CIA REPORT RR PR-113, ENTITLED UNIFICATION OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY IN THE SOVIET BLOC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000900070004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 23, 1955
• Content Type: MF

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23 June 1955
25X1A
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Projects Oe itrol Staff, ORR
FROM
SUBJECT
CIA Report RR PR-113, entitled Unification of
the Chemical tndustry in the Soviet Bloc
REFERENCE . Memorandum from Chief, Projects Control Staff,
dated 14 June 1955
1. This office does not object to the release of subject
document, embodying CS information derived from the resorts 25X10
25X1 C
a. The information obtained from the following report
is deleted:
25X1A
b. Appendix E is deleted, and
c. The dissemination is made with the concurrence of
OCD and the Security Office, CIA.
2. We regret that the source of the above cited report is
too sensitive to permit the release of the information requested.
Attachments:
Copies #54 and #58, PR-113
Copies #1 and #24, Supplementary Source References
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THE =SOVIET
CIA/RR PR-113
11 'May 1955
EN.TRAL INT4ELLI0ENC{E,* AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS.
ff
ABLE TO
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NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
UNIFICATION OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
IN THE SOVIET BLOC
CIA/RR PR-113
(ORR Project 22.457)
NOTICE
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
Office of Research and Reports
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FOREIGN NATIONALS
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This report is concerned primarily with the unification of
the chemical industries of the USSR and the European Satellites.
Hence the term Soviet Bloc, as used in the title and the text of
the report, includes only those countries. The term Satellites
refers only to the European Satellites. At the present time,
Communist China and North Korea are peripheral areas as far as
industrial unification is concerned, and there is occasional ref-
erence to them.
The term unification as used within this report refers to the
transfer of the responsibility for economic policy decisions from
the individual countries of the Soviet Bloc to central planning and
control groups governing economic activity within the Bloc as a
whole. This process is studied specifically in terms of the chemical
industry. The prediction of future economic events, a major task of
economic intelligence, depends largely upon analysis of decision making.
This report seeks the major source or sources for economic decisions
in the chemical industries of the Soviet Bloc.
The detailed research on trade and individual organizations was
concluded on 1 October 1951+. To insure the validity of the con-
clusions of the report, however, coverage of material relative to
the procedures and trends of unification continued until 1 March
1955.
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Page
Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. Possible Soviet Economic Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. Development of Self-Supporting Satellite Economies
. ("Mutual Aid of the People's Democracies") . . . . . . 8
C. Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
III. Elements of Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
IV. Concept of the Single Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
V. Integration of the Chemical Industry . . . . . . . . . . 14
A. Organizational Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
B. Intra-Bloc Trade Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . 21
C. Expansion of the Chemical Industries
of the Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
D. Direct Soviet Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
E. Other Evidences of Integration . . . . . . . . . . . 28
VI. Obstacles and Limitations to the Degree of Unification . 32
Appendixes
Appendix A. Production Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
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Appendix B. Strengthened Cooperation among the Chemical
Industries of East Germany, Czechoslovakia,
and Poland, 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix C. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendix D. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Appendix E. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Soviet Bloc Production of 12 Representative Chemical
Products, 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
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UNIFICATION OF THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY
IN THE SOVIET BLOC*
Summary and Conclusions
By the end of 1954 the Soviet government had established an in-
dustrial policy designed to make the resource planning** for the
chemical industry of the entire Soviet Bloc responsive to basic
guidance from Moscow. Implicit within the policy is the clear
intent that this centralization is to increase in scope and
efficiency.
Because of differences in economic and political environment,
each country within the Bloc approaches the instrumentation of this
policy in a different way. East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland,
which have relatively advanced chemical industries, currently ship to
the USSR the greatest quantities of highly processed chemicals. East
Germany is a particularly important source of the chemicals needed
throughout the Bloc. Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, which have
relatively retarded chemical industries, are more or less dependent
upon other Bloc countries, although Hungary has a highly developed
pharmaceutical industry and Rumania has an important petrochemical
industry. Communist China does not have a highly developed chemical
industry.
Moves to bring about more efficient utilization of resources
jointly by the chemical industries of East Germany, Czechoslovakia,
and Poland assume particular importance; these three countries
account for 87 percent of the total production of chemicals of the
European Satellites and Communist China. In the past, coordination
of the production of chemicals of these countries has been embryonic,
and policy has been determined largely by national aspirations. The
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 1 March 1955 (except as noted in the
Foreword).
** Resource planning is used here in the sense of planned direction
of the use of capital, labor, and raw materials, with concomitant
direction of production and allocation.
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combined production of the chemical industries of the European
Satellites and Communist China is equal to about 40 percent of the
total production of chemicals of the Soviet Bloc.
Each of the European Satellites has existing or potential lines of
chemical specialization contributing to the economy of the Soviet
Bloc. All of them, in turn, depend largely upon the USSR and upon each
other for needed raw materials, and they supply to each other necessary
products as determined by the specialties of the producing country and
by relative supply and demand within the Bloc.
Soviet policy concerning the chemical industries of the European
Satellites has evolved through two historic phases and is moving; into
a third. Immediately after World War II the USSR entered the first
phase, in which it adopted a policy of ruthless exploitation including
extraction of reparations, dismantling of plants, and establishment of
Soviet-owned corporations and Soviet-Satellite joint companies. All
of these devices weakened the economies of the European Satellites.
This was a short-term policy which had to be modified in response to
changing conditions.
The second and current phase is a transitional one, an admixture
of exploitation and rudimentary policy integration. Although full
observance of individual national sovereignties is claimed, the
general outlines of industrial policy are based largely on Soviet
domination of the Bloc economy. Under present long-term plans the
European Satellites are emphasizing a buildup of their productive
capacities in basic commodities (including basic chemicals), assisted
by long-term credits extended by the USSR. By interlinking long-term
trade agreements the European Satellites are beginning to be mutually
self-supporting and are decreasing the drain on the resources of the
USSR.
The third phase, integration, is being approached by current policy.
Increasingly, there is (1) consideration of the Soviet Bloc as an
economic whole in matters of economic policy, (2) encouragement of
product specialization within the Bloc -- regardless of national
boundaries -- toward the goal of maximum satisfaction of scheduled re-
quirements considered from a Bloc-wide point of view, and (3) the
establishment of Bloc-wide production and distribution planning., This
policy, if successfully implemented in the chemical industry and in
other major industries, will mean the eventual economic assimilation
of the European Satellites -- and, possibly, Communist China --:by the
USSR.
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The following conclusions apply to the relationship between the
USSR and the chemical industries of the European Satellites and, to a
much lesser degree, that of Communist China:
1. Basic industrial policy is centrally determined under Soviet
control.
a. The USSR controls the trade of the European Satellites
by the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and by its own
trading companies.
b. The USSR controls industrial expansion through control
of the sources of capital equipment in the Soviet Bloc and through
control of the industrial planning within the Bloc.
c. The USSR controls the domestic economic policy of 'the
European Satellites by means of the Party mechanism, the extension
of credit, the State Planning Commissions, and CEMA.
2. The Soviet organizations concerned are so many and function
in such diverse fashions that there would be virtual anarchy unless
there were some central coordinating and planning group. It is
assumed that there is such a group. Major organizations involved in-
clude the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the production ministries, the
foreign trade companies, the Main Administration for Soviet Property
Abroad (GUSIMZ), the Soviet-dominated CEMA, Soviet industrial
planning institutes, and probably Gosplan.
3. The existing mechanism is cumbersome and probably relatively
inefficient, even if coordinated within the USSR.
4. The mechanism for controlling the execution of centrally
decided policy is relatively primitive. No formalized, comprehensive
system of sending production reports to Moscow is known to exist;,
although such reports may occur on a selective basis.
5. There is a distinct trend toward increased integration.
There are open announcements concerning a higher degree of coordina-
tion for the 1956-60 Five Year Plans of the European Satellites and
the USSR. Moves toward the adoption of common industrial specifica-
tions represent a comparatively high degree of industrial unification.
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6. The response to centrally determined policy will depend
largely upon the commodities involved and the degree of central control
of the particular product. It seems doubtful that central planning
could exist as yet for the production and distribution of thousands
of commodities within the entire Soviet Bloc, although this could be
done for a limited number of selected items. General decisions could
be made on a central basis, however, and the details of execution
could be left to the participating countries.
7. At present the USSR would probably have moderate success in
including the European Satellites in any general industrial mob:Lliza-
ti.on. By 1960, after completion of the first coordinated Five Year
Plan (assuming that the plan is successful administratively), the
USSR may be able to accomplish a Bloc-wide industrial mobilization in
a relatively short period.
8. The process of integration is a tedious one, still in the
early stages of growth and susceptible to interruption by Free World
propaganda.
9. Assimilation of the Chinese Communist chemical industry is
in the very early stage, although increasing Soviet control is
accompanying Soviet aid in the construction of chemical enterprises.
10. Because East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia combined
account for 87 percent of the production of chemicals in the European
Satellites and Communist China, moves to coordinate and integra-:e
their production merit the closest attention.
I. Introduction.
The unification of industry in the Soviet Bloc is a development
based not only on Communist doctrine but also on recognition of the
realities of economic geography. In a 19+9 publication of the UN
Economic Commission for Europe appeared the following statement:
In Europe the size of the national economies is such
that, in most cases, full advantage could be taken
of the economies of large-scale production only
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through international specialization in industrial
development. 1/*
Communist motivation for the unification of Soviet Bloc industry
was clearly stated by Marshal Voroshilov on 26 May 1954 in an address
to the Hungarian Workers' Party Congress:
The development of economic collaboration between
the Soviet Union and the people's democracies
make it possible on the basis of attuned economic
plans to make more effective and rational use of
the natural wealth and material resources in the
common interest, as well as to utilize the ex-
perience of socialist construction and technical
achievements of the Soviet Union for the success-
ful construction of the foundations of socialism
in the people's democracies ... . J
Following World War II the USSR acquired political and economic
domination over a group of European powers -- East Germany, Czecho-
slovakia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria.** Domination over
this bloc of European Satellites gave the USSR virtual control of a
large part of the old economic empire of the German Reich. East
Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia offered particularly good
opportunities for the development of an economically significant
Satellite chemical industry -- once they could be cut loose from
the remaining ties to West Germany and to Western Europe. The
period from 1945 to 1955 has been largely one of a reorientation
of the chemical economies of the European Satellites away from the
former dependence on Germany to the new dependence on the USSR and
on the entire Sino-Soviet Bloc.
The countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, excluding the USSR, may
be divided into three groups according to the characteristics of the
development of their chemical industries. The first group -- coun-
tries with relatively advanced chemical industries -- consists of
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The second group -- coun-
tries with relatively retarded chemical industries -- consists of
Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The third group consists of China
and North Korea, countries with relatively underdeveloped chemical
industries. This third group is an economic entity separate from
* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix E.
Albania and the Soviet Zone of Austria are not considered in
this report.
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the European Satellites, and in this group the pattern of Soviet, control
is not so highly developed.
Few studies have been made of the relative volume of production of
chemicals by individual countries within the Soviet Bloc. A st-LLdy
made by a West German chemical periodical in 1950 indicates that the
total production of chemicals by the Satellites was equal to 42 percent
of the Soviet production. / The data used for this study, however,
were very crude, and the results were subject to a wide range of
error. A sampling of 12 major chemical items, with production esti-
mates by country weighted by unit values, is shown in Appendix A of
this report. From these estimates indices of relative scale of pro-
duction have been derived. In 1953 the European Satellites and
Communist China combined produced chemicals equal to 79 percent-!" of
Soviet production. The production of the Satellites alone was equal
to 74 percent of Soviet production. East Germany, Czechoslovakia,
and Poland together accounted for 87 percent of the total production
of the European Satellites and Communist China. It is probable that
this index overstates the value of Satellite production relative to
Soviet production because the index is heavily influenced by the basic
chemicals, the sector in which the Satellites as a whole are most
highly developed as a result of the postwar expansion. Allowing for
this overstatement, Satellite production of chemicals is estimated to
be equal to about 70 percent of Soviet production of chemicals.
An examination of Soviet Bloc shipments of chemicals to the USSR
reveals that the USSR receives relatively highly processed chemicals
from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. East Germany is an
especially important source of chemicals needed in the Soviet economy.
The other European Satellites and Communist China supply a less pro-
cessed type of material, reflecting the lesser degree of development
of their industries. Hungary, however, has a highly developed phar-
maceutical industry; Rumania has developed a petrochemical industry;
and each Satellite has tended to develop important lines of specializa-
tion contributing to the economy of the Soviet Bloc. A listing of
shipments of chemicals to the USSR by country does not necessarily in-
dicate the fields of specialization within the individual countries;
specialization has been developed highly in terms of inter-Satellite
cooperation. Much of the production of Hungary and Rumania, for ex-
ample, has been diverted to Communist China rather than to the USSR.
For the derivation of this and the following percentage figures,
see Appendix A.
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There is no uniform pattern of Soviet shipments of chemicals to
the Satellites. Bulgaria and Rumania are highly dependent on the
USSR for a wide range of chemical products, as Communist China would
be except for the fact that it has cultivated extensive non-Soviet
sources of supply. Because of extensive trade with East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, Hungary is less dependent on the USSR.
The USSR, however, supplies Hungary with many materials basic to its
chemical industry. The chemicals supplied by the USSR to East Germany,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia counteract resource deficiencies in those
countries and also include a few items which, by their key nature,
appear designed to maintain a control function on industrial develop-
ment.
In terms of size, the combined chemical industries of the Satel-
lites constitute about 4+0 percent of the total chemical industry of
the Soviet Bloc. The Satellites have resources in capital goods,
labor, and raw materials which are of use to the USSR. Efficient
use of these resources involves major problems of coordination and
administration. Soviet policy on the use of these resources reflects
a desire to maximize production in the Soviet Bloc to a degree con-
sistent with over-all Soviet economic and political objectives.
In the light of the possible Soviet economic policies applied
to the Satellites, some conclusions about actual present Soviet pol-
icy may be drawn. Three general categories of policy may be dis-
tinguished: exploitation, development of relatively self-supporting
economies, and development of an integrated Bloc economy. The
policy followed at any given time may actually be a mixture of all
three types.
A. Exploitation.
Exploitation, the policy of taking much and giving little, was
followed by the USSR immediately after World War II in East Germany
and in most of the other European Satellites. The policy involved
extensive extraction of reparations from former enemy countries among
* Thus aniline oil is basic in the coal-tar chemical industry (pro-
ducing dyestuffs, explosives, plastics, and the like). Tetraethyl
lead is the most common antiknock compound used in motor and aviation
4e_,~Xvd 6.
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the Satellites, dismantling of East German plants, and extensive
draining of Satellite economies by the Soviet-owned corporations such as the SAG's (Sowjetische Aktiengesellschaften -- Soviet-owned.
enterprises) in East Germany -- and the Soviet-Satellite jointly
owned corporations. In its full intensity, exploitation was short-
term policy; it either seriously weakened the Satellite economies,
leaving the people dangerously dissatisfied, or it created a later
drain on the Soviet economy when the USSR attempted to allay the dis-
satisfaction. Finally, the East-West impasse became such that the
short-term advantages of exploitation had to be waived in favor of a
new policy developing long-term strength within the Bloc.
B. Development of Self-Supporting Satellite Economies ("Mutual
Aid of the People's Democracies`
The development of relatively self-supporting Satellite
economies is largely a transitional policy based on the domination of
the Bloc economy by the USSR while claiming full observance or in-
dividual national sovereignties. In doctrine the Satellites are
"People's Economies" in the transitional phase between capitalism and
socialism. Under their first long-term plans the Satellites emphasize
a buildup of their productive capacities in basic commodities (in-
cluding basic chemicals). By interlinking long-term trade agreements
the Satellites become mutually self-supporting and reduce the drain
on the resources of the USSR during their buildup. This policy is
largely designed to make the resources of the entire Soviet Bloc
available to the USSR during any period of emergency.
C. Integration.
Integration in the economic sense would be characterized by
(1) consideration of the Soviet Bloc as an economic whole in natters
of economic policy, (2) encouragement of product specialization with-
in the Bloc -- regardless of national boundaries -- designed to
provide maximum satisfaction of scheduled requirements considered
from a Bloc-wide point of view, and (3) the establishment of Bloc-wide
production and distribution planning. This policy would lead:ulti-
mately to the economic assimilation of the Satellites by the USSR.
At the present time, the relations within the Soviet Bloc may
be characterized as being in the second stage, that of development of
relatively self-supporting Satellite economies.* The presence of
* This statement in no way implies absence of Soviet control and
direction.
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certain characteristic elements, however, indicates some trend toward
integration (the third stage), 4/ and certain other characteristic
elements indicate continuing Soviet exploitation (the first stage).
III. Elements of Integration.
Economic integration of the Soviet Bloc is the process of
developing component units into one economic unit fundamentally in-
dependent of the Free World and subservient to Soviet policy. This
economic unit would be characterized by regional specialization of
production, by centralized allocation of commodities of Bloc-wide
importance, and by centralized direction of basic economic policy.
Unification, as used in this report, is a synonym for integration.
A recent report stated the basic elements in this process of in-
tegration as follows J: (1) use of reparations payments, (2) use
of long-term credits, (3) use of joint companies, (4) control through
foreign trade, and (5) control through CEMA.
By 1954, reparations payments had lost most of their significance,
but historically they had made possible Soviet direction of a large
part of the industry of East Germany, Hungary, and Rumania. The USSR
stipulated the quality of the reparations (usually to Soviet specifi-
cations), established supplies of inputs necessary to insure the con-
tinuing flow of these products to the USSR, and established extensive
on-the-spot supervision of production. In turn, many items produced
as reparations became instrumental in the Soviet-directed buildup of
the other Satellites.
Long-term credits continue to play a major role in integration.
With these credits the USSR retains a high degree of control over the
Satellite economies, in many cases specifying both end uses (as in
the construction of designated plants) and the form in which repay-
ment is to be made (as in the case of repayment by delivery of
specified goods).
The joint companies have been a complex element of the integration
policy. In those cases where the USSR was a joint owner, the com-
panies were a means to Soviet intervention within the economy.* In
The return of most of the remaining Soviet-Satellite mixed com-
panies in 1954 eliminates a cumbersome Soviet economic system super-
imposed upon the Satellite economies. The Satellite-Satellite type
continues to play an important role in present moves for increased
coordination.
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those cases where two separate Satellites are owners, the effect is
to encourage regional specialization irrespective of national
boundaries.*
Control of foreign trade takes place by coordinated bilateral
trade agreements and the supervisory activities of CEMA. The USSR
dominates these trade relationships. Long-term agreements have
been particularly effective in developing regional specializat.on
within the Soviet Bloc; there is a tendency for these long-terra
agreements to be incorporated within the long-term economic plans
and the annual economic plans in order to make satisfactory alloca-
tions of imports within the economy and to assure the smooth flow of
exports.
Many studies have touched upon the trade activities of CEMA, but
little is known about the full scope of its activities. "The principal
function of CEMA is apparently the integration and conduct of orbit
planning." 6/ The specific steps toward integration found within the
chemical industry will be discussed later in this report, and attention
will be called to centralized controls.
IV. Concept of the Single Plan.
Within recent years, the political and economic forces orienting
the Satellites toward the USSR have created complex problems i:i
economic planning. Chief among these problems is the need for
maximum utilization of resources in order to create maximum strength.
This need is particularly noticeable in regard to capital equipment
and other materials in short supply. The problem is aggravated by
the fact that following the postwar recovery phase the USSR and the
Satellites are simultaneously embarking upon ambitious programs of
industrialization. The expansion goals are especially ambitious in
the chemical industry, which plays a key role in any plans for Bloc-
wide autarky. The chemical industry appears to be a means of circum-
venting material bottlenecks through the conversion of relatively
common materials into the materials in short supply.
Communist planning is detailed and thorough. In the USSR, as
trade with the Satellites increased, it became clear that un-
controlled variables in Satellite production and distribution would
For example, the Hungarian-Rumanian "collaboration" under
ROMAGCHIM. See p. 17, below.
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probably become troublesome unless some systematic relationship were
developed for simultaneous planning. Soviet planning required assured
shipments of requisite commodities from the Satellites, and conversely
it was handicapped by uncoordinated demands from them.
The "Single Plan"* has remained in the background during a long
period of apparent compromise between Soviet control of the economies
of the Satellites and a much-publicized desire to respect their
national sovereignties. In 1953, however, official circles within
the Satellites began to make some striking pronouncements, and
following the introduction of the new course" the frequency of the pro-
nouncements increased.
In February 1953 a Hungarian broadcast stated that the coordination
of the economic plans of the countries belonging to CEMA was of
special importance. 7/
On 3 August 1953 the official Hungarian newspaper, Szabad Nep,
carried an editorial admitting that in its economic planning Hungary
did not rely sufficiently on cooperation with the USSR and with the
other countries of the Soviet Bloc and that Hungary's Five Year Plan
aimed, in certain respects, at economic isolation and autarky. The
editorial concluded that socialist economic planning involves the
development not only of the internal economy of the country but also
of socialist foreign trade "and the distribution of work among the
democratic countries." Reference was then made to the further develop-
ment of economic cooperation with the "brotherly countries." J
Because centralized development of the "Single Plan" requires care-
ful formulation and analysis by competent planners, it is perhaps
significant that during the summer of 1953 there appeared to be a
turnover of Soviet advisory staffs in industries of Rumania and
Hungary. As a result, many experienced personnel returned to
Moscow** J and presumably will be available to help formulate the
coordinated 1956-60 Five Year Plans.
Addressing the Ninth Plenum of the United Workers' Party Central
Committee in October 1953, Premier Bierut of Poland referred to
* The "Single Plan" is the coordination of the key economic policy
of the whole Soviet Bloc and includes joint planning, division of labor,
and centralized controls (the latter being implicit but not explicit).
** Also see p. 33, below.
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serious disproportions existing in the economy and then associated
the "new course" in Poland with developments in the rest of the
Soviet Bloc by saying that "all the People's Democracies have laid
down as their main economic task in the present period of Socialist
building the speeding up of the rise in living standards." 1C/
On 20 January 1951+ the Budapest radio and press paid considerable
attention to CEMA. It stated that "before the introduction of the
new governmental program, excessive industrialization had resulted in
a certain economic autarchy. In the future we desire to take advant-
age to a larger extent of . . economic cooperation." 11
In a speech made the same day the Chairman of the Czechoslovak
State Planning Office, Josef Pucik, referred to the drawing up of
the Second Five Year Plan for 1956-60 and stated that by 1955 only
the draft plans for this period would be made because branches of
the economy of the majority of the "People's Democracies and the
USSR will be coordinated." / The context implies that the co-
ordination would exist subsequent to the formulation of the draft
plans in 1955.
On 12 February 1954, the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Trade,
Dvorak, reviewed economic cooperation among the countries of the
Soviet Bloc. He noted the advance of specialization among the coun-
tries of the Bloc, the exchange of technical documents, and the
preparation of long-term trade agreements. He also made this
significant statement:
Whereas before there was at times a tendency in some
countries to produce everything with one's own forces
and means, the period beginning particularly with the
second half of 1953, after certain readjustments had
been made in the national-economic plans, is charac-
terised by changes which will lead to further
development of this coordinated production. The line
of ensuring a more rapid rise in living standards
leads in all the countries of people's democracy to a
more thorough discussion of the new capital invest-
ments and to a more economic utilisation of existing
capacities, to the elimination of the tendencies
towards unjustified autarchy. 13/
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On 1 March 1954, Premier Georgi Chankov, addressing the
Bulgarian Sixth Party Congress, referred to the conclusion of long
term trade agreements and to coordination of the plans for Bulgarian
industry and agriculture with the plans of "other democratic coun-
tries." 14/
In the USSR, meanwhile, Saburov, Chairman of the State Planning
Commission, was also making significant comments. In a speech made
on 13 March 1954 he referred to the Fifth Five Year Plan as con-
tributing to a further strengthening and extending of economic
cooperation between the USSR and "the countries of People's
Democracy." 15/
On 30 March 1954, Ulbricht, Premier of East Germany, on behalf
of East Germany's SED Party, praised the activity of CEMA, referring
to it as a means of placing the economic experience of the USSR
directly at the disposal of the other countries of the Soviet Bloc.
He stated, "Further extension of the activities of the Council of
Mutual Aid is of benefit to the development of the national economy
of individual countries and beyond doubt serves to strengthen the
world peace camp." In a later passage he referred to the cooperation
of CEMA as a factor contributing to the changes in the rates of
development of sectors of the East German industry -- that is, the
changes termed the "new course." 161
On 24 May 1954,Rakosi, Party First Secretary, told the Third Party
Congress in Hungary that "international division of labor must be
realized to a greater extent during the Second Five Year Plan ...
among the countries of the Socialist camp. ... LEconomic efficiency
must be increased, substantial economies must be achieved in invest-
ments which become unnecessary owing to the international division of
labor, and serial production must be assured in many fields ... ." 17
Despite the fact that 1954 was the last year of the Hungarian First Five
Year Plan, 1955 is to be used as a year of preparation, the Second
Five Year Plan to extend from 1956 to 1960, in common with all the
countries of the Soviet Bloc except Bulgaria.*
Czechoslovakia's Five Year Plan expired in 1953, compelling a longer
wait for the initiation of the Second Five Year Plan. On 11 June 1954
the Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was informed:
* Bulgaria's industry, a high percentage of which has been constructed
under Soviet supervision, may be presumed to be coordinated already.
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"In 1956 our second Five Year Plan will start to operate. Our second
Five Year Plan will already be fully synchronized with the economic
plans of the USSR and the People's Democracies." 18/ Two days; later,
Premier Siroky stated that "in the interest of the intensifiedL
economic cooperation of the countries of the democratic camp, it will
'be necessary to speedily compare their economic plans." 19/
These statements, most of which are from official sources in the
Soviet Bloc, indicate that this new concept in economic planning --
the concept of the Single Plan for the entire Bloc -- is reaching
maturity. Application of the "Single Plan" to many sectors of the
economy would represent a remarkably high degree of economic integra-
tion. As will be seen below, coordination in the chemical industry
has reached such a point that either the entire chemical industry or
important sectors of it would be included in coordinated Soviet Bloc
planning.
V. 'Integration of the Chemical Industry.
The elements of the economic integration of the Soviet Bloc are
found in abundance within the chemical industries of the countries
-within the Bloc. Some of these elements are discussed below.
A. Organizational Relationships.
Centralized Bloc control of industry has been and continues to
be carried out through a large and interlinked system of organizations
with relatively direct responsibilities. In addition, there appears
to be an increasing and less obvious coordination of economic policy
at the level of the various state planning offices and the Communist
Parties of the countries of the Soviet Bloc.
Although it appears feasible for CEMA to exercise a coordina-
ting function in Bloc-wide economic policy and foreign trade, it
apparently uses devious and well-concealed means for carrying out its
decisions.
In June 1954 the USSR admitted, surprisingly, that a CEMA
session which had been held in Moscow that month discussed trade
matters and "the further development of a number of branches of in-
dustry and agriculture on the basis of economic cooperation between
the member countries." 20
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On the other hand, the Bloc-wide activities of GUSIMZ (Glavnoye
Upravleniye Sovetskom Imushchestvom Zagranitsey -- Main Administra-
tion for Soviet Property Abroad) have been documented in published in-
telligence reports. The primary responsibility of this organization
was the. direction and management of property in foreign countries in
which the USSR had a financial interest.* Thus it directed the
activities of wholly Soviet-owned companies (such as the SAG's) and
of Soviet-Satellite mixed-ownership corporations. It is significant
that the activities of these companies, which dominated the Satel-
lite economies, were centrally directed from Moscow by an organiza-
tion which executed planning, accounting, and operative activities.
By its nature.,GUSIMZ has been a major testing ground for the develop-
ment of the skills and techniques of international economic coordina-
tion.
The various national Administrations of Soviet Property were
under GUSIMZ. 21 In East Germany, the Administration of Soviet
Property in Germany (Upravleniye Sovetskom Imushchestvom v Germanii --
USIG) controlled the operations of the SAG's, the Soviet-owned enter-
prises. 22 Similar administrations have existed in the other
Satellites containing property of Soviet interest.
The role of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade in the
economic assimilation of the Satellites appears to be of major im-
portance. For example, it is the ideal organization to coordinate
CEMA work and the operations of GUSIMZ. The ties between CEMA and
the Ministry of Foreign Trade are relatively open, as CEMA is openly
concerned with trade matters. The Ministry's relations to GUSIMZ
were less obvious. GUSIMZ, however, has used the facilities of the
Ministry of Foreign Trade, including the offices of the Soviet Trade
Representation in the various Satellite capitals. It is also reported
that some major GUSIMZ officials were former members of the Ministry
of Foreign Trade.
In subsequent pages there will be discussion of a rather
highly developed liaison structure within the Satellites for the in-
terchange of industrial data. It seems logical to suppose that a
similar liaison structure would exist within the USSR to coordinate
planning activities, exchange of personnel, and the necessary ex-
change of materials on the level of the operating ministries.
* By the end of 195+, GUSIMZ had virtually come to an end.
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Another mechanism for detailed economic planning and super-
vision of the execution of the plans on an intra'.$loc basis exists in
the bilateral Councils of Economic Collaboration. The first Such
Council* was established in 1947, before CEMA began operation in 1949.
This first Council was composed of delegates from Poland and Czecho-
slovakia and established a permanent joint Council with eight.func-
tion.al commissions. By 1949)some 150 committees and subcommittees
were reported to be functioning, with a total membership of over 3,000
persons. In the course of time, the official references to the
Council began to stress geographic division of labor as a goal. and
later made reference to integral planning. A paper read before the
Polish Institute of International Affairs in 1949 referred to better
utilization of materials and capital equipment in the two countries
and to the development of specialization of production. The paper
concluded that "owing to the gearing-in of complementary elements in
the two economic organs, there is a more rapid increase in economic
development and productive forces in the two countries." 23/
Despite some failures and many obstacles, such as mutual dis-
trust and the mutual desire to maintain national control of the most
advanced technology, 24 this original Polish-Czechoslovak Council
is still functioning, the original 5-year convention presumably having
been. renewed. In March 1954 it was officially announced that the
sixth Polish-Czechoslovak Commission for Scientific and Technical
Matters (a commission of the Council) had met in Warsaw. Czecho-
slovakia agreed to turn over to Poland "her experience in the field of
production" of commodities including chemical and pharmaceutical goods
and rubber footwear. Poland was to reciprocate with "her experience"
in production of goods including tires and dyes. 25 Czechoslovakia
is now reported to be assisting Poland to build up its power network
and to construct the Kedzierzyn Nitrogen Plant. 26/
Polish-Czechoslovak economic cooperation has been mova_ng
closer to detailed mutual economic planning in important sectors. One
such sector is antibiotics. In June 1954 it was announced that the
first session of the commission for economic collaboration between
the two countries in the field of the pharmaceutical industry had been
held. in Warsaw. "Both sides agreed on a plan for exchanging medicines,
prescriptions, and experience; for coordinating research work, and for
establishing close cooperation in the production of antibiotics." 27/
* The term Council will hereafter be used to refer to a Council of
Economic Collaboration. The term CEMA is used to refer to the Council
of Economic Mutual Assistance.
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Bilateral arrangements, modeled largely on the pioneer
Polish-Czechoslovak Convention, now exist among all the Satellites.
The nature of the committees and subcommittees is determined by the
particular economic relationships between each pair of countries.
CEMA appears to have instigated the formation of the bilateral
Councils on a Bloc scale. An article in the official East German
economic periodical, Die Wirtschaft, discusses both CEMA and the bi-
lateral Councils in relation to the "common progressive development
of the economy ff the lands of the People's Democracy." 28
A relatively recent development has been close Hungarian-
Rumanian collaboration in the development of their chemical industries.
In late June 1952 the two countries signed a 3-year economic agreement
providing for a linking of their electric power networks and for
formation of a joint company, ROMAGCHIM, to exploit Rumania's natural
gas and chemical resources. 29 It was further reported that several
chemical plants were to be erected on Hungarian soil to utilize
Rumanian natural gas (via pipeline) and other Rumanian raw ma-
terials. 30/ A Hungarian publication reported that the natural gas
from the Transsylvanian area of Rumania was to be used in the cata-
lytic organic chemical industry to produce acetylene and from this,
vinyl products (such as polyvinyl chloride). 31 In 1953 it was re-
ported that in Hungary a new cellulose plant was to be erected which
would use straw and wood as raw materials. The wood was to be imported
from Rumania, which would then get, as compensation, 40 percent of the
cellulose produced. 32/
This trend toward integration of the chemical industries of
the two countries continued in 1954. On 8 January it was reported
that the fifth session of the Hungarian-Rumanian Scientific and
Technology Committee* had been held, at which it was decided that,
among other things, Hungary would provide Rumania with documentary
material pertaining to the pharmaceutical industry and would assist
in research work on the utilization of fuel of low calorie con-
tent. 33/ On 17 January 1954 a Rumanian delegation including the
Minister of the Chemical Industry, the Chief Deputy of the Minister
of Foreign Trade, and the Vice President of the State Planning
Commission arrived in Budapest. 34/ On 22 January the Hungarian
* The names of these intercountry organizations for scientific and
technical collaboration differ somewhat in form, depending on the
individual countries involved.
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press announced the signing of a protocol concerning collaboration of
the chemical industries of the two countries. 35
East Germany has moved much more slowly toward formali2,ed in-
tegration with neighboring countries.* Difficulties were encountered,
however, in drawing up long-term trade agreements with Czechoslovakia;
it was found that the two economies were sufficiently similar to com-
plicate the mutual exchange of goods and "therefore a detailed
coordination of their production programs is necessary." During
1952 ,consultations were planned to coordinate the production of
various machine tools and of products of the electrical, precision
instrument, optical, and chemical industries. 36/
Poland has been moving toward closer cooperation with Rumania.
At the fifth session of the Polish-Rumanian Scientific and Technical
Cooperation Committee it was resolved that Poland would give Rumania
"benefit of its technical experience" in five industries, including
the chemical industry. 37/
Within the mechanism of the bilateral commissions, extensive
work in development and integrated planning is being accomplished.
The Scientific and Technical Collaboration Committees** appear to be
most active, providing a mechanism to supply East German, Polish,
and Czechoslovak technology to the rest of the Bloc and to furnish
economic assistance from the European Satellites to China and to North
Korea. It appears most reasonable to assume that the bilateral.
Councils and their constituent committees and subcommittees do not
operate independently of each other but rather provide a mechanism
for the detailed execution of coordinated economic planning within
the general policy guidance of CEMA.
East Germany does not appear to be participating in industrial
agreements of the scope of those between Poland and Czechoslovakia and
between Rumania and Hungary. What could be of great significance to
the chemical industry of the European Satellites would be the develop-
ment of an integrated, regional chemical industry in the East Germany-
Poland-Czechoslovakia complex, an area rich in the materials needed
by the chemical industry and well-located with reference to
* For recent moves indicating a rapid change in this situation,
see Appendix B.
** These are distinct from the parent Councils of Economic
Collaboration.
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markets.* It remains to be seem whether or not both the intense
hatreds created by the war and the German pride in scientific supe-
riority can be overcome to a degree permitting unified operation of
this complex.
In addition to the indirect'type of centralized control
typified by the bilateral Councils of Economic Collaboration func-
tioning within the framework of CEMA, the direct controls relating
to the Soviet ownership of property in the Satellites, and the
relatively direct controls created by Soviet aid in the construction
of new enterprises, the USSR is a party to Pacts of Friendship and
Mutual Aid which enable it to establish further authority over the
economic activities of the Satellites.
By way of illustration, the story of the economic relations
between Poland and the USSR has been documented in an East German
periodical. 38/ A preliminary aid agreement was concluded between
the two countries in October 1944. On 21 April 1945 a Pact of
Friendship and Mutual Aid was signed, followed by a major economic
agreement in July 1945. An agreement signed in April 1946
specified equipment to be supplied to Poland.
An agreement on technical and scientific cooperation in the
field of industrial production was signed between Poland and the
USSR in March 1947, followed by agreements on 26 January 1948 (for
delivery of equipment and materials) and in June 1950 (also for de-
livery of capital goods).
Beginning in 1948, approximately 50 groups of Soviet
specialists came to Poland and gave instruction in plant location.,
technical design, and the coordination of assembly. In addition,
Soviet assembly teams were provided for the new construction.
Soviet advice was given in technology; population statistics; types
of products; supply of water, power, and raw materials; and matters
concerning fuels, transportation, and geology. Such Soviet advice
led to the establishment of the Polish industrial production offices,
such as the project planning office for the metallurgical industry
and the power industry.
Soviet aid was given in the following ways: (1) plans, patents,
and licenses were provided; (2) Soviet institutes made analyses of
* As of late 1954 this complex began to take shape. See Appendix B.
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raw materials and performed other tests and experiments; (3) scientific
information was exchanged; (4) the USSR supplied catalogs, norms., and
other industrial data; and (5) Polish technicians were trained in
Soviet plants. The aid to the chemical industry was extensive, most
of the plants being erected or reconstructed under the Six Year Plan
received Soviet assistance, and it was announced that 75 percent of
the capital equipment for the chemical industry was being provided by
the USSR.* In return, it was understood that the repayment of Soviet
credits and assistance would be in the form of products produced in
plants equipped through Soviet aid..
Within the accelerated program for the exchange of scientific
and technical information inside the Bloc, there has been a tendency
to set up formalized liaison offices as part of the governments of the
Satellites. These are the "Offices" of Technical-Scientific Collabora-
tion. Their mission is usually threefold: (1) they prepare the
necessary materials for the bilateral Committees of Technical-Scientific
Collaboration when those Committees are convened, (2) they provide a
mechanism for the necessary follow-up to see that the international de-
cisions are executed within the economy, and (3) they provide a co-
ordinating body relating all the work of the individual bilateral
Committees to the over-all needs and capabilities of the individual
country. In view of these functions, this type of liaison office has
assumed great importance within the movement toward the economic in-
tegration of the Soviet Bloc.
In East Germany the liaison office for the exchange of
scientific and technical information is the Office for Scientific and
Technical Cooperation (Wissenschaftliche-Technische Zusammenarbeit --
WTZ), a Main Department of the Central Office for Research and Tech-
nology (Zentralamt fuer Forschung and Technik -- ZAFT) of the State
Planning Commission. 39/ The WTZ receives and coordinates requests
originating within the Bloc for East German support in research;, ex-
perimentation, machine construction, and plant construction. It
then incorporates these projects, after they have been approved by
the pertinent bilateral commission, within the East German system of
project control administered by ZAFT. Each project receives both a
WTZ number and a ZAFT number, although only the ZAFT number is used in
most of the East German paperwork concerning the project. In Rumania,
-x Thi.s does not mean necessarily that the equipment was actually made
in the USSR.
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similar functions are exercised by the Commission of Technical-Scien-
tific Collaboration (Comisia de Colaborare Tecnica-Sientif ica --
CTS), LO/ and such offices appear to be part of a Bloc-wide pattern.
The importance of these offices has been emphasized by the
national laws of the various states. The East German law on the
Five Year Plan stated the fifth main task of the Plan as follows:
"The scientific-technical cooperation with the USSR and the countries
of the people's democracy is to be promoted in every way and to be ex-
tended to all fields of science, technique, and economy." 41/ A res-
olution of the Polish Government Presidium on 30 May 1953 pertained
to the "deepening of the collaboration of the agencies of economic
administration with the scientific-technical association allied in
the Supreme Technical Organization," a ponderous way of saying that
Polish government officials were to cooperate with the program for
the exchange of scientific and technical aid. 42/
B. Intra-Bloc Trade Relationships.
Intra-Bloc trade in chemicals occurs as (1) commercial ex-
ports under contractual agreement, (2) reparations shipments, and.
(3) "repayment in kind."
In Communist planning, imports are an important component of
the total available supply of any given item. Because distribution
planning depends upon a correct assessment of the total available
supply, motivation to "regularize" imports is strong. This motiva-
tion is matched by a corresponding one to regularize exports in order
to insure prompt fulfillment of contracts and to relate export volume
to the capabilities of the country.
The method used to solve these problems has been that of
establishing bilateral long-term trade agreements setting down the
trade volume for specified key products.* In theory, both importing
and exporting countries would have some assurance of the long-term
nature of trade flows; the necessary capital investment could be
undertaken to secure the proper supply of exports; and importing
countries would be able to plan on the basis of an assured supply of
essential items. In actual operation, however, the detailed annual
trade plans have retained their original importance, and the opera-
tion of the long-term plans has been hampered by inflexibility in the
* This is an area in which CEMA has functioned relatively openly as
coordinator.
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face of a changing international situation. Supplementary long-term
agreements have attempted to remedy this problem but with uncertain
success.
An illustration of this is the entering of East Germany into
long-term trade agreements with the other countries of the Soviet
Bloc, the most important agreement being the one with the USSR signed
on 27 September 1951 and covering the years 1952 through 1955. The
East German Five Year Plan, which-was announced 1 November 1951, in-
corporated this very important long-term trade agreement.
At the present time, reparations shipments have off iciaLly
dropped out of the trade scene. A primary advantage of these ship-
ments was that they held a priority over all commercial export ship-
ments. This priority advantage can be retained for Soviet benefit
by use of so-called "Friendship" shipments in "gratitude" to the USSR
and by the use of repayment-in-kind shipments in settlement of. Soviet
credits of various types. The repayment-in-kind shipments also re-
tain a high degree of Soviet control -- from the initial specifica-
tion of the commodities desired to the final shipment.
The so-called repayment-in-kind shipment possesses charac-
teristics of both the reparations shipment and the normal export
shipment. It is like a normal export in the sense that it is rec-
ompensed, at least nominally, by Soviet services or shipment of
goods -- indeed, repayment-in-kind shipments are usually included
in the over-all export plan, although under certain conditions they
may not be. On the other hand, there appear to be some important
differences from the ordinary export. These differences definitely
exist in East Germany and probably exist in the other Satellites.
The primary difference consists of a high degree of preferential
treatment. The shipments assume a priority ahead of other exports
at virtually all levels of handling. In East Germany the USSR ex-
ercises a high degree of direct control over these shipments, pre-
empting specific commodities for the specific requirements of its
operating ministries.
An authoritative East German source describes these repayment-
in-kind shipments, known in Germany as "Konto T," by stating that the
goods produced in SAG plants under the Konto T account were intended,
for specific Soviet ministries, whereas goods produced for regular
deliveries went to the usual Soviet importing agencies to be resold to
customers in the USSR. Also, such deliveries were reported to be based
on the "writing-off of mutual debts." 1?3/
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The impact of the Konto T shipments on the East German economy
has been strong. In March 1953 there were extensive discussions be-
tween East German chemical export officials and the State Administra-
tion for Material Supply about this impact. The state chemical import-
export firm, DIA Chemie, enclosed a list of 17 commodities which it
found most difficult to export in the quantities planned because of
the diversion of these commodities to Konto T deliveries. The in-
dustry was unable to produce additional quantities of chemicals to re-
place the diverted amounts. In many cases)East Germany would be unable
to fulfill export contract obligations. The solution proposed,
apparently as a sole alternative, was a downward revision of the
chemical export plan (except for Konto T shipments). 44/*
The East German Konto T shipments appear to have originated
in SAG plants. It is probable that in part they have represented
payment of rental and profits to the USSR from the operations of
these plants. Such shipments could also be in repayment of Soviet
long-term credits covering capital investment; such credits amounted
to 586 million Deutsche Mark for 7 of the chemical plants returned to
German control on 1 January 1954. It is probable that the USSR has
required payment for assets and repayment of outstanding credits ex-
tended to the more than 200 former Soviet-owned plants of all types;
the Konto T shipment would be a convenient form of payment and would
permit continuing control of the East German economy. In that case,
7 of the chemical plants returned on 1 January 1954 alone would
give rise to Soviet claims of more than 1.4 billion Deutsche Mark,
586 million for the long-term credits and 839 million for the
property value of the plants. 45/ By way of comparison, planned
East German exports of chemicals to the USSR in 1953 amounted to
224 million rubles (approximately 186 million Deutsche Mark). 46/
There is evidence suggesting that there exist in-the other
Satellites similar preferential arrangements for the repayment in
goods of Soviet credits. One source reports a secret protocol signed
in Moscow by the USSR and Hungary on 9 December 1947 giving Soviet-
owned and Soviet-Hungarian companies the "right" to transfer profits
and dividends to the USSR in the form of goods. 47/
An official East German periodical, referring to the extensive
Soviet credits granted to Poland, notes: "The dates for repayment
* A similar revision occurred in 1954, indicating a continuation of
Konto T shipments in 1954.
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have been so set that repayment will be in the form of products pro-
duced in plants equipped with capital goods furnished by the Soviet
Union." The same article states that 75 percent of Poland's chemical
capital equipment is provided by the USSR. L8/
In general, trade is a fertile area for indications of the
emergence of a Bloc-wide unified economic policy. Intra-Bloc trading
relationships, in terms of the chemical industry, are characterized
by predominant Soviet control of shipments and by the evolution of
Bloc-wide coordinating mechanisms.
Soviet trading companies have gained control of a volume of
chemical commodities much greater than that required for Soviet
consumption. There are many reasons for this, the most important
of which is the Soviet domination of East Germany, the leading ex-
porter of chemicals among the Satellites. As a result, the USSR is
in the position of middleman, directing extensive shipments from
producing country to consuming country. This position permits the
USSR to exercise a major influence on industrial development in the
countries concerned. In addition, in the case of several commodi-
ties -- ethyl fluid, for example -- the USSR is the major Bloc.
source of supply. This again permits direct Soviet control of' the
flow of the commodity.
In addition to those trade relationships in which it ex-
ercises relatively direct control, the USSR also dominates CENA,
which functions as a general coordinator in the preparation of intra-
:Bloc trade agreements.
An important development in the area of trade relations may
have been the multinational trade negotiation allocating key re-
sources to the member countries of the Bloc. Such negotiations may
have taken place concerning rubber. Significantly, the Chairman of
the Rubber Trade Association of London observed that Soviet rubber
purchases from Great Britain had declined in 1953 and that it was
clear that internal arrangements existed whereby imports were
divided among the countries of the Soviet Bloc. L9 It is probable
that he had in mind the extensive shipments of rubber to Communist
China, shipments which are much above the level of Chinese Communist
requirements.
This type of negotiation would differ little from the normal
Soviet negotiations preparatory to the signing of a trade agreement.
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It would be a logical development in relation to those products
which are provided to the European Satellites through the USSR. A
more important development would be allocation conferences for prod-
ucts supplied primarily by the Satellites themselves. Even this
level of allocation is virtually achieved through Soviet control of
the most important items of Satellite production -- East German
Buna S synthetic rubber, for example.
Throughout the whole interlinked structure of centralized
production control, there exists a strong potential for coordinated
sales effort, especially in relation to Western markets. Specializa-
tion within the chemical industry of the Soviet Bloc is such that for
the great bulk of the items only one or two countries have an export
surplus, and in such cases it is difficult to detect evidences of
concerted sales action.
In July 1954, while Western COCOM discussions were being held
in Paris, a meeting of CEMA was held in Moscow which discussed, among
other things, questions bearing on the development of foreign trade
between member countries and other lands. 50/
C. Expansion of the Chemical Industries of the Satellites.
The patterns of industrial expansion provide a valuable area
for the assessment of the impact of Bloc-wide planning. In terms of
the chemical industry, several forces can be seen at work determining
the direction of this expansion: (1) a drive for Bloc-wide in-
dependence from Western sources in basic industrial chemicals,
(2) development of specialized production in those countries which
have a supply of heavy chemicals large enough to support the general
industrialization program or which have special resources or skills
to support such specialization, and (3) emergence of rudimentary
international planning* for maximum utilization of resources.
The European Satellites and Communist China have emphasized
installation of heavy chemical plants. In recent years all or most
of the Satellites have installed plants for the production of sulfuric
acid, caustic soda, antibiotics, synthetic fibers, nitrogen and
allied products, plastics, coal-tar chemicals, and synthetic fertili-
zers.
* A leading example is RCMAGCHIM, a joint Rumanian-Hungarian chemical
development.
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Patterns of specialization are revealed to a certain extent
by the exports from a particular country. East German exports are
largely (1) items reflecting a relatively high degree of technolDgy;
(2) chemical ores and derivatives from chemical ores (potash, salt,
and the like); and (3) basic industrial chemicals in short supply
elsewhere in the Bloc. Polish chemical exports include (1) products
based on Polish coal; (2) products based on special resources, such as
zinc (derivatives include zinc chloride and zinc white); and (3) basic
industrial chemicals in short supply elsewhere in the Bloc. Czecho-
slovakia exports some coal-tar chemicals; some specialty products
(such as titanium white); tires; cellulose; and many products re:?lecting
relatively advanced technology (catalysts, laboratory chemicals, and
pyrocatechol). Hungary has become relatively specialized in some lines
of dyestuffs and dye intermediates, in many pharmaceutical items;, and
in the production of sera and vaccines. Rumanian specialties are based
largely on the petroleum industry and include petrochemicals, carbon
black, and industrial chemicals consumed in the petroleum industry
(such as sulfuric acid and caustic soda).
In addition to the general buildup in basic capacity, recent
expansion has tended to encourage this specialization where it rE;p-
resents a net improvement of the Bloc supply position. By the ad-
mission of prominent Bloc spokesmen, nevertheless, this movement toward
national specialization has barely begun.*
The size of the expansion of the chemical industries in the
Satellites is highly significant; the capital invested, being for the
greater part Soviet-controlled, could have been invested in an ex-
pansion of the Soviet chemical industry. As can be seen, the Satel-
lite expansion goes far beyond mere recovery of the prewar level of
production. In East Germany the production of chemicals planned for
1955 is to be more than three times the scale of 1936 production.**
In Czechoslovakia,,1953 production of chemicals was more than three
See pp. 11-13, above.
This statement is based on Ulbricht's claim that planned 1955
chemical production of 6.6 billion DM would be 304 percent of 1936.
The 1955 target was later increased to 8.2 billion DM. 51/
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times 1937 production.* Poland's 1955 target for production of
chemicals is an index of 800 percent of 1938 production; this target,
however, is inflated by Poland's postwar boundary changes. 53/ Al-
though allowance should be made for statistical inflation in all of
these official figures, they do indicate the order of magnitude.
A high degree of Soviet control went with the Soviet invest-
ments. Direct investment in Soviet-owned or Soviet-Satellite com-
panies was accompanied by direct Soviet control. Soviet "assistance"
in the construction or reconstruction of Satellite plants was
accompanied by Soviet planning, participation of Soviet "experts,"
and Soviet preferential call upon the production of the plants.**
Soviet control is somewhat less obvious when a capital in-
vestment is undertaken jointly by two Satellites. Within the frame-
work of the bilateral Councils of Economic Collaboration operating
within the Molotov Plan, the individual Satellites have
established liaison offices which coordinate the various tasks
involved in joint capital-investment activities.* East Germany
has gone a step beyond this by establishing Commissions for Economic
Cooperation in the power, metallurgical, and chemical industries.
The Commissions, composed of representatives of the industry, the
State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Trade, and the Central
Office for Research and Technology, are responsible for the control
of the preparation of equipment for other members of the Bloc. 54/
At first glance,such joint Satellite activities do not appear
to represent a centrally controlled activity, but there are both
logical and empirical grounds for further examination. Do the Satel-
lites themselves determine the policies concerning the joint activi-
ties, or do they merely implement in detail the policy decisions of
some central body such as CEMA? Logically, noncoordinated joint
* An index for 1953 of 370 (1937 _ 100 was derived from the
announcement that 1953 production was almost 2 1/2 times 1948 and
1948 production was 124 percent of 1937. 52/
An outstanding case history has been the story of the construc-
tion of the Dimitrovgrad Nitrogen Plant in Bulgaria, a plant erected
with Soviet "help" and now operating under what seems to be a high
degree of Soviet control. For discussion of the topic of preferential
call upon production, see p. 22, above.
This is the policy plan establishing CEMA.
See p. 20, above.
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investment activities would cause a state of chaos unless the necessary
resources of labor, materials, and capital itself were relatively
abundant, which they are not within the Bloc. Such lack of coordina-
tion would lead to what the Satellite radio calls "unjustified
autarchy." Whether or not rudimentary coordination has existed in
past years, the recent Satellite denunciations of "autarchy" vindicate
dissatisfaction with the results. Indeed, the Soviet Bloc is actively
considering a far-reaching form of integration.
D. Direct Soviet Controls.
The major elements of Soviet control have been discussed
earlier in.this report.* Direct Soviet controls of trade and indus-
trial expansion have also been discussed.**
A point not previously made in this report merits mention
here -- the existence of historical precedents for the preparation of
Satellite industrial plans on the basis of Soviet appraisement. The
occupation of East Germany permitted a high degree of Soviet control
at the central planning levels of that country. To some extent, how-
ever, East Germany is a special case. More generally, there is a wide-
spread feeling that the revisions of the Satellite long-term plans
occurring in 1950 and 1951 reflected some direct Soviet interference
at the planning level and certainly a great deal of indirect Soviet
manipulation.
It is not common to find: official statements resembling; an
admission of Soviet participation in industrial planning withi.a the
Satellites. Thus a statement made by Ruminski, the Polish Minister
of the Chemical Industry, is unusual 55/: "The plan, prepared at the
beginning of 1951 on the basis of Soviet appraisement, for the rapid
transformation of sulfuric acid factories gave basic directives .
Poland's laggard sulfuric acid industry gave continuing trouble, and,
in 1952, one of the leading Soviet sulfuric acid experts, Malin,
attended a conference in Warsaw. 56 There was not, however, any
apparent beneficial result to sulfuric acid production.
E. Other Evidences of Integration.
Although most aspects of the trend toward economic
centralism are disguised as the voluntary mutual assistance of free
* See .p. 9 above.
See pp. 61 and 25, above.
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and sovereign nations moving toward a glorious common future, the
effect is to place in Moscow the responsibility for an increasing
number of economic decisions for the whole Soviet Bloc.
Striking illustrations of this are found in three areas:
(1) the "voluntary" exchange of information about production capacity;
(2) the "voluntary" exchange of scientific and technical personnel; and
(3) the "voluntary" adoption of Soviet industrial specifications ,(GOST
standards).
If extensive economic integration of the Soviet Bloc were
already realized, the dominant flows of information would be from
the appropriate producing units through channels within their own
governments to the Bloc planning authority, with control and policy
guidance moving in the opposite direction.
The Soviet Bloc has apparently reached the point at which
general economic policy can be centrally determined but where many im-
portant aspects of the detailed implementation of that policy must be
executed on the initiative of the governments of the member countries.
The major significance of this is that the control mechanism for the
enforcement of policy decisions is crude and cumbersome and rests on
the fact of Soviet domination rather than on an efficient administra-
tive system.
Probably because of a Soviet reluctance to abandon the
pretense of equal sovereignty of the countries of the Soviet Bloc,
the exchange of information still has many aspects of informality
and spontaneity.
There are official indications that a more formal exchange of
information will be conducted, particularly for preparation of economic
plans. In May 1954.,Marshal Voroshilov referred to increased Soviet
Bloc division of labor on the basis of "attuned economic plans." In
June 1954 the Moscow radio reported a meeting of CEMA which discussed
"the further development of a number of branches of industry and
agriculture on the basis of economic cooperation." 57/
The exchange of technical and scientific personnel within the
Soviet Bloc serves two major purposes: (1) the training of personnel
in operations and procedures standardized on an international or a
Bloc-wide scale and (2) the development of cadres of Soviet personnel
intimately familiar with technical and industrial conditions within
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the Satellites. Such operations have been taking place on ar.
augmented scale and have become commonplace.*
To a large extent the international adoption of uniform
compulsory industrial specifications implies a loss of sovereignty
to the participating countries.. This is true in the Soviet E,loc,.
for in those countries industrial specifications have the force of
law. The purpose of industrial standardization** is to restrict
diversity in the interest of economic efficiency. It is for that
purpose (with the addition of an implied recognition of Soviet
economic assimilation of its Satellites) that the Bloc is moving
steadily toward the adoption of a common set of industrial speci-
fications. As this trend continues, it will facilitate centralized
industrial planning, and furthermore, it will decrease the logistic
problems of a Bloc-wide mobilization.
The pattern which is developing is one of "maximum use"
of Soviet industrial specifications within the Satellite economies.
This involves the outright adoption of Soviet specifications where
feasible and a maximum effort to reconcile Soviet and Satell'_te
specifications where differences in raw materials or industrial
environment preclude outright adoption of Soviet specifications.
The task is simplest in those countries which have received
much of their equipment and technical knowledge from the USSR
since World War II and is most complicated in those countries which
were highly industrialized before becoming Satellites. The latter
group of countries -- East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia --
possess their own relatively advanced systems of industrial
specifications.
See pp. 19 and 20, above.
Definition of standardization: "Standardization include., the
establishment of norms (specifications) which unequivocally specify
approved shapes, dimensions, properties, tests, definitions, nomen-
clature, classifications, and principles for the receipt and storage
of raw and process materials, and semifinished and finished products.
In the field of production and. technology, standardization leads to
concentration upon the minimum adequate number of sizes, types, and
grades of products, to rigid specifications for such products, and
to uniform manufacturing methods." 58/
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Conversion to Soviet specifications involves both substantial
initial capital outlays and potential loss of export markets. On the
other hand, continuation of independent systems of industrial specifi-
cations causes duplication of facilities, hinders interchangeability
of parts, and thwarts the introduction of Soviet labor and material
norms.*
In recent years there has been strong evidence of a concen-
trated effort to introduce Soviet specifications into the economies
of Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. In 1951, both the
Polish Committee on Standardization and the Czechoslovak Office of
Standardization were instructed by their respective state planning
offices to work out methods for the introduction of Soviet
standards. 59/ In an East German publication the same year, it
was stated that "in certain cases the Popular Democracies7 unite
for the 'typing' of production." /
By mid-1953, Czechoslovakia was prepared to initiate the
actual changeover. 61 The country was already producing such a
volume of export orders to Soviet specifications that the initial
cost of the changeover would not be prohibitive, and a detailed
timetable for the adoption of Soviet specifications was prepared.
This timetable called for substantial completion of the task by 1956,
the year subsequently announced as being the first year of Czecho-
slovakia's new "coordinated" (with the rest of the Soviet Bloc) Five
Year Plan. As previously observed, the adoption of Soviet standards
is not expected to be rigid but rather to be flexible, adjusted to
the circumstances of the country. As a result, the Czechoslovak CSN
(Czechoslovak State Norm) system of standards will continue to
exist -- but with a minimum of deviation from corresponding Soviet
standards.
East Germany, probably disturbed by the steady Soviet
assimilation of former German markets in Eastern Europe and jealous
of its heritage of scientific and industrial prowess, appears to be
resisting adoption of Soviet standards. On 1 August 1953,East Germany
approved formation of an Office of Standardization, including on its
limited staff a "Chief Expert for Cooperation with the Soviet Union
and the People's Democracies." 2`g' It has been rumored that the
* The introduction of Soviet norms applied to the expenditure of re-
sources is potentially a great weapon of detailed centralized Soviet
control of the entire Bloc.
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Office will have the task of prodding East German industry into
acceptance of Soviet specifications, but as yet there is no evidence
that the Office has begun operations.*
The large-scale adoption of Soviet standards by the Satel-
:Lite economies will make plain to the Satellite industrial technicians
the degree of Soviet control. It is thus a potential crisis point in
the imposition of detailed Soviet economic control upon the Soviet
Bloc.
VI. Obstacles and Limitations to the Degree of Unification.
The degree of centralization of economic policy within the
chemical industry of the Soviet Bloc is limited by a series of
political and economic factors:
:l. Within the USSR and its Satellites, Party rule has insured
the subordination of economic activity to the policy decisions of
the :Party. A movement such as that toward Bloc economic unification
will reflect considerations not only of economic efficiency but also
of political expediency. It may thus be reversed with short notice.
2. Soviet policy toward the Satellites has long been beset by
contortions reflecting battles between opposing points of view.
Those officials who expect a long-term division between East sand
West with a comparatively limited exchange of goods tend to support
economic unification within the Soviet Bloc. They are supported by
colleagues who think that there might be a larger exchange of goods
between East and West but still think that the Soviet Bloc should
be basically self-sufficient in the long run. Some other officials,
for a variety of reasons, favor relatively outright economic exploita-
tion. of the Satellites. These include those who distrust "foreign"
influences emanating from the Satellites. Others may contemplate a
relatively fluid foreign policy regarding the Satellites, in con-
trast to a high degree of assimilation. Others may be relatively
isolationist in outlook, favoring economic consolidation with'._n the
boundaries of the USSR.
* In early 1955 this program began operation. It is still too
early to assess the results or the possible impact oil planning for
1956-60.
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3. Economic unification will force the crisis with nationalistic
elements within the Satellites. Because its very justification is
maximization of production, unification requires the support of
administrators and technicians in addition to Party members. Yet
those same administrators and technicians are often those who have
the most to lose from the digestion of their countries by the USSR.
The problem will be most complex in East Germany and, to a lesser
degree, in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
4. The necessity for "respecting" national sovereignty vastly
complicates economic unification. It requires devious and over-
lapping channels for centralized control, including some direct
Soviet controls; extensive control through the international
Communist Party apparatus; controls by the respective Satellite
state planning offices; and controls by the CEMA mechanism for the
"voluntary" cooperation of "sovereign" states. The coordination of
this structure of direct, indirect, open, and secret controls must
be confusing even to a Soviet bureaucrat.
5. Unification requires not only the central determination of
general economic policy but a system of controls over the execution
of that policy. This requires trained planners, administrators,
technicians, and statisticians familiar not only with their re-
spective professions but also with the environment of the particular
Satellite states with which they are concerned. The widespread use
of Soviet "specialists" in the, Satellites has gradually expanded the
number of personnel with suitable background. The need for such
personnel both within the USSR and in the Satellites is so great,
however, that their comparatively small number will continue to be
a limiting factor.
6. The monetary problem is linked with the problem of individual
sovereignties within the Soviet Bloc. Diverse exchange rates,
fluctuating with respect to each other, create complicated problems
for price policy. Some experts believe that efficient utilization
of resources within an area requires a single market price applying
within that area for the same commodity and that discrimination in
pricing works against economic efficiency. Within the Bloc it is
still comparatively common to find price discrimination among the
member countries. Most notable is the typical Soviet insistence on
prices favorable'"to the USSR. "Buy cheap and sell dear" has not been
abandoned as a tenet of Soviet economic policy.
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7. The USSR is placed in a dilemma when it is faced with the
need of exchanging economic data with other nations, even those
controlled by itself. The USSR has a deep mistrust of releasing
detailed economic information outside of its own borders. On the
other hand, Soviet control of the Satellites requires that a con-
stant stream of Satellite economic data flow into the USSR. When
this flow of information becomes too obviously unilateral, the USSR
is placed in a difficult position -- especially because of the pre-
text of mutual and equal sovereignty.
8. Economic unification of a region implies the relatively free
movement of resources within that region. In turn, this free riove-
ment implies a reasonably adequate transport net. Within the USSR,
transport deficiencies encouraged a drive toward regional self--
sufficiency. Within the European Satellites, similarly transport
problems may encourage regional industrial development. Ultimate
policy control, however, would continue to come from Moscow.
9. International division of labor implies that productive
resources will be developed regardless of nationality. While the
USSR has conducted a surprising amount of industrial development out-
side of its own borders, it still seems true that in the most important
cases the USSR is given preference. It is unlikely that this t;-ill
change in the near future.
10. It is probable that enough overtones of exploitation will
remain in future economic policy to make the USSR vulnerable to
Western propaganda. Any clash between Soviet-oriented and national-
istic-oriented officials in Satellite states would increase this
vulnerability.
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APPENDIX A
PRODUCTION INDEX
A production index based on 1953 production by the countries
of the Soviet Bloc of 12 representative chemical products is
developed in the accompanying table.'
Total production by the Satellites and Communist China of the
items included in the index, equal to 79 percent of Soviet produc-
tion, is 44 percent of the total production of the Sino-Soviet
Bloc. The three major producers of the index item -- East Germany,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia -- accounted for 92 percent of the
Satellite total (excluding Communist China).
It should be noted that the index is weighted in favor of heavy
chemicals and rubber. It thus tends to understate the value of
Czechoslovak production, which runs to chemical processing and
specialty items, and of Hungarian production, in which phar-
maceuticals are very important.
Using the weighted value totals of the index, the following
rank order is obtained:
USSR
4,939,111
East Germany
2,147,522
Poland
777,421
Czechoslovakia
471,535
Communist China
248,150
Rumania
113,098
Hungary
105,323
Bulgaria
60,589
The table follows on p. 37?
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APPENDIX B
STRENGTHENED COOPERATION AMONG THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES
OF EAST GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND POLAND
195
In August 1951+., development of an integrated East German-Polish-
Czechoslovak regional complex for the chemical industry began to take
shape. As early as 1952.,preliminary coordination of the East German
and Czechoslovak chemical industries was begun.*
The two major agreements necessary to complete the triangle were
apparently signed in Warsaw in the last week of July 1951+, when
Polish-Czechoslovak and Polish-East German protocols for cooperation
in the chemical industry were signed.
The first of the two announcements stated that the first session
of the Government Commission for Economic Cooperation between the
Polish People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Republic in the chemical
industry had been held in Warsaw. During the session, decisions had
been passed which would contribute to the development of the chemical
industry in both countries and would constitute a further step in the
consolidation of economic cooperation. 61+/
The second announcement mentioned the signing of a protocol further
strengthening economic cooperation between Poland and East Germany in
the field of the chemical industry.
It is possible that the coordination envisaged in these protocols
includes coordination of production, as was announced in June 1951,
for a Polish-Czechoslovak agreement in the pharmaceutical industry. 66/
* See p. 1 above.
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No methodological problems were encountered except in the
preparation of Appendix A, which compares the Soviet Bloc produc-
tion of 12 major chemical items. CIA production estimates for 1953
were used. Sources and work sheets are available in the Branch re-
sponsible for this report. Soviet domestic prices for 1950, in
rubles, were utilized as the weights. It is believed that the items
used in the index create a bias in favor of heavy chemical produc-
tion. The figures cannot, therefore, be employed with full confidence
as representative of the over-all chemical industry, which includes
such component sectors as pharmaceuticals, plastics, rubber pro-
cessing, and chemical specialty items, as well as heavy chemicals.
Derivation of an index representative of the over-all industry must
await ORR estimates of Bloc-wide production of a larger range of
products.
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APPENDIX D
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
Although this report has placed its emphasis upon coordination at
the level of the chemical industry, the materials surveyed have raised
questions concerning over-all interindustry coordination within the
Soviet Bloc. Apart from these unanswered questions,which are beyond
the scope of this report, notable gaps exist relative to the central
problems of the report.
In some cases the absence of evidence is of the nature that
signifies either an intelligence gap or the nonexistence of a suspected
or surmised activity, organization, or relationship.
Of this nature is the lack of information concerning report flows
between the USSR and the Satellites. The conclusions of the report do
not postulate the existence of such flows on a comprehensive basis;
yet information as to their existence would be highly significant.
Other gaps concern phenomena so recent that present information is
sketchy. The possible financial settlements arising from the transfer
of the last remaining Soviet-owned corporations in East Germany to the
central government are not clearly established. There is no informa-
tion on the actual implementation of the protocols among Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany concerning the chemical industry.
This subject deserves concentrated continuing coverage.
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APPENDIX E
SOURCE REFERENCES
A report of this nature does not deal with much that is measurable:
it is qualitative rather than quantitative. Certain facts can be
established, however, such as the existence. of organizations and certain
functions performed by them. Gradually, patterns of behavior and of
relationships begin to appear. To establish such patterns, the indi-
vidual facts or observations which are their bases must be authori-
tative. Official sources, therefore, have been used as much as
STATS P EC ^ possible. Particularly valuable in supplying this information have
been publications, covert intelligence, and Soviet Bloc period-
icals and publications. The State Department economic reports from
the Satellite capitals have been invaluable in providing current
coverage and in calling attention to possible significant developments.
In many cases, field guidance also has been fruitful.
Evaluations,. following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
S
ource of Information
Doc. - Documentary
1
- Confirmed by other
sources
A
- Completely reliable
2
- Probably true
B
- Usually reliable
3
- Possibly true
C
- Fairly reliable
1+
- Doubtful
D
- Not usually reliable
5
- Probably false
E
F
- Not reliable
- Cannot be judged
6
- Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff
officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."
- ".5 -
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Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document.
1. UN, Economic Commission for Europe. Economic Survey of
STATSPEC Europe, 1948, Geneva, 1949, p. 228, U. Eval. Doc.
25X1A
3. "Status and Potential of the USSR Chemical Industry,"
Chemische Industrie, no 12, 1950, U. Eval. RR 3.
4.
5. NIS 26, State contribution to Section 65, Feb 53, P.
65-56 ff, S. Eval. RR 2.
6. Ibid.
25X1A 7? CIA. Current Intelligence Digest, 13 Jul 53, S. Eval. RR 2.
8.
9.
10.
STATSPEC 11.
12. Ibid., p. GG 1, U/OFF USE. Eval. RR 2.
13. Dvorak, R. "Economic Cooperation of Countries of Demo-
cratic Camp,"'For a Lasting Peace, for a People's
STATSPEC Democracy, Bucharest, no 7, 12 Feb 54, U. Eval. RR 2.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
CIA. CIA ORR Project 1.1 WP , Soviet and German Economic
Structures in East German, 28 Sep 53, S/US ONLY.
Eval. RR 2.
22.
Ibid.
23.
Douglas, Dorothy W. Transitional Economic Systems, the
Polish-Czech Example, London, 1953, P. 303-30b, U. Eval. RR 3.
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 5X1A
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51. Ulbricht, W. Der Fuenfjahrplan and die Perspektiven der
Volkswirtschaft, Berlin, 1951, U. Eval. RR 2.
CIA. FDD, Special Translation no 31, 3 Aug 53, SUS ONLY. Eval.
STATSPEC Doc.
52.
25X1A
53.
51.
55. Ruminski, Boleslaw. "To New Difficult Tasks of the Chemical
Industry in 1952," Polish Press Summary, 7 Jan 52, U.
STATSPEC 56. Eval. RR 2.
57.
58. CIA. FDD, U-1+91+9, 3 Nov 53, p. 11+9, State Commission for
Economic Planning, Poland, Niektore kierunki rozwoju te::hniki
w planie 6-letnim (Some Aspects of Engineering Development
in the Six-Year Plan), State Technical Publications, Wa:rsaw,
1952, C. Eval. RR 1.
59. For Czechoslovakia:
CIA. FDD, Translation no 75, 13 Oct 52, p. 18-19, C.
Eval. Doc.
Dostal, G. "The Introduction of Soviet Standards into the
Economy of the Czech Republic," Planung Technologische- and
Betriebsorganization, no 1, Berlin (East),, Aug 53, P. 3~-36,
U. Eval. RR 1.
CIA. FDD, U-1+91+9, 3 Nov 53, State Commission for Economic
Planning, Poland, Niektore kierunki rozwoju techniki w
planie 6-letnim (Some Aspects of Engineering Developmen-:
in the Six-Year Plan), State Technical Publications, Warsaw,
1952, p. 11+9-159, C. Eval. RR 1.
60. Parmov, M. "Economic Cooperation of the USSR with the Countries
of the People's Democracy," Neue Welt, Berlin (East), 1 Jun
51, P. 58, U. Eval. RR 1.
61. Dostal, op. cit.
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62.
63.
25X1A
STATSPEC 64+
65
66
proizvodstvenno-teknicheskogo naznacheniya, instrumenty
i aytozapchasti v tsennik 1950 goda (Pricebook for
Basic Construction and Auxiliary Materials,. Tools, and
Automobile Spare Parts in 1950 Prices). Baku gorod
11 G
tekhnicheskiye i vspomogatel'nyye materialy
49
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