PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT PROJECTED POPULATION OF THE USSR 1950-75

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• Publication Date: April 8, 1955
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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PROJECTED POPULATION OF THE USSR
1950-75
CIA/RR PR-106
8 April 1955
N[XT REVEEW UAYE
AUTH: HR 70
DATE:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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COM
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
PROJECTED POPULATION OF THE USSR
1950-75
CIA/RR PR-lob
(ORR Project 45.579)
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and. data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
CONFOp~~'
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CONFIDENTI
CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 . ; . 1
II. Population and Manpower . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. Total Population . . ? . . . . . . . . . . . ? 3
B. Labor Force Potential . . . . . . .
C. Military Manpower Potential
III. Vital Rates . . . . . . . . . .
A. Death Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 7
B. Crude Birth Rates . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . 10
IV. Capabilities and Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . 13
A. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Change in Population Trends . . . . . . . . . . 14
2. Urban Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3. Agriculture .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix
Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
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1. Projection of the Population of the USSR by. Age. and
Sex, Five-Year Periods, 1950-75 . . . . . . . 4
2. Number of Males of Military Age Compared with Number
of Males of Employable Age, Number of Total Males,
and Total Population in the USSR, Five-Year
Periods, 1950-75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Population Rates Used in the Projection of Soviet
Population, 1950-75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Comparison of Soviet and US Age Structure, 1950 . .
5. Projection of the Population of Males and
Females of Procreative Age in the USSR, 1950-75 . 12
Following Page
Figure 1. Population of the USSR by Age and Sex,
1.950 and 1975 . . . . . . ? . . . ? .
Figure 2. Projections of the Populations of the
USSR and the US, 1950-75 . . . . . . .
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coN~.~
CIA/RR PR-1o6
(ORR Project 45.579)
PROJECTED POPn TION Or TIM USSR, 1950-75*
Summary
The population of the USSR is expected to be approximately 300 mil-
lion by 1975. The expected increase is 100 million, or 50 percent,
above the 1950 estimate of 200 million people. This increase is
greater than that expected in the US, where the 1950 population of
1.52 million people is projected to 211 million in 1975, or an increase
of 41 percent. Two other projections of the Soviet population provide
higher and lower population figures. The upper estimate is 316 mil-
lion, and the lower is 280 million.
The number of potentially employable persons (15 through 59 years
of age) is expected. to expand from About 118 million in 1950 to about
175 million in 1975, an increase of 4.8 percent, or approximately the
same rate as that for the total population.
The increase in employable males is expected to be more rapid than
the total increase, as the presently distorted sex ratio (85 males per
100 females) approaches balance (94 males per 100 females) by 1975.
The total male population will expand from 92 million to 146.5 million
by 1975, or by 59 percent. Males in the employable ages (15 through
59 years of age), however, will. increase from 52 to 86 million, or by
65 percent.
The abnormality of the present age-sex distribution is especially
highlighted by changes in the n,miber of males of prime military age
(20 through. 29 years of age). The nu ber of these males is expected
to increase from 17.1 million in 1950 to 23.9 million by 1975. This
* The estimates .and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of -.1 January 1955
CY '111Y T1
e a r.
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increase is only 40 percent, considerably below the increase in total
male population (59 percent) and below the increase in males of em-
ployable age (65 percent). The lag in the increase of males.of prime
military age is due to the previous-bii-th-.deficits, casualties resulting
from two world wars, and forced agricultural collectivization during the
1930's.
The estimate of the number of survivors in 1975 of the 200 million
persons living in the USSR in 1950 is derived from recent Soviet claims
as to striking postwar reductions in the crude death rate and certain
assumptions as to further reductions. The recent Soviet claim of a
crude death rate in the USSR of 8.9 in 1952 (lower than that of the US)
can be accounted for with certain reservations, and an allowance is made
for a further decline of about 20 percent by 1975,
These death rate announcements, in conjunction with announcements as
to the rate of natural increase, yield an estimate of the birth rate in
1950 which is also sure to decline. Different birth rate assumptions
result in the three different projections referred to above. The pro-
jection used in this report employs a crude death rate of 11.6 in 1950,
which will have declined to 9..4 by 1975, and a crude birth rate of
about 27.7 in 1950, which will have decl'.ned to 21.3 in 1975. It is
assumed that there will be no mi ration or war casualties.
The principal objective of this report is to provide provisional
estimates of the growth of the population of the USSR from 1950 to
1975. No attempt is made to present these data as final and definitive.
They do, however, give the general pattern of population change.
The intelligence materials in t! Is report are important for
providing population data which may be used in conjunction with intel-
ligence research. in estimating Soviet capabilities of industrial and
agricultural production in 1975. The size of the population and the
availability of manpower may be controlling factors in Soviet plans in
distributing investments between agriculture and industry, in allocating
labor, and in. determining trade policies, and the rate of increase will
cause complex production problems.
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The starting point for the population projection developed in
this report was a population pyramid. (divided by age and, sex) as of
1. January 1950 (see Figure 1*) which has been derived from prewar
estimates of population in the USSR, /** based on the Soviet census
of 1939 and various prewar censuses in annexed areas. This method pro-
duced. the generally accepted total population figure of about 200 mil-
lion for 1 January 1950. This process also yielded an estimate by
sex for each 5-year age group born before 193.9 (11 years of age and
over in 1950; see Table lam). independent estimates of the population
under 11 years of age on 1 January 1950 could be derived on the basis
of enrollment statistics for grades I to 4 of the Soviet school system,
in conja.nction with .fragmentary data on mortality and natural increase.
The years after 1950 were estimated on the basis of the number of probable
survivors among perso s before ore '950-plus an estima e of,t number
'of births during the. ,years .precedi,.rg t1 estimate and ;the .propoti,gn of
these sarvi\ringv
II Population and Manpower.
Three different projections, Series A, B, and C, of the 1975 Soviet
population were made on the basis of different assumptions. J Projec-
tion Series A and C yield a range of population from 280 million to
316 million. Projection. Series B falls between these extremes, yielding
a 1975 estimate of 302 million people. Analysis in this report is con-
fined to study of the medium projection of population (302 million by
1975).
A. Total. Population.
The growth of the Soviet pop.:ilation by age and sex groups, at
5-year intervals from 1.950 to 1975, Is shown in Table 1. In Figure
2,***-* comparison is made of the populations of the US and of the USSR
at 5-year intervals for the same period.
Table 1 and Figure 2 show that in 1950 the Soviet population
comprised about 200 million people. ). The increment to 1975 would
amount to about 1.02 million, or 5.1 percent more people than in 1950.
Following P. 1..
For serially :numbered source :references r . see,, the: Appendix.
**-x Table 1 follows on p. 4,
xaz Following p ~ 4 .,
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Projection of the Population of the USSR by Age and Sex
Five-Year:Periods, 1950-75
Million People
~-- age
1950 l
1960
1965
1970 1975
0 through 14
63.5
72..3
79.9
90.1
96.0 97.3
Male
34-17,
36.6
40.6
46.0
49.0 49.8
Female
3O
35,7
39.3
41+.1
47..0 47.5
15 through 59
118.3
1.30.3
.1140.6
149.3
161.2 175.0
Male
52.0
58.7
64.7
70.0
77.3 85.7
Female
66.3
71.6
75.9
79.3
83.9 09.3
60 and over
132
15.2
17.6
21.2
25.1 29.4
Male
5.5
6.2
7.0
8.3
9.6 11.0
Female
7.7
9.0
lo1.6
12,9
15.5 18.4
Total
'opulation 200.0
217,8
238.1
260.6
7
282.3 p3 30_
;
Total. male 92.0
101.5
112.3
124.3
135.9 146.5
Total female 108.0
116-3
125.8
136.3
146.4 155.2
This increase would occur at a slightly faster rate than the increase
projected for the US, for which the 1950 population of 152 million is
projected to 214 million in 1975, an increase of )4.1 percent.. Thus
the extent to which the Soviet population exceeds that of the US,
which was 48 million in 1950, will increase to 88 million in 1975-
B. Labor Force Potential.
Persons in the age group from2.5 through 59 are considered to
constitute the largest group of potential workers. The manpower in
these ages in the USSR, according to data in Table 1, was about
118 million people in 1950, or 59 percent of the total population.
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POPULATION OF THE USSR BY AGE AND SEX
1950 and 1975
(In Millions)
i I I
66-70
61-65
56-60
51-55
ummim
10 5
19501975
Projected
Increase
10
FEMALES
PROJECTIONS OF THE POPULATIONS OF THE USSR AND THE US
1950-75
(In Millions)'
31-35
26-30
11-15
6-10
SECRET
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This total. is expected to climb to 175 million by 1975, at which time
58 percent of the total population will. be potentially employable. The
increase would amount to about 57 million people -- that is, about
L8 percent more potential workers would be available in 1975 than in
1950. It. follows, then, that if the current spread between the rate of
increase in production and the rate of increase in labor productivity
does not widen greatly by 1975, J supply of labor available in 1975
should. be adequate for a substantial expansion in the economy.
Not all the potentially employable persons will work in 1975.
Actual employment* in the USSR in 1.950 comprised only about 4+7 percent
of the total population.. ?/ Some of the persons aged 15 through 59
were not working. Most of these undoubtedly were women; older persons
approaching the upper years, 50 to 00; and. persons over 15 in school..
On the other hand, some persons imder. 15 and over 60 were employed.
Since relatively more able-bodied males will be available for
work in :1975 than it 1950, some reduction in the proportions of women
and of older people who work is possible. Probably about 45 percent of
the total. population will be in the civilian labor force by 1975, com-
pared with 47 percent in 1950.
The, 4litioil, then, of about 100 million people to the 1950
total population 'by 1977 would involve an increment of about 4+5 million
workers actually in the civilian labor force.. Calculated from the base
of 1955, the increase in labor force actually at work would constitute
about 38 million workers.
C. Military Manpower Potential.
Table 2** gives a projection of military manpower potential in
the USSR by 5--year intervals from 1950 to 1975 for males, using the
ages 20 through. 29 as prime ages for military duty: The probable
number of males of these prime military ages is contrasted with the total
number of potentially employable males in the 15 through 59 age group by
5-year intervals.
The estimated number of sales available for prime military duty
in the USSR will increase fro -m about 17 million in 1.950 to about 24 mil-
lion in 1.975, or by about 7 million. The increase is about 4+0 percent
Including forced labor but excluding the military.
Table 2 follows on p..6.
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Number of Males of Military Age
Compared with Number of Males of 1 nployable Age,
Number of Total Males, and Total. Population in the USSR J
Five-Year Periods, 1950-75
Million People
Year
Males of
Military Age
(20 through 29)
Males of
Employable Age
(15 through 59)
Total Male
Population
Total
Population
1930
17.1
92.0
200.0
1955
19.1
58.7
101.5
217.8
1960
1.9.9
64..7
1.12.3
238.1
1965
21.6
70.0
124.3
260.6
1970
21.1+
77.3
135.9
282.3
1975
23.9
85.7
1.6.5
301.7
Percent
increase
1950-75 1+0.0 65.o 59.0 51.0
above the 1950 level and is therefore less than the increase in total
population (51 percent); less than the increase in total male population
(59 percent); and less than the increase inmale. population in the em-
ployable ages, 15 through 59 (65 percent). In actual numbers there is
only a slight increase from 1955 t:j x.960 and an actual decrease from
1965 to 1970.
The comparatively disadvantaged position in the number of males
of prime military age (20 through. 29) is due to the depressing effects
of two world wars and of forced collectivization during the 1930's on
birth and death rates and on the sex ratio among their parents. In 1975
the males of :prime military age (20 through 29) will be those who were
born during 19+5-55 to parents in the reproductive ages (20 through 39),
who themselves had been born during the 1916-35 period. Large birth
deficits, reducing the potential number of these parents and especially
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of male parents, resulted from World.War I and from forced collectiviza-
tion. The persons who were born during the period 1916-35 were further
decimated by very high infant mortality rates during World War I and by
collectivization. Those who then survived infant mortality were subjected
to starvation and other debilitating,conditions as children during col-
lectivization 10 and to high military and civilian losses during World
War II. Thus the groups which reached, the child-bearing age from 1930 to
1950 were drastically reduced. T'11-.e military potential in 1975 will not
have increased, therefore, as rapidly as increases in other sectors of
the population.
III. Vital Rates.
The projection of population to future dates is based on assumptions
in the trend of vital rates -- that is, birth and death rates. These
rates may be observed in Table 3.*
The survival rates from 1950 to 1975 were estimated from death
rates computed on the basis of recent Soviet announcements. The decline
since 1940 is described by the following statements: the mortality
rate (presumably in 1950) "is half that of 1940" 11 the death rate**
(presumably in 1953) is "8.9 per thousand" 112/; the infant mortality**-*
rate (in 1950) "is less than half that in the latest prewar. years." 13
Mortality in 1953 is 51 percent in comparison with 1940 and less than
one-third of that in 1913. 14/
The first two statements must be taken in conjunction to be
interpreted correctly. The meaning of the 8.9 figure is also important
because the Russians are using it qu.i.te extensively in their propaganda
to indicate a lower crude death rate than that in the US as was shown
in a speech by T.V. Ryabushkin and remarks by other Soviet and Satellite
delegates at the World Population Conference at Rome in September
1954, The first statement as to the relationship between the
Table 3 follows on p. 8.
Statistically the mortality rate (or death rate) is the number of
deaths per 1,000 inhabitants.
The infant mortality rate is the number of deaths under 1 year of
age per 1,000 births in the same year.
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Table 3
Population Rates Used in the Projection of. Soviet Population
1950-75
1975 (Projection Series)
Population Rates
1.970
'`A
Population in millions
200.0
.315.9
301.7
'280.0
Crude birth rate (number of
births per 1,000 population)
27.7
2741
21.3
19.0
Crude death rate (number of
deaths per 1,000 population)
11.6
9.4
9.4
9.8
Sex ratio (number of males per
1.00 females)
85.2
94.8
94.4
94.4
.Expects,tion of life at birth,
males (age)
54.7
62.4
62.4
62.4
Expectation of life at birth,
females (age)
57.9
66.0
66.0
66.0
mortality rate of 1940 and that of 1950 may be approached as follows:
although there is no official fligre for the 1940 death rate, it is
generally agreed that it was probably 20 percent above that of 1938
(19.4). 1/ This would indicate t:h.at the 1940 rate was about 23.3, which,
if halved in 1950, would give 11.6 for the latter year.
A drop from 11.6 in 1950 to .9 in 1953 indicates a sharp decline
in the 3-year period, which is not impossible. The 8.9 figure is, how-
ever, subject to the following qualifications: it probably represents a
favorable year; otherwise it would not have been published, and it is
highly probable that it is a "free" population figure and does not in-
clude deaths in slave labor camps, which would increase the rate.
The fourth statement -- that the 1.953 rate!-VAS-51. percent -,of
1940 -- is not consonant with the 8.9 figure and either was a loose
approximation or referred to a rate calculated on a different base, since,
if the 1940 rate of 23.3 is correct, this statement would imply a rate
nearer 11.6 than 8.9. It is for these reasons that the death rates used
in projecting the population started with 11.6 in 1950.
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If the peculiar age and sex distribution of the USSR is con-
sidered, it appears that the claimed reduction in mortality is as much
due to change In the age-sex structure of the population as to progress
in public health. There was in the Soviet population in 1950 an excess
of some .15 million females, most,y between the ages of 25 and 50, and
female death rates are lower at every age than those of males. The com-
parison of the age structu.r.e of the USSR with that of the US (for 1950
.in both countries) i., shorni in : ab:.e 4.
Table 4,
Comparison of Soviet 17/ and US Age Structure
L7) 0
Percent irl. Group
.Age~{ro,a.p
USSR US)
Mortality Characteristics
0
through. 4,
1.1.60
10.8
High
5
through 24
42,55
29.9
Very low
25
through 59
39 25
-47J.
Moderate but rising with age
60 and over
6.6o
:112.2
Highi. to very high
Thus 43 percent of the pop;;r;'.ati.cn of the USSR is between the ages
of 5 and 25, when death rates are very lo'- Only 30 percent.of the.US
population is in this age bracket and 70 percent in the ages where death
rates are higher. In fact, if the po aa.1ation of the USSR were dis-
tributed. by age as i that of the US, the Soviet crude death rate would
be 16 instead of 11.6-
It is also reported that t ,.E, death rate of children in the USSR
under. .1 year of age had by .1.9` 0 been reduced by more than one-half from
that of the last prewar years. It wo't,i.Id appear from this that the in-
fant death rate in the USSR in 1950 was from 85 to 95, or about 3 times
the infant death rate in the US at present and at about the level of the
US infant death rate in .1.920. (For methodology, see _'18 . )
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This statement abvu.t t:e infant death rate, together with the
age distribution and the general crude death rate of 11.6 in 1950,
leads to the inference that death rates above age 1 had improved only
slightly from 1938 to 1950. 199/ I.`Is also is not too surprising, since
it is probable that the population still includes people whose vitality
had been weakened by war and hardships of confinement in prison camps.
Thus, if the Soviet s,pect is rates of 1938 20/ are revised by
reducing the death rate for children under 1 year of age by 50 percent
and by decreasing the rates above 1 year of age only slightly, a pattern
of rates is obtained which, when afr.. red to the estimated age dis-
tribution, yields a general rate of il.6 as estimated above.
The 1975 estimate of a population of 302 million is computed on
the basis of a series of age specific death rates which will produce a
crude total death rate of 11.6 in :1.950 and a rate.of. 9.4 in 1975. This
series was derived by allowing for a further drop of 50 percent in the
infant death rate and a smaller decline in the ages above 1. year.
Although the death rates at each age decline markedly,: the total death
rate does not drop so rapidly, since by 1975 a slightly larger proportion
of the Soviet population will be 91 ove age 40 and a much larger propor-
tion will be male.
B. Crude Birth Rates.
The 1.950 birth rate (the number of live births per 1,000 popula-
tion) may be determined on the basis of the natural increase and the
death rate. The latter has been dl.scussed above. The rate of natural
increase is derived from two official pronouncements: (1) that the
annual net increase (as stated in. Nove?nber 1951) amounts to more than
3 million persons L2 and (2) that the net increase during a 3-year
period, presumably for 191.8-51 (but possibly for 1949-52), amounted to
9.5 million people. 23 It may be conac_.+uded, that about 1.950 the annual
net increase in population varied from 3 million to 3.-5 million people
and that the rate of natural inc.r.ease is therefore about 15 to 18 per
1,000 population. 24 If the death rate of 11..6 is added to these
rates, a range of birth rates is obtained of. the order of 26.6 to 29.6
births per 1.,000 population. An estimate of 27.7 births per 1,000
population, as shown in Table 3,* is thus a distinct possibility for the
crude birth rate for 1950. 25/ This estimate represents about a.28-per-
* p. above
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cent decline in the crude birth rate of 1938 of about 38.3 births per
11000 population, and it continues the long-run decline in the birth
rate from 1.930, when It was over 4.0 births per 1,000 population,. and.
from the eve of World War I,, when th.e birth rate was 45. '26
Expectations as to the size of the birth rate by 1975 depend on
numerous factors, not the least important of which is the sex ration In
1939 the ratio was 92 males per. 100 fefnal.es, 2. in 1950 it was 85, and
by 1975 it is expected to appro:u:imat;e 94.
The sex ratio in the procreative ages (20 through 39) is more
important. `T?his sex ratio was 77.5 males per. 100 females in 1950, as
shown in Table 5.* Not until 1965 w:i.l.l the sex ratio of males to females
in this age group approach an equal balance. The current low sex ratio
in these ages is undoubtedly partly responsible for the current low point
in the general crude birth rate, 27.7 births per 1,000 population. The
incarceration of men in labor camps Is also associated with the low sex
ratio, and as long as these camps are operated on a large scale,: they,
will continue to depress the birth rate.
It must be recognized that, as the sex ratio approaches balance
(about 1.965), there will be a tendency in the sex ratio to boost the birth
rate upward.. Fewer women, propc'rti.onate3.y, will remain childless,
There is considerable a:rg me:-.tt for expecting the birth rate in
the USSR not to fall below the 1950 level. The history of countries under-
going industrialization shows that In the initial stages of development
the birth rate falls fairly rapi,d_ly as the population loses its pre-
dominantly agricultural -ways of life -- th t is, as the ways of city life
become dominant. After these initial stages have been passed, however,
the birth rate fluctuates, more or 1es?s depending on the prosperity or
depression within the country. i?us the birth rate in the US in the
1920-21+ period. averaged .22x8 births per 1,000 population, fell to 17.2
during the 1935-39 period., rose to a new peak of 25-8 in 191+7, and
fluctuated between 23.~ (tor 1950) ,and. 21.5 (for 1952) for the 1948-52
period. 29/
Declines in the birth rate in the USSR are not, however, unlikely.
The urbanization and irid.ustriaii zat.ton of the country are expected to
continue. The influence of concentration camps on available. males will
* Table 5 follows on p. 12.
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Table 5
Projection of the Population of Males and Females
of Procreative Age in the TLOSR
1.950-75
Males and Females of
Procreative Age (20 thr'o xgh. 39) Sex Ratio (Number of Males
(-.Million Peke _ per 100 Females 2
Year les
Females
1950 27-2 51i 77.5
1.7%5 29,9 35a0 85.4-
196o 36.1 38.0 95.0
1965 39.8 4,0.2 99.0
.1970 4014 40.2 100.5
1975 44.6 X30.8 .10118
a. -Projection Series
continue to be felt. Low birth rates are characteristic of many European
countries. West Germany has a birth rate of about 16 per 1,000 popula-
tion; Belgium, about 17 France, about 20; Norway, about 19; and Britain,
about 16. 3-1/
The assumptions that the Soviet birth rate would remain constant
from 1950 to .1960 and would fall thereafter approximately by 25 percent
to .1975 constitute the base's . ;.-f the Projection Series B estimate of
302 million population in. the USSR by 197.-),* --,Fn 1975 the birth rate
would be 21-3 births per 1,000 pop-~-uG ation, as shown in Table 3.**
* As in the case of mortality rates, a set of age-sex specific rates
(in this case, birth rates) was app.::ac.' . to the age-sex structure of the,
population pyramid.. partic,1arly for the reproductive ages, for each 5=?
year period., The 25-percent decline in.crude birth rates between 1960
and 1975 is approximately the same rate of decline assumed. in projec-
tions of the Soviet population prepared by the Office of Population Re-
search,, Princeton University. ?2
P. 8, above.
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It should be .re-emphasized that many of the estimates cited are
projections and, as such are vu ner.?sb r.e to the common error of economic
forecasting. To some extent the base population of 1950 is a projection
from the 1939 census of the USSR and. other, censuses of annexed areas.
With respect to the total 1950 estimate;, however, a.close check can be
obtained from estimates based. on, electicn returns . The figures for date s
s'u:bsequent to 1950 are projected. on certain assumptions as to the age
and. sex distribution in :1.950 and a, to birth and death rates by age in
the future. Althoh. this is standa:rd, procedure and is fairly satis-
factory for short periods, a projection for as long as 25 years is
subject to wide error. Slight errors in the base or in the ass-tuned
trends compound. rapidly .as t r.me passes, resulting in a substantial range
.of error before the end of the period. The present trends are so pro-
noun.ced., however, that this projection, even If subject to a 10-percent
error, -.indicates the magnitude of the problems underlying the projected
massive Increase in the population. of the USSR.
IV'. Capabilities and Vulnerabil.i.tieF.
A. Capabilities.
The association of an increase in economic and military caps
abilities in the USSR with. substantial increases in. population Is
obvious.
The increase in the working age segment is at about the same rate
as the total Increase. Under these circumstances and with continued in-
creases in productivity, substantial, expansion in both the absolute and
the per capita volume of production Is feasible. .Such growth can be
attained without danger of an over,-all. shortage of labor,
The more rapid. increase of :males than of females assures the
more efficient manning of heavy occupations and the efficient use of fe-
male workers in light Industry, trade, and the professions.
A L0?-percent expans_i.cn in. the, number of males 20 through 29
years of age, even though, not so rap d. as that of the total population,
insures a substantial increase in the capability for mounting a large
military effort.
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B. Vulnerabilities.
1. Change in Population Trends.
The vulnerabilities Inherent in a rapid population increase
are related. to the problem of the extent to -which the consumer goods
segment of the economy can be adjusted. to the population trends, The
Russians were not under the same pressure to e. 'pand the consumer goods
industries in the 1940's as at present. Because of heavy war losses,
the population of the USSR :increased less than 5 million from 19+0 to
1950,, whereas the expected increase Is about 38 million from 1950 to
1960. Thus, until 2.950, the needs of the expanding population were not
so compelling. Likewise, up to the time of the death of Stalin, the
planning of the USSR tended. to maximize the development of heavy in-
dustry and minimize the needs of the people. It is significant that the
public announcements calling attention to population growth which have
been cited in the previous sections were made soon after the death of
Stalin and soon after the onset of more rapid numerical increase.
At the same time that these public statements acknowledged
awareness of the volume of population :increase, promises were made to
raise the level of living of the people. This means an increase in per
capita consumpti.on,:or., in other it means that the physical
volume of production of consumer items must expand faster than the in-
crease in population. Failure to live up to this promise would produce
disaffection in the masses and. leave the regime more vulnerable to
popular agitation.
The expansion of the p:rcd:action of manufactured consumer
good.s such as clothing, household fE x?nishings, and household equipment
can be paced, ahead of population. growth. by real.. locations of productive
facilities which would not seriously affect continued expansion in other
industrial sectors. However, the c^snforts which are considered ele-
mental - food, and. shelter -- present more serious difficulties,
especially since these have been relatively more neglected in the past.
2. Urhan Housing.
Urban housing is a:_.read.y tt short supply because of past
failures of construction organizations to live up to plans. Thus the
agencies for the production of bu:i.Ld.ing materials and the construction
organizations are faced with a problem which will be aggravated by sub-
stantial increases in, the urban. popul!.ation.
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The production of adequate urban housing in the future will,
in all probability, require the diversion of construction materials,
manpower, and equipment for some years from industrial projects of low
priority.
3. Agriculture.
The rationalization of agriculture to feed 100 million
additional mouths will probably prove difficult. The extent of this
difficulty is highlighted by the record of the war and postwar period.
From 1938 to 1952, population in the USSR increased by about 6 percent,
a rate roughly comparable to the rate of increase in production of the
ten basic agricultural commodities.
The production of foodstuffs suffered by reason of the fact
that some of the most rapid increases in agriculture were in the commercial
crops. As a result, the caloric content of the diet in the USSR declined
from 1938 . to '1953 4
This trend has forced the Soviet rulers to reverse their
previous policy of assigning low priorities to agriculture. Several
possibilities are open for correcting this deficiency or at least
ameliorating it. All of them, however, require substantial reorientation
of plans and heavy investment in agriculture.
Three important measures internal to agriculture might be
adopted: expansion of the number of hectares in crops, shifting in the
crop pattern, and increasing the yields of crops and of livestock. Ex
pansion of the number of hectares in crops should, by itself, increase
the total volume of production. This expansion would undoubtedly.in
volve the cultivation of more marginal land areas where yields would
eventually be low. These areas would be better adapted to grain produc-
tion, and since labor costs could be reduced through increased use of
machinery, the total volume of grain production might be increased with
profit above the cost margin.
Considered by itself, the present program of bringing
30 million hectares of new lands into cultivation will be sufficient
to increase per capita consumption only for the short run (that is,
for the next decade). If it is assumed that the yield per hectare in
the new lands will approximate the average for the old lands (which is
uncertain), and if it is assumed that none of the grain produced will
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be fed to animals (which is also doubtful), then at the end of 9 years
the production of grain will have increased about 28 percent. The
population, however, will have increased about :L4 percent, allowing
about a 12-percent increase in per capita grain consumption. After this.
time, the continued growth of population will cause a fall in per capita
production from this source. Thus the present new land program alone is
not sufficient over the long run. To maintain per capita production at
even the modest level of 12 percent above the present, it will be
necessary to make further heavy investments in other new areas or in
raising yields on the old areas. This calculation applies only to grain
and does not take into consideration the increasing need for meat., dairy
products, and vegetables.
The second measure would be to shift the crop pattern. With
more marginal land in grain, some of the older cultivated better yielding
crop land could be diverted to the increased production of fruits, vege-
tables, and certain technical crops (for food consumption). These crops,
especially fruits and vegetables, yield much more heavily in physical
volume than do grains. Hence a slight proportional increase in area in
these crops would mean a much larger increase in production, and total
physical volume of production would undoubtedly increase by means of
the shift of the crop pattern.
These changes and increases in crop production probably, would
facilitate increases in the size of herds in animal husbandry and in
the production of meat and dairy products.. They would. undoubtedly im-
prove the Soviet diet (a) by expanding per capita caloric intake and
(b) by increasing the proportions of fruits and vegetables, of vegetable
oils, and of meat and dairy products eaten per person in the USSR.
Increases in the yields of crops and of livestock would re-
quire increased investments, not only in agriculture but also in industry.
For example, the use of increased volume of commercial fertilizers would
surely increase yields of crops. These increases would mean larger out-
lays for agriculture but also for industry in the construction of new
plants for the production of increased volume of fertilizers. Increases
in the quantity and quality of field crop machinery probably would
facilitate increases in yields by improving precision and timeliness
in agricultural field operations and thus by reducing losses. These
changes would involve costs to agriculture and also to industry in the
production of plants and in the distribution of the increased volume of
machinery to field husbandry. Increases in the quantity and quality of
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animal husbandry machinery and electrical equipment and installations
might improve livestock yields by better processing .f feeds, watering
of stock., and care of animals. These increases also would. involve in-
vestments by both agriculture and industry.
Increased yields might be obta.ned through the adoption of
improved and scientific practices In.. field and animal husbandry, such
as in the use of better seed. varieties and in the expansion of the
number of better breeding animals, These improvements would require
additional outlays and investment-' in the experimental activities and
installations of agricultural experiment stations.
It is clear that., in order to increase yields in agri-
cu.ltur.e, investments and con truce:,on not only in agriculture but also
in industry would, have to be expanded.. In industry the increased in-
vestment and construction would be directed toward fertilizer plants,
machinery and equipment plants, and the work of experimental stations.
Other changes in investmrnent and construction by nonagri-
cultural agencies would increase the consumption of agricultural produc-
tion. This investment and constrM.ction would, be associated with pro-
cessing., storage, and distribution of the increased agricultural produc-
tion. At the present time, muchl of the agricultural produce for sale
on the market by-the kolkhozy is processed for sale at home on the
kolkh.ozy. The same is true rf the produce sale by the kolkhozniki from
their private plots and herds. The produce must then be carted to town
and sold in ko.lkhoz markets,, sales booths of state and. cooperative
stores, or on delivery routes of clientele of the kolkhozniki. The pro-
blems of processing, storage, transp,-) tat:ton, and distribution of sur-
plus farm produce in the USSR woi '!.d seem to involve great waste of the
food actually produced in. Soviet ag:r ic