THE 1954-55 FOOD SITUATION IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A001000140001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 111
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 9, 1956
• Content Type: IR

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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE 1954 - 55 FOOD SITUATION
IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
CIA/RR PR-136
9 March 1956
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE 1954-55 FOOD SITUATION IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
CIA/RR PR-136
(ORR Project 21.450)
NOTICE
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
Office of Research and Reports
-R-E-T
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FOREWORD
This report describes the availability of food in the USSR, the
European Satellites, and Communist China during the consumption year
from 1 July 1954 through 30 June 1955. To provide comparative eval-
uations, availabilities of food during a prewar period and during the
1953-54 consumption year are also described.
The supply and consumption of food in each country are measured
by the conventional "food balance," a statistical device which reflects
directly the standard of living and indirectly the economic progress of
a country. Properly prepared, the food balance is an accurate indica-
tion of the availability of food in different periods of time in a
given country and in different countries at a given period of time.
The quantities of food available for human consumption in a country
depend on production, net trade, changes in stocks, and nonfood uses --
seed and waste, feed for livestock, and industrial utilization. In
estimating the availability of certain grains and oilseeds, the extrac-
tion rates in processing also must be considered. Because of the many
factors involved in deriving a food balance, and because of the lack
of specific data concerning those factors, the food balance must be
an approximation. It expresses the national average of food availa-
bility in terms of calories per capita per day, but it does not reflect
the many disparities in levels of consumption among population groups.
Moreover, only the major foodstuffs are considered in the food balance,
and food "consumed" is measured in terms of food available to the pro-
ducer at the source level and to the nonproducer at the wholesale
level -- after retail sale the extent to which food is wasted, misused,
or fed to animals,by the nonproducers is unknown.
This report should be considered as a preliminary and tentative
analysis of the 1954-55 food situation in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In
particular, the estimates of trade, changes in stocks, and, conse-
quently, gross availability for use as food should be considered
tentative. Lack of information makes impossible any direct appraisal
of current consumption. It has been necessary, therefore, to use
historical information on consumption, evaluated in the light of
current conditions and Bloc policies, to derive an estimate of the
quantities of food available during the 1954-55 consumption year.
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The data in this report do not represent measured or weighed
quantities. They are, at best, estimates based on all available
information and as such may have a range of error of at least
plus or minus 5 percent.
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1+
II. USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Food Availabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Trade 7
3. Changes in Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
C. Food Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
D. Pattern of Food Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . 10
E. Food Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
F. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions . . . . 13
1. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2. Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11+
3. Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
III. European Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A. Food Availabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2. Trade ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . 16
3. Changes in Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B. Food Consumption . . 21
C. Pattern of Food Consumption 23
D. Food Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
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E. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions . . . . . 25
1. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . 25
2. Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3. Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
IV. Communist China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A. Food Availabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1. Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2. Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3- Stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
B. Pattern of Food Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
C. Food Requirements . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . ? ? 33
D. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions . . . . . 33
1. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2. Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3- Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Appendixes
Appendix A. Statistical Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendix B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Appendix C. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Appendix D. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
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1. Index of Caloric Consumption in the USSR, 1938-39, 1952-53,
1953-54, and 1954-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2. Percentage Distribution of Calories in the USSR, 1938-39,
1953-54, and 1954-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Daily Calories per Capita of Selected Categories of Foods
in the USSR, 1938-39, 1953-54, and 1954-55 . . . . . .. . . 12
4. Index of Agricultural Production in the European Satellites,
by Country, 1938 and 1948-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Index of Agricultural Production in the European Satellites,
by Product, 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Estimated Net Trade in Selected Agricultural Commodities
by the European Satellites, Prewar, 1953-54, and Prelimi-
nary 1954-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7. Index of Daily Consumption of Food per Capita in the European
Satellites, 1948-49 and 1951-52 through 1954-55 . . . . . 22
8. Percentage Contribution of Selected Foods to Total Caloric
Consumption in the European Satellites, Prewar, 1952-53,
1953-54, and 1954-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. Exports of Agricultural Commodities by China, 1931-37
Average, 1953-54, and 1954-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
10. Percentage Contribution of Selected Foods to Total Caloric
Consumption in China, 1931-37 Average, 1953-54, and
1954-55 . . . ..................... 31
11. Trends in Consumption of Selected Foods in Communist China,
1953-54 and 1954-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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12. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in the USSR,
Consumption Year 1938-39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
13. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in the USSR,
Consumption Year 1953-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
14. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in the USSR,
Consumption Year 1954-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
15. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Albania,
Consumption Year 1933-37 Average . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
16. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Albania,
Consumption Year 1953-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
17. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Albania,
Consumption Year 1954-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
18. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Bulgaria,
Consumption Year 1933-37 Average . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
19. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Bulgaria,
Consumption Year 1953-54 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . . . . . . . . 43
20. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Bulgaria,
Consumption Year 1954-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
21. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Czechoslovakia,
Consumption Year 1933-37 Average . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
22. Estimated Supply and. Utilization of Food in Czechoslovakia,
Consumption Year 1953-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
23. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Czechoslovakia,
Consumption Year 1954-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
24. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in East Germany,
Consumption Year 1935-38 Average . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
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25. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in East Germany,
Consumption Year 1953-51+ . . ? . . . . . ? . . . . . . ? ? 1+9
26. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in East Germany,
Consumption Year 1951+-55 . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? 50
Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Hungary,
Consumption Year 1933-37 Average . . . . . . . . . . . 51
28. Estimated Supply. and Utilization of Food in Hungary,
Consumption Year 1953-51+ . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . 52
29. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Hungary,
Consumption Year 1951+-55 . . ? ? ? ? ? . ? ? . . ? . ? . . 53
30. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Poland,
Consumption Year 1931+-38 Average . . . . . . . . . . .
54
31. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Poland,
Consumption Year 1953-51+ . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? . ? ? ? . 55
32. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Poland,
Consumption Year 1951+-55 . . . . . . ? . ? ? ? . . . . . . 56
33. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Rumania,
Consumption Year 1933-37 Average . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
31+. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Rumania,
Consumption Year 1953-51+ . ? ? . ? ? ? . . ? . . .
58
35. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Rumania,
Consumption Year 1951+-55 ? ? ? . . . . . . ? . . ? ? . . . 59
36. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Communist China,
Consumption Year 1931-38 Average . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6o
37. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Communist China,
Consumption Year 1953-51+ . . ? . . ? ? . . . ? ? . ? . . 62
38. Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Communist China,
Consumption Year 1951+-55 . . . . . ? . . ? ? ? ? ? ? . . 61+
S-E-C-R-E-T
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CIA/RR PR-136 S-E-C-R-E-T
(ORR Project 21.450)
THE 1954-55 FOOD SITUATION IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC*
Summary
The availability of food in the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
during the consumption year from 1 July 1954 through 30 June 1955 was
still below prewar levels. In terms of calories per capita per day,
the availability of food for human consumption** during 1954-55 ranged
from a low of 1,674 in Communist China to a high of 2,963 in Poland.
The daily per capita caloric intake in the USSR was 2,642.
In the USSR, grains and potatoes contribute about 75 percent of
the calories in the average Soviet diet. Although 1954 production
of these foods increased slightly over 1953 levels, the indigenous
supply was still below prewar levels, and Soviet authorities again
had to draw about 2 million metric tons*** of grain from reserves.
The 1954-55 availability of the so-called "quality" foods -- meat,
fats, milk, fish, and sugar -- that provide less than 25 percent of
the total calories increased about 4 percent above 1953-54 availa-
bility but was 2 percent below the level of 1938-39-
The pattern of the Soviet diet has remained about the same since
prerevolution years. This pattern, more nearly Asiatic than European,
is characterized by a high-carbohydrate diet of grains and potatoes
and by some of the world's lowest consumption rates of protein and
fatty foods. As a nation's economy becomes industrialized and its
population becomes urbanized, the requirements for a better balanced
diet, relatively high in the proportion of quality foods, tend to
rise. The rapid industrialization of the USSR has not brought such
an improvement in the quality of the diet. The deficiency has retarded
labor productivity and has given rise to the recent emphasis on improv-
ing consumer welfare through greater production of agricultural commod-
ities.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 15 November 1955-
** The foods used in deriving food balances normally account for about
95 percent of the total calories in a national diet. Statistics used in
this report have not been adjusted to 100 percent.
*** Tonnages throughout this report are given in metric tons.
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Some attempt has been made to improve the quality of the Soviet
diet by imports of meat and other quality foods. The caloric value
of these imports, however, may be largely offset by exports of grains.
It is consistent with Soviet policy that the USSR continues to export
grains and is at the same time forced to withdraw from reserves grains
for domestic consumption. The Soviet export policy depends on polit-
ical and economic considerations that usually circumvent restrictions
arising from current production and utilization.
Since early 1954, Soviet leaders have launched two extensive
programs designed to raise agricultural production: (1) expansion
of grain acreages on "new lands" in which both soil and climatic
conditions are marginal and (2) expansion of corn acreages in the
Ukraine and in other areas of the USSR that are not well suited for
the growing of corn. Natural limitations, particularly climate,
appear to be such as to prevent the long-run success of either of
these programs.
In the European Satellites as a whole, agricultural production in
1954 increased only 1 percent above that of 1953, once again failing
to reach prewar levels, despite government policies directed toward
increasing productivity under the "new course." In 1954, there was
a serious decline, in production of bread grains, particularly in
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. Production of potatoes
and sugar beets increased somewhat in the major growing areas, but
the quality of these crops was affected by high moisture content.
Actual production of sugar in 1954 in the European Satellites as a
whole was lower than production in 1953. The supply of animal products
has failed continually to satisfy increasing postwar demands, and there
was no significant increase in production in 1954. To maintain con-
sumption levels during 195.-55, the European Satellites probably have
had to depend on imports to a greater extent than at any time since
19.7.
The more highly industrialized northern European Satellites have
had the greatest difficulty in meeting both quantitative and qualita-
tive requirements for food. A decline in production of animal fats
and vegetable oils has been felt especially by East Germany and
Czechoslovakia. In an attempt to obtain more meat and dairy products,
both countries have made trade overtures to Western countries. Not
only has low production plagued the European Satellites but also the
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problem of procuring foodstuffs from the farmers has been a pressing
one during recent years. East Germany in particular has suffered
during the 1954-55 consumption year. The government has been unable
to procure adequate quantities of food from the producers and also
has been unable to increase imports to make up for this loss. The
shortages have created unrest among the workers and have contributed
to lower labor productivity in East Germany.
During the next 2 or 3 years, improvement in the quality of the
diet in the European Satellites will have to come from increased
imports rather than from indigenous production. It is improbable,
however, that the governments of the European Satellites will be
willing to expend the amounts of foreign exchange that would be
required to purchase the large quantities of animal products needed
to effect a significant improvement in the diet of the average worker.
In Communist China, gross production of food in 1954-55 was about
4.5 percent below 1953-54 levels, and it was still at the general
level of the 1931-37 average. From 1937 to 1954, however, population
had increased by 22 percent. In 1954-55, then, the availability of
food for human consumption, in terms of calories per capita per day,
was about 20 percent below the prewar level.
Production of food in Communist China in 1954-55 was curtailed
seriously by extensive floods in the rice-producing districts of the
Yangtze and Huai Rivers. Winter production of crops, however, was
greater than that of the previous year, and production of crops
outside the flooded areas somewhat offset the losses caused by the
floods.
In the prewar period, China was a net importer of food grains
and a major exporter of vegetable oilseeds, largely soybeans. In
the postwar years, China has reversed its position and has become a
net exporter of food grains. Although Communist China has continued
to be a major exporter of oilseeds, exports have not regained prewar
levels after falling off during World War II. During 1954-55, Com-
munist China continued to be a net exporter of food, total exports
.amounting to about 40 calories per capita per day, 2.4 percent of
the national average diet.
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Because the national diet in Communist China is relatively a very
poor one, the export of food has aroused some resentment. The export
of foodstuffs, however, is an important means of acquiring capital
for the Chinese Communist industrialization program, and official prop-
aganda has tried to minimize the importance of exports of food, espe-
cially of those to the USSR.
Little is known about the effect on food availabilities of the
Chinese Communist efforts to stockpile grain. The government has
indicated its intention to stockpile between 16 million and 20 mil-
lion tons of grain by the end of 1957, but apparently there has been
very little progress toward this goal.
Because efforts to increase production of food have been unsuccess-
ful, the Chinese Communists have inaugurated a program of food transfer
between surplus and deficit regions and have imposed rationing restrict-
tions on a considerable segment of the population. Preharvest hunger
has been common, however, and in some areas there has been actual
famine.
I. Introduction.
Production of food in the USSR and the European Satellites occupies
more than half of the labor force but provides the people with only a
modest diet. To provide a diet still less adequate requires the efforts
of more than 75 percent of the labor force of Communist China. In the
US, only 16 percent of the labor force works in agriculture.
The failures of the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to solve their
food problems have given the question of food supply a central position
in government policy. It is the purpose of this report to discuss such
policies, and the programs that have resulted from them, only to the
extent that such discussion will assist in analyzing the problems of
food consumption in 195+-55 in the individual countries of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc.
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In analyzing these problems, use is made of "food balances," the
conventional means of bringing together a large part of the agricul-
tural data of a country, so that a detailed examination and appraisal
of the food and agricultural situation can be accomplished. As far
as possible, the same foods are specified in making up the balances
for each country. The foods specified for the USSR and the European
Satellites account for about 95 percent of the total calories con-
sumed, and the percentage may be higher for Communist China.
The scope of this report is restricted to the examination and
analysis of the available food supply of each of the countries of
the Sino-Soviet Bloc with regard to domestic production, interna-
tional trade, and stocks. It includes an examination of the patterns
of consumption in the various countries in 195+-55 and draws com-
parisons with selected prewar periods and postwar years. Comparisons
with prewar periods are not intended to suggest any judgment on either
the adequacy or the desirability of the levels of food consumption,
although levels of. consumption in China, the USSR, and Southeastern
Europe were generally considered inadequate in prewar days. These
comparisons are used because they provide a convenient measure by
which the agricultural developments in the Sino-Soviet Bloc may be
appraised.
The calorie is used as an over-all indication of the average
quantity of food consumed. It is a measure of energy value. Unfor-
tunately, the calorie does not measure the quality of the diet; high
caloric levels are, however, generally associated with high consump-
tion of the more desirable foods -- those containing a relatively
high proportion of animal proteins and fats.
A. General.
Food balances of the major commodities produced for human con-
sumption in the USSR in 1954 indicate the availability of a daily intake
per capita of 2,61+2 calories.* This level of intake during the. 1951--55
consumption year, although slightly higher- than that of 1953-54+, is
about 1+ percent below the level of 1938-39-
* The foods shown in the food balances (see Appendix A) represent
about 95 percent of the total caloric intake, which probably is about
2,781 calories per capita per day.
** About 1 percent.
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In recent years the pattern of food consumption in the USSR
has been about the same as in 1938-39 and is more Asiatic than Euro-
pean in character. The average Soviet diet continues to have a
preponderance of starchy foods such as grain products and potatoes,
which account for about 75 percent of the total caloric intake.
Production of grain, the most important item in the average
Soviet diet, was about 5 percent higher in 1954 than in 1953, prima-
rily because of a good harvest in the "new lands" area of Siberia
and Kazakhstan, which offset the results of drought in parts of the
Ukraine and the Volga region. Despite the slight increase in pro-
duction of grain, it is probable that the USSR again withdrew grain
from reserves, as it did in 1953-54, in order to meet both export
commitments and domestic requirements.
Among the so-called "quality" foods,* sugar showed the most
significant decline in production in 1954. Soviet imports of sugar
were increased significantly in order to supplement indigenous pro-
duction. Imports of oilseeds were also increased somewhat over the
levels of 1953-54.
Since the early spring of 1954 the USSR has launched two
extensive programs designed to raise agricultural production:
(1) the expansion of grain acreage on "new lands" where both soil
and climatic conditions are marginal and (2) the expansion of corn
acreage in the Ukraine and in other areas of the USSR not well
suited to production of corn.
In view of the investment of inputs in the "new lands" and
the top-level backing which the whole program is receiving, it is
unlikely that the project will be quickly abandoned or even seriously
curtailed in the event of a serious crop failure. Preliminary studies
indicate, however, that natural limitations, particularly climate,
are such as to prevent that long-run achievement of success for the
"new lands" program which is anticipated by Soviet leaders.
Because of climatic limitations and the lack of adequate
inputs such as lime and fertilizers, the Soviet corn program,
calling for a sevenfold increase in acreage by 1960, is unlikely
Meat, fats and oils, milk, fish, and sugar, for example.
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to produce a significant increment of grain per hectare above that
already being produced on the same land. In addition, labor input
will be significantly greater for corn than for other grain or
fodder crops.
B. Food Availabilities.
1. Production.
The 195+ crop season in the USSR was characterized by
drought conditions in parts of the Ukraine and the Lower Volga
region and exceptionally favorable weather in the "new lands" area
of West Siberia and Kazakhstan. In 1954, production of grain and
potatoes, the two most important foodstuffs in the Soviet diet,
increased over the mediocre levels of 195_3 by about 5 percent and
1 percent, respectively. Despite these slight increases, production
of these foods in 195+ was still below the prewar levels by 2 percent
and 10 percent, respectively. In the meantime, the population had
increased 13 percent.
Of the remaining food items, sugar showed the most signi-
ficant decline in indigenous production. Production of sugar in 195+
is estimated at about three-fourths of the 1953 tonnage and slightly
above the level of 1938-39. An 11-percent increase was reported for
production of vegetable oils in 195+ compared with production in 1953,
an increase made possible, at least in part, by increased imports of
oilseeds. Production of vegetable oils in 195+ exceeded production
in 1938-39 by 61 percent. Production of meat in 195+-55, compared
with production in 1938-39 and 1953-54, remained at approximately
the same level. Production of fish in 195+-55 increased 14 per-
cent over that of 1953-54, to reach a level about 75 percent higher
than in 1938-39. The caloric intake from fish, however, still is
less than 1 percent of the national total. Production of milk in
195+-55 showed an increase of about 3 percent over production in
1953 but is still only two-thirds of the level of 1938-39.
2. Trade.
Two significant aspects of the Soviet trade pattern
in 1954-55 are continued, though diminished, exports of grains and
increased imports of sugar. The net export of grains, accompanied
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by a withdrawal from reserves, repeats the pattern of the 1953-54 trade
year and emphasizes the fact that Soviet export policies are based on
considerations other than the existence or absence of a true exportable
surplus. The sharp increase in imports of sugar, chiefly from Western
countries, was necessitated by the low level of production of sugar in
the USSR in 1954.
In terms of calories, the food value of Soviet imports of
agricultural products in 1954-55 was twice that of the exports. The
net export of grain was equivalent to a daily intake of 69 calories
per capita, and the net import of quality foods (sugar, meat, fats
and oils, and fish) amounted to an intake of 136 calories per capita.
In 1953-54 the per capita caloric contents of exports and imports were
nearly equal. Imports amounted to 98 calories per capita per day,
compared with 95 calories per day for exports. In 1938-39, there were
no net imports, and exports amounted to 82 calories per capita per day.
3. Changes in Stocks.
As recently as February 1955, /* Khrushchev reaffirmed
the official statement concerning the need for maintaining state
reserves of grain. The current food-reserve program probably was
inaugurated a few years after World War II. Since that time, there
have been additions to the accumulating reserves of grain and other
staples, and these additions possibly reached a peak following the
favorable 1952 crop season. During the 1953-54 consumption year,
however, the USSR had to draw on reserve stocks of grain in order
to meet current needs. J A revised estimate places the withdrawal
from grain reserves in 1953-54 at about 2.4 million tons.**
In the 1954-55 consumption year, probably the USSR again
was forced to withdraw from grain reserves -- particularly reserves
of wheat -- in order to meet food requirements, to fulfill export
obligations, and to provide seed for the expansion of acreage under
the "new lands" program.
Indigenous production and imports of food products other
than grain probably provide a supply sufficient to meet current require-
ments, with no net change in stocks.
For serially numbered source references see Appendix , D.
For methodology, see Appendix B.
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C. Food Consumption.
The daily intake per capita in the USSR in the 1954-55 consump-
tion year is estimated to be 2,642 calories. This level of intake
represents an increase of only 26 calories above the level of 1953-54
and is still 113 calories, 4 percent, below the level of 1938-39. An
index of caloric consumption in the USSR, in 1938-39, 1952-53, 1953-54,
and 1954-55, is shown in Table 1.
Index of Caloric Consumption in the USSR
1938-39, 1952-53, 1953-54, and 1954-55
Year
Index
1938-39
100
1952-53
97
1953-54
95
1954-55
96
There is no available information on the different levels of
consumption among various segments of the Soviet population. In pre-
war years, however, the urban population consumed a higher proportion
of the quality foods than did the rural population. It is likely that
this differentiation has continued and, in fact, may have increased
during the last few years, when the government has been able to procure
a greater proportion of meat, milk, and the like from the producing
rural regions.
The distribution of food has been a continuing problem in the
USSR. In February'1955, J Khrushchev suggested a revision of the
program for the distribution of agricultural produce -- a revision
which would have the effect of increasing local responsibility for
meeting production targets. In this proposal, agricultural produce
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would be allocated to various areas more on the basis of production
than on need. In effect, this procedure would penalize areas failing
to meet production goals. According to Khrushchev, "a definite part
of ,he centralized state fund (food obtained through procurements)
must be directed to the satisfaction of the needs of the larger towns
and industrial centers which cannot draw sufficient produce from neigh-
boring regions, and also to the satisfaction of the needs of the army,
foreign trade, and state reserves. As for the remainder of the centra-
lized fund, it must be distributed among the other towns and regions
of the country with regard to their actual needs and taking into account
existing production possibilities." J
D. Pattern of Food Consumption.
In recent years the pattern of food consumption in the USSR
has been nearly the same as it was in 1938-39. The percentage distri-
bution of calories in the USSR., by category of foodstuffs, in 1938-39,
1953-54, and 195+-55, is shown in Table 2.*
Table 2 shows that starchy foods account for about three-fourths
of the total caloric intake and that in the average Soviet diet grain
products alone account for two-thirds of the total. The slight percent-
age changes shown in Table 2 indicate the continuity of this pattern of
a relatively low-quality diet.
Daily calories per capita for selected categories of foods in
the USSR, in 1938-39, 1953-54, and 1954-55, are shown in Table 3.**
Table 3 shows that, in terms of absolute quantities, the
caloric intake from grain products has declined in the last 2 years
compared with 1938-39. There also has been a sharp decrease in con-
sumption of whole milk. Per capita consumption of sugar and fats
and oils has increased somewhat, primarily because of imports to
supplement indigenous production.
Table 2 follows on p. 11.
* Table 3 follows on p. 12.
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Percentage Distribution of Calories in the USSR
1938-39, 1953-54, and 1954-55
Food 1938-39 1953-54
1954-55
Wheat 35.7
38.3
37.1
Rye 21.6
20.2
21.2
Total bread grains 57.3
58.5
58.3
Nonbread grains 10.2
7.8
7.6
Potatoes 10.3
11.7
11.3
Total basic foods
38.0
77-2
Meat and fish 4.1
4.1
4.0
Fats and oils 5.8
7.6
8.2
Sugar 4.3
5.5
5.7
Milk 8.o
4.8
4.9
Total quality foods 22.2
22.0
22.8
Total foods 100.0
100.0
100.0
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Table 3
Daily Calories per Capita of Selected Categories of Foods
in the USSR J
1938-39, 1953-54, and 1954-55
1938-39
1953-54
1954-55
Food
Calories
Consumed
Calories
Consumed
Change
from
1938-39
Change
Calories from
Consumed 18-3
Grain
1,859
1,734
-125
1,742 -117
Potatoes
285
305
+ 20
299 + 14
Total basic foods
2,144
2,039
-105
2,041 -103
Meats and fish
112
107
- 5
106 - 6
Fats and oils
159
200
+ 41
216 + 57
Sugar
119
143
+ 24
151 + 32
Milk
221
127
- 94
128 - 93
Total quality foods
611
577
- 34
601 - 10
Total foods
2,755
2261
6
2 -113
,
a. Foods shown in the food balances (see Appendix A) represent about
95 percent of the total caloric intake.
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E. Food Requirements.
The abundant publicity given by Soviet leaders to the problems
of agriculture in the USSR and the extreme measures taken to increase
total output indicate the continued failure of agricultural production
to meet current requirements. The necessity of withdrawals from grain
reserves during the past two years further emphasizes the failure.
The "new lands" program, inaugurated in the spring of 1954 for
expanding wheat acreage in marginal lands, largely in West Siberia and
Kazakhstan, continues to receive great emphasis. In addition, a seven-
fold expansion of corn acreage by 1960 was announced in February 1955
and has been widely publicized. These two programs are designed to
increase both the numbers and productivity of livestock herds and to
double the output of livestock products by 1960. Such a goal in itself
is unrealistic, but it represents an attempt to improve the present
low-quality diet. In February 1955 Khrushchev stated that in addition
to the grain needed for direct consumption, for reserves, and for
export, grain was needed to meet the requirements of an expanding
livestock industry. Production of grain significantly in excess of
that achieved in 1954 would be necessary, however, before feed alloca-
tions could be high enough to raise the output of livestock produce to
a level permitting any significant increase in the intake per capita
of such products -- particularly in view of the needs of a population
which is increasing by more than 3 million per year.
F. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions.
1. Capabilities.
In no postwar year have food shortages been sufficiently
serious to deter possible Soviet military action, and during the
1954-55 consumption year, there was no significant change in either
the total caloric intake or the composition of the average Soviet
diet.
In 1954 the "new lands" area of West Siberia and Kazakhstan
had unusually favorable weather, and a bumper crop was harvested in
much of this area. Similar success over a period of years is unlikely,
but there is the possibility of generally favorable weather throughout
much of the USSR in any one particular year, with a resultant production
of bumper crops.
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2. Vulnerabilities.
The USSR is engaged in two broad programs which seem
to have little likelihood of long-run success. The first of these,
the grain expansion program in the "new lands" area, has been referred
to briefly above. This "new lands" program is being implemented with
some of the necessary inputs -- machinery, labor, building, transporta-
tion, and the like -- at a somewhat faster pace than that set in the
majority of the "cure-all" programs previously inaugurated. Pending
completion of more detailed research on the capabilities of the "new
lands" project, it is believed, however, that natural factors, partic-
ularly climate, place definite limitations on the long-run success
of the program.
The corn expansion program is the second project
currently being stressed by Soviet leadership. The Soviet attempt
to inaugurate an Iowa-style corn-hog program on the scale envisioned
appears even more risky and costly than the "new lands" program.
The USSR has no major area geographically or climatically similar
to the US corn belt. Even assuming that corn is to be harvested as
silage, the inputs of labor, machinery, fertilizer, and the like
would be extremely large even to approach the planned goals. It is
extremely doubtful that the corn expansion program will produce a
significant increment per hectare above that already being produced
on the same types of land by other crops. In fact, it is not improb-
able that the whole program will fall into disrepute, along with
previously abandoned projects such as the grass rotation program in
dry areas.
3. Intentions.
The Soviet food balance in 1954-55 contains no
definable indications of intentions to wage war. The current
emphasis on strengthening the agricultural sector of the economy
appears to be the result of belated recognition of lags in agri-
cultural production and does not in itself indicate definite
intentions.
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III. European Satellites.
The following discussion concerning the current food situation in
the European Satellites will treat, as far as possible, the area as a
whole. Where the situation in a specific country warrants individual
treatment, this will be given. In discussing commodity production
and food availabilities, the European Satellites will be divided into
northern* and southern** groups, where such a division is applicable.
A. Food Availabilities.***
1. Production.
Agricultural production in 195+ in the European Satellites
failed once again to reach prewar levels. In spite of government
policies directed toward increasing productivity under the "new course,"
agricultural production in 195+ in the European Satellites as a whole
registered only a 1-percent increase over 1953.
During the consumption year from 1 July 1953 through 30
June 1954, adverse growing and harvesting conditions**** reduced the
195+ harvest of grains and oilseeds in a number of the European Sat-
ellites. Bread grains were particularly hard hit.***** Not only was
the harvest poor quantitatively, but also the quality of bread grain
was below average. In the grain harvest of 1954, Poland was able to
show a 13-percent increase over 1953 -- when the harvest was below
normal -- and Albania and Bulgaria showed only slight increases.
Although production of potatoes in Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Hungary, and Albania was greater in 195+ than in 1953 --
East Germany having the greatest increase -- the quality of the
potatoes was affected by high moisture content, and losses during
storage may reduce availabilities for food. Likewise, production
of sugar beets in 195+ approximated or, as in Czechoslovakia and
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland.
Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.
Statistical data contained in this section, unless otherwise
noted,, 'have been derived from Appendix A, Tables 15 through 35.
**** Flooded lowlands in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary
increased harvesting losses.
***** See Table 5, p. 18, below.
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East Germany, exceeded that of 1953, but the quality of the beets, in
terms of sugar content, was poor,'and production of sugar in 1954 in
the European Satellites as a whole was less than in 1953.
Production of animals and animal products, which has con-
tinually failed to satisfy increasing postwar demands, did not increase
significantly in 1954. Although there was a small over-all increase
in hogs and cattle, the primary meat animals, their production in
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary decreased somewhat. None
of the European Satellite governments claimed that the 1954 plan for
production of animals was fulfilled.
In 1954 the European Satellites failed once more to increase
availabilities of foodstuffs through increased indigenous production,
despite the new course" measures adopted. To maintain adequate levels
of consumption during 1954-55, the European Satellites have had to
depend, probably to a greater extent than at any time since 1947, on
imports of food.
An index of agricultural production in the European Sat-
ellites, by country, in 1938 and 1948-54, is shown in Table 4.* An
index of agricultural production in the European Satellites, by product,
in 1954, is shown in Table 5.**
During the 1954-55 consumption year the European Satellites
imported large quantities of grain, animal fats, and fish. The northern
European Satellites accounted for most of the imports of food, as they
did in 1953-54. For the first time since 1947, Hungary and Rumania
were net importers of bread grains. Normally exporters of grain to the
West, the European Satellites negotiated for imports of approximately
1.9 million tons of grain from the West during 1954-55. Imports of
quality foods, animal fats, and vegetable oil showed a slight decline.
Imports of fish in 1954-55 by East Germany, the major Satellite importer,
increased by 10,000 tons over imports in 1953-54.***
Table 4 follows on p. 17.
Table 5 follows on p. 18.
Continued on p. 19.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
For some years, sugar has been the major agricultural
export item of the European Satellites. Exports of sugar in 1954-55
probably declined 150,000 tons below the levels of 1953-54, largely
because of the shortfall in production. Rumania, an exporter of
sugar during the postwar years, has been a net importer in the 1955
calendar year. Despite current shortages of meat throughout the
Sino-Soviet Bloc, Poland and Rumania have continued to export meat
to the West.
Although imports of foodstuffs by the European Satellites
have increased during 1954 and 1955, they have not been sufficient
to improve significantly either the quality or the quantity of the
worker's diet. If requirements are to be met, greater quantities of
animal products and vegetable oils will have to be imported. Such
imports will force the European Satellites into greater dependence
on the West; it does not appear that the USSR is willing to increase
its exports of food to the Satellites. Because the European Sat-
ellites have been forced to use foreign exchange for imports of food
rather than for imports of raw materials for the consumer goods
industries, the planned increases of consumer goods promised under
the "new course" have not materialized.
Estimated net trade in selected agricultural commodities
by the European Satellites in prewar, 1953-54, and preliminary 1954-55
is shown in Table 6.*
3. Changes in Stocks
Three consecutive below-normal harvests in the European
Satellites and the "new course" policy of increasing availabilities
of foods to the consumer probably have forced a temporary halt in
the stockpiling of foodstuffs. Although there is no definite infor-
mation on state reserves, withdrawals from reserves, as announced
* Table 6follows on p. 20.
The term stocks refers to state reserves of food that are kept
for strategic purposes -- military, economic, or political. Normal
inventories and channel stocks are not considered; these stocks are
assumed to be held at relatively the same level from year to year.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
M
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
by some of the Satellites in 1953, and recent official statements of
the need to increase agricultural production to provide adequate re-
serves in times of emergency, tend to confirm assumptions of failures
in the stockpiling programs of the European Satellites. The use of
critically short foreign exchange for imports of food in 1954-55,
moreover, indicates the inadequacy of the reserves that the Satellites
may have had to draw on in times of short supplies.
It is estimated that during 1954-55 no additions were made
to state reserves of food in the European Satellites except small quan-
tities of sugar in Czechoslovakia and of wheat in Bulgaria. If there
were additions other than those mentioned, the food available to the
population was in even shorter supply than is presently estimated. The
possibility of grain being stockpiled by Poland should not be discounted,
in view of its large imports, but there is no evidence of such stock-
piling.
B. Food Consumption.*
Estimated daily consumption of food per capita in the European
Satellites during 1954-55 ranged from 1,742 calories in Albania to
2,963 calories in Poland. In the other Satellites the range was from
2,300 to 2,500 calories per day.** In the US in 1954-55, normal daily
consumption of food per capita was 3,200 calories.
Food rationing was abolished by Rumania in December 1954, and
only Albania and East Germany still ration certain foodstuffs. With
the announcement of the "new course" in 1953, the government of East
Germany promised the people that food rationing would be discontinued
in 1954. The poor harvest in 1954 and inadequate imports, however,
prevented the abolition of rationing of meat, fats, and sugar, and in
1954-55 the caloric intake in East Germany was lower than that of
1953-54. Bulgaria and Poland were the only European Satellites able
to reach or to exceed prewar levels of caloric consumption per capita
in 1954-55. An index of daily consumption of food per capita in the
European Satellites in 1948-49 and 1951-52 through 1954-55 is shown
in Table 7.
For methodology, see Appendix A.
East Germany, 2,308; Rumania, 2,329; Hungary, 2,362; Czechoslovakia,
2,423; and Bulgaria, 2,482. The range of error in calorie estimates is
15 percent.
xxx Table 7 follows on p. 22.
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Table 7
Index of Daily Consumption of Food per Capita
in the European Satellites
1948-49 and 1951-52 through 1954-55
Prewar = 100 a/
Country
1948-49
1951-52
1952-53
1953-54
1954-
Albania
N.A.
92
84
99
99
Bulgaria
102
99
9o
97
102
Czechoslovakia
102
101
90
101
96
East Germany
80
80
75
91
82
Hungary
100
96
88
9o
90
Poland
98
99
98
l06
107
Rumania
97
97
80
84
89
a. 1933-37 average for Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Rumania; 1934-38 average for Poland; and 1935-38
average for East Germany.
A basic problem that has plagued the governments of the Euro-
pean Satellites in recent years is the procurement and distribution of
food. During 1954-55 the situation did not improve, and every Satel-
lite government admitted failure in fulfilling procurement plans.
Because compulsory delivery quotas were reduced as part of the 0new
course," nonfulfillment of these quotas greatly reduced the share of
indigenous food production controlled by the governments through
official distribution channels. This situation created shortages
in urban areas, and the population was forced to purchase a greater
share of their food requirements on the free market at high prices.
East Germany in particular suffered during the 1954-55 con-
sumption year. The government could not procure adequate quantities
of foodstuffs from the peasant, and it could not increase imports to
make up for this loss. As a result, consumption of food declined in
the cities, and an extremely tight food situation existed throughout
the last half of the 1954-55 consumption year. The shortages created
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worker unrest and contributed to lower productivity. Less serious but
similar situations developed in both Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The
recent reintroduction of a stiff collectivization policy in both Czech-
oslovakia and Hungary probably includes the strong enforcement of com-
pulsory delivery quotas, which gives the government control of a larger
share of agricultural production, particularly in years of below-
normal harvests.
C. Pattern of Food Consumption.
The 'new course" emphasized the need to increase consumption
of quality foods, particularly of meat and fats. The growing indus-
trialization of the European Satellites levies greater demands for
animal protein for consumption by the labor force. On an average per
capita basis, however, consumption of meat and animal fats has re-
mained below prewar levels, and there was no significant improvement
in the diet in the 1954-55 consumption year. The percentage contri-
bution of selected foods to total caloric consumption in the European
Satellites in prewar years, 1952-53, 1953-54, and 1954-55 is shown
in Table 8.*
The more highly industrialized northern European Satellites
have had the greatest difficulty in supplying enough food of the
required quality and variety. A shortfall in production of animal
products and vegetable oil has been felt especially by East Germany
and Czechoslovakia -- both countries have been making trade overtures
to Western countries in an attempt to import meat and dairy products.
Improvement in the quality of the diet in the European Sat-
ellites during the next 2 to 3 years will have to come from increased
imports rather than from indigenous production. It is unlikely,
however, that the European Satellites are willing to expend the re-
quired amount of foreign exchange for the large quantity of animal
products needed to effect a significant improvement in the diet of
the average worker.
* Table 8 follows on p. 24.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
D. Food Requirements.
In the European Satellites, official press releases during 1955
emphasized the lag in agricultural production and the failure of output
to meet requirements. Substantial increases in the imports of foodstuffs
from the West during 195+ and 1955 are clearly indicative of indigenous
shortages. Because of the decline in indigenous production, however,
the increase in imports has not been sufficient to provide a net increase
in the availability of foodstuffs.
During the 195+-55 consumption year, the governments of the Euro-
pean Satellites made no greater progress toward a satisfactory balance
between food supply and food demand than had been made in the 1953-54
consumption year. J East Germany and Czechoslovakia, moreover, had
greater difficulty in satisfying food requirements during 195+-55 than
in 1953-54.
E. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions.
1. Capabilities.
Under present government policies, no immediate improvement
in the food supply of the European Satellites is likely. It is possible
that, on a short-term basis, tighter government control of procurement
could direct a larger share of the present production of foodstuffs to
the industrial worker and thereby improve his supply of food. In the
long-run, however, such a program would have disastrous effects on the
incentive to peasants and would reduce production to a level at which
food availabilities would decrease substantially.
The military capabilities of the European Satellites,
particularly East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, have been
affected by industrial workers dissatisfied with the supply of food
and by the low level of agricultural productivity.
2. Vulnerabilities.
The governments of the European Satellites have been
unsuccessful in raising levels of agricultural production and in
obtaining an adequate share of indigenous production to meet urban
- 25 -
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
requirements. In times of a shortfall in production, therefore, the
urban population has suffered, and, lacking control over a sizable
share of the food, the governments have had difficulty in lowering
basic food costs to the worker.
During 1954 and 1955 the European Satellites have increased
their dependence on the West for imports of foodstuffs, particularly
grain, meat, animal fats, and fruit. It is probable that, in order to
maintain or improve present levels of consumption of quality foods, the
Satellites will be forced to continue imports from the West. If Western
imports were cut off, the food supply available to the labor force would
be reduced and costs would be increased. Labor productivity and indus-
trial production would certainly decline. In spite of substantial
imports of food, East Germany is now faced with a labor force highly
dissatisfied because of a shortage of basic foods.
3. Intentions.
Positive indications of the military intentions of the
European Satellites would be strict food rationing in times of normal
production and major additions to state reserves of foodstuffs. There
has been no evidence of such activity during the 1954-55 food consump-
tion year.
IV. Communist China.
A. Food Availabilities.
1. Production.
Production of food crops* in Communist China is estimated
at 156 million tons in 1954, approximately 4 to 5 percent lower than
the 163 million tons estimated to have been produced in 1953.**
Food crops do not include cottonseed, which is crushed for oil.
In these estimates, potatoes are on a gross weight basis. It has
been the custom to report food production with potatoes on a grain-
equivalent basis. This is not done in this report, because it is
believed that the Chinese Communists are reporting production with
potatoes included on a gross weight basis. Thus, in December of 1954;
they claimed that production of "grain" for the year was 170 million
tons. J This claim fitted conveniently with the plan of January
1954, which called for a 3-percent increase in agricultural production
over that of 1953.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
Production of food in 1954 was approximately at the average of produc-
tion in the 1931-37 period and about 11 million tons below the peak
of production in 1952 -- the best year under the Chinese Communist
regime. Between 1937 and 1954 the population of China increased about
22 percent.
In 1954, production of food in Communist China was reduced
seriously by the extensive floods in the chief rice-producing districts
of the Yangtze and Huai Rivers. Production of winter crops, however,
was greater than that of the previous year, and other crops outside
the area of floods were relatively good. Although these favorable
factors somewhat offset the losses occasioned by the floods, in 1954-55
the availability of foods for human consumption, in terms of calories
per capita per day, was about 20 percent below the level of 1931-37.
In contrast to prewar levels in China, there has been in
recent years a definite decrease in the average availability of food.
This decrease is shown in the following tabulation:
Food Balance
Index of Calories
per Capita per Day*
1931-37 average
100
1952-53
84
1953-54
84
1954-55
8o
Concerned by the low level of the availability of food.,
the Chinese Communists, without marked success, have exerted efforts
to increase production of food. The government has inaugurated a
program to transfer food between surplus and deficit regions, and
* Because of the number of quantitative estimates required in the
preparation of each food balance, some of which are based on very
little information, the acceptance of the quantitative results shown
in the food balances is unwarranted. For example, it is probable
that the indexes of the postwar period overstate the actual fall
in the availability of food per capita. The general trend and the
relationship between the various periods, however, are believed
to be correct.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001000140001-2
this action has been accompanied by rationing restrictions affecting a
considerable segment of the population. In spite of this effort, pre-
harvest hunger in certain localities has been common each spring in
Communist China. Even in 1953, after the comparatively good harvests
of 1952, preharvest hunger was relatively widespread. This condition
has developed into actual famine in some limited areas. It is probable
that, if the food balance in 1954-55 reflects the true situation in
that year, the spring of 1955 was a particularly critical period for
those living in the deficit areas.
2. Trade.
Before World War II, China was a net importer of grains
and a heavy exporter of oilseeds and their various oils.* On a net
basis, China exported about 25 calories per capita per day, roughly
1 percent of the average calories per capita per day of the average
diet.**
During the period of Chinese Communist control, the govern-
ment has tried to reduce to the smallest practical extent imports of
foodstuffs and to expand exports of agricultural commodities for the
purpose of obtaining foreign exchange for imports of capital goods.
As a result of this policy, the Chinese Communists have
increased total exports of food, both calories per capita per day
and percentage of total calories available to the population. Exports
of agricultural commodities by China, 1931-37 average, 1953-54, and
1954-55, are shown in Table 9.***
It is clear that, in a relative sense, Chinese Communist
exports of food in terms of the total availabilities are not large.
In a country in which absolute availability is at a low level, however,
exports of even small magnitude have had adverse psychological effects.
The Chinese Communist propaganda has tried to reduce resentment among
consumers by pointing out that exports of certain items are only a
small part of total production of those items.
Although the estimate of net exports in 1954-55 by Com-
munist China must necessarily be a preliminary approximation subject
* This statement includes Manchuria.
** See Appendix A. Table 36, p.
*** Table 9 follows on p. 29.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
Table 9
Exports of Agricultural Commodities by China
1931-37 Average, 1953-54, and 1954-55
Period
Calories per
Capita per Day
Percentage of Total
Available Calories
per Capita per Day
1931-37 average
24
1.2
1953-54
53
3.1
1954-55 a/
40
2.4
a. Preliminary estimate.
to revision, it is compatible with other evidence. Both 1952 and 1953
were years of normal, or better-than-normal, food production, but in
1954, production was adversely affected by weather conditions. During
the 1954-55 consumption year, moreover, there was some reduction in
the shipments of grain which had been going to North Korea as part of
the plan of Chinese Communist aid to that country. This reduction
would be expected, as North Korea probably increased its production
of grain after the end of the Korean hostilties. It is probably true
that 1954-55 was a year of leveling out in the rate of increase of
Chinese Communist exports of foodstuffs that had held from 1949-50
through 1953-54.
3. Stocks.
The status of food reserves in Communist China continues
to be a subject on which data are insufficient to support a quantita-
tive estimate. For the purposes of estimating food balances, con-
sequently, the assumption has been made that from year to year move-
ments into and out of stocks have been about equal. There are reasons
to believe that a state reserve of foodstuffs is programmed by the
government of Communist China. Both the general level of food avail-
ability and the extent of the export program, however, indicate that
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
withdrawals for a large reserve have been unlikely.* It is possible
that some reserves were laid by in 1952, which was an excellent pro-
duction year, and in 1953 these reserves may have been maintained
and even increased. It is difficult to see how these reserves, even
if they exist, could be maintained in 1955. Assuming that such
reserves existed and have been maintained, they would be reflected
in the availabilities of calories per capita per day -- calories
per capita per day for 1953-54 would be somewhat lower than are
shown in the food balances for that year. If these reserves were
used, in part or in whole, to meet the emergency of the flood
disaster in 1954, then the food balance for 1954-55 should show
greater availability of calories per capita per day than it actually
does. Although it is possible that reserves of food were used at
that time, this hypothesis is not supported by the food balances
for those years.**
B. Pattern of Food Consumption.
The level of living in any country, insofar as foodstuffs
are concerned, is determined roughly by the "starchy staple ratio."***
This ratio has always been high in China -- more than 75 percent for
the periods shown in the food balances. The starchy staple ratio has
shown considerable stability, and there has been no significant change
under the Communist regime. The percentage contribution of selected
foods to total caloric consumption in China, 1931-37 average, 1953-54,
and 1954-55, are shown in Table 10.**
* There is no general agreement with this opinion. Indirect
evidence has suggested to some analysts that perhaps as much as 7
million tons of grain were withdrawn for reserves in 1952.
** To give some idea of possible magnitude, the following data
are presented: 5 million tons of grain (wheat and rice), on the
basis of 575 million population would, on the average, afford between
60 and 70 calories per capita per day. Thus the calories available
per capita per day in 1954-55, as shown in the food balance for this
year, could be raised 60 to 70 calories if (1) the government had
reserves of 5 million tons of grain, and (2) released these reserves
in the 1954-55 consumption year.
*** The starchy staple ratio is the ratio of calories from grain
products and potatoes to total calories consumed. In general, the
more wealthy a country, the lower will be this ratio. Thus, for the
US, this ratio was about 42 percent in the 1909-13 period, but by the
1949-50 consumption year the ratio had fallen to about 27 percent.
**** Table 10 follows on p. 31.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
Percentage Contribution of Selected Foods
to Total Caloric Consumption in China
1931-37 Average, 1953-54, and 1954-55
1931-37
Food Average 1-953-54 1954-55
Wheat
16.4
15.6
18.2
Other grains
23.8
23.0
25.0
Rice
35.3
35.4 a/
30.6
Potatoes
3.3
4.8
4.5
Total basic foods
78_.8
IM
38.E
Oilseeds
5.0
5.7
5.3
Meat,
eggs, and fish /
3.8
4.0
4.2
Fats
and oils
5.5
5.0
5.4
Other
6.9
6.5
6.8
Percent
Total quality foods 21.2 21.2 21-7
Total calories
100.0 100.0
a. Raised 0.1 percent to balance.
b. Excludes fat and fat cuts of pork, which are listed
with fats and oils.
Table 10 gives no indication of a trend in the composition
of the diet. Such a trend can best be shown by a comparison of the
actual calories furnished by the various foods. Trends in the con-
sumption of selected foods in Communist China in 1953-54 and 1954-55
are shown in Table 1l.* Table 11 indicates that trends or shifts in
the consumption of individual foods probably are not significant.
The dominant fact is the general decrease in available calories,
reflected in consumption of all foods except potatoes. The fact that
the contribution of potatoes to total calories has increased while
those of other foods have fallen may reflect some deterioration in the
quality of the diet.
Table 11 follows on p. 32. - 31 -
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001000140001-2
Ln Z U'
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r1
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C. Food Requirements.
Requirements. for food in Communist China are difficult to
define because they are relative and may be defined in either an
economic (demand) or a physical (necessary levels of energy intake)
context. It is known that, although preharvest hunger occurs in
Communist China, the population continues to expand. In an absolute
physical sense, then, there must be enough food to go around and, over
given periods of time, to take care of greater absolute numbers. On
the basis of present nutritional data, however, no one really knows
just what figure for the average number of calories per day represents
the minimum requirement. The only possible conclusion is that increas-
ing population, demands for industrialization of the economy, and
demands for exports of food products increase food requirements at a
-rate that probably is slightly greater than the rate of increase in
production. This conclusion is supported by evidence of the deteri-
oration of the average diet, as shown in the food balances, and of
the appaxent increase in the incidence of preharvest hunger.
D. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions.
1. Capabilities.
The lowered caloric intake per capita in Communist China
during the 1954-55 consumption year probably has not been sufficient
to deter the government from possible military action. Given favor-
able weather conditions, Chinese Communist agriculture should be able
to increase production considerably during the next few years. Stiff-
ening of the procurement mechanism and improvement in the allocation
of foodstuffs to non-self-suppliers should contribute to greater
nonfarm labor productivity and should increase the capability of agri-
culture to support a growing industrial economy.
2. Vulnerabilities.
The food level of the average citizen of Communist China
is such that in the event of hostilities the interdiction of internal
food movements would result in local shortages and probably in local
famine. This does not mean, however, that such occurrences would
affect the capability to wage war. Chinese Communist control over
the national supply of food is such that the government can divert
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
food to military end uses at the expense of the population. The ulti-
mate effects of a policy of ignoring population distress over food
shortages, however, are unknown. The apparently low level of strategic
stockpiles, coupled with the relatively low average of food availability
in Communist China, indicates that a disastrous crop year through either
natural or man-created causes might represent a considerable setback to
the capabilities of the Chinese Communists.
The interdiction of food imports by hostile action, either
by economic sanctions or by naval blockade, will not affect the food
position adversely. To the extent that Western action might decrease
exports of grain and oilseeds, it would tend to raise levels of food
availability in Communist China.
3. Intentions.
In the Chinese Communist food balances in this report,
there are no definable indications of intentions. Although the
government has programmed stockpiles of grain for a number of
eventualities, there is no evidence of extreme stockpiling efforts
that might indicate that the Chinese Communists are planning major
military activity.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001000140001-2
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES
The statistical tables (Tables 12 through 38) in this appendix
show food balances for the USSR, the European Satellites, and Com-
munist China. For each country, three food balances are given --
for a prewar period and for the 1953-54+ and 195+-55 consumption
years. Except for revisions of some estimates, the food balances
for the prewar periods and the 1953-54+ consumption year are essen-
tially the same as those given in source j. The methodology for
the revised estimates in these balances and for the estimates in
the balances in the 195+-55 consumption year is explained either
in the footnotes to the individual tables or in Appendix B of
this report.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 12
Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in the USSR a/
Consumption Year 1938-39 b/
(Population: 192,300,000)
Thousand Metric Tons (Except Where Noted)
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10
11
12
13
Utilization
Net Trade
Change
Seed
Extraction
Total
(+Import)
in
Total
and
Total
Rate
Net
Kilograms
Calories
Commodity
Frcdnctior, (-ExTort)
Stxks
Sup"
Waste
Feed
Industrial
Total
s
(Pcr +)
Food
per Year
per Day
Wheat
33,100 -
870
+ 1,000
31,230
7,100
570
4oo
6,070
23,160
85
19,686
102.4
982
Eye
19,300 -
6o
+ 4oo
18,840
4,oco
400
4,4oo
14,440
85
12,274
63.8
596
Barley
8,900 -
700
8,200
1,600
5,600
500
7,700
500
65
325
1.7
15
Oats
15,700 -
80
15,620
3,700
11,720
15,420
200
45
90
0.5
5
Corn
4,000 -
290
3,710
300
i,6io
1,000
2,910
Boo
93
744
3.9
38
Other e/
7,600
+ 500
7,100
1,500
500
2,000
5,100
90
4,590
23.9
223
Sugar (refined)
2,207 -
50
2,157
2,157
2,157
11.2
119
Potatoes
Meat
73,838
73,838
23,000
21,000
1,300
45,300
28,538
28,538
148.4
285
Beef and veal
1,422
1,422
1,422
1,422
7.4
29
Pork
1,614
1,614
1,614
1,614
8.4
69
Mutton and goat
429
429
429
429
2.2
6
Butter
250 -
5
245
245
245
1.3
26
Slaughter fats
515
515
86
86
429
429
2.2
47
Vegetable oils e/
858 -
20
838
308
308
530
530
2.8
68
Marine oils
3
3
3
3
Vegetable oilseeds e/
5,608
5,608
997
100
4,061
5,158
450
450
2.3
18
Total fats and oils
7,234 -
7.209
M
100
4.455_
5.552
1,657
1.657
8_6
154
Fish (landed weight)
1,600
i,6oo
448
448
1,152
1,152
6.o
8
Milk (whole)
28,400
28,400
2,600
2,600
25,800
25,800
134.2
221
a. Does not include alcoholic beverages.
b. The consumption year 1 July 1938 through 30 June 1939 was selected because it is the last prewar year for which detailed statistics on acreage are available and
for which estimates of production represent more or less the normal prewar situation.
The plus sign (+) denotes addition to state reserves and deduction from total supply, and the minus sign (-) denotes deduction from state reserves and addition
to total supply.
d. Includes rice and pulses.
e. Includes nonfood as well as edible oils.
-36-
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01 0001 40001-2
Table 36
Estimated Supply and Utilization of Food in Crffiuniat China J
Consumption Year 1931-38 Average
(Population: 473,700,000)
(Continued)
Thousand Metric Tons (Except Where Noted)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Utilization
Net Trade Change Seed Extraction Total
(+Import) in Total and Total Rate Net Kilograms Calories
Commodity Production (-Export) Stocks Supply Waste Feed Industrial Total Gross (Percent) Food per Year Per Day
Pulses and oilseeds
Vegetable oilseeds 17,708 - 2,196 15,512 1,930 602 8,004 10,536 4,976 4,976 10.5 104
Broad beans 3,018 - 86 2,932 386 60 446 2,486 2,486 5.2 49
Field peas 3,190 3,190 419 797 191 1,407 1,783 1,783 3.8 36
Fruits and vegetables 55.0 35
Meat
Beef and veal 629 - 7 622 622 622 1.3 6
Buffalo 436 436 436 436 0.9 4
Pork 3,873 - 27 3,846 3,846 3,846 8.1 45
Mutton and lamb 171 - 4 167 167 167 0.4 2
Goat 159 159 159 159 0.3 1
Poultry 402 402 402 402 0.8 4
Total meat x.670 - 18 5,632 5,632 5.632 11.8 62
Eggs 756 - 130 626 626 626 1.3 5
Fish (landed weight) 3,000 + 53 3,053 3,053 3,053 6.4 u
Fats and oils
Vegetable oils 1,601 - 113 1,488 190 1,298 1,298 2.7 65
Pork fat 1,032 1,032 1,032 1,032 2.2 49
Total fats and oils 2,633 - 111 2,520 L9-0 2,330 2,330 2:6644~
Total calories per day
a. Does not include alcoholic beverages. The general methodology used in the derivation of estimates in this table is described in detail in source Revi-
sions of the estimates given in that source are described in Appendix B, p. 67, below.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001000140001-2
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A001000140001-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01093A001000140001-2
APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in constructing the food balances given in
Appendix A is essentially the same as that used in constructing food
balances in the published report on the 1953-54 food situation in
the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It would be impracticable to reproduce that
detailed methodology in this report. Only the methodology used in
deriving new estimates and in revising previous estimates, therefore,
is discussed below, and there is frequent reference to the 1953-5+
report.
I. USSR.
A. 1938-39 Food Balance.
The food balance sheets for the US$R for the consumption year
1938-39 remain as published previously. 2/
B. 195 5 Food Balance.
The food balance sheets for the USSR for the consumption year
1953-5-f remain the same 10 for all commodities except grains and sugar.
The methodology pertaining to all other commodities is unchanged.
1. Grains.
Figures for production of grains in 1953 are revised esti-
Figures for trade in grains, as well as in all other products
during 1953-54., are preliminary estimates obtained from scraps of infor-
mation and reported trade agreements up to 30 March 1955, unless otherwise
noted, and are subject to a margin of error of 10 percent or more.
It is believed that during the 1953-54 consumption year the
USSR had to draw on reserve stocks of grains in order to meet current
needs. The revised estimate of withdrawals of 2.4 million tons from
reserves was based on the relation of the estimated total gross supply --
for both nonfood and food uses -- to estimated production.
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
Estimates of seed and waste are as follows:
Seeding
Rate Total Seed
Acreage (Centners Total Waste* and Waste
(Million per Seed (Million (Million (Million
Crop Hectares) Hectare) Metric Tons) Metric Tons) Metric Tons)
Wheat 49-.3 1.4 6.9 1.1 8.0
Rye 22.7 1.4 3.2 0.6 3.8
Barley 8.5 1.2 1.0 0.2 1.2
Oats 16.5 1.6 2.6 0.4 3.0
Cbrn 4.3 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3
Other
grains 10.7 1.2 1.3 0.2 1.5
The estimated quantity of bread grains fed to livestock has
not been revised, but a slight adjustment has been made in the quantitied
of wheat and rye. Estimates of oats and barley fed to livestock have
been revised downward in proportion to the downward revision in the esti-
mates of their production. 12 No revision has been made in the estimated
quantity of "other grains" fed. The estimate of corn fed to livestock
is a residual figure obtained by deducting estimated quantities of bread
grains, barley, oats, and "other grains" fed to livestock in 195,3'-5~4 from
the total requirements for grain feed of about 16 million tons, di-
vided as follows:
Annual Consumption
Numbers** Per Head Total
Tie of Livestock (Million Head) (Kilograms) (Million Metric Tons)
Horses 15.5 400 6.2
Hogs 29.6 200 5.9
Cattle 57,7 50 2.9
Sheep and goats 112.1 3 0.3
Poultry 275.0 2 0.6
Equals 3 percent of production.
As of 1 January 1954.
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Previous estimates of industrial uses of grains remain un-
changed 14+ for all commodities except corn. That estimate was in-
creased to 1.3 million tons to bring the total up to the 3 million tons
required for production of 198 million gallons of alcohol distilled
from grain and 18 million hectoliters of beer.
No significant change was made in the previous estimate of
the total gross availability of grain for direct consumption. The minor
changes in distribution of the grains resulted in very insignificant
changes in caloric intake.
2. Sugar.
The estimate of production of sugar in 1953 has been revised
to 3 million tons. / The estimated amount of sugar diverted into re-
serves was revised slightly upward on the basis of the higher produc-
tion figure.
? 1954-55 Food Balance.
1. Grains.
Figures for trade in grains, as well as in all other commod-
ities, are preliminary estimates, based on scraps of information and
reported trade agreements up to 30 March 1955, and are subject to a
margin of error of at least 10 percent.
Crop
Acreage
(Million
Hectares
Seeding
Rate
(Centners
per
Hectare
Total
Seed (Million
Metric Tons)
Waste*
(Million
Metric Tons)
Total Seed
and Waste
(Million
Metric Tons)
Wheat
61.0
1.4
8.5
1.1
9.6
Rye
23.0
1.4
3.2
0.6
3.8
Barley
8.o
1.2
1.0
0.2
1.2
Oats
15.5
1.6
2.4
0.4
2.8
Corn
14.0
0.5
0.7
0.1
0.8
Other
grains
13.0
1.2
1.6
0.2
1.8
Equals 3 percent of production.
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Because of the increased demand for seed created by the
expansion of acreage under the "new lands" program, the estimated
quantity of wheat fed to livestock has been held arbitrarily at
700,000 tons, and that of rye has been increased to 200,000 tons.
The estimates of barley and oats fed to livestock have been in-
creased, taking into consideration the fact that the percentage
increase in the quantities of these two grains fed to livestock
would certainly exceed the gross increase in production. The
quantity of "other grains" used for feed is assumed to have been
the same as in 1953-54. The estimate of the quantity of corn used
for feed is a residual figure used to bring the total quantity of
grains fed to livestock in 195+-55 up to 16.7 million tons, divided
as follows:
Annual Consumption
Type of Livestock
Numbers*
(Million Head)
Per Head**
(Kilograms)
Total
(Million Metric Tons)
Horses
16.2
4o0
6.5
Hogs
31.8
200
6.4
Cattle
58.9
50
2.9
Sheep and goats
11+.7
3
0.3
Poultry
280.0
2
o.6
16.7
The estimated quantities of wheat, rye, and barley used
in the manufacture of alcohol and beer have each been arbitrarily in-
creased 100,000 tons above the 1953-54 estimate to bring the total up
to the 3.3 million tons required for production of 215 million gallons
of alcohol distilled from grains and 20 million hectoliters of beer.
2. Sugar.
.
The estimate of production of sugar is apreliminary esti-
mate based on Soviet sources. iz/
As of 1 January 1955.
Feeding rates are the same as in 1953-54. 16
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3. Potatoes.
The estimate of production of potatoes was derived by
multiplying an acreage slightly greater than the acreage in 1953 18
by the yield per acre in 1953.
Waste is conventionally estimated at 10 percent of produc-
tion. The estimate of seed was derived by multiplying 8.5 million
hectares by 1,750 kilograms (kg) of seed per hectare. The estimated
sum of seed and waste has been rounded to 21.6 million tons.
The use of potatoes for feed was estimated to be 1 percent
greater than in 1953-54+. This increase is in proportion to the in-
crease in production.
The use of potatoes for industrial purposes includes the
quantity of potatoes required to produce 60 million gallons of alco-
hol distilled from potatoes.
4. Meat at.
The estimate of production of meat was based on estimated
livestock numbers and slaughter weights. Details are given in source L9/.
5. Slaughter Fats.
The estimate of production of slaughter fats was computed
from production of meat by the use of standard factors.
6. Vegetable Oils.
The estimate of production of vegetable oils, including
edible and nonfood oils, was based on a planned increase of 11 per-
cent 20 over the production level of 1953-54. Industrial use was
estimated at approximately 40 percent of the total supply.
7. Marine Oil.
in 1953-54.
Production of marine oil was assumed to be the same as
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8. Oilseeds.
The slight increase in production of oilseeds was based on
a reported increase in acreage. 21
This estimate of seed and waste includes the quantity of
seed needed to sow the estimated 1955 acreage of oilseeds plus a waste
factor of 3 percent of production.
The use of oilseeds for industrial purposes includes the
quantity of oilseeds required to produce 1,380,000 tons of vegetable
oils.
9. Fish.
The fish catch was based on a planned increase of 14 per-
cent 22 over production in 1953-54. Spoilage and waste were esti-
mated at about 28 percent of the total available supply.
Production of milk, 27.2 million tons, was estimated by
multiplying the estimated number of cows -- 25.2 million as of 1
January 1955 -- by the estimated average yield per cow -- 1,080
liters. It was estimated that 8.2 million tons of milk were used
for butter (20 kg of milk equaling 1 kg of butter). Whole milk
was estimated at 19 million tons, of which 2 million tons are esti-
mated to have been fed to livestock, and 17 million tons consumed
as whole milk or its products -- cheese, ice cream, and the like.
II. European Satellites.
The prewar food balance sheets prepared for the European
Satellites are the same as those previously published. 231 For
the consumption year 1953-54, however, minor revisions in the
balance sheets from those previously published 24 were made in
view of changes in population, production, and net trade. The
revisions for 1953-54 and the methodology for the 1954-55 food
balances are given below by country.
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B. Albania.
1. 1953-54 Food Balance.
Revisions in estimates of production in Albania, based on
more complete information, were made for sugar, meat, and slaughter
fats.
A change in the utilization pattern of bread grains and
corn for food resulted in increased estimates of stockpiling and
animal consumption of grain.
2. 1954-55 Food Balance.
The estimate of production of sugar was calculated on a
refined basis. Refined sugar is considered to equal 90 percent of
raw sugar.
Data on trade are estimates based on fragmentary evi-
dence from a number of sources.
Crop
Acreage
(Thousand
Hectares
Seeding
Rate
(Kilograms
per
Hectare
Total Seed
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Waste*
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Total Seed
and Waste
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Wheat
108.0
180
19.4
3.4
22.8
Rye
4.0
180
0.7
0.1
0.8
Barley
11.0
155
1.7
0.3
2.0
Oats
13.0
155
2.0
0.3
2.3
Corn
98.0
40
3.9
3.6
7.5
Rice
2.9
160
0.5
0.2
0.7
Other
grains
24.0
180
4.3
Potatoes
1.0
1, 500
1.5
0.2**
1.7
# Equals 3 percent of production of grains.
* Equals 5 percent of production.
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The estimate of industrial uses of grains is the same as
that shown in the 1953-54 food balance.
C. Bulgaria.
1. 193-54 Food Balance.
Estimates of production of meat, slaughter fats, and milk
in Bulgaria have been revised on the basis of more complete informa-
tion. Estimates of utilization were changed by application of the
same methodology used in source J.
2. 1954-55 Food Balance.
The margin of error in estimates of production is 10 per-
Estimates of trade were based on fragmentary evidence
from a number of sources.
Crop
Acreage
(Thousand
Hectares
Seeding
Rate
(Kilograms
per
Hectare
Total Seed
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Waste*
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Total Seed
and Waste
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Wheat
1,500.0
175
262.5
60.0
322
Rye
240.0
175
42.0
7.9
50
Barley
295.0
150
44.2
12.6
57
Oats
155.0
150
23.2
3.9
27
Corn
800.0
40
32.0
24.2
56
Rice
10.0
185
1.8
0.8
3
Other
grains
60.0
160
9.6
2.0
12
Potatoes
18.0
1,400
25.2
4.2**
29
Other nonfood uses were calculated in the same way as in
the report on the 1953-54 food balance. 26
* Equals 3 percent of production of grains.
Equals 5 percent of production.
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D. Czechoslovakia.
1. 1953-54 Food Balance.
Seed and waste requirements in Czechoslovakia have been
changed from the previous balance ?tI/ as a result of the change in
the area seeded. Data on trade have been revised on the basis of
more complete information. Only in the estimate of milk has there
been a change from the previous food balance and in the methodology
for obtaining estimates of industrial uses. A ratio of 23 kg of
milk to 1 kg of butter was used.
2. 1954-55 Food Balance.
Data on trade were compiled from many different sources,
of which all are available in CIA files. All estimates of trade are
preliminary.
Estimates of seed and waste are as follows:
Crop
Acreage
(Thousand
Hectares)
Seeding
Rate
(Kilograms
per
Hectare
Total Seed
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Waste*
(Thousand
Metric Tons
Total Seed
and Waste
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Wheat
780
180
140.4
103.6
244
Rye
645
180
116.1
85.7
202
Barley
620
150
93.0
84.3
177
Oats
600
150
90.0
80.6
171
Other
grains
160
6o
9.6
18.9
28
Potatoes
600
.2,100
1,260.0
765.0**
2,025
Feed has been calculated as a residual figure, except for
milk, which has been estimated at 13 percent of production. There
has been no change in methodology for estimating industrial uses since
the report for 1953-54.
* A waste factor of 8 percent of production of grains was used in
view of extremely unfavorable weather conditions during harvest time.
** Equals 15 percent of production.
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E. East Germany.
1. 1953-54 Food Balance.
Estimates of production in East Germany have been revised
on the basis of more complete information, as has the estimate of de-
liveries of wheat to the Soviet occupation forces, which has been esti-
mated at 150,000 tons. The decline in stocks of sugar was estimated
at 80,000 tons. Information reveals an increase in consumption of
sugar so there were probably no additions to stocks in 1954. For the
estimate of industrial uses of milk, the ratio of 22 kg of milk to 1
kg butter 28 was changed to 28 to 1.
2. 1954-55 Food Balance.
All figures on production of grains and potatoes are as
reported in source /, except as noted. Data on trade in grains are
estimates based on fragmentary evidence from a large number of sources,
except data on rice, which is a planned figure. LO/ This applies to
trade in all commodities.
Estimates of exports of potatoes were based primarily on
the Soviet occupation requirements for 400,000 Soviet troops of 200
kilograms per man per year. Allowing 20 percent for waste, this is
about 100,000 tons. Added to this figure are 50,000 tons for normal
frontier trade. Estimates of seed and waste are as follows:
Seeding
Rate Total Seed
Acreage (Kilograms Total Seed Waste* and Waste
(Thousand per (Thousand (Thousand (Thousand
Crop Hectares Hectare Metric Tons) Metric Tons) Metric Tons)
Wheat 420 180 75.6 67.8 143
Rye 1,220 170 207.4 146.8 354
Barley 320 150 48.0 16.0 64
Oats 590 140 82.6 31.3 114
Other
grains 150 170 25.5 8.1 34
Potatoes 800 1,800 1,440.0 1,755.0** 3,195
* Equals 3 percent of production for each grain except wheat and rye,
each of which equals 8 percent.
Equals 15 percent of production.
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 Approved For Release 1999109/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO01000140001-2
Three percent of production of wheat was used for feed. Twenty percent
of production of rye was used for feed. A residual amount of production
of barley and oats was used for feed. An estimate of 800 kg of potatoes
per hog was used as the annual feeding rate. This figure, multiplied
by 7 million hogs, yielded the estimated amount of potatoes used for
feed. The prewar feeding rate was 1,000 to 1,200 kg per hog per year.
In the methodology for estimating the amount of grains
and potatoes consumed by industrial uses there has been no change from
that employed in the report for 1953-54.
The extraction rate of wheat and rye was raised from 76
to 86 percent; and of "other grains," from 76 to 80 percent. lij
Production of sugar was estimated at 90 percent of its raw
value, estimated at 685,000 tons.
Trade plans for 1955 called for the export of 250,000
tons.. The 1954 plan, however, had called for the export of 227,000
tons, but actual exports amounted to 300,000 tons. It is probable,
therefore, that exports in 1954-55 will equal those of 1953-54.
Imports of meat were planned at 60,000 tons, of which
it was assumed that 20,000 tons were to meet Soviet occupation require-
ments.
It was assumed that 7,000 tons of meat were added to
stocks to replace withdrawals during 1953-54.
No allowance for butter was made for Soviet occupation
troops. The estimate of imports, 40,000 tons, represents a decrease
of 4,000 tons below that for the previous year.
The volume of trade in slaughter fats was assumed to be
86 percent of production in 1953-54. It was assumed that 20 percent
of the total supply of slaughter fats was consumed by industry.
Plans for imports of vegetable oils specified 170,000
tons of soybeans and 30,000 tons of peanuts. 15/ The oil equivalent
would be 60,000 tons.
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Industrial uses were estimated to have consumed 20 percent
of the total supply of vegetable oils. On the basis of available data
on trade agreements, imports of fish were slightly above the level of
1953-54.
It is estimated that 10 percent of production of milk was
used for feed. Industrial use was estimated on the basis of the quan-
tity of milk required to produce 91,000 tons of butter at the ratio of
28 to 1.
F. Hungary .
1. 1953-54 Food Balance.
Revisions in estimates of production in Hungary from the
previous balance j were made for meat, slaughter fats, vegetable
oils, and milk. Trade in grains was revised on the basis of more
recent and complete information.
2. 19 .54-55 Food Balance.
Data on trade were compiled from many sources. All esti-
mates of trade are preliminary.
In the methodology for deriving estimates of nonfood uses,
there is no change from that employed in the report for 1953-54. 311
Estimates of seed and waste are as follows:
Crop
Acreage
(Thousand
Hectares
Seeding
Rate
(Kilograms
par
Hectare
Total Seed
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Waste*
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Total Seed
and Waste
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Wheat
1,357
175
238
73
311
Rye
502
175
88
23
111
Barley
428
150
65
23
88
Oats
223
150
33
14
47
Corn
1,227
40
49
90
139
Rice
23
180
4
2
6
Other
grains
25
160
4
1
5
Equals 5 percent of production.
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1. 1953-54 Food Balance.
Estimates of production of sugar, potatoes, meat, fats and
oils, and milk in Poland have been revised on the basis of more com-
plete information.
Estimates of trade in grains and sugar have been revised
on the basis of more recent information of trade agreements and actual
movements of commodities.
The estimate of rye consumed as feed is a residual figure
amounting to 17.5 percent of total production.
2. 195+-55 Food Balance.
Production figures, except for fish, have been revised on
the basis of more complete information. The estimated production of
fish is the same as that of 1953-54.
Trade in grains has been estimated on the basis of trade
agreements and the actual movement of commodities, reported by many
sources. Estimates of trade in other commodities are assumed to
approximate those for 1953-5+ because of the lack of data. All esti-
mates of trade should be considered preliminary.
It is believed that consumption of wheat and rye in 195+-55
was approximately the same as in 1953-5+. Imports increased consider-
ably in 195+-55, although it is not known whether Poland absorbed all
of these imports or whether a portion was destined for other Sino-Soviet
Bloc countries. The assignment of 1 million tons of bread grains to
stocks was arbitrary, in view of increased imports as well as increased
production.
Estimates of seed and waste are as follows:
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Crop
Acreage
(Thousand
Hectares)
Seeding
Rate
(Kilograms
per
Hectare)
Total Seed
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Waste*
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Total Seed
and Waste
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Wheat
1,400
180
252
97
349
Rye
4,500
170
765
297
1,062
Barley
900
150
135
55
190
Oats
1,730
150
260
105
365
Other
grains
335
140
47
16
63
All other utilization of production was determined by the
same methodology as that used for the 1953-54 food balance. A slightly
higher proportion (20 percent) of production of rye was allocated for
feed.
H. Rumania.
1. 1953-54 Food Balance.
Estimates of production of sugar, meat, milk, and slaughter
fats in Rumania have been revised on the basis of more complete informa-
tion. There was no change in methodology for estimating utilization.
2. 1954-55 Food Balance.
Estimates of trade were derived from data obtained from
many sources giving the actual movement of trade for the last half of
1954 and trade agreements in effect during the first half of 1955.
Nonfood and food uses of various commodities were derived
by the same methodology as that used to estimate the food balance.
Estimates of seed and waste are as follows:
Equals 5 percent of production.
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-S-E-C-R-E-T
Crop
Acreage
(Thousand
Hectares
Seeding
Rate
(Kilograms
per
Hectare)
Total Seed
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Waste*
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Total Seed
and Waste
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Wheat
2,450
180
441.0
62
503
Rye
150
180
27.0
4
31
Barley
500
155
77.5
11
88
Oats
400
155
62!.0
9
71
Corn
3,400
50
170.0
87
257
Rice
20
185
3.7
1
5
Other
grains
60
160
9.6
I. Communist China.
The food balance sheets prepared for Communist China estimating
the prewar average and the 1953-54 consumption year have undergone minor
revisions from those previously published, 18J which were based on a
constant population of 480 million persons. Those food balances, therefore,
reflect primarily the changes in production from year to year, the different
levels of net imports or exports, and any changes in utilization and extrac-
tion rates.
In 1954 the Chinese Communists published the preliminary results
of their first census of the population, as of 30 June 1953. / Those
data made possible the recalculation of the estimated availability of
food in terms of kilograms per capita per year and caloric intake per
capita per day.
Production of food is estimated for the calendar year in which
it is harvested or produced. Consumption is computed for the 12 months
beginning 1 July of a given production (calendar) year through 30 June
of the following year and is associated with the population of 1 January.
Another adjustment was necessitated by the fact that only part of the
Chinese population lives in areas for which data on production are avail-
able.
* Equals 3 percent of production.
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The total population reported by the Chinese Communists as of
1 June 1953 was 601,938,035, including 31,582,299 persons living in
Formosa, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, Sinkiang, Tibet, and
Changtu, as well as overseas Chinese and students studying abroad.
The net population as of 30 June 1953 in the Chinese Communist area
for which data on production are available was 570,355,736.
Assuming that the annual increase in population averaged 1
percent, the net population as of 30 June 1954 was estimated at
576,059,293. The average of these two figures, 573,207,511+, is the
estimated population as of 1 January 1951+, to be associated with the
food balance for the 1953-54 consumption year. The population to be
associated with the 1951+-55 food balance is 578,939,589.
The estimates of population were carried back to 1 January
1932, on the assumption that the annual change in numbers averaged
1 percent.
The average of the years 1931 through 1937 is used as the
prewar base for comparison of production of food in China and is
used as the average of the years 1931-32 through 1937-38 prewar
base for comparison of consumption. The average population associ-
ated with the average prewar consumption year is the average of the
population as of I January for the years 1932 to 1938, which is esti-
mated at )+73,661,737.
These revisions in population, resulting in certain changes
in kilograms of food available per capita per year and the daily per
capita caloric intake, are presented in Tables 36, 37, and 38.*
Recent information also has made possible revisions in the estimated
gross production of certain commodities.
1. 1931-38 Food Balance.
The revisions in production, together with the revised
estimate of population, have resulted in an upward revision of the
estimated caloric intake from 2,057 calories per capita per day to
2,071 calories per capita per day, an increase of 0.7 percent.
See Appendix A.
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Estimated production of wheat has been revised from
22,508,000 tons to 22,763,000 tons LO J; of corn, from 8,696,000 tons
to 8,627,000 tons ~1 ; of millet, from 9,878,000 tons to 9,778,000
tons L 2J; of kaoliang, from 11,066,000 tons to 11,365,000 tons Y3J;
of miscellaneous grains, from 1,096,000 tons to 1,435,000 tons.
There were no changes in estimated imports or exports of grains.
In view of the revised estimates of production, appropriate revisions
have been made in the pertinent figures, according to the principles
of methodology described in the previous report on food balances. ~J/
A specific adjustment had to be made in estimates of
seed and waste because of revisions in certain of the previous esti-
mates of acreage. This adjustment results in changes in the estimates
of seed allowances, to which 3 percent of the revised estimate of
production has been added to account for waste.
Estimates of seed are as follows:
Commodity
Hectares
Thousands)
Seeding Rate
(Kilograms
per Hectare)
Seed Allowance
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Wheat
21,E+54
46
105
2,253
Corn
5,896
1]
70
1413
Millet
7,735
4
35
271
Kaoliang
7,987
55
31
Broadbeans
2,805
0
105
295
Seed and waste for miscellaneous grains are esti-
mated at 159,000 tons. This is the same proportion that is allowed
in source 511 for the previous estimate of miscellaneous grains.
b. Potatoes.
Estimates of exports of sweet potatoes have been
revised from 0 to 3,000 tons, / and of seed and waste from 2,933,000
tons to 2,979,000 tons. 53Estimates of production of white potatoes
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have been revised from 3,660,000 tons to 2,962,000 tons /; estimates
of exports, from 35,000 tons to 21,000 tons /; and estimates of seed
and waste, from 874,000 tons to 661,000 tons. / Appropriate changes
in utilization have been made according to the principles laid down
in the footnotes for the previous balance. 26/
c. Sugar.
Cane sugar exports remain unchanged. L8J
d. Pulses and Oilseeds.
Vegetable oilseeds include soybeans, rapeseed, peanuts
(unshelled basis), sesame, and cottonseed. The estimate of production
of oilseeds has been revised downward from 18,199,000 tons to 17,708,000
tons. The revisions for all seeds except cottonseed are in conformity
with the data given in source L9-/.
Cottonseed was estimated to be in bales of 478 pounds
in the ratio of 2 pounds of seed to 1 pound of lint, as reported by
the US Department of Agriculture, 60 and utilization was assumed to
be in the same ratio as in the original prewar food balance.
The estimate of production of broadbeans has been
revised downward from 3,358,000 tons to 3,018,000 tons. 61 Estimates
of exports of "other beans" have been revised from 85,000 tons to
86,000 tons. L2/ Minor adjustments have been made in utilization.
e. Fats and Oils.
Production of vegetable oils was assumed to be 20
percent of the revised estimate of oilseeds used industrially --
1,601,000 tons. Exports of oilseeds were revised from 110,000 tons
to 113,000 tons, including both China proper / and Manchuria
(average 1935-38). 64 Industrial uses of oilseeds were estimated
to consume 12.8 percent of the total supply, as in the previous
food balance. J
2. 1953-54 Food Balance.
In revising the food balance sheets prepared for Communist
China for the consumption year 1953-54, a revised population figure of
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573.2 million has been used instead of the figure of 480 million used
in computing the previously reported 1953-54 food balance. 66 This
increase in population of about 19.4 percent would indicate a corre-
sponding decrease in the supply of food per capita in terms of kilo-
grams per year as well as calories per day, other things being equal.
Recently obtained information, however, has resulted in the upward
revision of certain substantive estimates in the 1953-54 food balance,
so that the estimated supply per capita in terms of kilograms per year
has been reduced by only 11.4 percent and the estimated calories per
day by 12.2 percent.
a. Grains.
There have been no revisions in previous estimates of
production of wheat, miscellaneous grains, nonglutenous and glutenous
rice in 1953. !L1 Revisions have been made in estimates of production
of certain grains (in thousand tons), as follows: barley, from 6,646
to 7,338 68 ; oats, from 814 to 1,039 6
; corn, from 9,892 to 10,331
!9j -7-0
millet, from 9,142 to 9,494 ~; proso-millet, from 1,392 to 1,612
and kaoliang, from 10,150 to 9,988.
Estimates of exports (in thousand tons) have been re-
vised as follows: wheat, from 100 to 11; oats, from 0 to 2; corn,
from 100 to 46; millet, from 100 to 250; and kaoliang, from 100 to
250. The foregoing estimates and all other figures on the trade of
Communist China are preliminary, based on incomplete data plus allow-
ances for the movements of commodities indicated by trade agreements.
The estimates of seed and waste have been revised on
the basis of revised estimates of production and acreage. Estimates
have been made for grains, potatoes, broadbeans, and field peas as
follows:
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Commodity
Acreage
(Thousand
Hectares
Seeding Rate
(Kilograms
per Hectare)
Seed Allowance
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Waste*
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Total Seed
and Waste
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Wheat
26,668
3/
105
2,800
670
3,170
Barley
6,821
105
717
220
937
Oats
1,307
85
111
31
112
Corn
Rice
7,887
70
552
310
862
Nonglutenous
18,879
75
1,116
1,370
2,786
Glutenous
1,120
70
78
76
154
Millet
8Y444
35
295
285
580
Proso-millet
1,837
10
73
18
121
Kaoliang
Potatoes
8,029
55
4+2
300
712
Sweet (16 percent of production allowed for seed and waste) 4,588
White (26 percent of production allowed for seed and waste, 614
Broadbeans
3,112
105
330
90
120
Field peas
3,179
90
313
93
106
Estimates of winter crops other than wheat were based
on 1953 acreages. Summer crops also were based on 1953 acreages. This
estimate of planted acreage does not agree with estimates of acreage
published elsewhere for 1951, which generally are estimates of harvested
acreage. The estimates of acreage used here are preliminary and are
subject to revision.
Changes in estimates of production have necessitated
changes in the estimates for feed and industrial use. These changes
are based on the percentage factors used in the prewar food balance, 11~
taking into consideration certain differences in practices between
China proper and Manchuria.
The estimated extraction rate for wheat flour has been
raised from 85 percent to 90 percent. The estimated extraction rates
for nonglutenous and glutenous rice have been raised to 82 percent and
Equals 3 percent of production.
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78 percent, respectively, from the 74 percent and 70 percent used in
estimating the prewar food balance. L6J These revisions were made
because in the fall of 1953 the Chinese Communists began enforcing
the grain-processing standards that were set in 1950. Early in
1954, this policy of enforcement affected the availability of both
wheat and rice.
b. Potatoes.
The estimate.of production of sweet potatoes has been
revised downward from 32,475,000 tons to 28,673,000 tons, 79 and
appropriate changes in utilization have been made, resulting in a
decrease in estimated grams per capita per year from 39.9 to 29.5
and a decrease in estimated calories per capita per day from 106
to 78.
c. Sugar.
The estimate of production of cane sugar has been
increased from 383,000 tons to 390,000 tons. 80 Estimates of exports
have been increased from 75,000 tons to 92,000 tons. The revision in
the estimate of the population resulted in a revision of the estimate
of calories per day from 10 to 9.
d. Pulses and Oilseeds.
Estimated production of vegetable oilseeds has
been reduced from 17,570,000 tons to 16,175,000 tons. The revised
estimate includes data for China proper 81 for various seeds (in
thousand tons), as follows: soybeans, 5,400; rapeseed, 2,750;
unshelled peanuts, 2,100; and sesame, 675. To these figures have
been added estimates for Manchuria (in thousand tons), as follows:
soybeans, 3,650; and peanuts, 150. An estimate of 1,450,000 tons
of cottonseed was based on an estimate of lint cotton L2/, applying
the ratio of 1 ton of lint to 2 tons of seed.
Exports of vegetable oilseeds were estimated (in
thousand tons), as follows: soybeans, 1,159; peanuts, 406; sesame,
81; and rapeseed, 24. These are estimates based on many scraps of
information on shipments and commitments. An estimate of wastage,
computed at 3 percent of production, was added to the estimated
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requirements for seed, whibh were obtained by applying certain fac-
tors ;y to the following acreages: rapeseed, 4,757,600 hectares 84 ;
and cotton, 4,122,300 hectares.* The 1954 estimate of cotton acreage
is based on the estimated 1943 acreage of 3,787,300 hectares ?J plus
335,000 hectares planned for expansion in 1954. 16J The following
acreages also were estimated to have been seeded for 1954: soybeans,
8,341,700 hectares; peanuts, 1,320,900; and sesame, 1,271,700.
The oilseed allowance for feed for livestock was esti-
mated at 6 percent of the production of soybeans -- 543,000 tons. The
quantity of oilseeds consumed directly as human food, estimated at
5,477,000 tons, includes soybeans, peanuts, and sesame. The estimated
proportion of the crop consumed directly was based on source / for
soybeans and peanuts and on source 88 for sesame.
The estimate of 6,626,000 tons of oilseeds used indus-
trially is a residual figure derived by subtracting exports and other
utilization from the total supply.
On the basis of recent information, / the estimate
of production of broadbeans has been revised downward to 2,993,000
tons and the estimate of production of field peas revised upward to
3,105,000 tons.
e. Meat.
The estimates of production of meat fhr the different
classes of livestock have been revised since the completion of the
food balance prepared in the spring of 1954. The factors and method-
ology used in estimating production of meat from livestock numbers
are given in source 20/. The basis for the estimate of livestock
numbers is given in source 9_l/.
Estimated production of poultry meat, based on poultry
numbers, was revised upward with the revision of livestock estimates.
Because of the comparable importance of poultry and hogs to the house-
hold, it was assumed that poultry increased at the same rate as hogs.
With an approximate increase of 14 percent in poultry, production of
eggs was correspondingly increased.
* This is the seeded acreage and does not correspond to the harvested
acreage for 1954, because of the destruction of considerable cotton
by the floods of that year.
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The estimate of the fish catch in Communist China is
preliminary and subject to revision. Before World War II, official
landings totaled 1.7 million tons, and unofficial landings were esti-
mated at 1.5 million tons. The largest part of the unofficial esti-
mate stemmed from estimates of the catch from pond culture, which was
largely unreported. 9/ There is no information available on total
official landings in 1953. Official landings were reported by the
Chinese Communists for Kwangtung in 1953. 9 The total catch was
estimated on the assumption that the Kwangtung catch in 1953 would
bear approximately the same relation to the total catch that it did
in 1952. The total catch for 1952 is from source and the Kwang-
tung catch for 1952 is from source /. It is assumed that unofficial
landings have increased from the 1952 estimate by the same percentage
that official landings were estimated to have increased.
g. Fats and Oils.
Total production of vegetable oils was calculated
from estimated production of five oilseeds. The methodology employed
is similar to that used in the 1953-54 food balance.
Type
Supply for
Oil* (Thou-
sand Metric Tons
Extraction
Rate
Percent
Oil Production
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Soybeans
China
1,501
10.4
156
Manchuria
532
12.3
64
China
441
25.0
110
Manchuria
10
40.0
4
Rapeseed
2,501
28.0
700
Se
same
469
37.0
174
Co
ttonseed
1,172
10.0
117
Total
6,626
1,325
* Each of the figures is a residual derived from production less
export (if any) and other utilization.
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Information is lacking on which to base a definitive
estimate of industrial uses of vegetable oils. A considerable amount
of vegetable oils was used for lighting purposes before World War II.
With the growth of industry, it is probable that there has been some
increase in the industrial use of vegetable oils. The shortage of
vegetable oils and the increased supplies of petroleum, however, make
it probable that there has been some decrease in the use of oils for
lighting. It was estimated that, in 1953-54, industrial uses consumed
approximately 50 percent of the amount thus consumed in 1931-34. 71/
The estimated increase in production of pork fat was 16.3 percent
over the 925,000 tons previously reported, in conformity with the
increase in production of pork. The figure was rounded to 1.1 million
tons.
3? 1954-55 Food Balance.
a. Grains.
Production of wheat in 1954 was estimated at 24,825,000
tons, / taking into account the losses occasioned by the 1954 floods.
The estimates of acreage and production of barley and oats for China
proper were carried over at the level of 1953, with allowance made for
flood losses. Estimates of spring barley and oats grown in Manchuria
were increased.from the estimated levels of production in 1953 in
proportion to the total increase of 3 million tons in production of
grains in Manchuria.- 100
Production of corn, millet, and kaoliang in China
proper was estimated as equivalent to the 1953 acreage, minus the
acreage under flood in 1954 multiplied by the average yield of 1953.
To this figure was added 1953 production in Manchuria plus a propor-
tionate share of the estimated 1954 increase of 3 million tons in Man-
churia. There is no reported production of proso-millet in Manchuria.
Production of proso-millet in China proper was estimated in the same
* Production of grains in Manchuria in 1953 was estimated at 18,709,000
tons. 101 Favorable weather conditions are estimated to have raised
the 195 grain crop to 21,800,000 tons, an increase of 3 million tons.
This increase was distributed among the various grain crops in propor-
tion to the harvested acreages of 1953.
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manner as production of millet. The estimate of production of rice in
China proper was based on the 1953 acreage minus the estimated flooded
acreage multiplied by the 1953 average yield raised 6 percent, as indi-
cated by source 102 J. To this quantity was added the estimated Man-
churian production of rice, obtained in the same manner as the esti-
mated Manchurian production of millet. Estimates of foreign trade in
grains, as well as in all other products for 1954-55, are preliminary
approximations based on scraps of information obtained during the first
three quarters of the year ending 30 June 1955. At this time it can be
assumed only that the exports of certain commodities in 1954-55 were
approximately the same as in 1953-54? The quantities involved are so
small that they would have had only a minor effect on the caloric intake
per capita per day.
At the present time the only estimate that can be made
is that the seed requirements may be approximately the same as those
indicated in-the tabulation on page 86, above, giving the seed require-
ments for the acreage to be harvested in 1954. In each, 3 percent of
estimated production has been added to the seed requirements to allow
for waste.
Estimates of grains used for livestock feed and of
industrial uses for all grains, including rice, were assumed to bear
the same percentage relation to total production as they did in
1953-54. 103
Estimates of extraction rates for flour and grain
meals are the same as in 1953-54. The extraction rate for nonglute-
nous rice has been raised from 82 percent to 84 percent, and for
glutenous rice, from 78 percent to 80 percent. The latter revision
was made because the austerity measures announced in the fall of
1953 104 began to show their effects in the spring of 1954.
b. Potatoes.
The estimate of production of sweet potatoes in China
proper was based on the 1953 acreage minus the estimated flood acreage
in 1954 multiplied by the average yield of 1953.
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The estimate of production of white potatoes in Man-
churia has been carried over at the level of 1953.
Seed and waste for sweet potatoes were estimated at
16 percent of production and, for white potatoes, at 26 percent of
production, as in 1953-54.
Potatoes used for feed were estimated at 20 percent
of production for sweet potatoes and 7 percent of production for
white potatoes, as in 1953-54. Sweet potatoes used industrially
were estimated at 5 percent of production for sweet potatoes and 6
percent of production for white potatoes, as in 1953-54.
c. Sugar.
Production of sugar was estimated on a regional basis.
The estimate of production in Kwangtung was increased in proportion
to the announced acreage expansion. Acreages estimated for 1953 and
1954 are from sources 10 and 126/, respectively. The estimate of
production in Szechuan was increased according to the plan announced
for production of sugar in the Tokiang River area. 10 The esti-
mate of production in the northeast was increased by the same percent-
age that total crop production increased in the northwest. The esti-
mate of production in the rest of China was increased in proportion
to announced production in 1953-54 in Fukien.* Total increases are
equivalent to 50,000 tons.
d. Pulses and Oilseeds.
Production of soybeans in China proper was estimated
at 4,674,000 tons, obtained by multiplying the 1953 acreage less the
estimated flood acreage in 1954 by the 1953 average yield. To this
quantity was added 4,320,000 tons for Manchuria, estimated as the
proportionate share of the estimated 3-million-ton grain increase
in the northeast in 1954.
Production of peanuts in China proper was estimated
at 2.1 million tons and at 150,000 tons in Manchuria, as in 1953.
Rapeseed was estimated at 2,887,000 tons. 110 Production of sesame
seed was estimated at 519,000 tons, based on the 1953 acreage minus
the estimated 1954 flooded acreage multiplied by the 1953 average
yield.
See source 108 for 1953 and source 10 for 1954.
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Production of cottonseed was estimated at 1,306,000
tons, twice the figure for production of lint'cotton in 1954, com-
puted as,follows: the 1954 acreage seeded to cotton was estimated at
4,122,300 hectares, from which 706,600 hectares (based on source 111 )
were deducted for flood damage. The remaining figure, 3,415,700
hectares, was multiplied by the estimated yield of lint cotton per
hectare (191.2 kg), 112 resulting in an estimate of 653,000 tons of
lint cotton. Total production of oilseeds was estimated at 15,956,000
tons.
The estimate of trade was based on what little is
known of trade in the July-December period in 1954, on estimates of
the relative flow of exports in the first half of 1954 in relation
to the second half', and on the use of the trade data estimated for
1953-54.
With the exception of rapeseed, the 1955 oilseed
crops were not planted at the time these estimates were made. The
estimates of the latest known year were therefore used -- in this
case 1954, which indicates a seed requirement of 1,347,000 tons.
Waste was computed at 3 percent of all production of oilseeds, except
cottonseed for which 5 percent was used. The resulting total of 505,000
tons indicates seed and waste at 1,852,000 tons.
Feed. was estimated at 6 percent of production of soybeans,
as in the 1953-54 food balance.
The quantity of oilseeds available for industrial use
(oil extraction) is a residual figure left after deducting other nonoil
uses from the total supply. Nonoil use also includes a quantity of
oilseeds consumed directly.
Oilseeds consumed directly are soybeans, peanuts, and
sesame. The proportion of soybeans and peanuts consumed directly was
based on III/. The amount of sesame consumed directly has been
held at the same ratio used in source 114 .
Data-on broadbeans and field peas have been carried
over from estimates of the 1953-54 food balance.
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The methodology used in estimating production of meat
from livestock numbers is given in source /. The basis for an esti-
mate of livestock numbers is given in source 111L62. The methodology
for estimating livestock numbers is as follows:
For numbers of cattle and buffalo, it was estimated
that the annual rate of increase would be one-third as great as the
average annual increase between 1949-53. This estimate was based on
three considerations: (1) the average annual increase of cattle and
buffalo was based on a series of years of expanding crop production;
(2) in 1953, production of crops leveled out, and in 1954 it suffered
a decline because of adverse weather conditions; and (3) cattle numbers
estimated for 1953 were in excess of the estimated prewar numbers. It
was assumed that the number of hogs and poultry in 1954-55 would be
approximately the same as in 1953-54. It is believed that the decrease
in crop production in 1954 and the actual death losses caused by the
1954 floods will act to prevent a net increase. In the case of.sheep
and goats, it was concluded that one-third the rate of increase between
1952 and 1953 was the best estimate of increase for 1954-55. Although
the rate of increase in sheep and goat numbers has been extremely rapid
over the past 5 years, it tended to slow down in the latter part of the
period, and this trend probably will continue.
f. Eggs.
The estimate of production of eggs has been carried
over at the level of 1953-54.
g. Fish.
The estimate of the fish catch for Communist China is
preliminary and subject to revision. To date, it is not known what
the Chinese Communists claim as the size of official landings. Ex-
pected official landings were given by the Chinese Communists for
Kwangtung in 1954. 11 Later reports of the spring catch indicate
that the plan for 195 may be fulfilled. 118 An estimate of the
total catch was derived by assuming that the Kwangtung catch for 1954
bore the same relation to the total catch as it did in 1952. The
unofficial landings were assumed to have increased from the 1953
estimate of unofficial landings by the same percentage that official
landings were estimated to have increased.
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h. Fats and Oils.
Estimated production of vegetable oils -- derived by
employing the methodology previously described 11 -- is as follows:
Type
Supply for
Oil (Thou-
sand Metric Tons)
Extraction
Rate
Percent)
Oil Production
(Thousand
Metric Tons)
Soybeans
China
1, x+12
10
141
Manchuria
791
12
95
China
526
25
132
Manchuria
10
1+0
4
Rapeseed
2,613
28
732
Sesame
371
37
138
Cottonseed
1,306
10
131
Total
3,032
1,373
The estimate of vegetable oils consumed for indus-
trial uses is the same as in 1953-54. Production of pork fat was
estimated to be the same as in 1953-54+ because the number of hogs
probably remained the same.
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APPENDIX C
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
The three major gaps in intelligence on food balances in the Sino-
Soviet Bloc concern state food reserves, trade, and animal feed.
One of the most serious gaps is the lack of information on annual
additions to, or releases from, the state food reserves, and on total
quantities of food stored. These statistics are significant in de-
termining the total supply of a commodity available for consumption
and in evaluating the intentions and capabilities of the Sino-Soviet
Bloc.
Information is also lacking on trade in foodstuffs within the
Sino-Soviet Bloc. Very little information on trade is available
except for East German-Soviet trade and even this information is
incomplete on East German reparations and occupation deliveries of
foodstuffs to the USSR. Intra-Bloc trade in foodstuffs has a more
significant effect on availabilities of food in the European Sat-
ellites than in the USSR or in Communist China. A more concentrated
effort in compiling intra-Bloc trade data and the opening of new
sources of information will narrow the range of error.
The third important gap in information concerns the allocation
of cereals and potatoes for animal feed. Most of the feed allo-
cations have been based on prewar factors. The validity of these
factors and the amount of variation between crops need the support
of current information. Studies on livestock feeding which will be
done at a later date may help to fill this gap.
Although other gaps in information exist in the food balances,
the three gaps cited above are the most significant in influencing
estimates of the food available for annual consumption. Other gaps
in information pertain to factors or quantities which are held rel-
atively stable from year to year and therefore have little or no
effect on trends in consumption in terms of a national average.
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APPENDIX D
SOURCE REFERENCES
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Source of Information
Doc. - Documentary
1 - Confirmed by other sources
A - Completely reliable
2 -
Probably true
B - Usually reliable
3 -
Possibly true
C - Fairly reliable
4 -
Doubtful
D - Not usually reliable
5 - Probably false
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
6 - Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff
officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document.
1. Pravda, 3 Feb 55. U. Eval. RR 2.
2. CIA. CIA/RR 58, The 1953-54 Food Situation in the Soviet Bloc,
12 Apr 55, p? 9. S NOFORN.
3. Pravda, 3 Feb 55. U. Eval. RR 2.
4. Ibid.
5. CIA. CIA/RR 58 (2, above), p. 30. S/NOFC{N.
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6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
25X1A6a29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
25X1A8a
Bennett, M.K. The World's Food, N.Y., 1954, p. 164. U.
Eval. RR 2.
CIA. CIA/RR 58 (2, above).
Ibid., p. 47-48, and 131-134. S/NOFORN.
Ibid., p. 51-52. S/NOFORN.
Ibid., p. 143-144. S/NOFORN.
Ibid., p. 51. S/NOFQ N.
Ibid., p. 139. S/NOFORN.
Ibid., p. 51. S/NOFORN.
Licht, F.O. Sugar Information Service, Supp rpt no 24,
29 Dec 54, p. 1. U. Eval. RR 2.
CIA. CIA/RR 58 (2, above), p. 139. S/NOFORN.
Izvestiya, 28 Apr 55. U. Eval. RR 2.
Pravda, 27 Jun 54. U. Eval. RR 2.
CIA. CIA/RR 58 (2, above), p. 137. S/NOFORN.
Pravda, 21 Jan 55. U. Eval. RR 2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
CIA. CIA/RR 58 (2, above).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
CIA. CIA/RR 58 (2, above).
Ibid.
Ibid.. -D. 108-128. S/NOFORN.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
25X1A8a
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45. CIA. CIA/RR 58 (2, above), p. 110-112. S NOFORN.
46.
47-
48. Ibid.
49. lb .
50. Ibid.
51. Shen, T'.H. AMricultural Resources of China, Ithaca, 1951,
P? 378 and 382. U. Eval. RR 2.
52. Ibid., p. 378. U. Eval. RR 2.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., P. 378 and 382. U. Eval. RR 2.
55. Ibid., p. 382. U. Eval. RR 2.
56. Ibid., P. 378 and-382. U. Eval. RR 2.
57. CIA. CIA/RR 58 (2, above),, p. 111-112. S/NOFORN. 25X1A2g
58. CIA. CIA/RR IM-376, Production and Utilization of Sugar
in the Soviet Bloc, 1952, 1 Aug D. 14. S.
59.
60. Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Foreign Agri-
lt
8
u.c e, ?UL.-
, P. 122 ? real. nn 2. 25X1 A2g
61. cu
62. Shen, pE. ci-b . , P. 379-382. U ? Eval. RR 2.
63. Ibid., p. 331. U. Eval. RR 2.
64. CIA. FOO U-5863, 22 Apr 54, p. 31. U. Eval. RR 3.
(Chang, Yu-chiang. Conditions in the Agricultural and
Animal Products Exports Industry of Northeast China. U)
66. Ibid., p. 123. S/NOFORN.
67. Ibid., p. 124. S/NOFORN.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
75. CIA. CIA/RR 58 (2, above), p. 111. S/NOFORN.
76. Ibid., p. 108. S/NOFORN.
77.
78.
79.
8o.
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84.
85.
86.
25X1A2
83. CIA. CIA
81.
82.
S-E-C-R-E-T
58 (2, above), p. 119. S/NOFORN.
25X1A2g
CIA. CIA/RR I24-393, Preliminary Estimates of Production
of Textile Fibers in the Soviet Bloc, 3 Sep 54, p. 167 25X1A2g
25X1A2g
China, sec 61, Fig. 61-12. C. (to be published).
25X1A8a
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
94.
95.
96. CIA. CIA/RR 58 (2, above), p. 127. S NOFORN.
97. Ibid., p. 110. S/NOFORN.
98. Ibid.. , p. 124. S/NOFORN.
100. CIA. CIA/RR IM-399, Effect of the 195+ Floods oniculture
99.
25X1A8a lol.
25X1A2g
102--
103.
25X1A2g
loo.
105.
25X1A8a
l06 .
25X1A2g
107.
108.
25X1A8a
log.
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25X1A2g
25X1A8a
115. Ibid.
u6.~
117.
u8.
China, sec 62, Dec 53. C.
CIA/RR 58 (2,
above).
119. CIA. CIA/RR 58 (2, above), p. 127. S/NOFORN.
VIAL
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