PRODUCTION OF SMALL ARMS, MORTARS, AND ARTILLERY IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000700010001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 11, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

eR T
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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PRODUCTION OF SMALL ARMS, MORTARS, AND
ARTILLERY IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
CIA/RR PR-79 O EMT NO. _
r
-rvCLASS.
11 October 1954
u 0,gCLA
CLASS. CHANG
RUTH. HR 0-
DATE REVIEWER:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
VVIII 1W11-111 I If 1160
US OFFICIALS ONLY
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PRODUCTION OF SMALL ARMS, MORTARS., AND ARTILLERY
IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
CIA/RR PR-79
(ORR Project 31.211)
NOTICE
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREWORD
This project has been coordinated on an informal basis with the
interested sections of Army Intelligence G-2 and with AFOIN. This
coordination does not necessarily indicate an acceptance by these
agencies of the estimates contained herein.
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CONTENTS
Page
I. Weapons Industries in the European Satellites . . . . . . . . . 2
A. Czechoslovakia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
B. Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
C. Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
D. East Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
E. Rumania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
F. Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
G. Albania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II. Organization of the Satellite Weapons Industries . . . . . . . 7
A. Mechanics and Extent of Soviet Control . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. Regulation and Control of Production . . . . . . . . . 7
C. Roles of the USSR and the Satellites in Policy Planning . . 7
III. Production Trends as Indicated by the Defense Budgets . . . . . 8
IV. Production of Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A. Small Arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B. Mortars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
C. Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
V. Input Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
VI. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions . . . . . . . . . 16
A. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
B. Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
C. Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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Appendixes
Page
Appendix A Types of Weapons in Production . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix B. Armaments Plants in the European Satellites . . . . 21
Appendix C Methodology . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix D J Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix E. Sources and Evaluation of Sources . . . . . . . . . 29
Tables
1. Percentage of Budget Allocated for Defense and Security
in the. European Satellites, 1949-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2. Estimated Production of Small Arms in the European
Satellites, Fiscal Year 1954 10
3. Requirements Relative to the Production of Small Arms in the
European Satellites, Fiscal Year 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Estimated Production of Mortars and Artillery in the European
Satellites, Fiscal Year 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. Requirements Relative to the Production of Mortars in the
European Satellites, Fiscal Year 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Requirements Relative to the Production of Artillery in the
European Satellites, Fiscal Year 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Inputs of Steel, Aluminum, Copper, and Direct Labor Per
Weapon in the European Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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Page
8. Inputs Required for the Estimated Production of Weapons in
the European Satellites, Fiscal Year 1954 . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Types of Weapons Currently Produced in the European
Satellites . . . . . . . . . R . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . 19
10. Armaments Plants in the European Satellites by Country
and Product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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CIA/RR PR-79 - - -"- -
(ORR Project 31.211)
PRODUCTION OF SMALL ARMS, MORTARS, AND ARTILLERY
IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES*
Summary
The production of small arms, mortars, and artillery in the European
Satellites is directed by the USSR, whose policy decisions are implemented
by strong formal and informal Soviet controls. The over-all pattern of
production apparently takes into account political and military factors
as well as the capacity of the individual Satellite to produce weapons.
The production of small arms in the European Satellites during the
fiscal year 1954 is estimated at about 400,000 units, an amount suffi-
cient for current requirements, exports, and to increase reserves.
The production of mortars during the same period is estimated at about
1,700 pieces, which is enough to cover losses by attrition and to build
up reserves. The production of artillery is much below current re-
quirements, and virtually all Satellite artillery pieces are imported
from the USSR.
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland together produce 92 percent of
the small arms and 99 percent of the mortars produced in the European
Satellites. Czechoslovakia produces almost all of the artillery.
Although East Germany produces about 5 percent of the small arms, the
total production of East Germany, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania is a
negligible part of the total weapons** production of the European
Satellites.
The weapons industries of the European Satellites are not partic-
ularly vulnerable with respect to supplies of raw materials, manpower,
and equipment. The production of weapons by the European Satellites
at the present rate does not now indicate hostile intentions on the
part of the Soviet Bloc.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the
best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 July 1954.
** The term weapons as used throughout this report refers only to small
arms, mortars,. and artillery.
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I. Weapons Industries in the European Satellites.*
Czechoslovakia is the leading producer of armaments among the
European Satellites and is probably capable of producing a complete
range of weapons in quantities sufficient to fulfill domestic needs
and to provide weapons for export to other countries. Present produc-
tion includes small arms of all types from pistols to heavy machine
guns and artillery of light and heavy calibers. Mortars are probably
being manufactured, but little information on production is available.
Czechoslovakia is the only Satellite which has continued to test and
develop weapons of its own design on an appreciable scale.
Two of the main weapons producers in Czechoslovakia during World
War II were the Skoda Plant, which produced light, medium, and heavy
artillery as well as other heavy armaments, and the Zbrojovka Plant,
which produced small arms. Skoda reportedly produced 2,400 artillery
pieces a year during the var, and the Zbrojovka Plant in 1944 produced
700,000 rifles and 100,000 machine guns. /** A part of the armaments
production of the Skoda Plant was moved from Pilsen to Dubn.ica Nad
Vahom after World War II. The armaments industry was not greatly af-
fected by Soviet reparations following the war.
In the postwar years, the Skoda and Zbrojovka Plants have
continued to produce armaments. Skoda produced small quantities of
complete artillery guns -- 88-millimeter (mm), 210-mm, and 305-mm --
from semifinished surplus stocks and raw materials accumulated during
the war. Skoda is also reported to have produced the 210-mm gun for
the Soviet Army and for export. 1 The Skoda plants at Pilsen and
Dubnica Nad Vahom both have facilities for producing heavy artillery,
but information on the current output of these plants is lacking. 3
The largest producer of small arms in the country is the
Zbrojovka Plant at Brno. In April 1952, it was reported to have
increased the production of automatic weapons and concurrently re-
duced rifle production. V The Zbrojovka Plant in Vsetin appears to
be concentrating on the production of machine guns. 5 The plant in
Strakonice produces parts for small arms and finished automatic
pistols, and the plant at Uhersky Brod is reported producing small
* See Appendix A for types of weapons in production and Appendix B
for a list of the armaments plants in the European Satellites.
** Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in
Appendix E.
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arms components. Y A Zbrojovka plant located at Povazska Bystrica has
been reported to be producing weapons, including pistols, 37-mm anti-
aircraft guns, and bazookas-,7/
B. Hungary.
Hungary produces small arms in large quantities and a small num-
ber of artillery pieces and mortars. Hungary supplies most of the light
weapons needed by the Hungarian Army but depends on outside sources for
heavy weapons. Today there are indications that pistols and submachine
guns are being produced in quantities sufficient to permit export to
other Satellites. The artillery pieces which are reported to have been
produced include the 37-mm, 76-mm, 85-mm, and 122-mm guns, with apparent
emphasis on the 122-mm guns. 8J
During World War II Hungary produced the 8-mm rifle; 7.65-mm and
9-mm pistols; 9-mm submachine gun and 8-mm heavy machine gun; 50-mm,
81.4-mm,.and 120-mm mortars; 105-mm and 150-mm artillery pieces; 20- and
40-mm antiaircraft guns of the Bofors type; 37-mm antitank guns; and
75-mm mountain guns. 91 Since the Communist domination of Hungary, a
gradual rebuilding of the armaments industry has taken place.
Small arms are produced mainly in and around Budapest at the
Lampart Works (formerly Frommer and Company) i/ and the Danuvia plant. Il Il/
Some production of small arms, mortars, and arms components is reported
at the Matyas Rakosi plant (formerly Manfried Weiss Steel and Metallur-
gical Industries, Ltd.) in Budapest. 12/ Artillery is produced at the
Diosgyor Iron and Steel Works (Mavag), and gun carriages have been re-
ported in production in 1952 at the Mavag factory in Gyor. 13
C. Poland.
The Polish armaments industry is producing small arms and
some artillery and antiaircraft guns and components. Small arms pro-
duced include pistols, submachine guns, rifles, and light and heavy
machine guns. Possibly 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers are in production,
as well as an 85-mm antiaircraft gun. / At least components of these
weapons are being produced. Poland produces enough small arms for self-
sufficiency and for export but will apparently not become independent
of outside assistance for heavier weapons.
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Poland's industrial facilities suffered extensive damage from
World War II and the postwar removal of machinery by the USSR. An
agreement with the USSR in 1949 defined the scope of the Polish muni-
tions industry. By its terms Poland was to manufacture pistols; ri-
fles; machine guns; light antiaircraft, artillery, and antitank weapons;
and ammunition -- all of Soviet design. Polish efforts in the field of
heavier artillery were to be limited to the manufacture of artillery
components both for the Polish Army and for the USSR. 15/
The major producers of small arms are the State Armaments factory
(Panstwowa Wytwornia Karabinow) in Radom and the State Rifle factory
(Panstwowa Fabryka Karabinow) in Warsaw. 17 The Stalin Works in Poznan
(formerly H. Cigielski) gained extensive experience during the war in
the production of a German machine gun, and it remains today a major pro-
ducer of machine pistols, carbines, and barrels for other small arms. IS/
A large Soviet ordnance shop at Masselwitz near Breslau has been reported
to be assembling guns, pistols, and carbines from Soviet-made parts 19
and probably conducts overhaul and repair operations rather than the
original production of weapons.
During World War II, Poland assembled the German 88-mm anti-
aircraft guns but made no artillery from domestically produced com-
ponents. LO/ Today artillery components and possibly artillery pieces
are in production at the Stalowa Wola plant near Sandiomerz. This is a
large iron and steel plant, and the 122-mm howitzer, 152-mm howitzer,
and 85-mm antiaircraft gun have been reported in production there in
limited numbers. 2
Poland does not contribute to the development and testing of
new weapons. The production of complete weapons seems to be less im-
portant in the Soviet plans for Poland than other phases of the arma-
ments industry, such as semifinished and finished components used in
tanks and artillery.
D. East Germany.
The armaments industry of East Germany has been limited to the
production of small arms at the former center of the small arms in-
dustry of Germany, Suhl and Zella-Mehlis. Some sources have indicated
that current production of military equipment in East Germany is being
limited to those plants which can be moved easily and which produce
auxiliary equipment, such as electronics equipment and instruments. PP/
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The contribution of the East German armaments producers to the Soviet
Bloc is difficult to appraise.
Following World War II the industrial potential of East Germany
was vastly altered by the Soviet reparations program, and from 1945 to
1949 a general conversion to civilian and peacetime production was car-
ried out. In Suhl the small arms plants during the period from 1946 to
1951 produced shotguns, airguns, and sporting rifles. In 1951 the Soviet
authorities organized these plants under the name of the Ernst Thaelmann
Werke, and 1952 plans called for the combine to produce large numbers
of rifles, pistols, and submachine guns. By 1953 it was reported that
plans called for the production of over 200,000 small arms at Suhi.
There is no direct evidence of the fulfillment of these plans, but it
is certain that small arms in relatively large quantities are being pro-
duced there.
The East German technicians who were transferred to work in
armaments plants in the USSR have contributed considerably to the
testing and development of Soviet weapons since the war.
Several reports indicate that tank parts and artillery com-
ponents are also being manufactured in East Germany, 2 / but there are
no indications of complete production of any weapons other than small
arms. It is doubtful that the armaments production facilities of East
Germany will be expanded in the next few years.
Rumania is a modest producer of small arms, mortars, and artil-
lery. Small arms that are probably in production today include pistols,
rifles, carbines, light machine guns, and submachine guns. Current re-
ports indicate that artillery production is limited to the 76.2-mm
field gun and antitank gun and the 122-mm howitzer. Mortars are re-
portedly produced, but there is no indication of the size or extent of
production.. The quantity of weapons produced in Rumania is prob-
ably sufficient to satisfy the current needs of the Rumanian Army.
Rumania is still dependent on outside sources for heavy artillery and
other heavy armaments.
The capacity of the armaments industry was not seriously re-
duced following World War II. That capacity has been maintained by a
government order which provides that 40 percent of the equipment for
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armaments production cannot be used for nonmilitary purposes. 2/
Industrial capacity has been increased in a number of the nationalized
firms including the Sovrommetal Combine at Recita, a major arms pro-
ducer.
Rumania has developed a few weapons locally but for the most
part Czechoslovak, German, and British models were produced. Rumanian-
designed weapons which were produced in the past were the Orita 9-mm
submachine gun and a 120-mm mortar. Rumania does not at present
contribute to the Soviet efforts in development and testing of weapons,
but produces weapons of Soviet design.
The largest producer of small arms in Rumania is the Copsa Mica
and Cugir Metal Works. In 1943 this plant produced 5,000 machine guns
and spare parts. 2/ It was converted to the production of sewing ma-
chines after the war, but in 1951 returned to the production of small
arms. 29 Data on current production are not available. Small num-
bers of artillery and mortars are reportedly produced at the Sovrommetal
Combine at Recita (formerly the Recite Iron and Steel Works). Sovrom-
metal has been built up since nationalization in 1949 by importing
machines and machine tools and Soviet technicians. Armaments are only
one of the products of this large combine, which is the major steel
producer in Rumania. 30
It is not likely that Rumania will produce more than enough
armaments to satisfy its own current needs. Rumanian industry is
hampered by shortages of basic raw materials, inadequate transporta-
tion., and a :Lack of skilled technicians. 31
F. Bulgaria.
Small arms production in Bulgaria, although reportedly carried
on in several plants, probably consists of the assembly and repair of
small arms, for which some parts may be produced. Bulgaria lacks the
technical progress, plant capacity, and raw materials to carry on a
large armaments program. 32/ Even with Soviet assistance it is doubt-
ful that the armaments industry in Bulgaria will become an important
producer of Soviet Bloc weapons in the near future.
There is nothing to indicate that this industrially backward
country has any facilities for the production of armaments. Limited re-
pair facilities are its only contribution in ordnance activities.
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II. Organization of the Satellite Weapons industries. 33
A. Mechanics and Extent of Soviet Control.
Soviet control over armaments production in each Satellite is
strong and is achieved by means of a formal and an informal organiza-
tional arrangement. Formal control stems from the Soviet Military
Mission in each Satellite, which has a subsection with responsibility
for war or armaments industry in the Satellite. This control may be
exercised through a parallel armaments section of the General Staff of
the Satellite concerned or, in the case of important plants, may mean
the assignment of members of the Soviet Military Mission to the plant
in question. Informal control is insured by placing Russians in.key
positions in the Satellite military establishment and/or armaments
industry. These Russians may be Soviet citizens or may qualify in
some dubious way for citizenship in the Satellite.
B. Regulation and Control of Production.
Within the governmental structure of each Satellite the regula-
tion and control of armaments production is patterned on that of the
USSR. Control of such production is centered in a ministry that usu-
ally carries a title such as the Ministry for Metallurgical and Mechan-
ical Industries in Hungary or the Ministry for Machine Construction in
East Germany. At the present time these ministries do not concentrate
exclusively on armaments production, but contain subdivisions which do.
In addition every ministry has a secret section that coordinates the
production of raw materials or component parts for armaments purposes
within the ministry or, in cases where there is not such activity,
this section may plan for mobilization in the same fashion as the
Mobilization Departments in the USSR.
C. Roles of the USSR and the Satellites in Policy Planning.
The armaments policy of the Satellites is largely determined by
the USSR. The role of a particular Satellite is confined to carrying
out the given policy. Further, Soviet policy for Satellite armaments
production is probably based on the Soviet Bloc as a whole and not on
an individual basis. Once policy is decided by the Soviet Ministry
of Defense or by a higher level, it is transmitted through Soviet
channels to the Soviet military missions in the various Satellites.
It is probable that planning for armaments production in the Satellites
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is Bloc-wide and is not based on self-sufficiency for each Satellite.
The USSR probably intends that Czechoslovakia supply vehicles and small
arms to other Satellites. It is further probable that heavy weapons
are being sold by the USSR to the Satellites. The rehabilitation and
overhaul of these weapons by the Satellites has given rise to many re-
ports exaggerating the extent of new production of heavy weapons by
various Satellites.
Within this framework, policy decisions are transmitted by the
Soviet Military Mission to the Ministry of Defense in the Satellite con-
cerned. This Ministry submits requirements to the national economic
planning body, where defense requirements have a priority. Thereafter,
these requirements become orders and contracts for which facilities and
materials are allotted in the usual way. Fulfillment is checked on by
official or unofficial Soviet functionaries along the way.
III. Production Trends as Indicated by the Defense Budgets.
The Soviet defense budget, properly distributed between military
hard goods and other expenditures, tends to show changes over time in
production for military use. In a similar way meaning may be attached
to the budget allocations for defense and security by the European
Satellites. Broad trends in defense production may be indicated by the
relative portions of the State budgets devoted to defense and security
purposes. Although these expenditures are preponderantly for services
and items other than military hard goods, it is expected that expend-
itures for the latter will move in a manner similar to aggregate de-
fense expenditures. The proportions are shown in Table 1.*
In general the proportion allocated to defense and security in
1949 and 1950 exceeded the percentage in 1953 and 1954. This relative
change was probably not at the expense of the production of military
hardware in absolute terms, because budget expenditures for all pur-
poses generally increased considerably for the above period. This
increase was actually sufficient to allow an absolute increase in de-
fense expenditures and hence in expenditures for military hardware.
* Table 1 follows on p. 9.
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Table 1
Percentage of Budget Allocated for Defense and Security
in the European Satellites
1949-54 as
Country
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
Albania
18
25
N.A.
N.A.
10
11
Bulgaria
N.A.
14
8
12
12
11
Czechoslovakia
N.A.
N.A.
9
7
10
9
East Germany b
5
5
N.A.
N.A.
4
N.A.
Hungary
16
20
N.A.
14
14
N.A.
Poland c/
10
13
11
15
15
N.A.
Rumania
19
14
16
16
18
N.A.
a. Assembled by CIA; data are provisional.
b. An allocation is not shown for defense in 1949 and 1950. The
figures are only for internal affairs for those years. Does not
include occupation costs.
c. The figures for 1949 and 1950 do not include expenditures for
Justice, which are included in other years.
IV. Production of Weapons. 34/
A. Small Arms.
Small arms production in the Satellites for the fiscal year
1954 (Table 2)* is estimated to be approximately 400,000 units of all
types. This estimate reflects little significant change from G-2
estimates for fiscal year 1953, except for East Germany, which is now
reported to be producing some small arms.
The Satellites appear to have ample small arms available to equip
all known military units. 35 The number of weapons required to take
care of normal attrition (Table 3)** represents only about 15 percent
* Table 2 follows on p. 10.
** Table 3 follows on p. 11.
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of estimated current production. Some troops may, however, not have
standard type weapons at present. More than 340,000 small arms are
left for increasing reserves, replacing nonstandard items now in use,
and exporting to other countries.
Estimated Production of Small Arms in the European Satellites a
Fiscal Year 1954
Country
Pistols
Rifles
and
Carb nes
SMG's
LMG's
HMG's
Total
Albania
0
Bulgaria
Negligible
Czechoslovakia
44,000
69,000
44,000
12,000
1,000
170,000
East Germany
6,000
10,000
4,000
20,000
Hungary
15,000
15,000
16,000
4,000
50,000
Poland
5,000
90,000
50,000
5,000
150,000
Rumania
2,000
7,000
1,000
10,000
Total
72,000
184,000
121,000
22
000
1
000
400
000
,
,
,
a. See Appendix C, Methodology.
B. Mortars.
Mortar production in the Satellites for fiscal year 1954
(Table 4)* is estimated at approximately 1,700 pieces, with Czechoslo-
vakia and Hungary being the principal producers. There is no informa-
tion that Poland is producing complete mortars at the present time.
Latest inventory estimates 36 indicate that the Satellite
armies are at present about 30 percent below table of organization
(T/0) and table of equipment (T/E) requirements. 37 Estimated total
Table follows on p. 12.
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Table 3
Requirements Relative to the Production of Small Arms
in the European Satellites
Fiscal Year 1954
Country
T/E 3$
Requirements
Estimated
Annual
Attrition A/
Estimated
Annual
Production b/
Production
Less
Attrition
Albania
51,500
2,600
0
-2,600
Bulgaria
206,200
10,300
Negligible
-10,300
Czechoslovakia
195,000
9,800
170,000
160;200
East Germany
143,100
7,200
20,000
12,800
Hungary
153,500
7,700
50,000
42,300
Poland
240,000
12,000
150,000
138,000
Rumania
173,300
8,700
10,000
1,300
Total
1,162,600
58,300
400,000
341,700
a. Attrition estimated at 5 percent of T /E, assuming fully equipped
active organization.
b. From Table 2.
production will cover attrition (figured at 5 percent of T/E) leaving
about 65 percent of the output to increase inventories (Table 5)*.
C. Artillery.
The production estimate for the Satellites in 1954 (Table 3)
indicates a slight increase in production from the G-2 estimate for 1953,
but this will have little effect in satisfying their over-all needs.
Total production is believed insufficient to satisfy internal require-
ments. (Table 6).**
Table 5 follows on p. 13.
Table 6 follows on p. 14.
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Table 4
Estimated Production of Mortars and Artillery
in the European Satellites 1
Fiscal Year 1954
Mortars Artillery
122-mm
Country 82-mm 120-M Total 57-mm 85-mm 100-mm Howitzer 152-mm 210-mm Total
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Rumania
0
Negligible
500 400 900 200 140 50 125 75 10
0
450 250 700
Negligible
100 100
0
Negligible
6oo
0
Negligible
Negligible
Negligible
950 750 1,700 200 140 50 125 75 10 6oo
a. See Appendix C - Methodology.
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Table 5
Requirements Relative to the Production of Mortars
in the European Satellites
Fiscal Year 1954
Country
T/E 39
Require-
ments
Estimated 40
Inventor a
Estimated
Annual ~/
Attrition /
Estimated
Annual
production c
Albania
410
4
440
400
1
20
100
0
Negligible
Bulgaria
kia
l
0
2,0
060
2
,
1,850
100
goo
ova
Czechos
t Germany
E
,
1,640
58o
80
0
as
ary
Hun
1,540
1,270
80
700
g
land
P
2,56o
1,61o
130
Negligible
o
Rumania
1,680
1,100
8o
100
0
250
8
590
1,700
Total
11,93
,
a. Much of this equipment is not Soviet caliber, especially in
Albania.
b. Attrition estimated at 5 percent of T/E, assuming active units
fully equipped.
c. From Table 4.
V. Input Requirements.
There is almost no direct information concerning the input co-
efficients of weapons production in the European Satellites. Even
for labor the available information cannot be related specifically to
the output of weapons, because the manufacturing facilities ordinarily
produce many items along with weapons and parts of weapons. Inputs
are therefore selected and presented according to two criteria:
(1) where analogy with the US yields acceptable results, and (2) where
the productive service is sufficiently important to warrant an esti-
mate in spite of a considerable range of error. The inputs selected
by the first criterion are three metallic inputs; steel, copper, and
aluminum. The only input selected by the second criterion is labor.
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The latter estimate is based on US experience; hence, it must be con-
sidered a minimum requirement.
Table 6
Requirements Relative to the Production of Artillery
in the European Satellites
Fiscal Year 1954
T/E /
Estimated
Estimated
Country
Require-
ments
Estimated 4/
Inventory a/
Annual
Attrition Y
Annual
P
d
El
ro
uction
Albania
820
520
40
0
Bulgaria
3,330
2,360
170
Negligible
Czechoslovakia
2,180
3,740
110
600
East Germany
1,760
1,260
90
0
Hungary
2,530
1,340
130
Negligible
Poland
3,200
2,080
16o
Negligible
Rumania
2,910
2,260
150
Negligible
16,730
13,560
850
6oo
a. Much of this equipment is not Soviet caliber, especially in
Czechoslovakia.
b. Attrition rate estimated at 5 percent assuming active units fully
equipped.
c'. From Table 4.
The inputs per weapon in Table 7* are based on US production ex-
perience. The metal requirements per weapon are not likely to vary
significantly from country to country and may be used with some con-
fidence. The labor requirements, however, vary considerably from
country to country. Labor is undoubtedly more efficient in the US
than in the Satellites and the labor figures which represent only
* Table 7 follows on p. 15.
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Table 7
Inputs of Steel, Aluminum, Copper, and Direct Labor Per Weapon
in the European Satellites
Steel
Pounds
Weapons
Carbon
Aluminum
(Pounds
Copper
(Pounds
Labor
(Man-hours)
Pistol
11.6
1.3
0
Negligible
1.4
Rifle
11.7
10.9
o
0
6.3
Sub-machine Gun
23.8
0.6
0
Negligible
4.7
ht Machine Gun
Li
74.6
28.7
0.2
0
54.0
g
Heavy Machine Gun
29.4
154
o
0
31.8
82-mm
Mortar
105
173
0.9
6.4
127
,
120-mm
Mortar
497
818
4.2
30.3
508
,
57- Gun
1,340
5,730
0
50.7
1,620
85-mm Gun
2,510
5,620
o
93.7
2,400
100-mm Gun
5,110
ll,400
o
191
4,88o
122-mm Howitzer
2,480
11,000
o
119
3,170
152-mm Gun/Howitzer
6,760
28,900
0
0
10)100
210-mm Gun
31,400
211,000
o
1,520
60,900
direct labor must be considered a minimum. Direct and indirect labor
requirements would probably exceed these amounts by 50 to 75 percent.
Aggregate inputs are computed and given in Table 8.*
Table 8 indicates that steel requirements are in excess of 11,000 tons,
that aluminum and copper requirements are relatively small, less than
5 and 50 tons respectively, and that direct labor requirements are in ex-
cess of 2,600 man-years. Forty percent of the total labor requirements can
be expected to be indirect in such an industry. Therefore it is assumed
that direct and indirect labor requirements exceed 4,000 man-years.
Table 5 follows on p. 16.
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Inputs Required for the Estimated Production of Weapons
in the European Satellites
Fiscal Year 1954 1
Steel
(Short Tons)
Class
Aluminum
Copper
Labor
of Weapons
Carbon
Alloy
(Short Tons)
(Short Tons)
) b
(Man-
e
y
ars
Small Arms
3,930
1,560
2
1
1,300
Mortars
280
460
2
13
240
Artillery
1,000
4,080
0
31
1,070
Total
5,210
61100
4
45
2
61o
,
a. Computed from values of Tables 2, , and 7.
b. A man-year is assumed to equal 2,500 man-hours.
VI. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions.
A. Capabilities.
The European Satellites are capable of producing greater numbers
of small arms, mortars, and artillery pieces by further expanding their
existing production facilities. Present capacity is estimated to be
below wartime capacity. However the developing industrial base in the
Satellites makes them increasingly capable of conversion to the produc-
tion of military hard goods.
Input requirements in peacetime of steel, aluminum, and copper
are so small in relation to peacetime production of these metals that
considerable expansion of the weapons output would be possible if given
priority over other production.* Manpower for this industry is probably
* European Satellite 1954 production estimated by CIA as follows:
steel, 10 million short tons; aluminum, 119,000 short tons; copper,
67,000 short tons.
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not currently in short supply. The supply of skilled labor and techni-
cians is satisfactory and flexible in the countries of largest weapons
production -- Czechoslovakia and Hungary.* Machine tools for weapons
production are available in general, although supplies are not large in
Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania.*
B. Vulnerabilities.
The presence of a large number of dissatisfied workers con-
stitutes the greatest vulnerability in the Satellite weapons industries.
The weapons industries, as well as other Satellite industries, must
depend either on older experienced technicians and engineers who are
very likely not sympathetic with the Communists, or they must depend on
the younger postwar-trained technicians who are politically reliable
but may be lacking in experience. The politically reliable workers
are being placed in positions of control. Either of the above alterna-
tives allows inefficiencies in production. Standards of work produced
in the Satellites are closely watched when the product involved is of
importance to the USSR. ~ Defections from East Germany have seriously
reduced the number of skilled technicians available to industry there.
Close control by Soviet representatives in armaments plants and
the tight security system in force in these plants cannot completely
eliminate the errors caused by inefficiencies, intentional and other-
wise. During mobilization these manpower weaknesses are likely to be-
come more acute.
C. Intentions.
The present rate of production of small arms, mortars, and
artillery in the Satellites does not indicate hostile intentions on
the part of the Soviet Bloc. The apparent surplus of small arms being
produced is probably being used to equip the Satellite armies with
Soviet-type weapons. Some of these small arms are produced for export,
particularly those produced in Czechoslovakia. After the Satellite
armies are equipped with new weapons, the continued production of weap-
ons at the present rate would raise the question of what is to be done
with all of these weapons. This production continued over the,next few
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years might then be interpreted as an indication of hostile intentions
by the Soviet Bloc.
The USSR will probably continue to control the Satellite weapons
industries, economically, since it is strategically advantageous to do
so. The continued export of small arms from Czechoslovakia and possibly
Poland and Hungary can be expected because it is economically advanta-
geous to the country and also contributes to the war potential of the
Soviet Bloc by maintaining a market for weapons currently produced.
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APPENDIX A
TYPES OF WEAPONS IN PRODUCTION
Weapons currently in production in most of the Satellites are be-
lieved to be of Soviet design and caliber, although Czechoslovakia is
still reported to be producing weapons of native design. Whether the
Czechoslovaks have completely stopped production of their basic 7.92-mm
small arms in favor of the Soviet 7.62-mm weapons is not definitely known.
The list of weapons shown in Table 9 was compiled from a series
of intelligence reports and other reliable information. Types which
were mentioned but not confirmed by other sources as being in produc-
tion have not been included.
Table 9
Types of Weapons Currently Produced
in the European Satellites
Weapon
Caliber
(Millimeters)
Design
Type
6.35
Czechoslovak
Zbrojovka
7.62
Soviet
Tula Tokarev M1933
7.65
Czechoslovak
Zbrojovka
9
Czechoslovak
Zbrojovka
7.62
Soviet
7.92
Czechoslovak
Reported as model P-18
Submachine Guns
7.62
Soviet
PPSh
7.62
Czechoslovak
(Produced with solid
9
Czechoslovak
( and folding stocks
7.62
Soviet
7.92
Czechoslovak
Model 26
7.92
Czechoslovak
Model 37
12.7
Unspecified
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Table 9
Types of Weapons Currently Produced
in the European Satellites
(Continued)
Weapon
Caliber
(Millimeters)
Design
Tie
Mortars
82
Soviet
120
Soviet
Artillery
57
Soviet
Reported both as AA
85
Soviet
and AT
Divisional gun, M1945
100
Soviet
Possibly field-anti-
122
Soviet
tank gun, M194
Howitzer, M1938
152
Soviet
May be gun-howitzer
M1937
210
Czechoslovak
Skoda M1939
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APPENDIX B
ARMAMENTS PLANTS IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
Appendix B is a list of plants which produce complete weapons
or major components of weapons. Producers of minor components and
those for which information is unverified by other intelligence re-
ports are not included.
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Table 10
Armaments Plants in the European Satellites by Country and Prbduct
City
Coordinates
Firm Name
Small Arms Mo
t
r
ars
Artillery
Bulgaria
Kazanluk
42038'
25?33'
State Arsenal (Zavod No. 10)
Parts for small arms and artil-
Karlovo
42?38'
24?29'
lery. Possibly limited pro-
duction ~~~o~f complete end
item. CJ
Kalofer
42?37'
24?59'
Lovech
43?08'
24043'
Repair and assembly of parts
Sopot
43?01'
24026'
for small arms and mortars. ''/
Czechoslovakia
Brno-Zabrdovice
49?12'
16?38'
Zbrojovka 01
Vsetin
St
k
i
49?20'
'
18?00'
?
'
Zbrojovka 03
12,000
Rifles, submachine guns, machine
guns. Largest small arms capa-
city in Czechoslovakia. 47
Rifles and machine guns
ra
on
ce
49016
13
54
Ceska Zbrojovka
80,000
.
Pistols, submachine guns, small
Uhersky Brod
49?02'
17?39'
Ceska Zbrojovka
arms components. L9/
Povazska Bystrica
49?07'
18?27'
Povazske Strojarne
Small arms components. 50
0
'
?
Rifles, machine guns, mortars.
51
Dubnica nad Vahom
48
58
18
11'
Voroshilov Works, Skoda
600
Artillery production and re-
Pilsen
49?45'
13?22'
Lenin Works
Skoda
pair. 52
Vitkovice
49?49'
18?16'
,
Vitkovice Iron Works
Components for weapons. Poss-
ible production of some mili-
tary end items. 53
Castings and forging for weapons.
Kladno
50009'
14?06'
Poldina Hut
54 CG/
Bar
l
f
re
s
or small arms. Lt
Total
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Armaments Plants in the European Satellites by Country and Product
(Continued)
i
t
Firm Name
Small Arms Mortars
Artillery
City
es
na
Coord
East Germany
Suhl
50?37' to?41'
vEB Ernst Thaelmann Combine
20,000
Hungary
Budapest
47?29' 19?06'
Danuvia Fine Mechanical
1,500
Factory
Iampart, Frommer and
48,500
Czepel Island
47?26' 19?04'
Company
Magyar Acelarugyar
Matyas Rakosi Muvek
Diosgyor
48?06' 20?44'
(Manfried Weiss)
Hungarian State Iron Works
Negligible
Gyor
47?41' 17?38'
MAVAG
l
t
T
o
a
Poland
Warsaw
52?14' 20?58'
Panstwowa Fabryka
40,000
Karabinow, State
Radom
51?25' 20?09'
Rifle Factory
State Weapons Factory,
110,000
Poznan
52?24' 16?55'
General Walter Works
Stalin Plant
Stalowa Wola
50?34' 22?03'
Stalowa Wola Steel Plant
Negligible
Starachowice
51?03' 21?04'
Starachowice Mining Enter-
prise
Remarks
Pistols, rifles, submachine.
guns. 56
Submachine guns, machine guns,
and small arms components. L7./
Small arms components. 58
Small arms components. 59
Possible production of small
arms, mortars, and artillery.
!LO/
Artillery repair and some pro-
duction: 61
Artillery components. !L2/
Small arms components. L3/
Small arms and components for
mortars. Possible mortar pro-
duction. 64
Sma11 arms components and poss-
ibly some finished weapons. 65
Artillery and/or components.
Barrels for small arms. !L6/
Facilities for artillery pro-
duction. L7/
150,000 Negligible Negligible
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Table 10
Armaments Plants in the European Satellites by Country and Product
(Continued)
City
Coordinates
Rumania
Cugir
45?50'
23?22'
Copsa Mica and Cugir Metal
Works
10,000
Recita
45?18'
21?54'
Sovrommetal Kombinat
Bucharest
44?25'
26?06'
23 August Plant
10,000
100
Negligible
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Pistols, submachine guns, ma-
chine guns. J
Some weapons manufacture and
repair. 69
Components. 70
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APPENDIX C
METHODOLOGY
1. Weapons Production Estimates.
Weapons production estimates were taken from a series of intelli-
gence reports on the principal arms factories within each country.
These estimates were then resolved into an over-all estimate for each
country and compared with earlier ORR branch and G-2 estimates. For
years subsequent to the latest year for which information on produc-
tion is available, in some cases 1950, production was assumed to re-
main constant.
2. T/E Requirements Estimates.
In determining the T/E requirements of each Satellite for Tables 3,
5, and 6 the following methodology was used: (a) the number of each
type of unit, division, brigade, and regiment for each Satellite army
was determined from the Order of Battle Summary,* (b) the number of
weapons of each class required for each unit was determined on the basis
of tables from the Logistical Guide to Soviet Army Units,** and (c) the
number of units was multiplied by the number of weapons required for
that unit, giving a total by type of weapons for each Satellite.
3. Estimates of Inputs Per Weapon.
Inputs per weapon are based on inputs per unit weight of output
for various kinds of weapons as determined in CIA/RR PR-47,
29 January 1954.*** These inputs per unit weight multiplied by the
weight of the various Satellite weapons as given in G-2 publications
gives the input per weapon. Inputs are based on US experience and
are subject to errors inherent in such a comparison.
* Source No. 35.
Source No. 38.
* Source No. 43.
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APPENDIX D
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
The biggest gap in intelligence is the lack of specific information
on weapons production since 1950. Information on the wartime produc-
tion of weapons is available, as are numerous reports on weapons pro-
duction prior to 1950.
There is also need for detailed stud.ies of each of the major
weapons-producing plants in the Satellites. Intelligence coverage of
some of the major weapons producers, such as Skoda in Czechoslovakia
and MAVAG in Hungary, is good enough to warrant such studies. These
analyses are important as a basis for determining plant capacity and
individual plant production and should be one of the bases upon which
over-all estimates for the industry are made.
Another major gap in intelligence is the lack of a comprehensive
25X1 B46udy of weapons produced in the Satellites.
Much intelligence information could be gained on the t es and ossi-
bly the the number of weapons produced,by an analysis
25X1 B4d
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APPENDIX E
SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES
1. Evaluation of Sources.
The files of the Industrial Register were used extensively to
develop the data on the individual weapons plants. Information from
the Industrial Register consolidations, when compiled and correlated
with other intelligence reports, is considered reliable. CIA, Army,
Navy, and Air Intelligence reports on armaments activities in the
Satellites were used.
The source material for the input data was CIA/RR PR-47, which
is considered fairly reliable for the inputs used.
Finished intelligence reports by the Army, CIA, 25X1X7e1
were used, and are considered reliable.
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.", have the following significance:
S
ource of Information
Information
Doc. - Documentary
1
- Confirmed by other sources
A - Completely reliable
2
- Probably true
B
- Usually reliable
3
- Possibly true
C
- Fairly reliable
4
- Doubtful
D
- Not usually reliable
5
- Probably false
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
6
- Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff
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officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary"
instead of a numerical grade.
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on
the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this
report. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with
the evaluation on the cited document.
1. Army, ID GSUSA, Munition Industries of Foreign Powers,
Jan 1949. S. Eval. Do .
2. Ibid.
3. CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8016337. S. Eval. RR 2.
4. Air, FIR 49-26-396-1252;_ Nov 1952. S. Eval. RR 3.
5.
25X1A2g 6
25X1A2g 8?
9?
25X1A2g14.
25X1A2g
16.
25X1X7
CIA IR Consolidation No. 8016337. S. Eval. RR 2.
CIA IR Consolidation No. 8018940. S. Eval. RR 2.
CIA,IR Consolidation No. 8018795. S. Eval. RR 2.
Army,ID GSUSA, Munitions Industries Foreign Powers,
2k. cit.
CIA,IR Consolidation No. 8016499. S, US OFFICIALS ONLY.
Eval. RR 2.
CIA,IR Consolidation No. 8016461. S, US OFFICIALS ONLY.
Eval. RR 2.
CIA,IR Consolidation No. 8ol6o44. S, US OFFICIALS ONLY.
Eval. RR 2.
CIA,IR Consolidation No. 8016058. S, US OFFICIALS ONLY.
Eval. RR 2.
CIA,IR Consolidation No. 8016818. S. Eval. RR 2.
Army,ID GSUSA, Munitions Industries of Foreign Powers,
op. Cit.
Arm G-2 Intelligence Review, No. 200, Jan 1953? S.
CIA,IR Consolidation No.: 9070696. S. Eval. RR 2.
S-E-C -R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700010001-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700010001-0
S-E-C -R -E-T
25X1 A2gfl
22.
23.
25X1X7
25X1A2g 24.
25.
17. Army, AA Warsaw R112-51, 15 Mar 1951. S. Eval. RR 3.
Navy, Comnavger, No. 243-53, 2 Apr 1953. C. Eval. RR 3.
CIA,IR Consolidation No. 9104322. S. Eval. RR 2.
18. CIA1IR Consolidation No. 8015507. S. Eval. RR 2.
19. CIA,IR Consolidation No. 1052525. S. Eval. RR 2.
CIA,IR Consolidation No. 9066777. S.
CIAJR Consolidation No. 1050412.
ru-u ." uMbA, Munitions Industries of Foreign Powers, op. cit.
27. Ibid.
28. State, Board of Economic Warfare, Report EP 128, 31 May 1943.
r L~.. r.TI n
25X1A2g 29.
30. T CIA)I ^onsolidation No. 8018052. S, US OFFICIALS ONLY.
31. Army, ID GSUSA, Munitions Industries of Foreign Powers, ok. Sit.
32. Ibid.
33.
25X1A2g
25X1X7
25X1A2g
Rumania,,Section 81 "Ground Forces"
Sep 1950
S
,
.
.
CIA RR PR-21, Economic Organization of Czechoslovakia, 22 Jan 1953.
S.
CIA, ORR Projects 23-51-111, 23-51-Iv, 23-51-v (WP) Feb 1953.
C TTC OFFTCT AT [, n*n.s
- 31 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700010001-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700010001-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
25X1A2g
Army, DA-ID 238067 GSUSA SID - Hungary Chapter 4 Jconomic,
May 1948. S.
Navy, COMNAVGER 243-43, 2 Apr 1953. C. Eval. RR 2.
34. Airs 1053T9-D-51-7630F, Aug 1952. S. Eval. RR 2.
Air, PIR 49-26-334-1152, 21 Nov 1952. S. Eval. RR 2. 25X1A2g
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
25X1X7
25X1A2g
25X1A2
15 Mar 1951. S. Eval. RR 3-
n .,w, .. _, _- - - - -
Army,P-my, R-1433-50, 15 Dec 1950. C. Eval. RR 2.
2
.
G-2 USFA R-1195-50, Nov 1950. C. Fva1. RR
CI-A0
IR Consolidation No.
8016005.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8016123.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8ol6461.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8015261.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
3034320.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8016058.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8018935.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8018937.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8018940.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8018795.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8016337.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
9050163.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8018771.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8018052.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8015339?
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8016818.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8016808.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
9070696
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8015507.
S.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
3148199.
S.
- 32 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
25X1A2g
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700010001-0
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 9104322. S.,.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 1052525. S.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8051495. S.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 9066749. S.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 9067110. S.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 1050412. S.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 9059479. S.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 9066777. S.
35. Army, G-2, Order of Battle Summary No. 21, Jan 1954. S, US
OFFICIALS ONLY.
36. Army, G-2, Project 4831, Summary of Intelligence Reference Data,
revised 1 Feb 1954. S, US OFFICIALS ONLY.
37. Army, G-2, Project 6990, Logistical Guide to Soviet Army Units,
15 Jan 1954. C.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
Army, G-2, Order of Battle Summary, op. cit.
40. Army, G-2, Project 4631, Summary of Intelligence Reference Data,
OP. Cit.
41. Army, G-2, Order of Battle Summary, OP. cit.
Army, G-2, Project 6990, Logistical Guide to Soviet Army Units,
OP. cit.
42. Army, G-2, Project 4831, Summary of Intelligence Reference Data,
op. cit.
43. CIA/RR PR-47, In uts for the Peacetime Production of Small Arms,
Mortars, and Artillery Pieces in the USSR, 29 Jan 1954. S.
44.
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
9050163.
S.
Eval.
RR 2.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8018940.
S.
Eval.
RR 3.
CIA,
IR Consolidation No.
8018935.
S.
Eval.
RR 2.
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C0N I,DETIAL
50. CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8018937. S.
51. CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8018795. S.
52. CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8018771. S.
53. CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8016337. S.
54. CIA, IR Consolidation No. 9067937. S.
25X1 A29 55.
56. CIA, IR Consolidation No. 90667 9. S.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 9066777. S.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 1050413. S.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 1050412. S.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 9059479. S.
57. CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8016461. S.
58. CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8016123. S-
59. CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8016005. S.
60. CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8016044. S.
61. CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8016499. S.
62. CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8016058. S.
63. Army, AA Warsaw, 8112-51, 15 Mar 1951.
25X1A2g64.
65.
25X1A2g 66.
67.
25X1 A29 68.
25X1A269-
CIA IR Consolidation No. 104 22. S.
Eval.
RR 2.
Eval.
RR 3.
Eval.
RR 2.
Eval.
RR 2.
Eval.
RR 2.
Eval.
RR 2.
Eval.
RR 2.
Eval.
RR 2.
Eval.
RR 2.
Eval.
RR 2.
Eval.
RR 2.
Eval.
RR 2.
Eval.
RR 2.
Eval.
RR 2.
Eval.
RR 2.
Eval.
RR 2.
S. Eval. RR
Eval. RR 2.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 9070696. S. Eval. RR 2.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8015507. S. Eval. RR 2.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 1 1 . S. Eval. RR 2.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8016818. S. Eval. RR 2.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8018052. S,
Eval. RR 2.
70. Army, AA Greece~R163-52, 24 Mar 1952.
CIA, IR Consolidation No. 8015461. S.
- 34 -
S-F-V -R -F.-T
Eval. RR 2.
US OFFICIALS ONLY.
C. Eval. RR 3.
Eval. RR 2.
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