA gun has been seen, and it is assumed to be the 100-mm
AA Gun which will supersede the older 85-mm AA Gun when the replace-
ment program is completed. The replacement rate is equal to zero in
all cases where a new model is not being introduced during the period
covered by this report.
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B. Computed Coefficients.
1. Steel, Aluminum, and Copper.
The coefficients for steel, aluminum, and copper are
taken without adjustment from. the World War II production data for
equivalent US weapons. There is not enough information with respect
to these coefficients in the USSR either for their direct computation
or for providing adjustment factors. In order to avoid errors
resulting from differences in the weight of end items performing
similar functions in the US and the USSR, the coefficients settled
on are those giving the ratio of the weight of material input to the
weight of the finished output. The less satisfactory alternative is
to relate units of input to full units of output.
The first column of Table 2* repeats the list of
33 weapons composing Bundle 1 and Bundle 2. Column 2 in Table 2
gives the weight of the individual Soviet weapons which, multiplied
by Column 3 (the number of weapons per bundle), yields the weight
(Column 4) of each type of weapon per bundle. The coefficients of
Column 5 are the ratios of the input of finished steel products,
aluminum, and copper to pound of finished weapon, based on US produc-
tion data. 14 The input of steel includes all the steel required for
the production of each weapon. and the spare parts ordinarily produced
with the weapon; machining wastage and losses from rejects are there-
fore included. In the absence of definite information, it is assumed
that the same holds true for nonferrous metal inputs. Column 6, the
product of Columns 4 and 5, indicates the input per bundle by
weapon.
The steel, copper, and aluminum requirements for Bundle 1
are 1,861, 13, and 6 short tons, respectively, and for Bundle 2,
17,737, 729, and 23 short tons, respectively.
Table 14** listszwith their Soviet equivalents, the types
of US weapons used to compute these input coefficients.
2. Coal, Petroleum, Gas, Lumber, and Electric Power.
The data for this group of inputs are not so extensive
as the data for steel, copper, and aluminum, which covered the US
Table 2 follows on p. 13.
P. 48, below.
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Inputs of Steel, Aluminum, and Copper per Bundle of Weapons
1953
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficients L5 a/* Inputs per Bundle (Pounds)
Weight Number of Weight
per Weapons per Steel Steel
Weapon per Bundle
Weapons in Bundle 1 (Pounds) 16 Bundle (Pounds) Carbon Alloy Aluminum Copper Carbon 'Alloy Aluminum Copper
Rifles and Carbines 8.8 970.0 8,536 1.33 1.24 0 .0 11,353 10,585 0 0
Pistols 2.0 230.0 460 5.80 0.67 0 0.003 2,668 308 0 1.4
Submachine Guns 6.6 291.0 1,921 3.60 0.09 0 0.003 6,916 173 0 5.8
7.62-mm Machine Gun 28.7 32.4 930 2.60 1.00 0.008 0.004 2,418 930 7.4 3.7
12.7-mm Machine Gun 89.1 14.8 1,319 0.33 1.73 0 0 435 2,282 0 0
57-mm AA Gun 4,630.0 b 23.5 108,805 1.22 0.64 0 0 132,742 69,635 0 0
100-mm AA Gun 15,000.0 / 44.1 661,500 1.33 1.37 0.010 0.028 879,795 906,255 6,610.0 18,522.0
57-n AT Gun 2,535.0 11.7. .29,660 0.53 2.26 0 0.020 15,720 67,032 0 593.0
132-mm Rocket Launcher 2,300.0 / 2.5 5,750 0.82 1.35 0.007 0.050 4,715 7,763 40.2 288.0
82-mm Recoilless Rifle 166.0 / 8.2 1,361 0.82 1.35 0.007 0.050 1,116 1,837 9.5 68.0
82-mm Mortar ?128.0 3.4 435 0.82 1.35 0.007 0.050 357 587 3.0 21.8
120-mm Mortar 606.0 6.7 4,060 0.82 1.35 0.007 0.050 3,329 5,481 28.4 203.0
160-mm Mortar 2,381.0 3.2 7,619 0.57 3.15 0.007 0.050 4,343 24,000 53.3 381.0
13,868 0.67 1.50 0 0.025 9,292 20,802 0 346.7
85-mm Gun 3,748.0 3.7
122-mm Gun and Howitzer 7,643.0 c/ 7.7 58,851 0.50 2.22 0 0.024 29,426 130,649 0 1,412.4
152-mm Howitzer, Gun, Gun Howitzer 15,714.0 / 5.0 78,570 0.43 1.84 0 0 33,785 144,569 0 0
203-mm Howitzer 39,021.0 0.3 11,706 0.33 2.22 0 0.016 3,863 25,986 0. 187.3
100-mm Tank Gun (T-54) 2,382.0 / 63.0 150,066 0.03 2.85 0 0 4,500 427,688 0 0
122-mm Tank Gun (JS) 4,454.0 14.6 65,028 0.03 2.85 0 0 1,951 185,330 0 0
100-mm SP Gun (SU-100) 2,382.0 d/ 11.0 26,202 0.03 2.85 0 0 786 74,676 0 0
152-mm SP Gun (JSU-152) 4,500.0 b/ 21.9 98,550 0.03 2.85 0 0.005 2,957 280,868 0 492.8
23-mm Aircraft Cannon 150.0 212.9 31,935 0.21 3.08 0.17 0.090 6,706 98,360 5,430.0 2,874.2
37-mm Aircraft Cannon 405.0 d/ 58.3 23,612 0.21 3.08 0 0.021 4,959 72,725 0 495.9
Total (Pounds) 1,390,744 1,164,132 2,558,521 12,181.8 25,597.0
Total (Short Tons) 695.9 582.1 1,279.3 6.1 12.9
* Footnotes for Table 2 follow on p.14.
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Inputs of Steel, Aluminum, and Copper per Bundle of Weapons
1953
(Continued)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Coefficients 15 ,
Inputs per Bundle (Pounds)
Weight
per
Number of
Weapons
Weight
per
Steel
Weapon
Pounds) L6/
per
Bundle
Bundle
(Pounds)
Carbon
Alloy
Aluminum
Copper
Carbon
Alloy
Aluminum
Copper
37-mm AA Single Gun.
4,430.0
266.0
1,178,380
1.17
1.35
0
0.131
1,378,704
1,590,813
0
154,368
37-mm AA Twin Gun
7,970.0
78.6
626,442
1.17
1.35
0
0.131
732,937
845,697
00
82
064
45-mm AA Single Gun
1,124.0
60.0
67,440
0.69
1.91
0
0
46,534
128,810
0
,
0
3-inch/55 Single Gun
10,913.0 J
~
50.0
R
545,650
R
0.94
N
1.19
0.003
0.107
512,911
F
649,323
1,637
58,385
5 DD r I-i G'.:r.
.Jj6vv.v ~
1
v
~~7
nn
'
n
1 In
MQ
0 ln..7
_Jl
L- n-,,.
37,750
3.9-inch/51 Wet, Single Gun
12,400.0 b
40.0
496,000
1.15
2.77
0
0.141
570,400
1,373,920
0
69,936
3.9-inch/56 DP Single Gun
22,266.0
4o.o
890,640
0.94
1.19
0.003
0.107
837,202
1,059,862
2,672
95,298
3.9-inch/56 DP Dual Gun
90,000.0 J
26.1
2,349,000
0.94
1.19
0.003
0.107
2,208,060
2,795,310
7,047
251,343
4.8-inch/46 Twin Gun
88,500.0 b
36.0
3,186,000
0.94
1.19
0.003
0.107
2,994,840
3,791,340
9,558
902
340
6-inch/50 Three-Gun Turret
460,000.0 J
17.4
8,004,000
0.17
1.48
0.003
0.046
1,360,680
11,845,920
24,012
,
368,184
Total (Pounds)
17,696,352
10,973,900
24,500,827
45,984
1,458,230
Total (Short Tons)
8,848.2
5,486.9
12,250.4
22.99
729.1
a. Pounds of raw material per weight of finished weapon in pounds.
b. Estimated weight based on specifications of US and Soviet weapons.
c. Weighted average for all weapons in the category.
d. Weight of US prototype.
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equivalents for all 33 Soviet weapons. The data for these inputs
are for only 11 US ground and aircraft weapons and include partial
data for 3 US naval weapons. To apply the coefficients for the
11 US ground and aircraft weapons to all 23 Soviet ground and air-
craft weapons, it is necessary to treat 1 or more of the 11 US
weapons as representative of a class of Soviet weapons. Seven of
the ground force weapons (see Table 3)* are assigned to separate
classes; the type of weapons and coefficients differ sufficiently
to warrant separate treatment. The other four are assigned to one
class because of the homogeneity of their input coefficients. The in-
puts of coal, petroleum, and natural gas are not available for the
first three weapons of Table 3. The weapon most nearly like the first
three weapons in Table 3 is the one in Class F. The inputs of coal,
petroleum, and natural gas for Class F are therefore used for the first
three weapons of Table 3. Bundle 2, naval weapons, is broken down in-
to three classes. Because of the similarity of the input coefficients,
ground force weapons coefficients are used in all cases where data are
not available for the specific naval weapon.
The weapons listed in Table 3 are divided into 11 classes.
The inputs per 1,000 pounds of weapons of each class are assumed to
be representative of the inputs per 1,000 pounds of output for all
of the weapons assigned to that class. Class A, including the US
Rifle, Ml, is assumed to be representative of all the Soviet weapons
of that class -- namely, the carbine, the rifle, the pistol, and
the submachine gun. Class B, including the US Browning Automatic
Rifle, is assumed to be representative of the Soviet light machine gun.
Other classes are assumed to be similarly representative.**
Table 3 follows on p. 17.
The Soviet weapons included in each class are as follows:
Class A includes the carbine, rifle, pistol, and submachine gun.
Class B includes the 7.62-mm Machine Gun.
Class C includes the 12.7-mm Machine Gun, the 23-mm Aircraft
Cannon, and the 37-mm Aircraft Cannon.
Class D includes the 82-mm Mortar and the 82-mm Recoilless
Rifle.
Class E includes the 120-mm Mortar, the 160-mm Mortar, and the
132-mm Rocket Launcher.
Class F includes the 57-mm AA Gun.
(footnote continued on p. 16)
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Table 4* gives the results of the application of the in-
puts per 1,000 pounds of output from Table 3 to the 11 classes con-
sisting of 33 different Soviet weapons. The portion of the total
weight of the representative bundles accounted for by each class of
weapons (in units of 1,000 pounds) is given immediately below each
class designation. The inputs per 1,000 pounds of output make up the
first row following each input. The second row is the quantity of
that input required per bundle, or the product of the input per
1,000 pounds and the weight of the weapons (in units of 1,000 pounds)
in each class. The total inputs per bundle appear in the last column.
3. Rubber Tires and Antifriction Bearings.
The number of antifriction bearings and rubber tires for
Bundle 1 as determined from the descriptive data of Soviet and US
weapons is 2,209 units and 356 units, respectively. 17 The number of
antifriction bearings for Bundle 2 is 8,256.
4. Labor.
Labor is an important input in the production of weapons,
making up a considerable proportion of their cost. It is also an
(footnote continued from p. 15
Class G includes the 85-mm Gun; the 122-mm Gun and Howitzer; the
152-mm Gun, Howitzer, and Gun :Howitzer; the 57-mm AT Gun; and
the 100-mm AA Gun.
Class H includes the 100-mm Tank Gun, the 122-mm Tank Gun, the SU
100-mm SP Gun, the JSU 152-mm SP Gun, and the 203-mm Howitzer.
Bundle 2:
Class J includes both 37-mm AA Guns and the 45-mm AA Gun.
Class K includes the 3-inch/55 DP Twin Gun.
Class L includes the 3-inch/55 Single Gun, the 3.9-inch/51 Single
Gun, both 3.9-inch/56 Guns, the 4.8-inch/46 Twin Gun, and
the 6-inch/50 Three-Gun Turret..
* Table 4 follows on p. 20.
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Weight
of Coal
Natural
or
Producer
Gas
(Thousand Lumber
Electric
Power
Weapon (Short Petroleum
Pounds) Tons) (Gallons)
Cubic
Feet)
(Board
Feet)
(Kilowatt-
Hours)
Rifle, Ml
10.3 N.A. N.A.
N.A.
29
95
Input per 1,000
Pounds
1.10 J 11 J
2.8 J
2,815
9,223
Browning Automatic
Rifle, Caliber
.30, Ml, 1918,
H3
19.4 N.A. N.A.
N.A.
25
414
Input per 1,000
Pounds
1.10 J 11 J
2.8
1,289
21,340
Machine Gun,
Caliber .50 AC
113 N.A. N.A.
N.A.
'15
1,380
Input per 1,000
Pounds
1.10 / 11 J
2.8 J
133
12,212
Input per Weapon and Input per 1,000 Pounds of Output
for Eleven US Weapons 18
1953
81-mm Mortar,
M29, with Mount
M23A1
136 0.47 4.4
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Input per Weapon and Input per 1,000 Pounds of Output
for Eleven US Weapons 1$
1.953
(Continued)
Weight
of Coal
Weapon (Short Petroleum
Item (Pounds) Tons) allons)
Class D
(Continued)
Natural
or
Producer
Gas Electric
(Thousand Lumber Power
Cubic (Board (Kilowatt-
Feet) Feet) Hours)
Input per 1,000
Pounds
3.46
32.0
8.8
0
1,o44
4.2-inch Mortar,
M30, with Mount
M24
340
1.47
14.l
3.7
0
450
Input per 1,000
Pounds
4.32
41?0
10.9
0
1,324
40-mm Gun, Twin,
Automatic, T141
2,000
2.20
21
5.5
0
775
Input per 1,000
Pounds
1.10
11
2.8
0
388
105-mrs Howitzer
6,565
20.7
0
2,233
Input per 1,000
Pounds
3.2
0
340
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Table 3
Input per Weapon and Input per 1,000 Pounds of Output
for Eleven US Weapons L8/
1953
(Continued)
Weight
Natural
or
Producer
Gas
Electric
of
Coal
(Thousand Lumber
Power
Item
Weapon
(Pounds)
(Short
Tons)
Petroleum
(Gallons)
Cubic
Feet)
(Board
Feet)
(Kilowatt-
Hours)
155-mm Gun
SP, T97
7,350
57.66
533
162.0.
0
17,533
Input per 1,000
Pounds
7.84
75
22.0
0
2,385
8-inch Howitzer
#P, Tlo8
6,392
45.66
44o
133.0
0
13,933
Input per 1,000
Pounds
7.14
69
20.8
0
2,180
105-mm Howitzer
SP, T98
942
6.50
62
19.0
0
1,970
Input per 1,000
Pounds
6.90
66
20.2
0
2,091
155-mm Howitzer
SP, T99
3,490
20.72
196
72.0
0
6,300
Input per 1,000
Pounds
5.94
56
20.6
0
1,805
Underweighted
Average of In-
puts in Class H
per 1,000 Pounds 6.96 67 20.6 0 2,115
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Table 4
Inputs of Coal, Petroleum, Natural or Producer Gas, Electric Power, and Lumber per Bundle of Soviet weapons
1953
Class A Class B Class C Class D Class E Class F Class G Class H Class J Class K Class L
(1,000 (1,000 (1,000 (1,000 (1,000 (1,000 (1,000 (1,000 (1,000 (1,000 (1,000
Pounds) Pounds) Pounds) Pounds) Pounds) Pounds) Pounds) Pounds) All Classes Pounds) Pounds) Pounds) All Classes
J 0.9 x 56.8 x Total per Total per
Input 10.9 x a a , 1.8 x, 17.4 x 108.8 x a/ .842.5 x, 351.5 x a/ Bundle 1,872.3 x J 352.0 x a/ 15,471.3 x a/ Bundle
Coal (Short Tons)
Input per 1,000 Pounds J 1.1 1.1 1.1 3.46 4.32 1.1 1.1 6.96 1.1 6.96 6.96
Input per Bundle 12.0 1.0 62.5 6.2 75.2 120.0 927.0 2,446.4
3,635.9 2,059.5 2,4+9.9 107,680.0 112,189.4
Petroleum (Gallons)
Input per 1,000 Pounds b/ 11.0 11.0 11.0 32.0 41.0 11.0 11.0 67.0 11.0 67.0 67.0
Input per Bundle 120.0 10.0 625.0 57.6 713.4 1,196.8 9,270.0 23,550.5 35,546.6 20,595.0 23,584.0 1,036,577.0 1,080,756.0
Natural or Producer Gas
(1,000 Cubic Feet)
Input per 1,000 Pounds J 2.8
Input per Bundle 30.5
2.8 2.8 8.8 10.9 2.8 3.2 20.9 2.8
2.5 159.0 15.8 189.6 304.6 2,696.0 7,346.0 10,743.8 5,242.4
20.9
7,356.8
20.9
323,350.0 335,949.0
Input per.1,000 Pounds J 2,815.0 1,289.0 133.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Input per Bundle 30,683.5 1,160.0 7,554.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 39,397.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Electric Power
(Kilowatt-Hours)
25X1
Input per 1,000 Pounds J 6,700.0 t6,ooo.o 9,150.0 1,044.0 1,324.0 388.0 340.0 2,115.0 388.0 4,780.0 J 3,000.0
Input per Bundle 73,030.0 14,400.0 519,720.0 1,879.2 23,037.6 42,214.4 286,450.0 743,423.0 1,704,154.0 726,452.0 1,682,560.0 46,413,900.0 48,822,912.0
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input which varies with production rates and time and between
countries for a given amount of product. At the present time there
is not enough information to calculate the productivity of labor in
the production of weapons from Soviet-data, nor is there enough in-
formation to allow a reliable comparison of the productivity of US
and Soviet labor in the production of weapons.' It is therefore
necessary, in spite of any error involved, to use unadjusted US data
for the labor input.
Estimated Direct Labor Inputs for Weapons Production in the USSR
1944
Weight of
Man-Hours
per 1,000
Weapon
Weapon
(pounds)
Man-Hours
per Weapon
Pounds of
Product
76-mm Regimental Cannon
1,323
800
605
76-mm Division Cannon
2,460
600
244
152-mm Howitzer
7,937
2,1l00
302
384
Large-Caliber Machine Gun
89.1
329
3,692
Rifle
10.3
9
874
2, 283
The man-hour requirements for similar weapons in the US are as
follows:(footnote continued on p. 22)
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Table 5* shows the man.-hour requirements for the same
11 US.ground force weapons used to determine inputs in the previous
section. Column 1 of Table 5 gives the weight of the weapons;
Column 2, the direct man-hours required to produce the weapons; and
Column 3, the number of direct man-.hours required to produce
1,000 pounds of the weapons, calculated by dividing Column 2 by
Column 1 and multiplying by 1,000.
footnote continued from p. 21
Direct Labor Inputs for Weapons Production in the US
1944 and. 1952 20
Weight of
Man-Hours
per 1,000
Weapon
Weapon
(Pounds)
Man-Hours
per Weapon
Pounds of
Product
75-mm Howitzer, Pack
2,000
1,649 a
820
75-mm Howitzer
2,700
2,045 a
757
105-mm Howitzer
6,565
4,200 b/
640
Average
739
Machine Gun, Caliber
?50 126 45.0 357
Rifle, Ml, Caliber .30 10.3 7.35 724
Average 541
a. 1944 data.
b. 1952 figure. The ratio of 1 to 4.2 for US to Soviet labor
in small arms production is in line with general belief. 21
The ratio of 1 to 0.52 in artillery production is, however,
quite to the contrary. It may be that the Soviet figure is
mainly an assembly time figure or a subtotal for only part of a
finished weapon. The US figure includes direct labor only.
* Table 5 follows on p. 23.
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Direct Man-Hour Requirements for Eleven US Weapons L2/
1953
Class
Weapon
Weight
of
Weapon
(Pounds)
Direct
Man-Hours
per
Weapon
Direct. Man-Hours
per 1,000 Pounds
of Output
A
Rifle, Ml
10.3
7.35
714
B
Browning Automatic Rifle,
Caliber .30
19.4
36.5
1, 881
C
Machine Gun, Caliber .50 126
45.0
357
D
81-mm Mortar 136
135
993
E
4.2-inch Mortar 340
285
838
F
40-mm Gun, Twin,
Automatic
2,000
3,730
1,865
G
105-mm Howitzer
6,565
4,200
640
H
155-mm Gun, SP
7, 350
21475
337
8-inch Howitzer,
SP
6,392
2,690
421
105-mm Howitzer,
SP
942
830
881
155-mm Howitzer,
SP
3,490
2,240
642
Unweighted Average of
Class H
570
The labor input per 1,000 pounds of weapons output varies
from 357 man-hours for a machine gun, caliber .50, to 1,865 man-hours
for a 40-mm AA gun and finally to 1,881 man-hours for an automatic
rifle.
In Table 6* the coefficients of Table 5 are applied to
all 23 Soviet ground and air force weapons of the 8 classes. In
addition, coefficients for each naval weapon, obtained from ORR, are
listed in Table 6 and are applied in'the same manner as the coefficients
for each of the ground force classes. The first column gives the
weight of the class in thousands of pounds. The second column gives
the direct man-hours per 1,000 pounds of output (derived from Table 5).
* Table 6 follows on p. 24.
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Direct Man-Hour Requirements per Bundle of Soviet Weapons a/
1953
Weight of Man-Hours
Class b per 1,000 Pounds Man-Hours
Class of Weapons (1,000 Pounds) Output per Bundle
A 10.9 714 7,783
B 0.9 1,881 119693
C 56.8 357 20,278
D 993 1, 787
E 17.4 838 14,581
F 108.8 1,865 202,912
G 842.5 64o 539,200
H 351.5 570 200,355
37-mm AA Single Gun
37- AA Twin Gun
45-mm AA Single Gun
3-inch/55 Single Gun
3-inch/55 DP Twin Gun
3.9-inch/51 Wet, Single
Gun
3.9-inch/56 DP Single
Gun
3.9-inch/56 DP Twin Gun
4.8-inch/46 Twin Gun
6-inch/50 Three-Gun
Turret
Bundle 2
1,178.4
626 . 4
67.4
545.7
352.8
496.0
890.6
2,349.0
3,186.0
8, 004.0
Total
a. See Table 5, p. 23, above.
b. See Table 2, p. 13, above.
c. ORR estimate.
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988,589
1, 4oo c/ 1,649,760
1,4oo 876,960
500 33,700
990 540,243
306,230
612 303,552
612 545,047
4oo 939,600
4oo 1, 274, 4oo
289 2,313,156
8,782,648
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and the last column, the product of the first two, shows the direct man-
hour requirements of each class and all classes per bundle of weapons.
The total number of direct man-hours required for Bundle 1 is
988,589 and for Bundle 2, 8,782,648. Allowing 2,500 man-hours per
man-year, 23/ the total labor requirements per Bundle 1 are 395.4
man-years, and for Bundle 2, 3,513.1 man-years.
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III. Output and Input.
In this section, output is considered in terms of bundles of
weapons. A level of output is established for the production
estimates in order that estimates of total input may be made.
A. Output.
The trends in gun production for more than two decades
are shown in Table 8.x-3- The figures in Table 8 relating to the
early 1930's are not so large as those quoted in the historical
discussion of Section I, because all plants are not covered in
the first series' of estimates, nor are al, guns included,
particularly tank guns and heavy guns. The production indexes
in the last column of Table 8, crude as they are, serve to in-
dicate major changes in gun production. The base years for the
two indexes are 1937 and 1941. The year 1937 was the middle year
of three fairly stable years for gun production, and 1941 was
the first year for which there are reliable data.
Production increased sharply from 1931 to 1933, corres-
ponding to the final years of the First Five Year Plan (1928-32)
and the beginning of the Second Five Year Plan (1933-37) and also
increased steadily from 1933. to 1940, with the exception of the
slight setback in 1934. The years from 1941 to 1944 were the
Table T -follows on p. 29.
Table 8 follows on p. 30.
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Table 7
Transportation Input per Unit of Weapons in the USSR J
Average Length Short-Ton-Kilometers
Short Tons of Haul b/ 26/ per Bundle of Weapons
per Bundle (Short-Ton- (Thousand Short-Ton-
Material of Weapons Kilometers) Kilometers)
Bundle 1
Coal
Petroleum
Steel
Aluminum
Copper
Lumber, Nonconstruc-
tion
Construction
Material
Capital Equipment
Coal 112,189
Petroleum 3,980 J
Steel 17,737
Aluminum 23
Copper 279
Lumber, Nonconstruc-
tion
Construction
Material 1,250
Capital Equipment 209
92,261.3 to 96,520.4
a. Not including transportation of rubber tires and antifriction bearings.
b. These are average haul figures for. 1950 .
c. Converted to weight from gallons.
d. Converted to weight from board feet.
e. Average haul for all freight.
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3,636 640 to 660
131 c/ 950 to 1,000
1,861 900 to l"000
6 900 to 1,000
13 900 to 1,000
69 / 1, 000 to 1, loo
2,327.0 to 2,399.8
124.5 to 131.0
1, 671+.9 to 1,861.0,
5.4 to 6.0
11.7 to 13.0
69.0 to 75.9
240 to 250 36.0 to 37.5
690 e/ 17.3 to 17.3
4,265.8 to 4,541.5
150
25
64o to 660 71,801.0 to 74,044.7
950 to 1,000 3,781.0 to 3,980.0
900 to 1,000 15,963.3 to 17,737.0
900 to 1,000 20.7 to 23.0
900 to 1,000 251.1 to 279.0
240 to 250 300.0 to 312.5
690 / 144.2 to 144.2
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years of expanding war production, which occurred in spite of the
structural changes in the armaments industry resulting from the
German invasion and the evacuation of plants eastward into the Urals.
The year 1944 was the high point in armaments output for the USSR.
Stalin stated in a speech at Moscow in 1946 31 that the average yearly
production of weapons in the USSR during the last 3 years of the war
was 120,000 guns,.450,000 machine guns, 3 million rifles, 2 million
submachine guns, and 100,000 mortars.*
Gun production declined considerably from 1944 to 1945,
from 40 to 47 percent. By 1948, after further declines, gun produc-
tion leveled off to between one-sixth and one-fifth of the highest
level in 1944, coinciding with a general trend in all armaments
production. 33
Table 8 gives the estimated figure for 1952 gun production
as 22,500 units, including spare parts. This figure is less re-
liable than the figures up to and including 1949. From 1949 to the
present, data with respect to gun plants have been less reliable
and less extensive than data before that time. Recent estimates of
gun production have been influenced by the stable trend of output
from 1947 through 1949.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, US Department of the Army,
has estimated that Soviet gun production in 1952 was 22,500_ units. For
small arms, the estimate is 317,500, and for mortars the estimate is
6,000, making a total for all units of 346,000. 34/ Table 9** shows the
weight of the 346,000 weapons as 131,629,730 pounds, or 65,815 short tons.
These weapons do not include the 23-mm and 37-mm aircraft cannons, rocket
launchers, or naval guns. Excluding these weapons from the represent-
. ative bundle, the weight of 1 bundle is 1,328,086 pounds, or 664 short
tons. If 664 short tons of weapons are equal to 1 bundle of weapons,
then 65,815 short tons of weapons are equal to 99 bundles. This number
of bundles is accepted as the estimate of weapons production.
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G-2 Estimates of Soviet Production of Weapons
and Weight of Weapons
1952
Pistols
Rifles
Submachine Guns
7.62-mm Machine Gun
12.7-mm Machine Gun
82-mm Mortar
120-mm Mortar
160-mm Mortar
76-mm Gun
85-mm Gun
100-mm Gun
122-mm Howitzer
122-mm Gun
152-mm Howitzer
152-mm Gun Howitzer
152-mm Gun
203-mm Howitzer
280-mm Howitzer
57-mm Gun
37-mm AA Gun
85-mm AA Gun
100-mm AA Gun
Super-Heavy Artillery
76-mm Gun, Tank, SP, and Spares
85-mm Gun, Tank, SP, and Spares
100-mm Gun, Tank, SP, and Spares
122-mm Gun, Tank, SP, and Spares
152-mm Gun, Tank, SP, and Spares
Total
Weight Production Weight
of Weapon Estimates of Weapons
(Pounds) (Units) (Pounds)
2.0 35,000 70,000
8.8 125,000 1,100,000
6.6 100,000 66o,ooo
28.7 50,000 1,435,000
89.1 7,500 668,250
317,500 3,933,250
128 3,000 384,000
606 2,000 1,212,000
2,381 1,000 2,381,000
6,ooo 3,977,000
2,460 4,200 10,332,000
3,748 1,000 3,748,000
7,628 1,000 7,628,000
4,960 1,200 5,952,000
15,692 600 9,415,200
7,937 8oo 6,349,600
15,714 8oo 12,571,200
40,093 6o 2,405,580
39,021 100 3,902,100
40,565 20 811,300
2,535 X00 1,267,500
4,630 1,000 4,630,000
9,480 1,000 9,480,000
23,148 500 11,574,000
97,000 a/ 20 1,940,000
1,:190 500 595,000
3,210 6,ooo 19,260,000
2,382 1,200 2,858,000
4,500 1,000 4,5oo,ooo
4,500 1,000 4,500,000
22,500 123,719,480
346,000 131,629,730
a. Average weight of the 210-mm Gun. and the 305-mm Howitzer.
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B. Input.
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1. In Real Units.
The input coefficients per representative unit of output
were developed in Section II. Multiplied by the output in representa-
tive bundles of weapons, the input coefficients yield the quantity of
inputs required for the estimated levels of weapons output. Table 10
lists the quantity of inputs required for the production of 99
representative units of Bundle 1 and 1 representative unit of
Bundle 2.
Inputs per Bundle of Weapons and Quantities of Input
of the Soviet Weapons Industry a/*
1953
1 2 3 4
Bundle 1
Input Total Inputs
Unit Input for Required Input for (Column 2 plus
Input of Input Bundle 1 99 Bundles Bundle 2 Column 3)
Labor Man-Year
Steel Short Tons
Aluminum Short Tons
Copper Short Tons
Coal Short Tons
Electric Power 1,000 Kilowatt-
Hours
Petroleum 1,.000 Gallons
Natural or
Producer. Gas 1,000 Cubic
395.4 39,145 3,513 42,658
1,861 184,239 17,735 201,974
6 594 23 617
13 1,287 729 2,016
3,636 359,964 112,189 472,153
1,704
36
168,696 48,823 217,519
3,564 1,081 4,645
1,063,656 335,949 1,399,605
Feet 10,744
Lumber, Noncon-
struction 1,000 Board
Feet
Antifriction
Bearings Units
'Rubber Tires Units
39 3,861 0 3,861
2,209 218,691 8,256 226,947
356 35,244 0 35,244
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Inputs per Bundle of Weapons and Quantities of Input
of the Soviet Weapons Industry
1953
(Continued)
Input
Unit
of Input
Input for
Bundle 1
Bundle 1
Input Total Inputs
:Required Input for (Column 2 plus
99 Bundles Bundle 2 Column 3)
Machine Tools
Units
3.5
347
29
376
Other Produc-
tive Equip-
ment
Short Tons
13.7
1,356
114
1
470
Construction
Materials
Short Tons
150
14
850
1
250
,
16
loo
Transportation. 1,000 Short-Ton-
Kilometers 4,542
P
449,609
,
96,520
,
546,129
The ruble value of the inputs received for the production of
weapons in the USSR is indicated in Table 11.-x- With the exception of
labor, the prices are those of 1 January 19`50. For labor the best
available estimate was that of current wages. It was not possible in
all cases to find the price of a particular item -- roller bearings, for
example. Instead, the price of a similar item was used, such as the_
price of ball bearings of similar dimensions and specifications.
The specific inputs listed in Table 12 are limited to
direct charges against the cost of production of weapons. In order to
establish the value of indirect charges, US cost data for weapons were
examined. The cost analysis by the Springfield Arsenal for small arms
Table 11 follows on p. 35.
Table 12 follows on p. 36.
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Ruble Value of Inputs at 1950 Prices Required
for Soviet Weapons Production in 1953
Price per
Unit 35
(Rubles)
Rubles Value of
Total Inputs
Total Input J (Million Rubles)
Labor
Man-Years 7,800 to 8,4o0
42,658
358.3
Petroleum
Metric Tons 405
14,392
5.8
Steel
Metric Tons 1,650 J
183,231
302.3
Aluminum
Metric Tons 10,360
56o
5.8
Copper
Metric Tons 9,000
1,829
16.5
Coal
Metric Tons 89 /
428,337
38.1
Electric
Power
1,000 Kilowatt-
Hours
500 J
217,519
108.8
Lumber, Non-
construction
1,000 Board
Feet
800
3,861
3.1
Antifriction
Bearings
35
226,947
7.9
Miscellaneous
Metals (Zinc,
Tin, and the
Like)
Metric Tons
8,-000 J
2,744
22.0
Transportation
1,000 Metric-
Ton-Kilometers
50
495,448
24.8
Rubber Tires
Units
300
35,244
10.6
Natural or
50
42,814
2.1
906.1
Indirect Costs
(125 Percent
of Direct Costs)
1,132.8
Total
2,038.9
a. The inputs expressed earlier in short tons are changed to metric tons.
b. Steel price is weighted to include both carbon and alloy prices.
c. Price at the mine.
d. Price when usage is at the rate needed by the average plant.
e. Miscellaneous metals is calculated as 1.5 times the weight of copier. This
is an estimate of alloying elements, particularly those used in brass or solder.
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revealed an approximate 1 to 1 ratio for direct cost to indirect cost.
Information for heavier weapons was not so precise but showed a higher
value for indirect cost -- in one case as high as 150 percent of the
direct, cost. It is assumed that indirect costs are 125 percent- of the
direct costs as calculated in Table 12. The total value of direct
and indirect inputs for 1952 is 2,040 million rubles in 1950 prices.
The defense budget including estimated supplementary
allocations is divided into munitions and nonmunitions components in
Table 12. The munitions portion is expressed both in current and in
constant 1940 prices.
Procurement in the Soviet Defense Budget
1949-53
Constant
1940
Explicit Supplementary
Munitions
Defense Budget Allocations
Nonmunitions Munitions Price
Price
Year
(Billion (Billion
Rubles) - Rubles) -
(Billion
Rubles) _
(Billion
Rubles)
Index
(194o=loo),
(Billion
Rubles)
1949
79.2
15
55
39.2
135
29.0
1950
82.9
15
56
41.9
115
36.4
1951
93.9
16
56
53.9
log
49.4
1952
108.6
16
56
68.2
106
64.3
1953
110.2
16
56
70.2
104
67.3
The price index decreased from 115 in 1950 to 106 in 1952;
therefore, the value of inputs in 1952 is 106/115 x 2,040 million rubles,
or 1,880 million rubles. This value of inputs into the Soviet weapons
industry in 1952 represents 2.75 percent of the munitions portion of the
defense budget. US weapons production is 5 percent of the munitions
portion of the defense budget, but that includes fire-control instruments
and other pieces of equipment which ordinarily accompany the weapon.
There has probably been a, great emphasis in the USSR during
the postwar years on the production of aircraft, guided-missiles, and
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electronic equipment in order to alleviate shortages and to enhance the
power position of the USSR. The proportionate value of expenditures
for weapons as defined in this report might well be lower than similar
items in the US.
IV. Capacity.
The fundamental policy guiding the operation of the weapons industry
in the USSR is that wax industries should not be separated from other
industries. In the words of the official Soviet press, "The problem is
in the assimilation of war production with commercial processes. The
manufacture of a tank and a tractor, of a commercial and military air-
plane, an automobile and an armored car, of an instrument used for
military and civil communication, naval and merchant marine shipbuilding,
and a number of other industries have a great many points in common.
Even artillery, machine guns, and rifles could be manufactured
successfully in the commercial factories. The cooperation of various
enterprises in manufacturing separate parts, to be assembled later on
in munitions factories, would further strengthen the national defense
of Soviet Russia." 36
Even though this official opinion was stated more than two decades
ago, it is essentially valid today. For example, the 19+1 Gosplan held
the armaments and munitions ministries responsible for the production
of such items as steam turbines, machine tools, instruments, steel
bands, celluloid, and forging and pressing equipment. Postwar
examples include motorcycles, bicycles, machine tools, fans, sewing
machines, and many others.
In the USSR there are 22 plants believed to be devoting all or
part of their facilities to producing guns, small arms, or both.
(See Appendix A.) The average floor space of the 22 producing plants
is 1,210,000 square feet. The average labor force is between
8,700 and 10,000, working in 2 full shifts.* The total number of
* It seems in most cases that 3 shifts are worked, but in total
employees the number amounts to no more than 2 full. shifts.
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workers engaged by these armaments plants ranges from a little more
than 191,000 to slightly more than 222,000, working in 2 full shifts. L7/
With minor retooling, the plants now devoting only part of their
facilities to weapons production probably could turn all of their
facilities to that use, in which case all their workers would be
producing weapons.* The maximum output. resulting would be 555 ground
and air force bundles per year (222,000 minus 3,513, the man-year re-
quirement for 1 naval bundle, divided by 395.4 man-years).- The 555
ground and air force bundles and 1 navy bundle would represent the
production of approximately 395,128 tons of weapons per year. Produc-
tion from the existing 22 plants, however, cannot be considered the
sole source of weapons for the Soviet armed forces. During World
War II, many plants producing various types of industrial products
were converted to weapons production, especially small arms and mortars.
There is every reason to believe a similar policy would be followed
during any future mobilization. The resulting output would be con-
siderably higher than the 395,128 tons of weapons per year.
V. Export and Import.
The movement of weapons between the West and the Soviet Bloc is
almost nonexistent, although some clandestine shipments are re-
ported. 38 There is, of course, movement of weapons between the USSR
and the Satellites. The pattern of this exchange is generally of the
following nature. Each of the Satellites produces some weapons or
parts of weapons. Many of these are exported to the USSR, and in
return the Satellites receive weapons which have become obsolescent
or which are being replaced in the Soviet Army. On balance, the USSR
probably exports more in the way of weapons to the Satellites than it
imports. Czechoslovakia and East Germany (on balance probably an im-
In the case of mobilization the number of workers employed in the
plants would be increased. It is assumed that the increase would
be sufficient to account for the indirect labor requirements, which
are not included in the labor input per bundle.
* It is assumed that naval requirements would remain constant.
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porter of weapons) reportedly have exported weapons to the USSR.*
Communist China, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania are
ultimately dependent in varying degrees on the USSR for supplies of
weapons. 40
There may be a further limiting characteristic of the trade
determined by the USSR's general policy of prohibiting the assembly.
of guns, as distinguished from small arms, in the Satellites: that
is, the import of weapons into the USSR is likely to consist of
small arms and unassembled gun parts, whereas the exports, con-
sisting of all items, probably favor major-caliber guns. 41
* Czechoslovakia reportedly delivered 540 100-mm Howitzers to
the USSR in 1951 to 1 September. In addition, between 12,000 and
15,000 submachine guns, 24,000 to 25,000 rifles, and 7,000 to
8,000 pistols were delivered.
** A report of a Sino-Soviet agreement stated that Communist China
was to be supplied with 1.4 billion rubles worth of weapons, in-
cluding 500 artillery pieces, 290 medium tanks and armored fighting
vehicles, 780 fighter planes, 54 bombers, and AA equipment.
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Table 14
Soviet Weapons with the US Equivalent Used for Estimating Metal Inputs 8-8/
Rifles and Carbines
Pistols
Submachine Guns
7.62-mm Machine Gun
12.7-mm Machine Gun
57-mm AA Gun
100-mm AA Gun
57-mm AT Gun
132-mm Rocket Launcher
82-mm Recoilless Rifle
82-mm Mortar
120-mm Mortar
160-mm Mortar-
85-mm Gun
122-mm Gun and Howitzer
152-mm Howitzer, Gun, Gun Howitzer
203-mm Howitzer
100-mm Tank Gun (T-54)
122-mm Tank Gun (JS)
100-mm SP Gun (SU-100)
,152-mm SP Gun (JSU-152)
23-mm Aircraft Cannon
37-mm Aircraft Cannon
Springfield Rifle, MA1903A1, Caliber .30..
Colt Pistol, M3, Caliber .45.
Thompson Submachine Gun, M3, Caliber .45.
Browning Automatic Rifle 1918A2, Caliber .30.
Browning Machine Gun, M2, Caliber .50.
40-mm Ml, Mount (M-5)
90-mm Ml and M1H1, AA Mount Mill
57-mm AT Gun
Multiple Rocket Launcher, 6 x 6 Mount
75-mm Recoilless Rifle
81-mm Mortar
4.2-inch Mortar
75-mm Field Gun,
105-mm Howitzer,
155-mm Howitzer
Mill
M2A1
155-rnm Gun, M2 and
90-mm Gun, M3A1
90-mm Gun, M3A1
90-mm Gun, M3A1
90-mm Gun, M3A1
37-mm Automatic Gun, M9
37-mm Automatic Gun, M9
37-mm AA Single Gun
37-mm AA Twin Gun
45-mm AA Single Gun
3-inch/55 Single Gun
3-inch/55 DP Twin Gun
3.9-inch/51 Wet, Single Gun
3.9-inch/56 DP Single Gun
3.9-inch/56 DP Twin Gun
4.8-inch/46 Twin Gun
6-inch/50 Three-Gun Turret
40-mm Single Gun, M3
40-mm Twin Gun, Mark 1
3-inch/50 DP Single Gun
3-inch/50 DP Single Gun
5-inch/25 Wet, Single Gun
5-inch/38 DP Single Gun, Mark 30
5-inch/38 DP Single Gun, Mark 32, Model 12
5-inch/38 Twin Gun, Mark 38, Model 1
6-inch/47 Three-Gun Turret, CL 155 Class
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