SURVEY OF THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES OF POLAND

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000600100001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 13, 1954
• Content Type: IR

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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SURVEY OF THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES
OF POLAND
CIA/RR PR-7$ ~~f; ;s.ry~,r.,i , , ~ LA58.
13 October 1.954 ~ .,... ~ ~ .~'.;, ` ~~ Y'`'
,~~/`~
;~- --
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
US ONLY
JC
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This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
town unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SURVEY OF THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES OF POLAND
CIA/RR PR-78
(ORR Project 38.253)
NOTICE
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Counnents and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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FOREWORD
The purpose of this report is to present a survey of Poland's
engineering industries which will indicate the present status and
capabilities of each major industry and show its place within the
framework of Poland's intensive industrialization program.
The position of Poland within the Soviet Bloc is of primary
intelligence significance. The correct evaluation of Poland's
engineering industries is of vital importance for the appraisal
of the over-all economic and war-waging capabilities of the USSR
and its Satellites.
This report is based on a study of a considerable variety of
material regarding Polish machine building industries, and of the
measures taken by the government to meet the goals outlined by the
Six Year Plan, which is designed to convert Poland into a powerful
industrial base for the Soviet Bloc.
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CONTENTS
Surrmiary and Conclusions 1
I. Introduction 2
A. Early Industrialization ? 2
1. Before 1940 2
2. Effect of World War II 3
3. Postwar Economic Planning 5
B. Industrial Base 5
1. Raw Materials 5
2. Electric Power 6
3. Manpower 6
II. Engineering Industries . 7
A. Organization 7
B. Production . 8
1. Industrial Machinery and Construction 8
Equipment
2. Mining Machinery 10
3. Agricultural Machinery 11.
4. Textile Machinery 13
5. Transportation - ? 14
a. Locomotives 14
b . Motor Vehicles 16
6.
7?
8.
9?
10.
Machine Tools 1~
Antifriction Bearings 19
Electrical Engineering 20
Shipbuilding 22
Armaments .. 24
a. Weapons 24
- v -
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Page
b. Ammunition .
... 25
11. Aircraft 26
III. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions .
. 2g
A. Capabilities 29
B. VulnPrahili+.;A~
Appendixes
Appendix A.
Major Engineering Industry Plants in Poland
33
Appendix B.
Geographic Coordinates of Polish Cities
Mentioned in the Report
43
Appendix C . .
Methodology
45
Appendix D.
Gaps in Intelligence
47
Appendix E.
Sources and Evaluation of Sources
49
Tables
1. Index of Industrial Production in Poland, Before 1940 4
2. Estimated Production of Tractors in. Poland, 1950-55 13
3? Estimated Production of Locomotives, Freight Cars, and
Railroad Passenger Cars in Poland, 1945-55 . 15
~+. Estimated Production of Motor Vehicles in Poland, 1948-53 16
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Page
5?
Estimated Production of Machine Tools of all Types
in Poland, 1948-55 18
6. Estimated Annual Capacity of Heavy Electrical
Machinery in Poland by Major Electrical Plant, as of
1 January 1953 . . 21
7. Estimated Production of Weapons in Poland, Fiscal
Year 1954 25
8. Airframe and Aircraft Engine Plante in Poland 28
9?
Estimated Production of Airframes and Aircraft
Engines in Poland, 1946-53 28
Illustrations
Following Page
Organization of the Polish Ministry of Machine
Industry (Chaxt) 8
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SURVEY OF THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES OF POLAND~-
Summary and Conclusions
The primary economic objective of the Communist regime in Pola.zid
is to develop and expand the country's engineering industries. This
program has been generally successful. The current Six Year Economic
Plan (1950-55) and its high production targets have been designed, in
fact, as an instrument for shifting Poland's economy from its tradi-
tional agricultural basis to a basis characterized by a high degree
of industrialization. The plan has been intended to prepare the
groundwork for the establishment of a Polish economy>patterned after
the Soviet model.
The reported nverfulfillment by 3.9 percent of the 1953 plan for
industrial production indicates that the industrialization tempo in
Poland is continuing its upward trend. The continuing expansion of
Poland's engineering industries in spite of a shortage of basic raw
materials (with the exception of coal, lead, zinc, and arsenic), an
inadequate supply of skilled workers, labor turnover, and absenteeism,
has been significant.
Although the industrial targets fixed for 1955, the final year of
the Six Year Plan, are very high, it may be assumed that most engi-
neering industries in Poland will fulfill or nearly fulfill these
production goals. This assumption is based upon the constant expansion
of these industries during the past 4 years, the determination of the
Polish government to use all the means of mass persuasion to bolster
labor productivity, the prospects of improved worker morale resulting
from the "new course," and the growing possibility of obtaining raw
materials and sem.if finished and finished products from abroad. The
pace of Poland's expansion of engineering industries might slow down
should present policy be modified by increasing production of consumer
goods for the purpose of eliminating underlying currents of dissatis-
faction caused by the shortage of such goods.
~ The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 August 1954.
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The postwar progress achieved in the field of engineering industry
could not have been achieved without the annexation of the highly in-
dustrialized German areas, which contain important plants producing
such items as heavy machinery, rolling stock, and vessels of all types.
In spite of these major acquisitions, however, Poland is still unable
to satisfy its requirements for many specialized types of industrial
machinery and equipment, including highway construction equipment,
hydraulic presses, excavators, crushing and grinding machinery, cranes,
and pumps. Poland's dependence on foreign imports of various types of
heavy machinery will remain long after the expiration of the current
Six Year Plan.
I. Introduction.
A. Early Industrialization.
1. Before 19+0.
After its political resurgence in 1919, Poland was faced
with the task of integrating into one system the economies of three
separate territories which had been under Russian, German, and Austrian
rule for some 125 years. One of the, government's major tasks was to
restore and expand industrial output and to improve the communications
system of the newly reunited nation. 1/~
Early in its existence, as a result of a lack of capital,
the Polish government felt compelled to resort to nationwide
* Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in
Appendix E.
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industrial planning and when necessary sought to bring private enter-
prises under state control. State planning was theref ore developed in
prewar Poland to a greater extent than in any other European country
except the USSR.
Bef ore the outbreak of World War II the Polish government
devoted considerable attention to the development of the armaments in-
dustry. This industry, operating since the early days of the resurgent
Polish Republic with-large subsidies and government assistance, con-
siderably increased its output of weapons, ammunition, and aircraft
following Hitler's. rise to power in 1933?
In 1937 the Polish government decided to create the new
Central Industrial District {Centralny Okreg Przemyslowy), an area of
some 60,000 square kilometers embracing the greater part of the
triangle limited by War-saw, .Krakow, and Lwow. This area, with a
population of about 5 million and containing considerable natural re-
sources and good agricultural land, was well suited for becoming the
foundation of Poland.'s projected industrial expansion. The govern-
ment's long-range plans were, however, abruptly stopped with the
outbreak of World War II. 2~
The Polish industrial production index in Table l~
reflects the depression of the early 1930's that sharply curtailed
production. In the latter years of the decade, improved economic
conditions, increased industrial capacity, and increased labor pro-
ductivity permitted previous production levels to be surpassed.
2. Effect of World War II.
By the end of World War II, industrial production in
Poland had declined to an extremely low level. War destruction did
incalculable damage to the transportation system, power plants, mines,
and other industrial installations.
Following the defeat of Germany, Poland was-once again
restored to the community of European ns,tions. It was, however, a
different Poland from that which had existed bef are the .outbreak of
World War II. In addition to the territory east of the so-called
Curzon line, the USSR annexed Lwow and its surrounding areas (ab out
70,000 square miles), while Poland, reduced to the role of a Soviet
~ Table 1 follows on p. ~+.
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Table 1
Index of Industrial Production in Poland
Before 1940
1928=100
Year
Index
1922-27
45
1928
100
1932
64
1933
70
1934
79
1935
85
1936
94
1937
111
1938
119
1939
126
Satellite, was granted about 42,000 square miles of former German
.territory. This land included the prized industrialized areas of
Silesia, Pomerania, and part of East Prussia.
Poland's present territory is approximately one-fifth
smaller than in 1939. Its population, reduced by mass exterminations,
forced deportations, and boundary changes, decreased from 3~-,360,000
in 1939 to 25,000,000 by the end of 1950. 4~
Although considerably smaller in total area, Poland pro-
fited from the acquisition of former German industrial areas. For
example, Polish hard coal production capacity was increased by nearly
80 percent, brown coal by 400 percent, coke by 160 percent, zinc and
lead by 150 percent, pig iron by 400,000 tons, and steel by 700,000
tons. In addition, Poland inherited engineering industry centers in
Gdansk, Elblag, Szezecin, Wroclaw, Zielona Gora, and Jelenia Gora. 5~
Conversely, the vast stretches of land ceded to the USSR, with the
exception of the Lwow area and of the Drohobycz area with its crude
oil wells, contained no mineral resources or industrial concentrations.
The acquisition of this wealth of raw materials and highly developed
industries was the prim.a,ry reason for the relatively quick pace of
Poland's economic and industrial recovery following World War II.
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3. Postwar Economic Planning.
Shortly after the end of World War II, Poland embarked on
an ambitious program of industrial planning. After the 19+5
Preliminary Plan, intended to meet the emergency conditions which
prevailed in devastated Poland, the Warsaw government initiated a
Three Year Plan which was to cover the years 19+7-49.
The goals set by the Three Year Plan were, for the most
part, achieved. According to official Polish announcements, the plan
was fulfilled by 100.6 percent. By the end of 19+9, it was claimed
that the output of Polish industrial production was almost 75 percent
greater than before World War II.
The Three Year Economic Plan was followed by the current
Six Year Plan (195-55), designed to transform Poland into a highly
industrialized Communist state following the pattern established by
the USSR.
Poland's reserves of raw materials, although-considerable,
are generally inadequate to meet the demands of the country's far-
reaching industrialization program. The mayor natural resource is
Poland's extensive coal deposits. This .asset is outweighed, however,
by the absence, shortage, or poor quality of most other raw materials.
With the exception of lead, zinc, and arsenic, Poland must rely on the
importation of almost all its requirements for nonferrous metals and
ferroalloys, although there are negligible deposits of copper, nickel,
tin, and manganese. 8/
Iron ore extraction is lagging behind the pressing needs of
industry. Moreover, Polish ore is of poor grade, containing an aver-
age of only 30 percent iron. The metallurgical industries have had to
import iron ore, which comes mostly from Sweden. The 1955 production
target of 3 million metric tons of iron ore will probably not be
attained. The Polish iron and steel industry will remain dependent
on imported ore for an indefinite period of time.
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2. Electric Power.
Poland's electric power generating capacity is presently
inadequate to meet the expanding needs of industry. The plants and
equipment are for the most part out-dated and the distribution net-
work is poorly developed. ~ Polish power stations are nearly all
thermal. Hydroelectric facilities account for only 6 percent of the
total power generating facilities in Poland, although there has been
a notable increase in emphasis upon hydroelectric developments in
Poland in recent years.
The 1955 target of 18 billion kilowatt-hours (kwh), later
raised to 19.3 billion kwh, appears unrealistic, even on the assumption
that the 11 new thermal and 7 new hydroelectric plants envisioned by
the Six Year Plan are completed.
Power stations attached to individual industrial plants
comprise an important segment of Poland's total generating capacity.
The current trend, however, is toward the establishment of large
central stations and the elimination of the smaller, less efficient
power plants.
3. Manpower.
Although Poland remains a predominantly agricultural
country, there has been in recent years a shift of workers from agri-
culture to industry, in insufficient numbers, however, to satisfy
Polish industrial requirements.
The shortage of industrial manpower, particularly skilled
workers and technicians, is one of the major weaknesses hampering
Poland's drive to increase its industrial capabilities. The lack of
industrial manpower is further aggravated by extensive absenteeism,
heavy turnover, the frequent desertion of rural workers from the
factories, and other forms of dissatisfaction. 10~
To remedy the manpower shortages the Polish government
has resorted to compulsory labor, increased employment of women, and
intensive training programs.
Labor is compulsory and regimented. The State Off ice of
Employment has the right to assign workers to any industry or plant
in which a need exists. Youths 14 years old come under the provisions
of the compulsory system.
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The employment of women in mines and industry, much empha-
sized by Communist authorities, has met with only partial success.
Besides the unwillingness of many women, particularly of peasant stock,
to leave their homes, there is also considerable reluctance on the part
of the management of mines, foundries, and engineering and chemical
industries to employ female labor.
The Six Year Plan calls for an intensive program of
technical. training to alleviate Poland's deficiencies of engineers
and skilled technicians. It is anticipated that over 1 million voca-
tional school graduates will have completed training courses by the end
of 1955. Industry and transportation services are to receive 580,000
graduates, construction 44,000, and agriculture 79,000. An additional
224,000 persons are scheduled to attend special technical courses with-
in the 6-year period of the economic plan.
The gravity of the manpower shortage has long been acknow-
ledged by the Polish government. Franciszek Bliniowski, Uice Chairman
of the State Planning Commission, addressing the Plenary Session of the
Polish Trade Unions on 29 July 1952, described the shortage of .manpower
in the building, iron, steel, and chemical industries as "grave." He
further stated that only increased employment of women and a check to
absenteeism and labor turnover could alleviate the manpower shortage
felt in all branches of the Polish engineering industry. 11~
II. Engineering Industries.
A. Organization.
The organizational structure of Polish industry and the
formulation of production plans are determined by the State Economic
Planning Commission and the Council of State, both of which are
responsive to the Polish United Workers Party (the Communist Party).
The task of exercising administrative control of the Polish economy,
including industrial planning and production, is the responsibility
of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers.
Postwar Polish industry was originally organized into six
echelons including: (1) the Ministry; (2) 21 Central Administrations;
(3) Board of Managers for each branch of industry;
(4)
Association;
(5) Enterprise, consisting of several plants; and
(6)
the individual
plant. In May 1950 a simplified system was put into effect consisting
of: (1) the Ministry, (2) Central Administrations, and (3) Ente~~-
prise. 12~
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In addition to the Central Administrations there exists
another form of administrative control over particular segments of
Polish industry in the form of Associations (Z~ednoczenia). The tasks
of the Central Administrations are to plan production of respective
branches of industry, plan and supervise capital investments, and
generally to exercise control and supervision of subordinate plants.
The Central Administrations are handling whole branches of industry on
a national scale. The Associations are organized instead on a terri-
torial basis and may be viewed as having an independent status, each
controlling a given number of plants within its territory. Since 1950
there has been a tendency to concentrate the control of industrial
plants under the direct authority of the Central Administrations with-
out the use of Associations.
The Ministry of Machin2 Building, formerly the Ministry of
Heavy Machinery, exercises control over all aspects of Poland`s engi-
neering industries. This Ministry is directly subordinated to Vice-
Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz, who is reported to be in charge of the
industries producing weapons and ammunition and of industrial plants
of special interest to the military authorities. 13 The actual con-
trol over Poland's war industry, including production of war material
and investment allocations for military plants, is presumably exercised
by a special military bureau of the State Economic Planning Commission,
which in turn would be directly responsible to the Ministry of
Defense . 1~+
The Ministry of Machine Industry, as shown in the chart,*
consists of l~+ d.epartments in charge of industrial activity, including
planning, investments, accounting, organization of cadres, labor re-
cruitment, and wages. An integral part of the ministry are 2.1 Central
Administrations, each controlling production of a particular branch of
industry, for example, the Central Administration of Heavy Machinery
Construction. Three separate offices of the Ministry deal with sup-
plies for workers, transportation, and organizational-administrative
matters. 15/
B. Production.
1. Industrial Machinery and Construction Equipment.
As a result of the acquisition of ma,~or former German
plants, Poland's ability to produce heavy machinery and construction
~ Chart follows p. 8.
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equipment is much greater than in the prewar period. Polish plants in
this industry, however, are still unable to meet the demands of the
expanding Polish economy. The shortage of skilled manpower, lack of
high-grade technical personnel, and inadequate plant facilities are
major stumbling blocks in this industry. Poland must depend on the
importation of substantial quantities of heavy machinery, particularly
highway construction machines, hydraulic presses, excavators, crushing.
and grinding machinery, cranes, and pumps. ~ Italy, Switzerland,-
F'rance, and West Germany are Poland's principal suppliers of this type
of machinery. 17/ In spite of recent advances, Poland will depend for
many years on the importation of heavy machinery and equipment. 18~
The Six Year Plan calls for the .production of 1,150 con-
crete.mixers, 1~+0 heavy cranes, 75 excavators, and 2,150 construction
hoists in 1855. Although there is insufficient information upon which
to base a firm estimate of 1953 production, it appears that some
genuine progress has been made toward achievement of the goals set for
1955?
In January 195+ it was announced that as the result of a
-special Soviet license,-the Warsaw Workshops of Building Installations
started preparatory work for the assembly of a new type of crane, the
Unwersalnyi Bazennyi Kran (UBK-1). Production of these cranes was to
begin in 1854. 19~
In addition, the Central Workshops of Equipment of
Municipal Building (CWS) in Warsaw completed by the end of 1953 pro-
duction of the first group of 12-ton self-propelling cranes, designated
"Pazdziernik 36." This type of crane, never produced bef ore in Poland,
can lift and transfer materials on the building site as well as trans-
port them over longer distances. The CWS Workshops are expected to
produce ~+0 cranes of this type in 1g5~-. 20~
The Warsaw Industrial Equipment Plant, which produced
tower cranes and flat-bed trailers for the first time in Poland in
1951, is manufacturing new construction machinery. This plant has
started production of excavators patterned on the designs of the Soviet
E-505 machine. The shovel capacity of this machine is 0.5 cubic
meters. 21~
Appendix A shows the principal Polish 'plants currently en-
gaged in the production of heavy machinery and construction equipment.
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2. Mining Machinery.
The production of mining machinery and equipment is
below the needs of Poland`s intensively exploited coal mining in-
dustry. The need for additional output in this field is pointed up
by the continuing breakdown of old, worn-out mining machines, a
constant cause of trouble in Polish mines. Special teams have been
organized in. the mines to recondition the old machinery and equip-
ment, indicating the seriousness with which the authorities view this
problem. The Six Year Plan calls for the production of mining ma-
chinery in 1955 of a total value of 290 million zloty at 1937 prices.
Increased production of modern, efficient mining machinery
has a high .priority in the plans of the .Polish government, since Poland
earns a major share of its foreign exchange by exporting coal. 22/ An
increased availability of mining machinery and equipment is a basic
requirement for the attainment of the 1955 production goal of 100 miles
lion tons of hard coal.
Mechanization, electrification, and improved ventilation
of old mines are goals stressed in the Six Year Plan and the so-called
"Miners' Charter." The latter is a series of regulations for the
benefit of the coal industry and its workers. 23/
Production of mining machinery and equipment amounted to
13,561 tons in 19+6, 22,088 tons in 19+7, and 2+,000 tons in 19+8. 2~+/
There are no data available for output in subsequent years. The 19r+$
plan called for the manufacture of 8,000 cars, 600 pumps, 210 cutting
machines, 2,x+00 rock drillers, and 2,200 pneumatic pick hammers in
that year. 25/ These output figures were probably not reached because
of the shortage of materials, machine tools, and skilled labor which
plagued the mining machine industry in the postwar years and which
still presents serious drawbacks to continued expansion in output.
The Central Administration of the Mining Machinery
Building Industry reported fulfillment of the 1953 production
plan. 26/ The official communique stated that mining machinery plants
increased their output approximately 20 percent in 1953 over the pre-
vious year. According to the Polish press the mining machinery and
equipment industry in Poland is presently producing some 500 basic
types of mining equipment and installations. 27/
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The USSR has supplied Poland with technicians. and plans for
Soviet-designed mining machines, including the Donbas-type combine. 28
The first Donbas-type combine entirely produced in Poland (KW-17) was
announced in July 1951. 29 This combine was manufactured at the
Mining Machinery Works in Piotrowice. The announcement stressed at
that time that the Piotrowice plant was scheduled to enter into batch
production of these machines. This plant has now completed production
of the prototype of a coal cutting, crushing, and loading machine
known as Lupacz (L5)? 3~ According to the Polish press the first ma-
chine of this type was initially developed in 19+6, but no steps were
taken toward placing it in serial production because of negligence s.nd
lengthy bureaucratic procedures in the Ministry of Mining and the Ma-
chine Building Construction Bureau. This machine was reported to be
undergoing tests in the Siemianowice colliery in the fall of 1953. 31
Appendix A gives Poland's major mining machinery plants.
3. Agricultural Machinery.
The Polish government is well aware that increases in
agricultural production, apart from overcoming peasant resistance, are
largely dependent on increased availability of agricultural machinery.
Plants producing agricultural machines and implements in
Poland are affiliated with, and controlled by, the Union of Agri-
cultural Machinery Industry with headquarters in Bydgoszcz and Lodz.
The major task of this organization is to speed up the production of
agricultural machinery and increase the availability of spare parts.
To judge from frequent complaints in the Polish press,
agricultural machinery,. both new and old, is of generally poor quality
and was produced at excessive cost. ~2~
Polish agricultural machines in general, and tractors in
particular, are subject to considerable deterioration because of
poorly trained operators, inadequate repair shops, and shortage of
parts for tractors of Western origin. Efforts have been-made to check
this deterioration, but its rate, in spite of some improvement in the
last two years is still high. It is the hope of the Polish authori-
ties that State Machine Centers can assist Poland's peasantry,
especially the collective farms, in repairing machinery and preventing
its deterioration. 33
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The Six Year Plan calls for a 1955 production target of
750 harvester combines, 14,300 tractor plows, 5,000 tractor sowing ma-
chines, 5,600 sheaf binders, and 6,000 motorized threshing machines.
The total value of 1955 agricultural machinery output is anticipated
to amount to 130 million zloty (in 1937 prices), almost triple. the
value of the machinery produced in 1950. 34
Production of this quantity and variety could not be
reached with existing postwar facilities. In order to fulfill the
ambitious program of the Six Year Plan two large new factories were
built, one in Brzeg on. the Oder River and another in Staroleka near
Poznan. In addition, existing plants were rehabilitated and ex-
panded. 35 The Brzeg factory reportedly began production in 1953s
specializing in sowing machines and artificial fertilizer spreaders.
The capacity of this plant will be 3 times the entire 1952 production
of sowing machines in Poland. ~ The Staroleka factory will specia-
lize in the production of modern harvesting combines of Soviet design.
This plant is officially expected to begin full production in 1955 and
should then account for approximately 30 percent of total Polish pro-
duction of agricultural machinery. 37/
Po:iish press reports indicate that the agricultural ma-
chine factory in Plock has been engaged in the serial production of
reaping and binding machines patterned on Soviet designs. Production
of new types of agricultural machines such as mechanical mowers,
grain-dyers, beet harvesting combines, and milking machines is now
taking place.
The production of tractors in Poland is presently con-
centrated in one large plant, URSUS Plant No. 1 in C2echowice near
Warsaw. This plant began production in 1947. 38/ The first tractors
produced were copies of the "Ea,ng Bulldog 45" ~LB-45), later designated
the URSUS-45. 39 Production of a second model, the URSUS-30, started
in 1948. Both versions are driven by a horizontal, single-cylinder
engine. 40
The main weakness of the URSUS tractors is the poor
quality of castings and mechanical parts. These tractors are much more
suited for agricultural than construction purposes. The Polish press
has cited the URSUS plant on a number of occasions for "technological
errors" in production and a lack of discipline among its labor
force. 41/
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.The proposed expansion of this plant would have to be on a
major scale in order to meet the 1955 target goal of 11,000 tractors
annually.
The estimated production of tractors- in Poland for 1950-55
is given in Table 2.
Estimated Production of Tractors in Poland ~+2~
1950-55
Year
URSUS-30
URSUS-45
Total
1950
2,800
1,200
~+,ooo
1951
3,000
1,150
,X50
1952
~+, o00
1, 800
5, 800
1953
x+,700
2,000
6,700
1954
6,000
2,700
8,700
1955
7,700
3,300
ll,ooo
1+. Textile Machinery.
The textile machinery output in Poland is probably
sufficient to meet the essential needs of the textile industry,
although there-are notable exceptions, such as the shortage of
spinnirg machines and of spare parts. In 1952, serial production
was reportedly begun on a number of new machines, including rayon-
spinning machines, some types of cotton-carding machines, modern
automatic looms, and other types of textile machinery.
It is estimated that the 1952 production of textile ma-
chinery of-the type indicated above amounted to 5,000 units, of which
looms aec~unted for a little over orie-half. It required about-3,000
workers to produce this quantity, which weighs about 15,000 metric
tons. 43/
Factories producing textile machines and equipment are,
for the most part, located in Bielsko, Zdunska Wola, and Lodz. The
Textile Machinery Associatir.~, which had controlled 16 factories in
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1950, comprises now only 10 factories following the amalgamation of
some small enterprises and the exclusion of those with less than
50 workers . ~+1+
The two principal textile machinery producing plants are
the Fabryka Maszyn Wlokienniczych (formerly Josephy) in Bielsko and
the Widzewska Fabryka Maszyn Wlokienniczych in Lodz. Among the types
of machines produced by the Bielsko plant are carding machines, self-
acting-mules, s,nd ring spinning machines. The present labor force of
this plant, which has notably increased its output during the last
few years, amounts to about 2,500 workers. The well-equipped Lodz
plant was scheduled to produce cotton-spinning machines with 25,000
spindles in 1953, with 50,000 spindles in 1954aand with 100,000
spindles in 1955? ~+5 The plant was reported to employ 750 workers.
There are insufficient data pertaining to the output of
Poland's minor textile machinery manufacturing plants (among them,.
the Zdunska Wola factory, the textile machinery plant at Kamienna
Gora, and the former Mueller and Seidel factory in Lodz) to permit
production estimates.
5? Transportation.
Poland's present capacity for the production of steam
locomotives, railroad cars, and other rolling stock is more than
adequate to meet domestic requirements. As a result, the USSR is
directly benefiting from the increased output of Poland's railroad
transportation industry. Due to the shortage of transportation equip-
ment in the USSR, the Soviet authorities have placed increasing
demands upon the Polish railroad transportation equipment industry. 46
In addition, Poland has also been reported supplying locomotives to
China, Bulgaria, and Albania.
This Polish industry has also advanced technically.
During 1952-53, the Panstwowa Fabryka Wagonow-Pafawag (.State Railroad
Car Factory) in Wroclaw began the construction of electric locomotives.
The sixth and seventh electric locomotive produced by this plant were
scheduled to begin operation on the Warsaw-Lodz line in May 195+? ~+7
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Estimates of production of locomotives and of freight
and railroad passenger cars for the ,period- 1945-55 are given in Table 3.
Estimated Production of Locomotives, Freight Cars,
and Railroad Passenger Cars in Poland
1945-55 ~+8/
Freight Cars Railroad
(2-Axle Equiva.Lent Passenger
Year Locomotives Units) Cars
1945
75
1946
178
5,221
5
1947
254
11,458
108
1948
265
15,000
232
1949
267
14,200
200
1950
237
16,200 a/
300
1951
261
20,000
400
1952
290
16,400 a/
400
1953
320 to 360
12,800 to 14,400 a/
400
1954-
450 a/
16,400 a/
400
1955
465 a/
18,800 a/
630
The 1945-55 estimated production figures given in
Table 3 are in general. agreement with planned targets. The production
of passenger cars will most likely continue at the rate of 400 units
annually until the last year of the Six-Year Plan.
The acquisition, as a result of boundary changes, of
the highly developed former German plants has been largely responsible
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for the substantial increase in freight car production in Poland.
These plants have included the Zaklady Zaodrzanskie Budowy Mostowa.
Wagonow (Trans-Oder Bridge and Car Works) in Jelenia Gora and the
Panstwowa Fabryka Wagonow-Pafawag. Appendix A gives the names, location,
and supporting data for Poland's major railroad equipment manufacturing
plants.
b. Motor Vehicles.
The capacity of Poland's automotive industry has been
greatly expanded during the last 3 years as a result of the construc-
tion of 2 truck factories and 1 passenger car factory. The increase
in capacity is reflected in the 1951-53 production figures given in
Table 4, which presents the estimated production of the Polish motor
vehicle industry for 1948-53?
Estimated Production of Motor Vehicles
in Poland 50
1948-53
Year
Trucks
Passenger Cars
Motorcycles
1948
20
0
1849
240
0
6,000
1950
900
0
N.A.
1951
2500
10
N.A.
1952
6, goo
1,500
N.A.
1953
11,000
2,50o
N.A.
1955 (Plan)
25,000
12,000
32,000
The Polish automotive industry is largely dependent on
the USSR however, for parts, components, and technological assis-
tance. 51~ Unless additional parts are made available and more skilled
labor procured, it is doubtful whether Poland will be capable of pro-
ducing the plan goals of 25.,000 trucks, 12,000 passenger cars, and
32,000 motorcycles anticipated for 1955?x'
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Before World War II, Poland had practically no motor.
vehicle industry. 52 In May 1846, plans were initiated to build two
factories for the production of trucks, one in Starachowice and the
other in Lublin; one factory in Zeran to assemble passenger cars; and
a factory in Warsaw to manufacture motorcycles. 53~
The. new Starachowice Truck Plant has been producing
the 2-1~2-ton Star-20 trucks. This truck has served as a prototype
far the construction of the Star-50 truck, primarily designed as a
bus, with a useful load capacity of 3 tons. Other versions of Star-20
trucks reportedly under construction at Starachowice include fire
engines with a separate pump motor and tank trucks with 2,500 liters
capacity. 54
The Lublin plant, still under construction, has been
assembling the Lublin-5l-type truck. This is the 2-1~2-ton OAZ-51
truck built from parts supplied by the Molotov Truck Factory at Gor'kiy
in the USSR. The ~-cylinder engine of this truck develops 70 horse-
power. Its maximum speed does not exceed 70 kilometers per hour.
The Zeran Passenger Automobile Plant, originally
scheduled to produce-FIAT vehicles, has been assembling the Soviet
Pobeda cars appearing under-the markings of M-20 Warszawa. This
factory should eventually be capable of manufacturing an all-Polish
product, since it is now producing its own engines and other complicated
units of the car . 56
Appendix A lists Poland's main plants producing trucks
and passenger cars.
6. Machine Tools.
In 1948 the Polish machine tool industry could produce only
one-fourth of the country's domestic requirements. As a result of
Poland's postwar industrialization, the machine tool industry* was cap-
able of meeting the 1953 Production target of 20,300 tons 57 estimated
to be equal to E>,200 units.~*
-~ According to official Polish announcements, the machine tool in-
dustry failed to fulf ill the 1953 plan. These announcements evidently
refer to metalworking machine tools generally. Machine toals in the
definition of CIA are one part of the larger class of metalworking ma-
chines which also includes hammers, presses, shears, and the like.
-~ CIA estimate.
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Nevertheless, it appears doubtful whether the high 1955 Pro-
duction goal of 12,000 units can be met. The large differential between
the 1953 plan and 1955 goal appears excessive for the 2-year period in-
volved. In addition, the Polish machine tool industry is still dependent
on imports of component parts which, together with a lack of skilled
labor, could prevent the major spurt in production necessary to meet the
1955 plan.
The present level in technology in the Polish machine tool
industry is considerably below corresponding Western industrial standards.
Many of the machine tools produced in Poland have features copied from
Soviet models. The next few years will show whether the Polish machine
tool industry can develop an independent domestic technology.
The estimated annual production of machine tools of all
types for the period 19+8-55 is indicated in Table 5.
Table 5
Estimated Production of Machine Tools of All Types in Poland
19+8-55
Year
Machine Tools
19+8
3, 293
19+9
~+~ 695
1950
5, ~+oo
1951
5,g4o
X952
6,530
1953
6,200
1954
9,020
1955
12,000 J
In spite of the growing domestic need for machine tools and
the necessity of importing machine tools (mostly of heavy duty and
precision types) from abroad, Poland has been delivering machine tools
to Communist China, Rumania, and probably Bulgaria. 58~ The Polish
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press :has exploited these exports as an example of the economic
integration of the Satellites. Polish propaganda Y,a.s claimed that
this industry has been rehabilitated to the extent of exporting ma-
chine tools abroad. These exports are not indicative, however, of
excess Polish capacity in all types of machine tool production.
Appendix A lists the principal producers of machine tools
7. Antifriction Bearings.
Poland is extremely short of antifriction bearings. By
far the largest share of Poland's antifriction bearings requirements
must be imported. In the hope of remedying this critical shortage,
the Machine Industry Department of the State Economic Planning
Commission (PKPG), in conjunction with the interested industrial
ministries, formed in August 1953 a commission for the purpose of
spurring the rebuilding of roller bearings. In collaboration with
the Design Office for Roller Bearings (B.iuro Konstrukcy~ne Lozysk
Tocznych) 59 of the Ministry of Machine .Industry, the Commission is
to conduct research and recommend unif orm technical methods for the
rebuilding of roller bearings. The existing Central Off ice of Anti-
friction Bearings (Centralne Biuro Lozysk Tocznych-CEBILOZ), which was
set up on 30 April 1950 to reduce the impact of this shortage by con-
trol of maintenance and use of bearings, achieved limited results in
its efforts to supply the growing demand for antifriction bearings. 60~
Nevertheless, the shortage of bearings has continued to
exist in Poland as well as in the entire Soviet Bloc and is of
significant proportions. 61 The insistence of the Polish government
on including embargo-type bearings in its trade negotiations with
Western countries, the use of illegal channels to procure antifriction
bearings, the willingness to pay high prices, and reported bearings-
smuggling by Polish diplomatic couriers returning from Western Europe
indicate how acutely this shortage is being felt by Polish industry. 62
The total value of Polish imports of antifriction bearings
from the West, through legal and illegal channels,-was about $5,300,000
in 1950 (estimated 2,366,000 units), and about $4,300,000 in 1951
(estimated 2,076,000 units). 63
There was no production of antifriction bearings in Poland
from 1919 to 1950. The first efforts to develop such production were
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reported in March 19+8. Production did not actually begin until 1950,
when the Fabryka Wyrobow Metalowych (Metal Products Plant) was set up
in Krasnik, near Lublin. ~ The USSR supplied equipment, plans, and
technical assistance to build this plant. Sinee reports concerning
production of ant ifriction bearings at Stalowa Wola, near Nisko, have
not been confirmed, Polish production may be considered as limited
almost exclusively to the Krasnik plant.
The Krasnik antifriction bearings plant produced an esti-
mated 500,000 units in 1951, the first year of its full-scale produc-
tion. ~ Information pertaining to the 1952 and 1853 production of
this plant is too scarce to make a reliable and sound estimate of its
output for the last 2 years.
8. Electrical Engineering.
There are about 60 factories in Poland coming within the
category of the electrotechnical industry. The Polish goverrunent has
devoted increasing attention to the development of this industry,
which had suffered severe war damage. Almost all of these plants
have undergone construction, rehabilitation, or conversion since the
end of World War II. 66
The progress of Poland's industrialization depends in
considerable measure upon an adequate supply of motors, generators,
turbines, transformers, and other electrical equipment. The dependence
on supplies of semifinished products from abroad and the shortage of
skilled workers which this industry requires are the two major defi-
ciencies blocking the quick development of the electrotechnical in-
dustry in Poland. 67~
These plants will not be able to supply the necessary
electrical equipment required for the power-generation program. The
minor electrotechnical items, such as radios, telephones, and signal
equipment, will be produced in sufficient supply for civilian consump-
tion by the end of the Six Yedr Plan.
The estimated annual capacity of heavy electrical machinery
as of 1 January 1953 is shown in Table 6.
* Table follows on p. 21.
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Table 6
Estimated Annual Capacity of HeaXy Electrical Machinery in Poland
by Ma,,jor Electrical Plant, as of 1 January 1953
Plant
Motors
~
Generators
~kw~
Transf ormers
~~a~
Turbines
~~~
Zaklady
_
100,000
Small
100,000
Negligible
Eiektro Mechaniczne
quantity
Rohn-Zielinski,
ZycYtlin
Fabryka Maszyn
10,000
Small
None
Negligible
Elektrycznych
quantity
MY10, Wroclaw
Total
110,000
100,000
Poland's industrial planners have been striving to increase
production. of electrical equipment and machinery, while less attention
is given to the. output of such products as cables, wires, and storage
batteries.
The current production capacity and output of the. Polish
electronics industry, which was almost entirely wiped out during
World War II, is negligible. The former Philips-Wola tube and Lamp
factory in Warsaw was rebuilt during 1950 and 1951 with machinery and
technical assistance of the Philips Company of the Netherlands. This
plant is expected to become the.ma~or producer of tubes. The present
output is much below its capacity. 69
The Communist authorities have selected the capital city
of Warsaw as a center for telecommunications equipment factories pro-
ducing amplifiers and loudspeakers. 70 The available data on the
production of .Polish radio receivers are generally inadequate to obtain
a reliable estimate of their present output.
The Polish electrical industry has shown signif icant pro-
gress resulting from the government's. intensive interest in its
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development. Much will hate to be done., however, to come close to ful-
filling the targets set by the plan for this industry in 1955?
According to the Six Year Plan, the value of production of the electro-
technical industry is to be more than tripled, amounting to at least
900 million zloty in 1937 prices.
The 1955 targets of the Six Year Plan call for an annual
production of (a) 170,000 units of electric motors up to 50 kw,
(b) 5.,000 units of electric motors of more than 50 kw, (c) 2.4 million
kva power transformer equipme~rt, and (d) distribution equipment and
safet~r apparatus valued at 181 million zloty at 1937 prices. 72 The
plan calls also for an output of 22,000 tons of high-tension under-
ground cables, 33 million standard electric lamps, 85,000 standard
telephone handsets, and 300,000 radio receiving sets.
Appendix A lists Poland's major plants engaged in pro-
ducing electrical machinery and equipment.
9. Shipbuilding.
Before the start of World War II, Poland had only one
shipbuilding and repair establishment at Gdynia, a tiny fishing
village transformed by the Polish government into one of the best-
equipped harbors in Europe. At present, as a result of the postwar
territorial changes, Poland has 16 shipbuilding and repair yards, 73/
employing a labor force estimated at 32,000 men. These yards, how-
ever, had suffered .considerable damage by bombing and dismantling,
and only some of them have been restored to their full productive
capacity. Among those restored are 2 large yards in Gdansk, 1 in
Gdynia, and 2 in Szczecin on the Oder River, in addition to minor
shipbuilding plants at Wroclaw, Maloszyu, Swinoujscie, Leba, Ustka,
and Wladyslawow. 74
The fact that Polish ships are carrying an increasing
bulk of cargo from the Satellite countries to Communist China may
prove to be an incentive in furthering greater shipbuilding activities
in Poland. Expansion of the existing shipbuilding and .ship re~5air
yards and an increased output of vessels may be expected. 75
~' CIA estimate.
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The Six Year Plan calls for the construction of not less
than 149,920 deadweight tons (DWT) in 1955? It also calls for the
extension and modernization of existing plants and the adoption of new
techniques, particularly in the prefabrication of parts and sectional
assembly of hulls. 76/
The shipbuilding industry in Poland produced about 49,000
DWT in 1953, including the first vessel built at the Stocznia
Szczecinska yard in Szczecin, a collier of 3_,800 DWT. The 1953 pro-
duction target called for 117,000 DWT, but it is estimated that only
42 percent of the ambitious ship-construction target of last year
was completed. 77
The present available facilities of the Polish shipyards
are adequate to meet domestic requirements for all types of craft.
They are used, however, to fill construction orders coming from the
USSR. Since the USSR is concentrating on the building of naval craft,
the Satellite shipyards, and especially those of Poland, are required
to provide building and repair facilities., space, and labor force for
the needs of the. Soviet merchant marine. 78
In 1953, Polish shipyards reportedly completed for tYie
USSR 2 Donbas-type vessels, 3 Levant Class, 5 Soldek ore and coal
carriers, 1 Kolno Class vessel, 1 Bug Class, 6 Melitopol Class,
6 super trawlers, and 20 regular trawlers (157 gross register tons
each). The total tonnage of vessels delivered to the USSR amounted
to 36,893 gross register tons. 79/
The factors limiting production of ships in Polish yards
are principally shortage of skilled labor and lack of facilities to
produce marine diesel engines. 80 Although the Polish government
has been training large "cadres of youth for the purpose of chan-
neling them to shipbuilding activities, the lack of technicians and
skilled workers is still felt in Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin, and other
shipbuilding centers. Marine engines are obtained in Italy, the Free
Territory of Trieste, and Switzerland, 81 and from other Western
European countries. As far as steam engines and other necessary ship
components are concerned, Poland does not depend on imports of these
articles from abroad, since they are mostly produced in domestic
plants.
Appendix A indicates locations, names, and types of
vessels produced .in Poland's principal shipyards.
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a. Weapons.
The Communist regime in Poland planned to establish in
the irtunediate postwar period a complete and integrated armaments in-
dustry. The USSR, however, ordered the abandonment of these plants
for two main reasons: (1) to channel Poland's maximum efforts toward
the rebuilding of damaged industrial plants and the realization of
the Three Year Plan, and (2) to prevent the resurgence of an armaments
industry in a country which has nurtured for centuries strong anti-
Russian feelings. Consequently, the Central Administration of Armaments
Industry was disbanded in June 19+7. The dependence of the Polish Army
on the USSR for all types of heavy weapons became an accomplished
fact. 82 This was later formally sanctioned in the 19+9 Polish-.Soviet
Agreement, which defined the scope of the Polish armaments production.
According to its terms, Poland was to manufacture pistols, rifles, ma-
chineguns, light antiaircraft, antitank weapons, and ammunition -- all
Soviet types. 83/
At present, at least five plants, in addition to several
small factories, produce weapons for the Polish armed forces. Although
several reports mentioned tank production in Poland, it is well
established that no armored vehicles are produced in Polish plants.
They are limited in this field to the repair and overhaul of Soviet
tanks and tank equipment. Several tank repair centers have been
established to repair and keep in operation Soviet tanks supplied to
the Polish Army. These centers call upon certain industrial plants for
the production of a limited number of component parts. 8~+/
Estimates of the weapons production in Poland for the
fiscal year 195+ are given in Table 7.~--~
Poland's production of mortars and artillery is not
known, but it is estimated to be -very modest, almost negligible from
the viewpoint of Soviet Bloc armament requirements.
In the plans of the USSR, Poland does not appear to
figure as an important factor as far as the production of complete
weapons is concerned. The primary role assigned to this Satellite is
~ CIA estimate.
~ Table 7 follows on p. 25.
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Table 7
Estimated Production, of Weapons in Poland 85/
Fiscal Year 1q5~+
Pistols
5x000
Rifles and Carbines
90,000
Submachineguns
50,000
Light Machineguns
5,000
as a producer of semifinished and finished components used in tanks
and artillery.. The extents if any, of future changes in the type
of weapons to be produced in Poland will be determined by the USSR.
One may assume, however that the USSR will be disinclined to allow
Poland to produce complete weapons of the heavier types. 86/
In the event of war, Poland's armaments plants will
not be in a position to produce modern types of heavy weapons. In
view of the unquestionable expansion of the .country's metallurgical
and engineering industries Poland could, however supply certain.
classes of light weapons and a variety of components. Many of the
heavy steel plants in Poland have been mentioned as contributing
minor amounts. of rough castings and forgings for artillery pieces. 87/
b. Ammunition.
The ammunition industry in Poland has been given in-
creased attention in the past few years. Existing plants have been
expanded and a few new facilities have been added. Poland has
apparently now been assigned a greater place among the Soviet Bloc
ammunition industries than seemed to be the case in the immediate
postwar period. At present, Polish potential is second only to
C zechoslovakia~ although the actual production of Poland may be less
than that of Hungary.
The present organization of the ammunition industry
appears designed tos,.1pply Poland's requirements for pedc:etime mili-
tary use and to permit a surplus. for moderate reserves, with some
components reportedly planned for export to the. USSR. Although the
industry would not be capable at present of self-sufficiency in
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wartime, its continuing expansion indicates that such capability may
be included in the ultimate plan for over-all production. 88/
The considerable degree of uncertainty concerning
current activities in Poland's ammunition-producing plants is an in-
evitable result of the time-lag in receiving information pertaining
to the status and output of these plants.
The 1953 minimum production is estimated at 2,x+00 tons.
This estimate is based on the ammunition needs for training purposes
of the Polish Army, plus a small amount of stockpiling. 89/ Poland
probably is producing more than these estimated minimum needs, although
its production may not cover all. classes of ammunition.
Between 30 and ~+0 ammunition plants, several of which
are of recent construction, 90/ are engaged in some type of ammunition
production. The largest group of these plants is located in the highly
industrialized Silesian region. There are, however, enough factories
in other localities to maintain limited production in case the major
groups are eliminated by military action.
The output of Poland's ammunition industry may now be
adequate for its needs as far as small arms ammunition, grenades, and
mines are concerned. It may be assumed, however, that for several
years Poland will still depend upon imports for larger caliber artillery
ammunition in amounts exceeding those normally required for training
purposes.
Appendix A indicates the major Polish plants engaged in
the production of ammunition.
11. Aircraft. 91/
Although the Polish aircraft industry has produced very
few powered aircraft since the war, it is the only MIG-15 producer in
the Satellites other than Czechoslovakia.
At the beginning of World War II the major aircraft plants
were at Warsaw/Okecie, Mielec, and Rzeszow. The total floor area for
the industry was about 2 million square feet. Within a few days of the
start of World War II the two largest plants at Warsaw/Okecie were
badly damaged by bombing. The Germans took over the remaining facili-
ties and used them for repair work and components manufacture, although
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they never integrated the Polish plants very closely into their own
efforts .
By-the end of the war the Polisk~ aircraft industry had
practically ceased to exist. Most plants were either destroyed or
damaged., The rest were dismantled and their personnel dispersed.
For the first 6 years after the war the aircraft in-
dustry, which had been nationalized, had a low priority, so that
Polish aircraft production was insignificant, although some of the
wartime damage was repaired. Small series of a few light aircraft
types were produced by the Experimental Aeronautical Institute, or
Lotnicze Warsztaty Doswiadczakne (LWD) at Lodz and by the Mielec
plant, which may also have assembled about 150 Po-2 biplanes from
Russian parts. Engines for the Po-2 's were produced at the engine
plant in Psie Pole, near Wroclaw.
In 1951 Poland reportedly received drawings from the
USSR and began tooling to produce the MIG 15 at. Mielec and its engine
at Rzeszow. Production probably started about October 1953. In June
1954 the rate of output was estimated at 5 MIG-15's per month and
11 jet engines per month. Total 1954 MIG-15 production will probably
be of the order of 60 aircraft.
Airframe and engine production facilities in Poland are
summarized in Table 8.~
Estimated airframe and engine production (excluding pro-
totypes) in Poland in the period 194-53 is summarized in Table 9.~
Under mobilization conditions the output of the Mielec,
Psie- Pole, and Rzeszow plants could be expanded considerably, as they
are operating well below capacity. If M-day were 1 January 1955, the
capacity of the plants in 1957 would probably be about 600 MIG-1,5's,
2,500 VK-1 jet engines, and 1,800 M-11 reciprocating engines.
Although Poland in the past had been dependent on the
USSR for imports of all combat aircraft for its air force, by the end
of 1954 the country should be manufacturing sufficient MIG-15's to
satisfy its own .requirements for this aircraft.
~ Table follows on p. 28.
~-* Table 9 follows on p. 28.
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Table 8
Airframe and Aircraft Engine Plants in Poland
Location
Plant Name
Floor Area
(Square
Feet
Remarks
Lodz
LWD
Very
Experimental institute. Too
Lublin/Swidnik
Small
Unknown
small to engage in mass pro-
duction of aircraft.
Plant under construction which
Mielec
WSK
563,000
reportedly will produce air-
craft .
Formerly called PZL. Produced
Psie Pole
Zavod
154,000
Szpak and Zak trainer types
and assembled CSS-13 (Po-2).
Production of MIG-15's started
October 1953?
Has produced a limited number
Matalowy
of M-11 radial engines.
Rzeszow
PZL
663,000
Has engaged mainly in engine
repair, Production of het
engines for MIG-15 started in
October 1953?
Table 9
Estimated Production of Airframes and Aircraft Engines
in Poland
1946-53
Airframes Where Produced Number Produced
Type
CSS-13 (Po-2) Mielec (Assembly Only} 150
MIG-15 Mielec 1
Szpak--4 Mielec 10
Zak-1 Mielec 11
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Table 9
Estimated Production of Airframes and Aircraft Engines
in Poland
1946-53
(Continued)
Airframes.
Where Produced
Number Produced
T
C ontinued)
Zak_2
Lodz
11
Zak-3
Lodz
11
Zuch-2
Lodz
11
Total
205
Aircraft Engines
Where Produced
1Vumber Produced
Type
M-11
Psie Pole
361
~_1
Rzeszow
8
Total
369
III. Capabilities,-Vulnerabilities, and Intentions.
A. Capabilities.
The present capabilities of Poland's engineering industries are
considerably higher than those which existed in 1950, at the time the
current Six Year Plan was initiated. Polish technology is now more
advanced and the output of Polish industries is considerably greater
and more diversified than at the peginning of. the plan.
Poland's industrial capabilities were greatly augmented in the
postwar period by the annexation of the highly industrialized areas of
Germany. These territorial gains included the shipbuilding industries
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at Gdansk and Szczecin, the heavy machinery plants of Wroclaw and
Elblag, the Pafawag State Railroad Car Plant in Wroclaw, electrical
machinery plants, several large power plants, and textile plants. By
1952, production from the annexed areas amounted to 2~+ percent of
Poland's total industrial output.
The rehabilitation of industrial plants which had suffered war
damage as well as dismantlement by the USSR has been virtually com-
pleted. The construction of new plants and expansion of existing
facilities has notably increased the capabilities of Poland's engi-
neering industries. The 1953 plan was overfulfilled by the Ministry
of Machine Industry by 3 percent. If the present industrial tempo
continues, without program modifications such as increased consumer
productions it is probable that the production goals envisioned by
the Six Year Plan will, for the most part, be completed. The capa-
bilities of Poland's engineering industries will rank among the highest
of the Satellites, exceeded only by East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
Poland's capabilities in the engineering industries are
especially pronounced in the fields of transportation equipments ma-
chine tool production, and construction and repair of ships. In these
areas Poland constitutes a substantial asset to the USSR in peacetime
and can serve to great advantage to the USSR in time of war.
The engineering industries of Poland are capable of further
expansion as newly trained workers and technicians became available
as well as increased quantities of iron and steel products and raw
materials.
There are three vulnerable aspects of Poland's engineering in-
dustries; (1) shortage of skilled workers; (2) the deteriorating
morale of the workers particularly felt in the principal machine
building centers; and (3) the necessity of importing a large portion
of the raw materials and fabricated products needed by the engineering
industries, products which are obtainable mostly in non-Soviet Bloc
countries.
In additions the highly concentrated nature of Poland's engi-
neering industries makes them -potentially vulnerable to wartime
attack. The Polish government has recognized this condition in
establishing new industrial centers removed from the congested upper
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Silesian, Lodz, and Warsaw areas. Projected industrial centers include
the areas of Krakow, Czestochowa, (7pole, and particularly Ku,jawy,
Staropole~ Bialystok, Lublin, and Notec.
C. Intentions.
It is the intention of the Polish Communist regime to achieve
a forceful and rapid industrialization of Poland, placing special
emphasis on the development of its engineering plants and facilities.
This industrialization directly benefits the economy of the Soviet Bloc
and the military potential of the USSR: The long-range economic pro-
gram is designed to transform the economy of Poland along the pattern
established by the USSR and to integrate these economies and industries
into a coordinated self-sufficient entity.
This .program is being pursued with considerable vigor because
of the important geographical and strategic position that Poland
occupies between the USSR and the West. The USSR is aware that, in
any possible conflict with the Western powers, the Polish industries
could be a significant forward supply base. The utilization and ex-
pansion of its engineering industries will be forcefully pressed.
The production of consumer goods will be conditioned and
determined only by the effect of shortages on the morale and productivity
of the workers. The effect of the "new course" in Poland on industrial
investments and output has been more limited than in other Eastern
European Satellites. Alone among the Satellites, Poland reported in-
dustrial productio~i for 1953 at 3.g Percent above the plan. There are
indications that the satisfactory rate of growth for industrial pro-
duction was accounted for largely by the manufacturing industry, leaving
some inadequacy in basic material production. The consumer goods
industries exceeded their 1953 plan by 5.7 percent, while producer goods
were 2.5 percent above the plan. The former increase was due to the
considerable development of consumer goods production in the fourth
q~zarter of 1953, coinciding with the period immediately following the
announcement of the "new course."
In case the Polish government implements the new economic course
to provide for-more consumer goods, some reductions in the investment
program in the heavy industrial sector of the economy will be necessary.
It has been announced that, although growth of the national income is
expected to permit the absolute volume of investment to remain at the
1953 level, appropriations for heavy industry are scheduled to fall
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frarm 46.7 percent of total capital expenditures to 40.4 percent in
1954 and 1955?
The proposed Five Year Plan (1956-60), which is to succeed
the current Six Year Plan (1950-55), emphatically promises a "rapid
increase in the welfare of the working classes." The broad outline
of the plan, announced in September 1952, points out that measures
will be taken to mechanize work and that Polish industry would reach
a production level 10 times greater than before the war.
Specific intentions of the Polish government include
(1) training of cadres of skilled workers, (2) exploitation of
domestic natural resources, (3) improvement in the morale of in-
dustrial workers, (4) transfer of the peasant population to industrial
centers and increased use of female labor, and (5) improvement and ex-
pansion of maintenance tech~iiques and repair programs in industry.
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ro of the Office of Intelligence Research, Department
of State, dealing with Eastern Europe and Poland are of value with
regard to general aspects and currents of Poland`s economic and in-
dustrial activii;ies. They contain, however, little information on
individual engineering industries or on Poland's key plants.
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following signif icance:
Doc.- Documentary
A -Completely reliable
B - Usually reliable
C - Fair?ly reliable
D - Not usually reliable
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
1 -Confirmed by other sources
2 - Probably true
3 - Possibly true
~+ - Doubtful
5 - Probably false
6 -Cannot be ,fudged
"Documentar;y" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or inf ormation extracted from such documents by a staff
officer, all of which will carry the field evaluation "Documentary"
instead of a numerical grade.
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document.
_50_
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The sources listed in this report and which serve as the basis for
the assertions and estimates of the Polish .engineering industries be-
long generally to the categories designated as B-2 and B-3.
1. J. Taylor, The Economic Development of Poland, 1918-1950,
Cornell University Press, 1952, p. 35. U?
2. Concise.Statistical Yeaxbook of Poland, 1939-41, p. 67,
Table 2 U.
3. Ibid.
~+. The Statesman's Yearbook, 1952, Chapter on Poland, p. 1,334?
U,
5. State,-Preliminary Draft to NIS Section 64, Poland, 1953? S?
6. Rehabilitation of Polish Economy, New York, Polish Research and
Information Service,. 19 , p. 3? U.
.T. T_avlor. o-c. cit. , A? 202.
25X1X7 g.
g. Air, AFOIN, Ai 92-53, Apr 1953 ? C. Eval. C-3.
10. State, Intelligence Report No. 6137.2, Eastern Etiirope in 1952.
S. Eval. RR 2.
11. Labour Affairs, London, No. 214, 6 Sep 1952. U. Eval. RR B-2.
25X1 A2r~.
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
lg.
20 .
21.
22.
23?
24.
CIA ORR Project 23-51 (WP), Economic Organization of Poland,
g Feb. 1953, P? 31. S, US OFFICIALS ONLY.
Monitor Polski (Polish Monitor) No. A-28, 7 Apr 195.2?
Monitor Polski (Polish Monitor) No. A-50, 13 Jun 195.2?
State, Warsaw Despatch No. 127, 16 Oet 1953 ? C. Eval_ RR B-2.
Zycie Waxszawy, 3 Jan. 1954. U.
Ibid.
Trybuna Ludu, Warsaw, 3 Jan 1953. U.
CIA. NIS, Poland, .Section G-2, Fuels and Polder, Chapter VI, Sep
1 2. S US OFFICIALS ONLY.
Section , O
Draft to NIS
liminar
P
St
t
land, op. cit.,
,
y
re
a
e,
p. 64-B-1g.
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25.
FOIAb3b'~6
27.
28.
25X1 X7 31.
25X1A2g
32.
33?
34.
25X1A2g
25X1 X7 35
36.
25X1A2g 3g;
39?
25X1 X~?
~+1.
25X1A2g
42.
43.
44.
46. CIA~RR 27, Production of Locomotives and Rollin Stock in the
USSR and in the European Satellites, 1 Dec 1953? S, US
0 ICIAIAS ONLY.
25X1X7
CIA~RR 21, The Coal Mining Equipment Industry of the USSR,
May 1953, p? 113. S. Eval. RR B-2.
Trybuna Ludu, 18 Sep 1953? U. Eval. RR B-3.
Trybuna Ludu
26 Feb 1
CIA FDD, Law on the Polish Six-Year Plan (1950-55 ), 11 Mar
1953? c?
Les Investissements Indu~triels en Pologne (Industrial Invest-
ments in Poland , Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs,
Paris, No. 1797, p. 22. U. Eval. RR B-3.
Ibid.
CIA ORR Project 32.221, The Tractor Industry in the Soviet Bloc,
May 1954. S. Eval. RR B-2. Unpublished .
Les Investissements Industriels en Pologne, op. cit., p. 23.
Eval. RR B-3. -
CIA ORR Project 32.221, op. cit.
CIA ORR Project 34.234, Textile Machine Industry in the Soviet
Bloc, 29 Apr 1954. S, US OFFICIALS ONLY.
45. CIA ORR Project 34.234, op. cit.
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25X1A2
47.
48.
o cit.
CIA RR 27
25X1A2g
4g.
,
50.
CIA ORR Project 11.2, East-West Comparative Study, 10 Mar
25X1A2g
1 ~+. S .
51.
Izvestiya, No. 106,. p. 1, 6 May 1953? U?
52.
Strategic Intelligence Digest, Poland, May 1948, p. 113.
S.
FOIAb3b1 53 , ~~ ? ~ B-2.
25X1A2g
54.
5S?
?~X1 A6a
5h.
Zycie Wa,rszawy, 11 Nov 1953?
U?
25X1 A2g 5g ;
25X1X7
25X1 A2g
60 .
61.
CIA Report, Soviet Bloc Antifriction Bearings Position in
COCOM 8 Dec 1 53. C.
25X1 A2g 62.
63.
64.
CIA/RR 26, The Antifriction Bearings Industry in the Soviet
Bloc., 30 oct 1953? S?
25X1X7 65 ?
Ibid.
66.
67.
25X1A2g
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25X1A2g
25X1X7
25X1A2g
68. CIA~RR 9, The Hea Electrical Machiner Industr in the
Soviet Bloc, 12 Sep 1952, P? 1 S. Eval. RR B-2.
69. CIA RR 7, The Electron Tube Industry in the Soviet. Bloc,
70 .
71.
7~?
73?
74.
75?
25X1X7
76.
77?
25X1A6a
25X1 A2g7g;
~80 .
81.
25X1A2g
82.
CIA FDD,-Law on the
Ibid.
Plan, off. cit.
ational Committee for Free Europe, Poland in the Year 1951,
Part II, p. 216. U.
CIA FDD, Law on the Polish Six-Year Plan, ~, cit.
CIA ORR Project 35.241 (draft), The Shipbuilding Industr
Poland, 1 Jun 1954. S, US OFFI I~NT,Y.
CIA ORR Project 35.241 (draft), op. cit.
83. CIA. ORR Project 31.211, Production of Small Arms, Mortars, and
25X1A2g
84.
25X1 A2g 86
25X1 A6a~7
25X1 A2g 88
89.
o.
25X1
25X1 X~'-
25X1A2g 94;
95
Artillery In the European Satel ites, ay ,
OFFICTQTS ONLY.
CIA 00, Dec
1953?
IA ORR Project 33.22+, Analysis o t e rcraf_t Industry of
the European Satellites. unpublished.
State, Preliminary Draft to Section 64, NIS Poland, Figure 64-B-
8, op. cit. S.
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96.
97?
98.
99?
25X1 X71oo .
101.
FOIAb
25X1A2g
103.
104.
FOIAb3k~~5 ,
25X1 X7 106.
107.
-108.
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
25X1 A2g 124.
25X1A2g
126.
127.
Ibid., pp. 3-12.
Ibid., p. 3-11..
State., Preliminary Draft to Section 64, NIS Poland, Figure
64-B-8 o cit.
Preliminary Draft to Section , NIS Polan , figure
State
,
64-B-8, o cit.
Pravda 29 Jul 1951. U.
Preliminary Draft to Section , o an , gore
State
,
64-8-5, op? cit.
Ibid.
State~Preliminary Draft to Section 64, NIS Poland, Figure
64-B-8, op. cit.
Echo Poznanskie 5 Sep 1953?
CIA ORR Project 32.221, off. cit.
CIA//RR 27, off. cit.
~~9A2q
CIA/RR 27, o~? cit.
Ibid.
Strategic.Intel~ig'ence Dimmest, Poland, Chapter 4, p. 139
on. cit.
CIA~RR 9, 12 Sep 1952, off.. cit.
Ibid.
Ibid.
CIA RR 7, 29 Aug 1952, op. cit.
State, Preliminary Draft to Sec ion , Oland, Figure
64-B-6, op. cit.
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25X1X7
25X1A2g
128.
.129.
130.
131.
132.
133?
FOIAb3b1 134?
135?
25X1A2g
136.
137.
138.
25X1 A2g 139
25X1A2g
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
~~~RDP79-01093A000600100001-1
State, Preliminary Draft to NIS, Poland, Figure 64-B-3,
op. cit.
State, Preliminary Draft
Ibid.
to NIS, Poland 64, op. cit.
GIA IR Consolidation No. 8104322. S, US OFFICIALS ONLY.
Eval. RR B- .
CIA IR Consolidation No.
8016808.
S
US OFFICIALS ONLY.
CIA IR Consolidation No.
8051983.
,
S
US OFFICIALS ONLY.
CIA IR Consolidation No.
go936g8.
,
S
US OFFICIALS ONLY.
CIA IR Consolidation No.
9070554.
,
S
US OFFICIALS ONLY.
CIA IR Consolidation No.
9070554.
,
S
US OFFICIALS ONLY.
CIA IR Consolidation No.
8015584.
S
US OFFICIALS ONLY.
CIA IR Consolidation No.
8016795.
,
S,
US OFFICIALS ONLY.
56 _
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-~ --
SE
RET
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