CONTROL OF THE LABOR FORCE AND TRADE UNIONISM IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES 1945-55

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000900100005-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 20, 1955
• Content Type: IR

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CONTROL OF THE 'LABOR FORCE
AND TRADE UNIONISM
N THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
1945- 55
'CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE . AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND, REPORTS
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,''A It N IN Gr
This material contains information affecting
l,-he National Ur'tense of the United States
1@thin the meaning of the espionage laws,
Titee 18, USC, 793 and 794, the trans--
i.,*,,sion or revel, tion of which in any manner
to,,,n unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTROL OF THE LABOR FORCE AND TRADE UNIONISM
IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
1945-55
CIA/RR PR-116
(ORR Project 41.712)
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
Office of Research and Reports
IAL,
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FOREWORD
The immediate goal of current labor policy in the European Satel-
lites is to raise labor productivity, quantitatively and qualitatively.
Of the manifold devices used to achieve this objective -- economic
incentives, ideological indoctrination, coercive and penal measures,
and forced labor -- two have been chosen as subjects of this report:
governmental control of trade unionism and of the labor force.
Discussion of trade unions in this report covers primarily organization,
membership, and functions. Discussion of labor-force controls includes
(1) devices for recruiting manpower and allocating workers to industries
and geographic areas in accordance with over-all economic plans, (2)
methods of controlling the employment of trained workers, (3) measures
for reducing absenteeism and labor turnover, and (4) enforcement of
labor discipline.
A report like this may be arranged by subjects or by countries.
To make it equally useful for readers who are interested in over-all
developments, of the Soviet Bloc and for readers who wish to understand
policies in specific countries, a middle course has been chosen.
Section I presents an analytical examination of pertinent features
common to all European Satellites. Section II is devoted largely to
a factual description of labor-force-controls and trade unionism in
the various countries.
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Some General Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
A. Recruitment and Allocation of Manpower . . . . . . . . . . 2
B. Enforcement of Labor Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
C. Trade Unionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
II. Situation in Individual Satellite Countries . . . . . . . . . . 7
A. Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Control of the Labor Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Trade Unionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Control of the Labor Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2. Trade Unionism . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
C. East Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Control of the Labor Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2. Trade Unionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
D. Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Control of the Labor Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2. Trade Unionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
E. Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1. Control of the Labor Force . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2. Trade Unionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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Page
F. :Rumania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
.1. Control of the Labor Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2. Trade Unionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Appendixes
Appendix A. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendix B. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
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CONTROL OF THE LABOR FORCE AND TRADE UNIONISM
IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES*
1945-55
Summary
The implementation of postwar economic goals in the European
Satellites' has resulted in fundamental institutional changes
affecting the labor force. Economic planners not only have had to
develop a labor supply of the required size and skill but also have
had to direct workers into the desired industries and areas and
attempt to insure their cooperation in fulfilling planned production
goals. In carrying out these tasks, the Satellite governments for
the most part have adopted laws and practices very similar to those
in effect in the USSR.
To accomplish desired manpower allocations, various kinds of
labor-exchange networks have been established in each Satellite.
In addition, 4 of the 6 countries have adopted formal arrangements
for organized recruitment. To insure the requisite supply of skilled
workers, all of these countries have established extensive training
programs, which, except for East Germany, involve large elements of
compulsion and regimentation. Soviet-type labor-reserve programs
in effect in several countries entail draft of a specified number of
young persons for training in special schools and compulsory work
assignments for 3 to 5 years. Graduates of all types of technical
schools and universities are also generally subject to such compulsory
assignments.
In Communist ideology the concept of "discipline" pervades all
aspects of the working relationship. In their attempts to carry out
manpower and production plans, the Satellites have waged constant war
against "lax discipline." With rare exceptions a worker's freedom
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 15 May 1955-
** Unless otherwise noted, the term Satellites in this report refers
to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania.
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to change jobs at will has been eliminated or sharply curtailed through
the use of labor books and the provision of various types of penalties
for unauthorized quitting. Absenteeism has been an especially serious
problem, calling for special penalty devices to combat it. Finally,
a number of breaches of "work discipline" are punishable by dismissal,
which. generally means that the dismissed employee can be forced to
accept jobs assigned by the state. The development of these various
types of labor-force controls has been progressive throughout the
postwar years and seems to have 'been little affected by events of the
"new course" during 1953-54+. There is little reason to expect that
these controls will become less stringent in the near future.
To tighten their control over the working population, the Satel-
lites have converted existing trade unions into unions of the Soviet
type, which are completely controlled by the Communist Party. In all
Satellites these unions have become mass organizations whose primary
function is to "educate" their members in Socialist principles and
exert pressure on workers to fulfill production tasks required by
state plans. In addition, trade unions administer state social insur-
ance programs and supervise enforcement of industrial safety and
health laws. The organizational structure of the unions is virtually
identical in all six Satellites. About 18.7 million workers belong
to these unions, which comprise from three-fourths to more than
nine-tenths of the industrial labor forces in the six countries.
I. Some General Comparisons.
A. Recruitment and Allocation of Manpower.
Economic plans introduced in the European Satellites in recent
years have emphasized industrial development at the expense of the
agricultural and service sectors of the economy. In each of the
Satellites, operation of these plans has entailed,.to a greater or
lesser extent, a forced shift of the labor force from agriculture
into industry and a redirection of the existing industrial labor
force in accordance with the specific requirements of the Plans.
In addition, each country has had. the problem of training workers
in the needed skills, steering them into the desired-industries
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and areas, and obtaining their cooperation in fulfilling manpower and
production goals. In order to cope with these problems, the Satellites
have established new institutional arrangements, most of which are
similar to those in effect in the USSR, and have introduced a variety
of "coercive-persuasive" devices for controlling the labor force.
In each Satellite, annual economic plans detail the number
of workers needed to fulfill the plan, the industries and areas in
which they are to work, and the number who are to be trained in
various skills. In East Germany, recruitment and allocation of
manpower is carried out by various economic ministries assisted by
specially created "Labor Sections" of the city and county govern-
ments. These sections also function as local employment exchanges
where employers must report vacancies and where unemployed workers
may be referred to jobs. In the other Satellites, with the exception
of'Poland, special programs for the organized recruitment of workers
have been set up under the Ministry of labor or its counterpart in
addition to a network of labor exchanges. These arrangements are
similar to the organized recruiting methods in effect in the USSR.
In Poland, all persons of working age are required to register and
are subject to 2-year compulsory work assignments,, evasion of which
can result in imprisonment. In nearly all Satellites, workers are
subject to obligatory temporary labor service in the event of
national disasters or to prevent "danger" to the economy.
To insure the requisite supply of trained workers, all
Satellites have instituted extensive training programs, and all except
East Germany have surrounded these programs with measures involving
compulsion and regimentation. Bulgaria and Rumania have established
a formal system of labor-reserve schools, faithfully patterned after
those in the USSR. Young people graduating from these schools are
compelled to work for 4 years in jobs assigned to them by the proper
authorities. In Czechoslovakia, graduates from similar schools must
accept compulsory work assignments lasting from 3 to 5 years, and all
persons graduating from schools of any kind must accept jobs to which
they are assigned by the appropriate authorities. In Poland, voca-
tional training is compulsory for all young persons, who must also
serve 6 months in the labor service organization, "Service for Poland."
In most of the Satellites, graduates of universities and technical
schools are also obligated to accept compulsory work assignments for
periods ranging from 18 months to 3 years. Finally, certain categories
of skilled workers may be transferred from one job to another at the
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option of the responsible authority. Failure to accept obligatory
transfers of this kind is considered a breach of work discipline and
is severely punished.
For the most part, the existing laws and institutional arrangements
relating to allocation of manpower were adopted during the years from 1950
to 1953 and represent the efforts of the various regimes to direct a recal-
citrant labor force into desired channels. Developments in this field do
not seem to have been greatly affected by the events of the "new course"
put into effect in the various countries in 1953. It seems probable that
as long as Communist-type economic planning and controls exist in the Euro-
pean Satellites, direction and allocation of workers will continue bo be
carried out by methods involving large elements of compulsion and regimen-
tation. The laws and institutional arrangements established for this
purpose should serve to facilitate reallocation of manpower that would be
required to support a program of-full or partial economic mobilization.
B. Enforcement of Labor Discipline.
In Communist ideology the concept of "work discipline" or
"socialist discipline" pervades all aspects of the working relation-
ship, and the Satellite regimes in recent years have had to wage
constant war against "lax discipline" on the part of the workers.
Their greatest efforts have been directed at reducing labor turnover
or job-changing, eliminating unjustified absenteeism, and reducing
the amount of poor-quality or defective output. A worker's freedom
to change jobs on his own initiative has been eliminated or sharply
curtailed in all countries except, possibly, East Germany, and job-.
changing there probably has been curtailed somewhat by the existence
of some unemployment. In all countries employees are required to have
labor books or comparable documents and employers are forbidden to
hire workers who do not possess these documents "properly" filled out.
In Hungary and Rumania the laws against job-changing are particularly
severe. Employees are forbidden to quit without the employer's permis-
sion, and "arbitrary" leaving of employment is punishable by impris-
onment or corrective labor. In Poland, employers may suspend a
worker's right to quit for a period of 2 years and may order transfers
at their discretion. Similar laws were enacted in Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia in 1953 but were promptly repealed because of widespread
worker resistance. Some of the Satellites have also sought to reduce
labor turnover by making various social-welfare benefits dependent
upon the length of continuous employment by a worker in one enterprise.
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Unwarranted absenteeism has been a serious problem in the Satel-
lites. throughout most of the past few years, and all have taken steps
to combat it. Some of the measures adopted are extremely severe. In
Poland, for example, unjustified absence of 4 or more days per year is
considered "malicious and stubborn infraction of labor discipline" and
is punished with fines and imprisonment. In Hungary, absentees are
deprived of lunch periods and trade union membership for designated
periods of time. Other breaches of labor discipline, such as viola-
tion of work rules or refusal to transfer, are punishable by dismissal
without notice. This punishment generally means also that the
dismissed employee must seek his new job through the state labor
exchanges, where he is subject to assignment to a job at the will of
the authorities. In all countries except East Germany, employees
receive no pay for totally defective production, and partial rejects
are paid for in accordance with the usability of the product.
An interesting characteristic of Satellite labor law is the
fact that employers as well as employees are made responsible for
maintenance of work discipline. In general, the laws make managers of
enterprises personally responsible for enforcing disciplinary rules
and for reporting violations to the appropriate authorities. Fines
and imprisonment are prescribed for those who fail to exercise these
responsibilities. In dealing with problems of labor discipline,
moreover, all Satellite governments have recourse to criminal law as
well as to ordinary civil and labor law. The economic plans have the
force of law, and severe punishments are provided for such offenses as
"sabotage," "diversionism," "offenses against the economic plan," and
"undermining work discipline." These laws have, in fact, been used
to a considerable extent in the enforcement of labor discipline.
C. Trade Unionism.
Free trade unionism of the type in effect in the Western
democracies does not now exist in any of the European Satellites.
Trade unions in existence before the assumption of power by the
Communists have been converted into unions of a type identical in
almost every respect to those in the USSR. Trade unions, whose
structure and functions are essentially the same in all Satellites,
are the largest of the Communist-controlled mass organizations and
as such are the principal links between the government and the workers.
The basic terms and conditions of employment are fixed in the labor
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laws and the economic plans. The unions, therefore, have no power to
negotiate concerning them, nor have they the right to strike. They are
"schools of Communism," which are completely controlled by the Party
through placement of its members in all key positions.
In each of the Satellites, primary control over the day-to-day
operations of the trade unions is vested in a national council, which
functions through a presidium and a department for each major activity.
Members of the council are elected by delegates to a congress which
meets every 4 years and which also serves to rubber-stamp policies and
programs already decided upon by the Party and the government. Counter-
parts of this structure exist in the industrial trade unions which
have been organized in each major economic field. Individual workers
belong to plant and office locals of these industrial unions. These
unions are established and function in accordance with the basic
Communist principles of "democratic centralism." Their general policy
is to invest theoretical control in elected parliamentary bodies while
reserving actual control to small executive bodies functioning through
a bureaucratic apparatus. Union membership is not legally compulsory
in any of the countries. Workers are virtually forced to join, however,
in order to receive various kinds of welfare payments and to enjoy
certain other benefits reserved for union members. The latest
available membership figures for the union organizations of the
Satellites are as follows:
Country
Trade Union Organization
Number of
Members
Percent of
Total
Industrial
Labor
Force
Bulgaria
General Workers Trade Union
920,000
95
Czechoslovakia
Revolutionary Trade Union
Movement
3,500,000
97
East Germany
Free German Trade Union
Federation
5,300,000
92
Hungary
National Council
of Trade Unions
2,000,000
81
Poland
Association of Trade Unions
4,500,000
76
Rumania
Central Council of Trade
Unions
2,500,000
86
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The functions of these trade unions may be best described as
"transmission belts." Their role is restricted to intensifying pro-
duction, organizing and intensifying work competition, and making
secure the leadership of the Party. In carrying out their educational
functions, the unions organize schools and courses and supervise
plant libraries and "Red Corners." They also organize sports and
recreational activities and build and operate vacation resorts and
sanatoria. In addition, they provide financial assistance to their
members through mutual aid funds. Each year they "negotiate" collective
agreements with the managers of individual enterprises. These Soviet-
type agreements bear no resemblance to the collective bargaining con-
tracts negotiated by trade unions and employers in the West. They set
forth, rather, the production goals to be met by the factory during
the year, mutual pledges to fulfill these goals, and commitments by
management to adhere to labor laws and regulations and to provide
certain types of working conditions. The unions also participate in
settling worker grievances and labor disputes in all Satellites except
Czechoslovakia.
The governments in all Satellites have assigned two important
functions to the trade unions. The first function is the administration
of the social security system (not including pensions). Even here,
however, basic policies concerning eligibility and benefit amounts are
set by the government. The unions serve only in an advisory capacity
and perform the administrative tasks in connection with the operation
of the system. A second function given to the trade unions is that
of enforcing basic regulations concerning work safety and the protec-
tion of the health of workers. Finally, trade unions are also gener-
ally permitted to participate in the formulation of annual economic
plans in matters relating to labor and in the drafting of labor laws
and regulations.
II. Situation in Individual Satellite Countries.
A. Bulgaria.
1. Control of the Labor Force.
a. Recruitment and Allocation of Manpower.
The Bulgarian government has adopted a variety of
measures to bring about the industrial and geographic distribution
of manpower required by its various economic plans. Most of these
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measures involve large elements of compulsion. A 1949 law on labor
mobilization provides that any worker may be "mobilized" without his
consent to perform tasks assigned by the government to meet designated
types of "emergencies." In addition, all men of military age are
subject either to compulsory military service or to compulsory labor
service, the latter being required of all men who cannot be inducted
into the Bulgarian Army because of limitations put on its size by the
peace treaty of 1947. Inductees into units of the Compulsory Labor
Service serve for a period of 3 years and work on production, construc-
tion, and "other" projects as assigned. The program is administered
by the Main Administration for Labor Service, attached directly to
the Council of Ministers. J*
Two other agencies have been established in Bulgaria
to carry out plan directives concerning the size and industrial.
allocation of the labor force. The first is a network of Bureaus
for Registering and Allocating Manpower. All new workers and unemployed
persons must register with these local bureaus, whose function is to
assign workers to available jobs and to steer them into labor-short
industries and areas. The bureaus are attached to the okrug offices
of the Main Administration for Labor Reserves.
The second agency is the Main Administration for
Labor Reserves, which is subordinate to the Ministry of Culture.
Created in 1952, this agency is responsible for obtaining manpower
for the fulfillment of economic plans (1) by establishing programs
for the organized recruitment of workers from farms and villages for
work in factories and on construction projects and (2) by administer-
ing labor-reserve schools, where young workers are trained in indus-
trial skills. Graduates of labor-reserve schools are required to
work for a period of 4 years in enterprises assigned to them in.
accordance with directives of the Council of Ministers. / According
to a recent decree, an obligatory work period of 3 years is required
of graduates of universities and technical schools. Moreover, by
explicit provision of the labor Code, trained workers in certain job
categories specified by the Council of Ministers "may be transferred
without their consent to other work in the same or another undertaking
or to work in another locality by decision of the Minister concerned."
The Labor Code also gives the manager of the enterprise the right to
transfer an employee to work in another area if production needs
require it. /
* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix B.
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b. Methods of Enforcing Labor Discipline.
Because labor turnover and absenteeism have deleterious
effects on production, the Bulgarian government has sought in various
ways to reduce migration of workers from job to job and to curtail
unjustified absences. Workers are required to sign written employment
contracts, which may be for definite or indefinite periods. In Bulgaria,
unlike the situation in certain other Satellites, employment contracts
with indefinite duration may be terminated at the will of the worker
after giving appropriate notice. J A statute entitled "Law to Establish
Manpower Stability in Factories and Offices," dated 17 February 1953,
established a virtual job freeze and provided severe penalties for
unauthorized changing of jobs. This drastic law, however, like a similar
one in Czechoslovakia, was repealed within the year. J Since individual
passports and travel visas are required for internal travel in Bulgaria,
undesired labor migration can still be prevented merely by refusing
travel visas.
Another device designed to reduce turnover is the use
of labor books, which have been required of all workers in Bulgaria
since 1949. J These books provide a continuous record of a worker's
employment, including training, awards, and reasons for dismissal or
leaving. Employers must report to local people's councils all cases
of "arbitrary" (not defined) leaving of employment. Finally, a recent
decision of the Council of Ministers concerning payment of social
security benefits strengthens the government's hand in its attempts
to reduce labor turnover. The decision makes the amount of certain
sickness and welfare benefits dependent upon the length of "uninter-
rupted service" in a single enterprise. J If an employee quits his
job, his service is considered to be interrupted. Likewise, if he
is dismissed from his job and fails to report to the local labor
office or to accept a suitable job offered him by the office, his
service is also considered to be interrupted.
The Bulgarian Labor Code and various criminal laws
prescribe punishments for violation of labor discipline. The following
are listed in the Labor Code as breaches of discipline: arriving late
for work or leaving early, absence, refusal to accept a transfer ordered
by management, failure to work during working hours, and violation of
work rules. Punishments prescribed in the Labor Code range from warnings
and reprimands to downgrading and dismissal without notice. J In
addition, offenses against labor discipline are punishable under
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Sections 117 and 124 of the 1951 Criminal Code. J Section 117 refers
to "noncompliance with a legal provision calling for performance of
actions or delivery of goods in connection with the Economic Plan,"
and Section 124 defines the punishments for "undermining labor disci-
pline in government offices or nongovernmental institutions or
enterprises." Those convicted under these provisions are fined or
sentenced to terms of correctional labor.
Finally, regulations issued in April 1953 established
harsh rules relating to "work stoppages" (meaning "down time," not
strikes) and defective production. 10 Bulgarian workers receive no
wages during stoppages for which they are at fault, and failure to
inform management of factors that may cause work to cease is to be
considered a breach of labor discipline. In cases of defective output
for which the worker is to blame, no wages are paid for total rejects,
and work resulting in partial rejects is compensated for at varying
rates, depending upon the usability of the defective product, bat in
no such case will an employee be paid more than 70 percent of his
normal wage.
2. Trade Unionism.
a. Organization and Membership.
The only trade union organization permitted in :Bulgaria
is the General Workers Trade Union (or the General Workers Professional
Union) (Obsht Rabotnicheski Profesionalen Suyuz), a monolithic organ-
ization patterned after those in the USSR. According to the Bulgarian
trade union statutes, the supreme organ of the General Workers Trade
Union is the Trade Union Congress, which meets every 4 years and is
composed of delegates elected by congresses of the 18 or more indus-
trial and professional unions that make up the General Workers 't`rade
Union. Like its counterpart at the governmental level, the Trade
Union Congress has little real power except to approve the policies
and programs for the General Workers Trade Union already decided on
by higher authorities and to elect members of the Central Council of
Trade Unions. The Central Council functions through an executive
bureau, a secretariat, and various branches and supervises the carrying
out of the basic activities assigned to the trade unions. Provincial
councils of the trade unions coordinate the work of the individual
unions at the regional level.
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Bulgarian workers belong to basic trade union organiza-
tions established in each plant and office. According to the Trade
Union Statutes, the task of these "locals" is "to mobilize all workers
and employees in the enterprise and institution for the fulfillment
and overfulfillment of the production plan, to strengthen labor
discipline, and to develop socialist competition." 11 Although
membership in these organizations is not legally compulsory, nearly
all workers belong to them, since those who do not join receive only
half of the amount of sickness benefits payable to union members. In
early 195+ the General Workers Trade Union claimed a total membership
of 920,000, 12 or about 95 percent of the total industrial labor
force. Membership dues are fixed at 1 percent of a worker's monthly
wage.
b. Functions.
The basic role of trade unions in Bulgaria, as in other
Communist countries, is well expressed in a 1951 Resolution of the
Bulgarian Communist Party: "The most important role of the trade unions
in a proletarian dictatorship is, therefore, their organizational-eco-
nomic and educational role, their role as schools of communism." 13
And again, quoting the trade union newspaper Trud, "The basis for the
activity of the trade unions in the people's democracy can be the
coordination of the personal interests of the workers and employees
within the common interests of our Socialist Fatherland. The working
class must be constantly taught that the only correct road is the
organization of patriotic socialist competitions and the fulfillment
of the state economic plans." 14+ More specifically, according to
provisions of the Labor Code the trade unions (1) represent the workers
in all matters relating to labor and state social insurance; (2) propose
laws and regulations concerning such matters; and (3) represent the
workers before courts, state authorities, and third parties.
Bulgarian trade unions administer the state social
insurance system, which is set forth in detail in the Labor Code,
through local and national social insurance councils. They may
organize and maintain sanatoria, rest homes, and vacation resorts
for their members. They help to plan and enforce state regulations
concerning safety and health of workers in factories and offices.
They organize "Red Circles" and conduct courses in Communist theory
and practice in order to educate the masses to their political and
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economic obligations under socialism. They organize and supervise
recreational and sports activities in the enterprises and render :Legal
and financial assistance to their members.
The local Bulgarian unions "negotiate" collective
agreements with managers of the enterprises. These agreements se-1-
forth reciprocal obligations of the workers and management in fulfill-
ing and exceeding the production plan, improving the organization of
work and protection of labor, and improving the material and cultural
facilities for the workers. Furthermore, the unions participate
extensively in the settlement of grievances and disputes. Each enter-
prise is required to establish a conciliation board, which works under
direction of the plant committee of the trade union. Composed of an
equal number of representatives of management and union, these boards
have authority to examine and issue decisions on disputes concerning
a wide range of subjects, including transfers of employees to other
employment; payment for defective work and cases involving nonattainment
of norms; dismissals for specified reasons; certain obligations specified
in the collective agreement; "down-time" pay; overtime pay; and, in
general, all matters not expressly excluded or covered under othe;^
regulations concerning disputes. Appeals from decisions of conciliation
boards may be made to the district committee of the trade union, whose
decision is binding.
B. Czechoslovakia.
1. Control of the Labor Force.
a. Recruitment and Allocation of Manpower.
Throughout the period of the Five Year Plan (191+-9-53)
and the "new course" the Czechoslovak economy has been plagued wi';h the
twin. problems of manpower shortages and an "undisciplined" labor force.
The government has taken drastic measures in an attempt to cope with
both these problems, thereby establishing institutional arrangements
in the labor field quite similar to those in effect in the USSR. The
investment goals of the revised Five Year Plan meant a substantial
shift of manpower from agriculture and light industry into heavy,
industry, mining, and construction. Because methods of "voluntary"
recruitment had proved inadequate to accomplish the required manpower
goals, the government decreed establishment of a program of organ:Lzed
recruitment of manpower. 15 Recruitment is conducted by local and
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district agencies directed by the Ministry of Manpower in accordance
with plans for organized recruitment drawn up by the State Planning
Department and approved by the Council of Ministers. Detailed plans
specify the number of workers to be obtained by organized recruitment
in each district and commune and also the number to be released by
various enterprises and industries. The decree states: "The programs
of organized recruitment and the allocations thereunder shall be
binding on the central authorities, people's committees, and under-
takings, and must be carried out." Although workers are to be
recruited "by direct contact and persuasion," thus giving an appear-
ance of freedom of choice, workers without employment or-those
declared "surplus" and releasable by the central authorities probably
would have little choice but to be "recruited." Enterprises may
themselves seek to obtain needed workers, provided their efforts do
not interfere with organized recruitment plans.
In the past the Czechoslovak government has taken
measures involving the arbitrary transfer and assignment of workers
and presumably would do so again if the occasion arose. In June 1951
the Cabinet established a special commission whose function was to
effect the transfer of 77,500 employees from administrative work to
production work. Staffs were to be reduced in accordance with quotas
established for each ministry and enterprise. Employees declared
"surplus," if they did not volunteer for production work, were to be
"assigned to work in accordance with the requirements of the Manpower
Plan." 16
Through a series of decrees issued during 1951-54 the
Czechoslovak government now dictates and controls completely the
assignment of young people to their first jobs and compels them to
remain in these jobs for designated periods. Upon completion of
compulsory schooling at age 14, young people have the choice of
taking a job or continuing their education. If they elect to go to
work, they are to be recruited and given employment in an enterprise
according to a scheme directed by government authorities, "planned
according to the needs of the national economy." 17 If they wish
to continue their education, they may attend labor-reserve schools
administered by the Ministry of Manpower. These are of two types:
technical colleges with courses lasting from 2 to 3 years and factory
training schools with courses lasting from 6 to 12 months. Graduates
of labor-reserve schools must work in undertakings specified by the
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Ministry of Manpower for a period of from 3 to 5 years, as prescribed
by the Ministry. 18 With few exceptions, all graduates of universities
and vocational-technical schools must work for 3 years at places assigned
to them by the responsible authorities, and enterprises are forbidden
to accept any such graduates who have not been properly assigned. 11
12/
In addition, graduates of the 11-year secondary schools and students
who have been expelled or who have dropped out of technical schools and
universities may accept employment only with the approval of the
competent central office having jurisdiction over the school, given in
accordance with the government economic plan. 20 Finally, a 1952
decree provides that certain categories of skilled workers, mainly
graduates of engineering, scientific, and technical institutions,
may be transferred from one job to another without their consent for
a period up to 3 years, if the competent central authority deems such
transfer to be in the interest of the national economic plan. 21
b. Methods of Enforcing Labor Discipline.
Absenteeism and high rates of labor turnover, termed
"labor fluctuation" by the Czechoslovaks, have been prevalent in Czechoslovakia
throughout the period of the successive Plans, with admittedly serious
effects on output and labor productivity. Various measures, apparently
none of them too successful, have been introduced in an effort to
eliminate these evils. In July 1952 the government introduced what
amounts to the use of labor books. Although workers were previously
required to have identity papers, the new law provided that all changes
of employment must be noted on the identity card and that employers
could not hire any one without documentary evidence that his previous
employment had been lawfully terminated or his training properly
completed. 22 According to newspaper statements, this measure was
designed to preserve voluntary work discipline" and to correct
situations where "people could change employment as they pleased."
A network of employment offices was established to facilitate and
control the employment of workers. Enterprises had to report the
names of dismissed workers to these offices.
Apparently these devices proved ineffective in
controlling labor "fluctuation," and absenteeism continued high. Rude
Pravo, the Communist daily newspaper, reported that during the second
quarter of 1953, 11 percent of the gainfully occupied missed their
shifts every day and "every tenth person changed his or her job." 24J
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Even the currency reform of May 1953, which virtually wiped out workers'
savings, apparently did not substantially reduce absenteeism and labor
turnover. On 30 June 1953 the Czechoslovak government promulgated a
new decree establishing drastic penalties for infractions of labor dis-
cipline. Among other things the law provided (1) that employees who
quit their jobs without their employers' permission must be reported
to the Office of the Prosecutor for court action, (2) that enterprise
managers who failed to report such employees or who authorized an
employee to quit without good reason were subject to criminal pros-
ecution, and (3) that employees absent without excuse for 4 or more
days per year were to be reported to the public prosecutor for court
action. This last decree was suddenly rescinded on July 6, in part,
at least, because of the hostile reaction of workers, and it was
announced that the trade unions would assume the responsibility for
waging war against lax labor discipline. L5/ Despite the fact that
absenteeism was almost as serious a problem in 195+ as in 1953, 26
efforts to combat it seem to have been confined largely to agitation
and propaganda, 27 although the government has recently ruled that
workers' annual leave benefits are to be reduced by 2 days for each
day of absence without acceptable excuse during the year. 28
In enforcing labor discipline, the Czechoslovak govern-
ment also has recourse to the Penal Code and to laws dealing with
sabotage and offenses against the state. Czechoslovak law makes it
the duty of all citizens to work, and individuals who evade work may
be confined to labor camps. Section 135 of the Penal Code provides
punishment for any one who by negligence obstructs or impedes the
Unified Economic Plan, especially by evasion or failure to perform
duties required in connection with work. Under this provision,
absenteeism and job-changing could be punished if they hindered the
successful functioning of the government's economic Plan. 29
2. Trade Unionism.
a. Organization and Membership.
The organization responsible for furthering trade
unionism in Czechoslovakia is the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement
(Revolucni Odborove Hnuti -- ROH). In theory, the highest responsible
body within it is the All-Union Congress, made up of delegates elected
by member unions of the ROH and meeting once every 4 years. Aside
from approving policies already decided upon by the Communist Party
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and the government, the main function of these congresses is to elect
the 120 members who make up the Central Trade Union Council, which
administers the affairs of the union in accordance with established
po:Licy directives of the Congress. The Council functions through a
central board of 25 members and a secretariat, and, since the reorgan-
ization of 1952, conducts day-to-day union affairs through the medium
of 16 departments, each concerned with a major aspect of union function-
ing. 30J Counterparts of the Congress and Council exist on the regional
and district levels. In addition, certain special organizations have
been established for the territorial division of Slovakia.
The ROH is made up of 27 separate unions organized
along industrial lines and corresponding closely to the economic
ministries of the government. 31 The organizational structure of the
member unions is similar to that of the ROH itself. The basic unit
of each member union is the work group, which must be organized. in any
establishment employing as many as 20 workers. These groups elect
work councils, whose function is to carry out ROH directives, especially
those relating to fulfillment and overfulfillment of the government's
plan for the enterprise.
Although trade union membership is not legally compulsory,
members enjoy certain economic benefits which afford strong inducement
for workers to join. The latest available membership figures are for
early 1953, and they indicate a total ROH membership of 3.5 mill,-'.on, 32
or about 97 percent of the total industrial labor force. Union dues
vary with monthly income and average about 1 percent of a worker's
monthly wage.
b. Functions.
The ROH is the largest mass organization in Czechoslo-
vakia, and as such its primary task is to "educate" the workers in the
principles of the building of socialism. In practice, this means that
the trade unions must see to it that workers perform the tasks required
of them by the economic plans of the state. To this end, they organize
socialist competition, support innovator and stakhanovite movements,
and exhort and coerce the workers into observing labor discipline. They
promote the political and economic education of workers by conducting
schools and special courses, by publishing various kinds of house organs,
and by supervising "Red Corners" and libraries in individual enterprises.
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Czechoslovak trade unions are responsible for the
conclusion and enforcement of collective agreements with managers of
individual enterprises and the first real impetus for this Soviet
type of activity by a decision of the Central Trade Union Council in
November 1953. 33 In 1954 a vigorous campaign was launched to conclude
such agreements, and a similar campaign is apparently being conducted
in 1955. These agreements, which are primarily a device for implementing
state economic plans at the enterprise level, include (1) a detailed
statement of the production plan; (2) a description of methods of wage-
fixing, bonuses, and wage and piece rates to be in effect; (3) an outline
of methods to be taken by management and the union in the enforcement
of labor discipline; and (4) standards to be applied in setting up
socialist competition programs and in dealing with inventions and workers'
suggestions. Trade unions in Czechoslovakia, unlike those in other
Satellites, do not participate in the settlement of grievances and dis-
putes at the plant level.
Czechoslovak trade unions have been given responsibility
for the enforcement of measures designed to protect the safety and health
of workers in plants and offices. This task is carried out through depart-
ments and committees set up for the purpose. By decree of 27 December
1951, 34 the ROH was assigned responsibility for administering the
social insurance system, not including pensions. According to the decree,
the physical payment of benefits, the collection of contributions, and
the handling of employee appeals were to be decentralized insofar as
possible. Regulations of the ROH concerning the amount of benefits,
conditions under which benefits are payable, and rates of contribution
are first subject to government approval.
Finally, Czechoslovak trade unions supervise sports and
recreation activities, build and maintain vacation resorts and clubs,
operate factory canteens, and supervise the Unified Workers' Fund. This
Fund is financed by compulsory contributions of the enterprises, and
expenditures from it are made for purposes of improving the social,
health, and cultural welfare of workers and for granting financial
assistance to deserving workers.
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C. East Germany.
1. Control of the Labor Force.
a. Recruitment and Allocation of Manpower.
Recruitment, training, and allocation of manpower in
East Germany is an integral part of the process of economic planning.
The annual economic plans specify the number of workers to be employed
in each industry and in each factory and also the number of skilled
workers and apprentices to be trained during the year. Since 1951 the
various industrial ministries have been responsible for obtaining and
training the workers called for by the plans for their respective
industries. The Ministry of labor exercises jurisdiction in general
labor matters, carrying out its functions in cooperation with the eco-
nomic ministries and serving more or less as an executive agent of the
State Planning Commission in the labor field. The Ministry's Main
Administration for labor is responsible for (1) assisting in the
procurement of labor for important industries and enterprises;
(2) improvement of the manpower exchanges; and (3) research, planning,
and statistical reporting with respect to manpower requirements and
resources. The Ministry functions through local offices, or labor
exchanges, in the cities and counties. Since 1951 these offices have
been attached to the-city and county governments, although their transfer
back to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labor reportedly has been
recently under consideration. 35
With certain specified exceptions, all men aged 14
through 65 and all women aged 15 through 50 are required in East
Germany to register with the labor exchanges. Employers must re-port
any change in a worker's employment status. The labor offices are
required to distribute the available supply of labor among the enter-
prises and to carry out recruitment directives issued by the Ministry
of Labor in furtherance of the manpower plans established by the State
Planning Commission. In performing these duties, the offices formerly
were permitted to issue compulsory work assignments, but this right
has recently been withdrawn, allegedly because it had not proved
necessary to issue such compulsory assignments. 36 Since job-seekers
must register with the exchanges, various kinds of less direct methods
no doubt suffice to steer workers into the desired industries and
enterprises.
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To obtain the number of skilled workers called for by
the Five Year Plan (1951-55), the East German government has developed
extensive facilities for training workers. This training is carried
out through the regular educational system, through a large-scale
apprenticeship program, and through establishment of factory and
technical schools. Although various incentives have been provided to
induce workers to undergo training, the government has not resorted
to some of the compulsory methods used by other Satellites, such as
the drafting of young persons into labor-reserve schools or the
requirement of obligatory work assignments for graduates of technical
schools. A recent decree provides that graduates of universities
and technical schools who intend to continue in their chosen profession
may sign contracts with enterprises to participate in a kind of indus-
trial interneship program. Signing of such an agreement is not
compulsory. 37
b. Other Methods of Labor Control.
As a measure to curb labor turnover, the East German
Labor Code requires that workers, with a few exceptions, must have
labor books, which give a record of their employment history, including
salaries, training, and remarks of the employer. Employers are forbidden
to hire employees who do not have a labor book, and fines and imprison-
ment may be meted out to employers who disobey this rule and to employees
who accept employment without submitting their labor books. An unemploy-
ed person must have a control card, which is issued by the local labor
office with which he is required to register. Although the Labor Code
states that employees cannot leave their jobs without good reason, it
does not specify what reasons may be considered "good." The employer's
permission is not required for an employee to terminate his employment
legally. In this respect the worker's freedom to change jobs is
greater in East Germany than in the other Satellites, but this freedom
has been tempered by the presence of some unemployment.
The East German government attempts to maintain work
discipline through a combination of incentives and penalties. The
overriding emphasis is on maximum production, and violations of
"discipline" which result in reduced output, such as absenteeism,
inefficiency, tardiness, or strikes, may be punished by fines, reduced
benefits, or dismissal. Workers may also be punished under the
criminal laws as "diversionists" or "economic saboteurs." If a worker
is judged to be at fault for defective production (rejects), his wages
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are -educed, but in no event may his wage be reduced below 0.50 Deutsche
Mark (East) per hour. 38 The regulations concerning work discipline
in East Germany appear to be less harsh and less rigid than those in
effect in the other Satellites, and the East German Communists appear
to have been forced to proceed with more caution in introducing Scviet
methods of manpower management. For example, in 1952 a decree which
in draft form provided stringent disciplinary methods was reported to
be circulating among the ministries. When the decree was finally
issued, however, it was much milder than originally projected. 39/
The relatively liberal nature of the East German labor law, in comparison
with the other Satellites, probably can be attributed to the fact that
Germany has been traditionally an industrialized region and the German
worker is habituated to discipline by nature and background. The regime
also may fear that the adoption of stringent control and disciplinary
devices may goad the workers into the adoption of active or passive
resistance measures which would hamper production goals or frustrate
various political objectives.
2. Trade Unionism.
a. Organization and Membership.
The only trade union allowed to exist in East Germany
is the Free German Trade Union Federation (Freier Deutsche Gewerkschaft-
bund -- FDGB), which was established in 1945 and now claims a member-
ship of 5.3 million, 40 or approximately 92 percent of the total
industrial labor force in East Germany. The FDGB is comprised of 21
member unions, each representing a major industry or economic activity.
According to the FDGB statutes, the supreme policy-making authority
is the Trade Union Congress which meets every 4 years. Actually, however,
the Congress merely rubber-stamps decisions that have already been made
by the trade union, Party, and government hierarchy. Heading the FDGB
structure; is a 9-man secretariat, which runs the day-to-day affairs of
the union through 21 departments. There is also a presidium consisting
of the secretariat and a representative from each of the 21 member
unions, as well as a supreme executive body elected indirectly by the
membership. To insure maximum control by the central leadership,
individual workers hold membership, not in the constituent unions, but
in the FDGB itself.
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The FDGB has 15 district organizations. Local commit-
tees are also established in the counties and major cities. At the
plant level the workers are organized into Trade Union Groups (Gewer.k-
schaftsgruppen), and the affairs of the plant trade unions are con-
trolled by the Trade Union Directorate (Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitung --
BGL). These plant councils are responsible for putting into effect
the drives for worker "enlightenment" and for the increased productivity
decreed by the upper echelons of the FDGB, Party, and government.
Membership in the FDGB is not compulsory, except for
public employees, but constant political pressure coupled with the
more generous social security benefits given union members make it
difficult for a worker to remain outside the trade union. Dues, which
vary with the amount of the worker's weekly wage, are collected, not
by the check-off method but by union functionaries in the plant.
From time to time, workers have refused to pay membership dues, in
concerted protest against labor policies of the trade union and the
government. In 1953, for example, this type of action resulted in a
substantial drop. in union membership, causing the FDGB to respond by
making certain social insurance benefits applicable only to union
members in good standing and by instituting a systematic check of the
dues books of all members. 41
b. Functions.
The FDGB is the largest mass organization in East
Germany and as such is completely subservient to the Communist Party
and the East German government. The President of the FDGB has stated
the matter most clearly: "We acknowledge the leading role of the
Socialist Unity Party ... . The trade unions set for themselves the
goal of helping the Party win the entire working class for the building
of socialism ... . The trade unions are schools for socialism." 42
Within this broad framework the two basic tasks of the trade unions
are to promote high levels of output at whatever cost to the worker
and to conduct programs of "cultural enlightenment" to secure worker
support for the Party's domestic and foreign policies. In addition,
the unions have been given the task of administering the state social
insurance system.
In promoting the production drives of the regime,
the trade unions sign collective agreements with individual enter-
prises. These agreements are patterned after master contracts drawn
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up by the economic ministries and the Ministry of Labor and bear no
resemblance to the collective bargaining contracts traditional in the
West. In the collective agreements the plant managers obligate them-
selves to create the necessary conditions for carrying out the prDduc-
tion goals which have already been set forth in the over-all economic
plans. The unions agree to organize socialist competitions, to
cooperate in the setting of work norms, and to indoctrinate workers
in the necessity for maintaining work discipline. Pledges by
individual workers to fulfill or overfulfill certain specified output
goals were also included in the plant agreements until recently.
These individual pledges were omitted in the 1954 master contracts,
however, because of widespread worker resentment. Because all basic
conditions affecting the economic well-being of the worker are deter-
mined by state planning authorities, the collective agreements are
not basically economic in nature, despite surface appearances to the
contrary. The agreements are merely propaganda devices. Indeed., at
the 16th session of the FDGB Executive Committee in early 1954, local
union officials were severely criticized for emphasizing economic
matters, thereby failing to realize that the agreements are primarily
designed to promote the political indoctrination of the workers. `~
Trade unions have been given at least a nominal voice
in the formulation of decisions that affect labor. Representatives
of the appropriate industrial union must be consulted by the ministry
in drawing up the labor aspects of the economic plans. They are also
given the right to complain directly to the ministries concerning any
measure which they consider to be adverse to the interests of workers.
They see to it that management fulfills its obligations under the
collective agreement and may report flagrant violations to the ministry.
The union participates at various levels in the settlement of grievances
of workers, the primary device being the Factory Conflicts Commission,
which was established in most public enterprises in 1953. 44 These
commissions, consisting of two representatives each from management
and the trade union, may settle disputes concerning employment contracts,
shift and holiday work, leave, and the like. They may not consider
disputes relating to work norms, manpower distribution, or dismissals
ordered by state control authorities. The unions have also been given
authority to enforce basic safety regulations at the plant level.
In the declining private sector of the economy, trade
unions are expected both to protect the interests of the worker ar..d to
foster the conversion of private enterprises to socialism. The FIGB
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insists that its locals in private firms must exercise vigorously their
right to "codetermine" business policies, including such activities as
checking of tax payments, control of price policy, and supervision of
the performance of contracts with publicly owned enterprises. Unions
may strike to enforce their demands against private employers. Local
union officials and members, however, instead of following the policy
dictated by the FDGB leadership, have frequently helped private employers
to keep their businesses by tailoring their demands to fit the ability
of the enterprise to meet them without endangering its existence. As
a result, wages and working conditions in private firms have sometimes
been better than those in the public sector.
D. Hungary.
1. Control of the Labor Force.
a. Recruitment and Allocation of Manpower.
The emphasis on industrial development inherent in
the Hungarian Five Year Plan (1950-54+) meant a rather drastic expan-
sion and redeployment of the Hungarian labor force. Although the
Communist regime has not resorted to a labor draft to obtain the
desired shift of workers from agriculture into industry, various
measures, some of them involving compulsion to a greater or lesser
extent, have been taken to facilitate the expansion of the industrial
labor force. In 1951 the Council of Ministers established by decree
a system for the organized recruitment of industrial workers. 45
A national manpower recruitment plan is to be prepared each year by
the National Planning Office in cooperation with interested ministries
and the Office of Manpower Reserves.* On the basis of the plan,
recruitment quotas are established for various local areas, and the
actual recruitment is organized and controlled by the executive commit-
tees of the county and district councils assisted by the interested
enterprises. Individuals who have been recruited under the plan sign
employment contracts with the enterprises for a period of 1 or more
years. Special recruitment bonuses are paid to those entering the
* There is no Ministry of Labor in Hungary. The Office of Manpower
Reserves, which is attached directly to the Council of Ministers and
whose President is Janos Peisi, administers the labor recruitment and
employment exchanges and also has responsibilities for directing
worker training programs.
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mining and building industries. Because of the failure to meet manpower
goals for 1951, the Hungarian government decided to make a special effort
to recruit peasants for factory work. By confidential decree, local
councils were instructed to determine what agricultural workers were
"surplus" in their area and to assign these workers to factory jobs in
the cities. 46
In early 1952 the Hungarian government promulgated a
decree which is tantamount to establishing a period of compulsory
labor service under state direction for graduates of universities, tech-
nical institutes, and secondary professional schools. 47 Immediately
after the completion of their training, graduates of these institutions
are assigned to work in their professional fields at enterprises.
determined by the appropriate ministry. The "obligatory practicing
period" is 2 years for university and high school graduates and. 18
months for secondary professional school graduates. Severe penalties
are provided for infractions of the rules governing the "obligatory
practicing period."
Various other devices exist by means of which the
Hungarian government can exert authority over the allocation of manpower.
A system of labor exchanges is operated by the Office of Manpower
Reserves, and these agencies were implemented in September 1954 by the
establishment of 49 manpower directing offices. These organizat:Lons
function as centralized employment offices. Although workers are not
normally compelled to seek jobs through these offices or to accept
the jobs offered them, their only alternative in most cases is to find
their own jobs or remain unemployed and become subject to arrest for
"loafing." Persons violating "labor discipline" in certain ways, such
as by arbitrarily quitting their jobs, may not be employed except
through the intermediary of the labor exchanges, thus affording the
government the opportunity to assign such workers wherever it wi:;hes.
In addition, various kinds of crimes and infractions of "discipline"
are punishable by assigning the guilty persons to labor battalions,
which work solely under the direction of the state. Finally, the
Hungarian Labor Code provides that citizens may be called up for
temporary labor service in the event of a natural disaster "or in
order to avert any other danger to the economy or to the country,"
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b. Methods of Enforcing Labor Discipline.
Managers of enterprises in Hungary are forbidden to
employ any one eligible for military service unless he has registered
with the military authorities and possesses a military identity card. L8/
In addition, no person may be employed who does not possess a labor
book properly filled out. L q/ rules govern the use of labor
books, which provide a continuous record of a worker's employment and
are designed to discourage migration from one job to another. Employers
who habitually hire persons without labor books or persons who have
"arbitrarily" quit their previous job without the employer's permission
are subject to a maximum punishment of 5 years' imprisonment.
Freedom of a worker in Hungary to change jobs on his own
initiative has been virtually eliminated by provisions of the Hungarian
Labor Code and various implementing decrees. The Labor Code stipulates
that employment contracts between a worker and his employer may be either
oral or written, but in either case employment may be legally terminated
by the worker only if he (1) becomes eligible for an old-age pension,
(2) becomes eligible for advanced education or training, or (3) has com-
pelling personal reasons. In the latter case, the employer's permission
is required before he may quit. An employee who "arbitrarily" quits his
job or who is discharged for cause may secure employment for a period
of 6 months only through the use of the government labor exchanges. 50
Furthermore, workers leaving their jobs without permission suffer re-
duction in sick leave and sickness benefits on their new job. 51 A
worker is considered to have quit "arbitrarily" if he refuses to work
overtime when directed to do so or if he refuses to transfer to another
job in the enterprise. These measures relating to "arbitrary" quitting,
together with use of the labor book, would seem to provide fairly
effective measures for chaining workers to their jobs or compelling
them to work at the direction of the state labor exchanges.
Chronic absenteeism among industrial workers has been
a perennial problem in Hungary, and a variety of measures have been
taken to combat it. A Cabinet decree issued in 1951 instituted drastic
measures against absentees. Workers absent without good reason are
deprived of trade union membership and other benefits, perhaps for as
long as 1 year. 52 A subsequent decree deprives workers of their
scheduled lunch periods during any month in which they are found guilty
of unwarranted absenteeism. 53 Absenteeism has been particularly
prevalent in the mining industry, and the Communist regime has sought
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to prevent it by providing rewards as well as punishments. As part of
the milder "new course" of 1953-54, the government issued a decree in
August 1953 establishing a "loyalty" bonus for miners who had not, missed
a single shift during 1 year. Those who had missed only 1 shift received
half the bonus, and those who had missed more than 1 shift received no
bonus at all. 54
Hungarian labor law also provides suitable punishments
for a variety of offenses against "state discipline." A series of
decrees issued in 1950-51 established penalties for "violation of labor
discipline." This term is very broadly defined to cover such offenses
as inefficient or defective work, violation of employers' work regula-
tions, immoral or scandalous conduct, and other actions detrimental to
planned economy and "socialist ethics." 55 Penalties for violation
of labor discipline range from oral reproof to immediate dismissal.
Fines were also included in early decrees but were abolished in November
1953 as part of the "new course." 5/ Other decrees specify the punish-
ments applicable to specific kinds of offenses. Decree No. 100 cf 1952,
for example, makes an industrial trainee or his parents liable fcr repay-
ment of training expenses and fines if the trainee violates labor dis-
cipline or arbitrarily terminates his employment. A worker's wages are
withheld if it is determined that production rejects are the result of
his negligence. All disciplinary punishments must be posted on bulletin
boards at the place of work. Responsibility for enforcing labor dis-
cipline rests with enterprise managers, who are prohibited from meting
out "unreasonably lenient punishments" and who are subject to punishment
for failure to execute their responsibilities properly. 57 In addition
to these more concrete measures for enforcing "discipline," the regime
attempts to force workers to "cooperate" by "correctional education"
and by devices subjecting workers to social pressures, such as stakhan-
ovism, socialist competition, and the establishment of "norms" and
pledges.
2. Trade Unionism.
a. Organization and Membership.
Following the complete subversion of the Hungarian
trade unions in 19+8-49 by the Communist Party and the arrest of
their former leaders in June 1950, the trade union structure was remade
along lines similar to those in use in the USSR. 58 At the top of
the structure is the National Congress of Trade Unions, which is
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composed of delegates from the individual trade unions and is supposed
to meet every 4 years. The real control over union affairs, however,
is exercised by the National Council of Trade Unions (Szakszervezetek
Orszagos Tanacsa -- SZOT) elected by the Congress and scheduled to
meet every 6 months. This body functions through permanent committees
and a secretariat and has county and local counterparts responsible
to it. Individual industrial-type unions, of which there are 20, are
organized on an industrial basis and include such unions as the Trade
Union of Chemical Industry Workers, the Trade Union of Railroad Workers
and Boatmen, and the Trade Union of Agricultural and Forestry Workers.
These organizations also function through a congress, a council, and
committees. At the plant level the workers belong to the shop organ-
ization of the trade union, which functions through factory committees
elected by open ballot.
Although membership in a trade union is not compulsory,
it is to the financial interest of a Hungarian worker to join in order
to be eligible for the higher social security benefits and other
privileges reserved to union members. Latest figures available place
total union membership at 2 million, 59 or about 81 percent of the
total industrial labor force. There are reported to be 450,000
"activists" among the union membership. 60 Membership dues range
from 15 to 50 forints per month, varying with the worker's wage. 61
b. Functions.
Like trade unions in all Communist countries, the
primary function of Hungarian unions is to serve as a device for
carrying out the will of the government and Party leadership. Unions
are expected "to mobilize the workers ... for the fulfillment and
overfulfillment of the production plans, ... to organize socialist
labor competitions and the Stakhanovite Movement, ... to fight ...
for the consolidation of labor discipline." 62 In carrying out these
basic duties, the unions have been given a number of specific tasks
to perform. Ministerial Decree No. 36, promulgated on 23 September
1950, transferred responsibility for the state social security program
from the Minister of Public Welfare to the National Council of Trade
Unions. 63 Another decree issued on the same day gave the trade unions
responsibility for enforcing rules for the prevention of industrial
accidents. This function is to be accomplished through individual
shop committees, but basic safety regulations are to be drawn up
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jointly by the Ministry of Health and the National Council of Trade
Unions. 6~+
Hungarian trade unions also conclude collective contracts
with the managements of enterprises. Agreements are drawn up by the
enterprise manager and the shop committee representing the workers and
must be approved by the appropriate ministry and the National Council
of Trade Unions. 65 These contracts generally specify the production
goals to be fulfilled by the factory, mutual pledges to accomplish
these goals, and pledges by the enterprise to supply the workers with
specified tools and facilities. The National Council of Trade Unions
is responsible for organizing workers' vacations and is given appro-
priate financial aid by the state.
Hungarian trade unions also participate in settling
grievances and disputes. Although the basic grievance committee at
the factory does not include union members -- it consists of repre-
sentatives of management and of the plant Party committee -- the
unions have been enjoined nevertheless to "improve the work of the
grievance committees" and were criticized for neglect in this area. 66
The unions do participate, however, in the settlement of disputes.
The Labor Code provides that disputes concerning the classification
of workers in wage categories, hours of work, leave, transfers, food,
work clothing, and termination of a work contract must be brought
before a conciliation committee composed of representatives of the
National Board of Wages, the trade union, and the local government.
Major questions of principle arising in connection with the grievance
procedure are dealt with by industry-wide conciliation committees
made up of two members each from the appropriate ministry and the
trade union. 67
In addition to these major functions, Hungarian
trade unions are reported to do the following: operate the enterprise
cafeterias and nurseries; supervise the workers' recreation program;
arrange for housing for the workers; run the factory library and club
room; and make small, personal loans to workers. 68
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E. Poland.
1. Control of the Labor Force.
a. Recruitment and Allocation of Manpower.
To achieve its over-all objectives of a higher degree
of industrialization and greatly increased total output, the Communist
regime in Poland has established and attempted to enforce far-reaching
controls over the labor force, which have largely destroyed the worker's
freedom of choice and action concerning his employment. The direction
of available manpower into appropriate channels is carried out by the
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare in accordance with the requirements
of over-all economic plans. The Ministry operates through a network
of employment exchanges, which refer workers to vacant jobs and also
cooperate with other agencies in vocational training. Employers are
required to report all vacancies to these exchanges. The offices also
send recruiting agents out into the country to recruit labor for
industrial plants.
A series of decrees issued in Poland during the period
from 1946 to 1950 established the legal framework for compulsory labor
service. A decree of 8 January 1946 imposed on every man aged 14 through
55 and every woman aged 18 through 45 "the duty to engage in socially
useful employment." With certain specified exceptions, all Polish
citizens were required to register and were made subject to compulsory
work assignments for a period of 2 years. Persons evading compulsory
work were liable to imprisonment for terms up to 5 years. 69 Under
certain conditions, compulsory work on projects "necessary to defense
or the economic plan" may be substituted for military service (law
of 4 February 1950). It is reported that in practice this type of
forced labor is reserved for political unreliables. 70 A law of
25 February 1948 established a system of compulsory labor service
for boys and girls (Sluzba Polska -- Service for Poland). This com-
pulsory service may last up to 6 months, and for men it normally
precedes military service.
The drive to industrialize Poland meant that large
numbers of unskilled workers had to be trained in mechanical and tech-
nical skills. Although Poland has not adopted a formal labor-reserve
system comparable to that of the USSR, an extensive network of
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training facilities has been established, and a law of 19+8 made voca-
tional training compulsory for all young persons between the ages of
16 and 21. This training may be taken simultaneously with enrollment
in "Service for Poland" organizations and may be done in connection
with on-the-job training plans in factories or in special vocational
schools. Young people who enter the preparatory vocational schools
must sign an agreement either to work for a period of 2 years following
their graduation at an enterprise designated by the training institution
or else to refund the cost of their training. 71 Graduates of basic
trade schools are obligated to work at their trade at a state-designated
enterprise, and those who try to evade such compulsory assignments are
liable to fines and imprisonment. 7/ The length of the assignments,
not to exceed 3 years, is determined by the Central Board of Vocational
Training or by the economic ministry concerned. Finally, a recent
decree relating to special scientific training courses for professional
workers requires graduates of these special courses to work for a
period of 3 years in a position designated by the "institution employing
them." 73
b. Methods of Enforcing Labor Discipline.
High rates of absenteeism and labor turnover have been
a chronic problem in Poland throughout the period of forced industrial
ization, and the government has taken drastic measures in an attempt
to enforce "socialist discipline" on the workers. A statute of I' March
1950 established the legal basis for a job "freeze" on all workers in
state undertakings, and it also legalized the arbitrary shifting of
workers from one job to another. Under this statute, directors of
state enterprises were given authority to suspend an employee's right
to quit for a period not to exceed 2 years and also to order compulsory
transfers in the interest of promoting the "socialist economy." Arbi-
trary "freezes" and transfers could apply to teams and brigades E,,.s well
as to individuals. Persons who violated work-assignment orders were
made subject to 6 month's imprisonment, severe fines, or both. The
principle of the labor book has also been introduced in the form of the
"release card" which a worker must obtain from his employer in order to
change jobs. The extent to which these drastic provisions have actually
been used is not known, although controls over assignments and quitting
are reported to be particularly stringent for various kinds of profes-
sional and technical workers and workers employed by the railroad.s. 74
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Employees cannot quit without their employers' permission, and employers
are not supposed to hire workers who have not been properly released
from their previous jobs. The tight labor market in Poland, however,
apparently has fostered the development of various means for evading
these regulations.
A Polish statute of 19 April 1950 "on the safeguarding
of labor discipline" imposed stringent penalties for "unjustified absen-
teeism." 7 Absences of 1 to 3 days per year without adequate reason
are punishable by reprimands and deductions from wages. Unjustified
absences of 4 or more days per year are punished by the courts as
"malicious and stubborn infractions of labor discipline." Fines rang-
ing up to 25 percent of annual wages may be imposed, and an employee
is forbidden to leave his job until the deductions are paid off. Should
he do so, he may be imprisoned. Plant managers and supervisors who
fail to punish guilty employees are also subject to heavy fines and
imprisonment.
Severe punishments are provided in Poland for those
convicted of "crimes against socialist property," and a recent decree
on "intensification of struggle against poor quality products" estab-
lishes a system of fines and imprisonment for workers judged responsible
for rejects.
Other devices adopted by the Polish regime to get workers
to do its bidding are (1) programs of propaganda and education, (2)
various forms of socialist competition, (3) differential pay scales,
and (4) a system of rewards. Some of these rewards supplement the
system of punishments described above. For example, according to the
statute on labor discipline of 19 April 1950, employees who have no
unjustified absences for a period of 3 years are to be rewarded by
management with honorary titles, decorations, and money prizes. Simi-
larly, more generous leave and other benefits are available to persons
who remain on one job than those available to employees without
continuous service in one enterprise.
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2. Trade Unionism.
a. Organization and Membership.
The trade union structure in Poland is headed by the
Central Council of Trade Unions (Centralna Rada Zwiazkow Zawodowych -- CRZZ)
which is elected every 3 years by the Congresses of the Association of
Trade Unions (Zrzeszenie Zwiazkow Zawodowych -- ZZZ). These Congresses,
which are composed of delegates elected by member unions, serve merely
to approve decisions concerning trade union policy laid down by the
Communist Party and the Polish government and to elect the members of
the Central Council. The affairs of trade unions are conducted by the
Central Council according to the directives concerning union functions
laid down by the Party through the trade union congresses. The Central
Council functions through an elected presidium and through provincial
councils whose task it is to coordinate the work of the unions at the
local level.
In 1949 the Association of Trade Unions consisted of
31 industrial trade unions. A series of mergers in 1953, however,
reduced the number to 21. 78 These unions are organized on an indus-
trial basis and represent all major segments of the economy. Each
one is organized along lines similar to the organizational structure
of the Association. Individual workers belong to plant locals of these
industrial unions. Their mission is to put into effect policy decisions
handed down by higher organs in accordance with the principle of
"democratic centralism."
According to reports submitted to the Third Trade Union
Congress in May 1951+, there were 4.5 million members in Polish trade
unions, 79 or about 76 percent of the total industrial labor force.
Although membership is not legally compulsory, most workers are com-
pelled to join in order to be eligible for certain types of welfare
allowances available only to trade union members in good standing.
Membership dues, which vary with a worker's earnings, are assessed on
a graduated scale starting with 1 percent of the worker's monthly wage.
b. Functions.
As in the other Satellites, trade unions in Poland bear
no resemblance to those in the West but rather merely represent a mass
organization whose function is to promote the will of the Communist
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Party among the working population. The trade union's function is most
clearly stated in a resolution of the Central Committee of the United
Polish Workers' Party concerning the work of trade unions, issued in
April 1954: "The Party sees in the trade unions its most important
means of communication with the worker masses; it considers them to be
a school of socialist education and a reservoir of cadres, a school
teaching how to manage and govern, a school. constructing a new system
and a new life." J The union, in turn, inserted in its revised
statutes the following: "Trade unions realize their tasks under the
leadership of the United Polish Workers' Party, the vanguard of the
working class, the leading power of the Polish nation." 81
In carrying out their mission to assist in the real-
ization of the government's economic plans, Polish trade unions (1)
organize and supervise programs of socialist competition or "rivalry
in work" in the individual enterprises, (2) take measures within their
area of responsibility to insure that work commitments are fulfilled
by plants and by individual workers, and (3) "educate" workers to
observe work discipline and protect socialist property. They conduct
cultural and recreational activities at the plant level through
supervision of reading rooms and libraries, organization of classes,
and supervision of athletic activities. They provide benefits to
members as follows: (1) free legal advice, (2) organized vacation
rest homes, (3) priorities for admission to sanatoria, (4) special
accident benefits and family allowances, and (5) the right to partici-
pate in benefit-loan societies.
In recent months, Polish trade unions have been given
several functions formerly performed by the Ministry of Labor and
Social Welfare, functions which had been delegated to trade unions
much earlier in other European Satellites. On 1 December 1954 the
unions took over responsibility for enforcing laws and regulations
concerning work safety and hygiene, implementing their new authority
by establishing a uniform system of technical inspection. L2/ In
March 1955 the unions also took over administration of the state social
insurance system, except for pensions and retirement benefits. The
revised statutes adopted at the Third Trade Union Congress in May 1954
emphasized the right of unions to participate in drafting regulations
affecting the working and living conditions of the workers and gave the
Central Council of Trade Unions the right to issue regulations under
current labor legislation and to give official interpretations of
labor law. 83
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Polish trade unions participate extensively in the
settlement of disputes and grievances. A decree of 24 February 1954
established arbitration boards in all socialist enterprises. ?r The
boards, whose decisions have the validity of those of a court of law,
are composed of 2 members representing management and 2 representing
the workers through the factory works council. Their Jurisdiction
is limited to matters arising out of the work contract.
By an April 1954 resolution of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party, Polish trade unions were given all functions
entrusted by law to the factory works councils. Finally, the local
trade unions conclude collective agreements with the managers of the
enterprises. Provision for these Soviet-type collective agreements
was made by order of the Council of Ministers, dated 5 February 1954.
The new type of agreements includes mutual pledges of workers aE.d
management to fulfill the production goals set by the economic plan
for the enterprise and commitments by management to adhere to labor
laws and regulations, provide measures for the safety and protection
of workers' health, implement plans for training employees, and the
like. On their part, the trade unions agree to assist in maintaining
labor discipline, participate in developing means for raising the
quality and quantity of output, and fulfill their obligations to
provide specified welfare benefits and facilities for workers.
F. Rumania.
1. Control of the Labor Force.
a. Recruitment and Allocation of Manpower.
The Communist government of Rumania adopted during
the period from 1950 to 1954 a series of measures which give it fairly
complete control over the industrial and geographic distribution of
the labor force. The most important ones include (1) a system for the
organized recruitment and distribution of unskilled labor, (2) control
over the training and allocation of skilled workers through labor-reserve
schools, and (3) provision for compulsory temporary labor service by
nearly all able-bodied citizens.
Late in 1952 the Rumanian government introduced i3 system
for the organized recruitment and distribution of unskilled workers for
industrial enterprises, to be administered by the General Directorate
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of Labor Reserves (subsequently transferred to the General Directorate
of Recruitment and Distribution of the Labor Force under the Council
of Ministers). Recruitment of workers for agriculture and forestry
is to be conducted by the appropriate ministries with the authorization
of and under the general direction of the General Directorate. L5/
The actual recruiting and assigning of workers is done by local organs
of the General Directorate in cooperation with local people's councils,
in accordance with labor force recruitment plans prepared by the State
Planning Committee, the economic ministries, and the General Directorate.
The General Directorate recruits workers on the basis of a written con-
tract signed with the appropriate ministry or other central organ.
Individual work contracts are also signed with the recruited workers.
The hiring of unskilled labor for a period exceeding 6 months may be
done only through the local bureaus of the General Directorate, and
permission of these bureaus is also required for the recruiting of
seasonal and temporary workers.
In 1951, Rumania introduced a draft of young persons for
training in labor-reserve schools, patterned after the system in oper-
ation in the USSR. ~/ As now in effect, ? the plan provides for the annual
draft of from 45,000 to 55,000 persons between the ages of 14 and 25
for training in various types of labor-reserve schools. Training periods
range from 6 months to 3 years. Upon graduation from the schools the
young workers are assigned to enterprises by the General Directorate
of Manpower Reserves on the basis of manpower plans prepared by it and
the ministries concerned. Graduates must sign contracts agreeing to
work for 4 years at the enterprise to which they are assigned. Failure
to report to the designated enterprise is punishable by imprisonment
and restitution of training expenses. Breaking a work contract is also
subject to punishment. It appears that graduates of higher educational
institutions and professional schools, except those administered by the
General Directorate of Labor Reserves (under the Ministry of Education),
are also subject to compulsory assignment, transfer, and stipulations
for minimum length of service.
With certain specified exceptions, all Rumanian men
aged 16 to 50 and all women aged 16 to 45 may be called up for tem-
porary labor duty. Calls for. labor duty are to be made only by
decision of the Council of Ministers "in exceptional cases, to avert
and combat calamities and to cope with a lack of manpower in carrying
out important tasks of the State, or to perform certain temporary
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obligations of labor." 88 These provisions, it would seem, give the
government full authority to institute a draft of workers for any purpose
and for any length of time deemed necessary.
b. Methods for Enforcing Labor Discipline.
By government decree issued early in the period of the
Communist regime, all Rumanian employees are required to possess labor
books, which constitute a continuous record of the worker's employment.
The labor book must be given to the employer by the employee when he
is hired and is returned to him with appropriate entries when he leaves.
Detailed regulations govern the use of these labor books, which are
designed to reduce the migration of workers from job to job. Employers
are forbidden to hire workers who do not possess labor books or those
who have left their previous jobs without their employers' consent. 139/
Freedom to change jobs voluntarily has been virtually
eliminated in Rumania by provisions of the Labor Code and various
decrees. Employment contracts may be either oral or written and of
definite or indefinite duration. A work contract may be terminated
by the employee without his employer's consent only (1) upon com-
pletion. of the period for which the contract was signed; (2) for reasons
of health, as certified by medical authorities; (3) upon admission to
a training school; (4) upon becoming entitled to old-age or disability
pensions; or (5) for various specified reasons related to family cir.-
cumstan.ces. Enterprise managers who hire workers who have left their pre-
vious jobs without consent are subject to imprisonment of from 3 months to 1
year. Presumably the employees who quit arbitrarily are also subject
to this penalty and, in addition, probably must also seek a new job
through government employment bureaus. 90
Any Rumanian employee is subject to arbitrary trans-
fer anywhere within the country for reasons of disciplinary action.
In addition, certain classes of technical, skilled, and professional
employees may be transferred anywhere at any time by order of the
minister of the industry concerned or by order of another "competent
central agency." Certain benefits are provided for such trans-
ferred workers, but failure to report to the place of assignment is
punishable with imprisonment.
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These various regulations governing labor books, termi-
nation of employment contracts, and transfers would seem to provide the
Rumanian government with adequate means of minimizing labor turnover.
At the same time, these measures and those relating to recruitment,
training, and allocation of manpower also mean almost complete loss of
freedom by the individual worker to choose his job.
Violation of labor discipline is punishable in Rumania
under both civil and criminal law. For various types of infractions
of the internal work rules of the enterprise, a worker may be trans-
ferred to a less desirable job or locality, or he may be dismissed.
If a worker is judged to be at fault for producing work that is
rejected by inspectors, he loses all or a part of his wages covering
that work. The Labor Code states: "Employed persons are responsible
for losses caused to the respective units in connection with their
work." 92 When losses are the result of negligence or violation of
regulations, fines not to exceed 3 months' wages may be imposed. When
the reason for the loss is of a penal nature, the employee may be
fined by an amount not to exceed double the amount of the loss. In
addition to these more concrete methods, the government also exerts
great pressures on workers to conform to its dictates through such
means as propaganda and education, establishment and enforcement of
work norms, and various forms of socialist competition.
2. Trade Unionism.
a. Organization and Membership.
Trade unions in Rumania are organized under the Central
Council of Trade Unions (Consiliul Central al Sindicatelor -- CCS), and
the organizational structure is patterned after that in the USSR. 93
At the top of the structure is the General Congress of Trade Unions,
meeting every 4 years and composed of delegates elected by the congresses
of the individual trade unions. The General Congress selects the members
of the Central Council of Rumanian People's Republic Trade Unions, which
is the controlling body for the trade union movement. The Council
functions through a presidium and a secretariat and exercises general
direction over and supervision of the carrying out of the functions
assigned to the trade unions. At present there are 20 or 21 individual
trade unions, each having a general congress meeting every 2 years
and a council. These unions are organized along industrial lines,
generally paralleling the economic ministries. Coordination and common
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action of the individual trade unions of a region are effected through
regional Trade Union Councils, which are directly subordinate to the
Central Council. Delegates to these regional councils are selected at
inter-union conferences at the city or rayon level. The basic unit of
the trade union structure is the local union at the enterprise, which
functions largely through committees elected by the workers.
Trade union membership in Rumania is open to all
workers and students who are Rumanian citizens. Although membership
is not compulsory, it is to the economic interest of workers to belong
to a union, since, among other things, social security benefits given
to union members are double those given to nonmembers. Monthly trade
union membership dues amount to 1 percent of the worker's monthly
wage. The latest available data show that the total trade union member-
ship is 2.5 million, 94 or more than 85 percent of the total indus-
trial labor force.
b. Functions.
Like all Communist trade unions, the primary function
of Rumanian unions is to serve as a major transmission belt between
the government and Party and the country's labor force. The unions
have been assigned two major functions by the government. The first
responsibility is the Communist education of workers, and the second
is the management of the state social insurance system. 95 The
educational function is performed through the establishment of grade
union schools; the supervision of libraries and "Red Corners" in. the
enterprises; the publication of a newspaper, Munca, and other lit-
erature; and the constant verbal propaganda activities of "activists."
With respect to social insurance, the union (1) "elaborates draft
lags, which are submitted to the government, in problems of ... Social
insurance"; (2) conducts the actual payment of pension and other
social insurance benefits; and (3) participates in the planning of the
state budget for social insurance. Another important task allotted
to the trade unions is the supervision of measures to protect the
safety and health of workers in the enterprises.
Rumanian trade unions participate in settling disputes
between workers and the managers of enterprises. The basic dispute-
settling mechanism is the Commission for Settling Labor Controversies
in the local enterprise. This commission is made up of an equal
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member of representatives of management and the trade union. Disputes
involving a collective contract or a matter of principle are handled
by boards on which higher echelons of the trade unions are represented.
The local unions sign collective contracts annually with the enter-
prises and oversee their implementation. According to the Labor Code
the collective contract "establishes the commitment of both parties
with respect to (1) the carrying out of production in the implementation
of the state plan; (2) the improvement of working and living conditions
of the workers." Z_/ These collective contracts are reviewed by the
appropriate trade unions and ministries.
In addition to these more general functions, Rumanian
trade unions also perform the following tasks: (1).give financial
aid to individual workers, (2) render legal assistance to workers,
(3) conduct recreational activities, (4) organize the details of
socialist competitions, and (5) help to develop and introduce ration-
alization measures and other devices to improve labor productivity.
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APPENDIX A
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
The major gap in intelligence concerning manpower controls in the
European Satellites is lack of detailed knowledge of the extent to
which legally permissible controls are actually applied in practice.
There is reason to believe that at least some of the controls are not
well enforced and that various means of circumventing them have been
devised by enterprises and employees.
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APPENDIX B
SOURCE REFERENCES
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Source of Information Information
Doc. - Documentary
A - Completely reliable
B - Usually reliable
C - Fairly reliable
D - Not usually reliable
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
1 - Confirmed by other sources
2 - Probably true
3 - Possibly true
4 - Doubtful
5 - Probably false
6 - Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a
staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by a
staff officer, all of which may carry'the field evaluation "Documentary."
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document.
2. CIA. FDD, Summary, no 212, 16 Sep 54, p. 20, C. Eval. RR 2.
3. ILO. Legislative Series, Nov-Dec 53, U. Eval. Doc. (tr of Labour
Code of Bulgaria, chap 2, par 26, U)
1.. Ibid., par 30, U. Eval. Doc.
5. State, Belgrade. Dsp 382, 2 Dec 53, R. Eval. RR 2.
6. State, Sofia. Dsp 56, 29 Mar 49, R. Eval. Doc.
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8. ILO. Legislative Series, Nov-Dec 53, U. Eval. Doc. (tr of Labour
Code of Bulgaria, chap 8, par 129 and 130, U)
9. Library of Congress, Mid-European Law Project. Highlights of Current
Legislation and Activities in Mid-Europe, vol 2, no 4, 1 Mar 54,
25X 1X7 P. 58-59, U. Eval. Doc.
10. Ibid., 1 Jun 53, p. 2, U. Eval. Doc.
. Sofia, 26 Feb 5 4., U. Eval. .
12. Rabatnichesko RR 3
13. Dell.in, L. A. D. Trade Unions and Labor Legislation in Bulgaria
(1878-1953), The National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.,
Mid.-European Studies Center, 4 Dec 53, p. 18, U. Eval. RR 3.
14. Ibid.
15. State, Prague. Dsp 159, 28 Oct 52, R. Eval. Doc. (tr of
Czechoslovakia. Decree no 128/1951 of 27 Dec 51, "Organization
of the Recruitment of Manpower," U)
16. State, Prague. Dsp 19, 26 Jul 51, C. Eval. Doc.
17. Library of Congress, Mid-European Law Project, ok. cit. (9, above),
vol. 2, no 9, Sep 54, p. 246, U. Eval. Doc.
18. Ibid. .
19. Ibid.., vol 1, no 5, 1 Oct 53, p. 4, U. Eval. Doc. (citing Czecho-
slovakia. Decree no 20, 6 May 52 and Decree no 56, 23 Jun 5.3,
20. Ib)
id., (citing Czechoslovakia. Decree no 56, 23 Jun 53, U)
21. Ibid., p. 5 (citing Czechoslovakia. Decree no 43, 19 Aug 52, U)
FOIAb3
23. State, Prague. Dsp 104, 12 Sep 52, S. Eval. RR 2.
FOIAb3
25X1A2g26. CIA. OCI, Current Intelligence Digest, 30 Aug 54, p. 2
Eval. RR 2.
25X1A2
29. Library of Congress, Mid-European Law Project, oE. Lit. (9, above),
vol. 1, no 3, 1 Aug 53, p. 7, U. Eval. Doc.
25X1A2
1. State, Prague. Dsp 36, 29 Jul 52, C. Eval. RR 2.
32. Prace, Prague, 16 Apr 53, U. Eval. RR 3.
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33? "Collective Agreements in Czechoslovak Undertakings," Industry and
Labour, 1 Nov 54, p. 417, U. Eval. RR 2.
34. no. Legislative Series, Jan-Feb 54, U. Eval. Doc. (tr of
25X1A2g Czechoslovakia. Act respecting the reorganization of national
insurance, 19 Dec 51, U)
36. Gesetzblatt, no b7, Berlin, 14. Oct 54, p. 828, U. Eval. Doc.
37. Gesetzblatt, no 100, Berlin, 20 Dec 54, p? 932-933, U. Eval. Doc.
38. Das Arbeitsrecht in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Labor
Law in the German Democratic Republic), Berlin, Deutschen
Zentralverlag, 1953, p. 106, U. Eval. Doc.
39. State, HICOG, Berlin. Dsp 864, 6 May 52, U. Eval. RR 2.
Gesetzblatt, no 64, Berlin, 27 May 52, p. 377, U. Eval. Doc.
F0lAb3
41. State, HICOG, Berlin. Dsp 344, 10 Nov 53, C. Eval. RR 2.
42. Tribuene, Berlin, 1 Aug 52, U. Eval. RR 1.
43, State, HICOG, Berlin. Dsp 758, 6 Apr 54, U. Eval. RR 1.
44. Gesetzblatt, no 63. Berlin, 13 May 53, D. 695. U. Eval. Doc.
25X1A2
46.
Varga, L. The Position of the Hungarian Worker between January 1950
and November 1952, The National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.,
1953, U. Eval. RR 2. (citing Hungary. Confidential Decree no
3781/2-1952, U)
47. State, Budapest. Dsp 571, 14 Mar 52, R. Eval. Doc. (tr of Hungary.
Decree no 18/52 of the Cabinet Council of the Hungarian People's
Republic, U)
48. State, Budapest. Dsp 571, 14 Mar 52, R. Eval. Doc. (tr of Hungary.
Decree no 17/52 of the Cabinet Council of the Hungarian People's
Republic, U)
49. State, Budapest. Dsp 633, 23 Jun 50, U. Eval. Doc. (tr of Hungary.
Decree no 175/1950 of the Cabinet Council of the Hungarian People's
Republic, U)
Ibid., Dsp 651, 10 Apr 52, R/OFF USE. Eval. Doc. (tr of Hungary.
Decree no 28/52 of the Cabinet Council of the Hungarian People's
Republic, U)
50. State, Budapest. Dsp 129, 5 Sep 51, U. Eval. Doc. (tr of Hungary.
Decree no 161/51 of the Council of Ministers on amendment of the
Labour Code, U)
51. Pisky, Fred S. Labor Discipline in Hungary, The National Committee
for a Free Europe, Inc., Mid-European Studies Center, 11 Jan 54,
p. 12, U. Eval. Doc. (citing Hungary. Decree no 2000/1950, U)
52. Library of Congress, Mid-European Law Project, o . cit. (9, above),
vol 1, no 1, 1 Jun 53, p. 14, U. Eval. Doc. (citing Hungary.
Decree no 190/9-1951, 24 May 51, U)
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25X1A2
25X1A2
53- Pisky, ok. cit. (51, above), p. 13, U. Eval. RR 2. (citing
Hungary. Cabinet Resolution no 1008/1952, 16 Apr 52, U)
54. State. Intelligence rpt no 6424, "New Course" in Hungary: ?olicies
and Prospects, 28 Sep 53, p. 20, C. Eval. RR 2.
55. Pisky, ova. cit. (51, above), p. 13-14, U. Eval. RR 2.
56. News from Behind the Iron Curtain, Jan 54, p. 54, U. Eval. RR 2.
57. Library of Congress, Mid-European Law Project, o . cit. (9, above),
vol 1, no 1, 1 Jun 53, p. 14, U. Eval. Doc. (cciting Hungary.
Decree no 533/27-1950, 14 Sep 50, U)
58. Gabor, R. The Bolshevization of the Hungarian Trade Unions The
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., Feb 52, U. EvaL. RR 2.
60. State, Budapest. T 494, 9 Feb 54, C. Eval. RR 2. (quoting speech
of Istvan Kristof)
63. State, Budapest. Dsp 127, 5 Sep 51, R. Eval. RR 1.
67. State, Budapest. Dsp 127, 5 Sep 51,
69. Gryziewicz, S. The Pattern of Life in Poland, Paris, Mid-European
Research and Planning Center, 1952, sec 11, p. 8, U. Eval. RR 1.
70. State, Warsaw. Dsp 366, 5 Apr 54, U. Eval. Doc.
71. "Planned Employment in Poland," Industry and Labour, vol 10, no 11,
1 Dec 53, p. 404, U. Eval. RR 1.
72. Sulimirski, T. The Pattern of Life in Poland, Paris, Mid-European
25X1A2g Research and Planning Center, 1952, sec 3, p. 18, U. Eval. RR 1.
73. CIA. FDD, Summary, no 212, 16 Sep 54, p. 32, C. Eval. Doc.
citing Poland. Ordinance of 16 Jun 54, U)
77. CIA. OCI, Current Intelligence Digest, 1 Jul 54, p. 4, S. oral.
RR 1.
Compulsory Methods Concerning Labour in Poland, The National Commit-
tee for a Free Europe, Inc., Research and Publication Section,
Nov 52, U. Eval. RR 1.
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79. State, Warsaw. Dsp 427, 14 May 54, U/OFF USE. Eval. RR 3-
80. State, Warsaw. Dsp 391, 15 Apr 54, U. Eval. Doc.
81. State, Warsaw. Dsp 427, 14 May 54, U/OFF USE. Eval. Doc. (tr of
Poland. Report of the Statute Commission submitted to the Central
FOlAbabuncil of Trade Unions, May 54, U)
83. "Federation of the Trade Unions in Poland," Industry and Labour,
vol 12, no 9, 1 Nov 54, p. 450, U. Eval. RR 2.
84. Library of Congress, Mid-European Law Project, off. cit. (9, above),
25X1A 2, no 5, 1 May 54, p. 143-149, U. Eval. RR 1.
Library of Congress, Mid-European Law Project, op. cit. (9, above),
vol 2, no 11, Nov 54, p. 341-342, U. Eval. RR 1. citing
Rumania. Decree no 68, 1951, U)
87. Ibid., vol 2, no 3, 1 Mar 54, p. 76-77, U. Eval. RR 1. (citing
Rumania. Decree no 171, 1953, U)
88. Rumanian Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.
The Labour Code of the Rumanian People's Republic, chap 5, p. 62,
U. Eval. Doe.
89. Rumania. Buletinul official, 21 Nov 51, U. Eval. Doc. (citing
Rumania. Decree no 20T; 1951,. U)
90. State, Bucharest. Dsp 208, 5 Dec 51, R. Eval. RR 2.
91. Rumania. Buletinul oficial, 21 Nov 51, U. Eval. Doc. (citing
Rumania. Decree no 20 , 1951, U)
92. Rumanian Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries,
off. Sit. (88, above), chap 9, U. Eval. Doc.
93? State,. Bucharest. Annex II to Amleg Press Review no 1953-65,
Statutes of RPR Trade Unions, 14 Mar 53, U. Eval. Doc.
94. ca teia Bucharest, 12 Jun 54, U. Eval. RR 3.
Ibid. 29 Jul 54 U. Eval. RR 3.
25X1A2g
96. Rumanian Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries,
ok. cit. (88, above), chap 2, U. Eval. Doc.
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