TOPOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01147A000100010021-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 21
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOPO 'HIC ML
At the beginning of World War II the Services were confronted with the
problem of planning for future operations in many parts of the world...they
discovered suddenly that Jotal war demands total intelligence. Unfortunately
they also discovered that the files of data in the intelligence offices were
woefully lacking in detailed information. The belief that war was impossible,
or that America was safe and isolated; the omnipresent prejudice in this country
against doing anything that does not appear to have immediate application; as
well as general "economy" measures explain, in part at least, why we were
caught so wholly and utterly unprepared. It is hoped that we have learned
that our intelligence activities must be ever active--during peace as well as
during war, I might say especially during peacetime. The need for strategic
intelligence is immediate when conflict arises. Who would have thought, when
Germany marched into Poland, that we should suddenly have to range our inquiries
from the cryolite mines of Ivigptt.. Greenland to the gr l.e plants of 'Y'ucatan,
Mexico; or from the twilight settlements of Kiska to the coral beaches of
Guadalcanal. `i'ho even thought. we should be required to know (or indeed suspected
that we did not know) everything about the beaches of France and the tides and
currents of the P glieh Channel.
The first year of the war saw a mad scramble in Washington to got
"caught up", The service intelligence divisions set about the task of building
up research staffs, collecting information, and publishing reports. But there
was no stock of coherent intelligence to serve even as a basis for systematic
research. Such data as were available were scattered among the files of many
government agencies.
A Coordinator of Information was appointed by President Roosevelt in
the person of General Donovan, but there was little information to coordinate
so the Coordinator of Information also took up the task of collecting information
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and Coordinator of Information became a research and collecting organization
with its name changed to office of Strategic Services (oSS). But there was
still no coorcnat research. Each agency, or even different sections within
each agency, foraged independently and published reports independently. 'sheen
topographic intelligence on a given area was called for at short notice, there
ensued a -wild scramble for any scrap of information from any source, often to
the prejudice of security to gay nothing of the shameful waste of manpower.
Competition for source material sometimes resulted in agencies denying infer-
nation to rival agencies though both were working toward the same end.
Duplicating and uncoordinated reports were written and published on
many areas. In addition to many special reports, there were at least 4 major
strategic intelligence publication: OKI Monographs, MID Strategic Intelligence
d r, , 3~ lx?A 5
Surveys, OSS Research and ence Reports, and OCE Strategic Engineering
Studies. Many of these were not completed in time to be used in planning of
the operation. Each of the many studies had certain gaps in its information
and many serious discrepancies come to light. (it is reported that President
Roosevelt decided the United States should publish a Joint Army and Navy
Intelligence Study at the Casablanca Conference (1/21/43)
4ha
'i NgMLIGMGD; STUDY
on, General Strong (0-2), Admiral Train (ONI)., and
Genera,... Donovan (OSS) decided that some joint effort should be substituted
for the then existing duplicating publications. A steering c e composed
2gC'Aa Joseph Evans (0-2), Lt. Col. Richard Cutts (ONI) and
(OSS) was appointed. This committee recommended formation of the
Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board to consist of a member each from
0-2, ONI, and OSS.
This Board is charged with "the duties of coordinating, supervising,
editing, and promulgating Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies" (JANIS),
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These studies were to replace the ONI Monographs, MID Strategic surveys and
the OSS R and A Reports.
The mission of JANIS as set forth in its basic directive is"to make
available one publication containing all the necessary detailed information
upon which may be based a war plan for 'Military and Naval operations in a
given areaO.
The original JISPB consisted of three officers only: one each from
ONI, G-2, and 035. These officers plus a secretary, a -WAVE ensign and a
cartographer edited and produced the first JANIS. This study was accepted
by the Joint Intelligence Committee as superior to any proviouely produced
study and the JISPB was implemented by an increase in its staff and the
addition of an A-2 member and later an OCE member to the Board.
Coordination of strategic topographic intelligence next became inter-
national. By informal agreement JISPB C. en major responsibility to
produce studies in the Pacific Theater:
As now constituted, JISPB receives its directives from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Intelligence Committee, through the Joint Topographic
Subcommittee. Manuscript for JANIS is prepared in some twenty (20) agencies
of the United States Government. Effort has been made to enlist the services
of the most expert sources available. The following outline gives the chapters
of JANIS and the present contributing agencies,
Chapter II. Military Geography - Topographic Branch, MIS
Chapter III Oceanography - Rydrographic Office and Coast and Geodedic Survey.
Chapter IV Coasts & Landing Beaches - Strategic Studies Section, ONI and
Beach Erosion Board OCE.
Chapter V Climate and leather - leather Division AAF, Aerology Section, Navy
and Weather Bureau.
Chapter VI Ports and Shipping - Rivers and. Harbors Board OCE
Geographical Desks of Foreign Branch ONI
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Chapter VII Transportation and Telecommunications - Intelligence Section,.
OC : and Signal Corps
Chapter VIII Cities and Toms - Intelligence Section OCE.
Chapter IX Resources and "Trade
Industries - Political Economic Board, BaD
Electrical Power - Intelligence Section OCE
Agriculture - Office of i,oreign Agricultural Relations, Agric.
Construction and Raw Materials, Water Supply - USES
Finance - Federal Reserve Bank
Trade - Office of Foreign & Domestic Commerce - Commerce
Chapter X People and Government - State
Chapter Xi Health & Sanitation - Surgeon General's Office
Chapter XII Aviation - A-2
Chapter XIII Gazetteer & tap Evaluation .. Board on Geographical Names
Army Map Service and Map Intelligence
Div. State
Operating Procedure
The priority list for Joint Intelligence Studies originates with the
Joint Intelligence Committee, the Joint War Planners or Joint iogostic Planners.
The Joint Topographical Subcommittee then determines the capability of the
contributing agencies to meet the schedule and issues deadline dates to JISPB
6" Ub"i rs5o
for,comp1et studies. The JISPB adapts the outline guides to the area,
produces a basic outline map and inetr;ictions for the contributing agencies.
Considerable attention is given to planning and outlining each JANIS and in
preparing directions for the contributors. A map is carefully selected which
serves as a uniform base for all general maps in the study.
When the individual chapters or topics have been written.. the manu-
scripts are sent to the JISP3 for editing, coordination, and printing, JANIS
editors carefully check-one chapter against another to remove duplicating
data and to be sure that the study is free from conflicting statements.
When a statement in one chapter conflicts with information given, in another
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chapter, the editors call in the contributors concerned and the conflicting
statements are reconciled. Critical editing involves not only resolving
conflicts in information and avoiding duplication but also in pointing up
the material to give proper emphasis and in cutting down verbosity. All
these functions are highly important and are a regular part of JANIS techniques.
Particular attention is paid to making text and maps agree and numerous corrections
are made in maps as well as in text before final printing.
Liaieon and Coordination
In A .Joint enterprise such as JANIS, liaison and coordination are all
important. Experience has shown that few intelligence activities in 'ashington
take the trouble to find out what other agencies are doing or even what material
Aare a -:ctes 7
have in files and libraries. Chapter editors and others of the JAN15 staff
W7V o" .aJA cwa,d.VSte 04a,
are in constant consultation with contributors to insure close chock Speed of
production and press of work has prevented as much liaison and coordination as
is desired. One of the great obstacles of the past -- the unwillingness of one
agency to give information to another is rapidly being improved) uch inter-
agency jealousy has made the task of producing JAMS more difficult than it
should be, By and large, however, whenever information is desired for JANIS,
it is made available. In the process of cooperation all agencies learn from
each other and each agency discovers that the true spirit of research pays
dividends.
1)issemination of JANIS
During the war 2500 copies of each JANIS were produced. These were
distributed by 0-2, ONI, k-2, OSS, and OCE to staff and theater organizations
as well as to some civilian organizations engaged in the war effort. The
present printing schedule is 1100 copies_atr d the Department of State receives
the former OSS allotment. Much interest has been expressed in JANI5 by agencies
of the departments of Interior, Commerce, Agriculture and others. If classi.fi-
cati.o4 could be lowered, the demand would be greatly increased.
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All evidence points to success of JANIS. Some 20 studies were
prepared during the var at a rat of oneAeach month). fumerous letters
of commendation have been received both from the field and from staff
planners. All agree that the JANIS program should be continued as a
peace-time activity.
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