CIA ATTRIBUTION ON MAPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01153A000100030003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 17, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO ? Director of Basic Intelligence
,rROM : Chief, Cartography Division, OBI
SUBJECT: CIA Attribution on Maps
DATE: 17 March 1966
1. In evaluating the question of putting CIA as a credit line on all
maps, charts and other graphics produced by the Cartography Division, it is
necessary to review the background of the existing policy. Many times since
World War II Division policy has been changed to reflect higher-up policy
changes relative to the control and dissemination of Agency production. In
essence the question each time the problem has arisen has been, "Does the
Agency want to advertise its product, and how extensively?" The answer has
usually been, "As much as possible within the bounds of security." The
Division has always recognized the desirability of a broad dissemination
of its unique maps through the Intelligence Community and outside of Govern-
ment, particularly the academic field, but Agency security has been an in-
hibiting factor. Maps are a medium of intelligence dissemination as are
reports. Each is a definitive, explicit story easily interpreted and pre-
sented in a universal language. Therefore, our maps, used in all kinds of
reports, operations, briefings; in short a broad spectrum of Agency activ-
ities, whether classified or not, can reveal a wealth of information on
the interests and activities of the Agency.
2. The policy guidelines resulting from these reviews have usually
been a compromise between Division desires and security requirements, and
the policy existing today represents the best balance attainable. Simply
stated that policy is as follows:
Identification:
a. All maps and graphics are identified by a serial number and
month and year in lower right corner of map.
b. All classified graphics have the date followed by "CIA."
c. Unclassified graphics do not have the CIA credit.
There are special exceptions to the above in that OCI has requested no
credit line on certain productions we do for them, and frequently the
credit line is deleted from graphics produced for operational and brief-
ing purposes.
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a. The Division exercises complete control over the quantity
of printed copy and its distribution. The Division determines, in
consultation with the requester, whether or not distribution of the
graphics beyond the needs of the report is required.
b. Actual distribution, whether "limited" or "general" is made
by the Map Library of OBI. In some instances the requester receives
copy which he distributes. Copy sent to the Map Library with a lim-
ited designation cannot be distributed or shown to anyone without the
expressed consent of the Division. Distribution control of all other
copy is the exclusive responsibility of the Map Library. The Cartog-
raphy Division assumes "regular" maps will be distributed widely to
anyone in the world. This is particularly true of unclassified maps
which the library routinely distributes to embassies, the world-wide
exchange collection program, and many agencies of the Government such
as USIA, AID, State, etc. Out of the unclassified maps produced each
month, the Division releases selected general purpose maps for filing
in the Library of Congress.
c. Maps and graphics produced by the All-Source Branch in the
Special Center, code word or otherwise, are distributed under special
controls by the Map Library Division. Because of limited printing
facilities---nearly all are printed in the Special Center reproduction
plant---only small quantities are available for distribution. All of
the classified graphics produced in CD/X, except where requested not
to do so, are accredited to the Agency. Unclassified materials do
not carry the credit line.
d. It should be pointed out that Cartography Division production,
particularly maps, is a unique contribution to the Intelligence Com-
munity in that no other Government agency produces a like product.
Our thematic map bases are admirably adapted to illustrating intel-
ligence reports and are used widely in the Community both in printed
copy and in reproducible plate separation forms.
3. Arguments for and against identifying our production with the
Agency, as mentioned earlier, have been reviewed many time. The follow-
ing summarizes our past feelings:
Arguments for:
a. Crediting our production to CIA would add to the prestige
of the Agency. Attribution on our graphics would denote the authority
for the data shown. When associated directly with the text, this is
not significant, but when distributed independent of the text, the
prestige of the Agency and its resources adds to the veracity of the
content.
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b. It is right and proper that graphics used to portray the
activities of the Agency, such as briefing boards, vu-graphs, maps,
charts, etc., be identified. This is particularly true for high-
level briefings and graphics which are kept within the Intelligence
Community. It is important that CIA receive credit for its intel-
ligence production the same as DIA and other intelligence agencies.
c. It is desirable to identify all Office of Basic Intelligence
production.
Arguments against:
a. Because many of the unclassified maps now distributed under
existing rules divulge the interests and activities of the Agency,
the addition of a credit line denoting the identit of the producer
would be unwise from a security standpoint.
b. To identify CIA produced maps places the stamp of authority
and responsibility for the data portrayed. Along with taking credit
is the responsibility to supply sources from which the data has been
taken. At times, by the very nature of the research effort which
frequently involves classified information, answering requests of
this nature could be extremely embarrassing.
c. Since all production in the Cartography Division is iden-
tified by number and date, recipients are provided with a fairly
revealing means of determining what is being done in CIA and at
the precise time. Since our unclassified maps are widely used in
the Government---in NIS, ONE, Department of State publications, DIA,
even AID and USIA---the factor of security becomes significant.
25X1 C2a
d. To identify our maps would create a variety of problems in
various other agencies in Government. Exceptions would have to be
made to those going into Department of State publications.
e. By the nature of unclassified publications our maps are
frequently listed on accession lists prepared by other libraries
inside and outside Government. Such listing is beyond the control
of the Cartography Division and the Map Library Division.
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f. As mentioned earlier, many of the unclassified maps are re-
leased to the Library of Congress for inclusion in their map files.
These files are available, with some restriction and control, to
the public. As now controlled, the Agency is not identified as
the producer.
g. As more CIA produced maps become available, more people
would want to see CIA production, and not only is this undesirable,
but the added burden of making, filing and distributing copy would
increase manpower and material costs appreciably. We print and dis-
tribute a limited number of copies, very seldom exceeding 2500, tai-
lored on the capabilities of our reproduction plants and the staff-
ing/storage resources of MD/BI.
4. Conclusions and Recommendations:
a. In evaluating the foregoing reasons for and against iden-
tifying unclassified CIA maps, it is very difficult to arrive at a
precise policy which the Agency should follow:... The desire to pub-
licize CIA production, as well as make its unclassified research
available to non-Government research activities, is in conflict
with the security requirements and considerations inherent in an
intelligence agency.
b. The system in effect today is a compromise of these con-
flicting aims. The system is an outgrowth of day-to-day exper-
iences of professional cartographers, geographers and librarians,
who take great pride in their work and desire recognition for the
Agency, yet recognize the importance of security requirements. In
their judgment security considerations outweighed the advantages
attribution would promote.
c. The Cartography Division does not recommend a change in the
present policy. In our judgment a change of policy would require
relaxing security with no more benefit to the Agency than prestig-
ious recognition of a relatively minor portion of the Division's
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production. By virtue of all classified maps being accredited, the
Intelligence Community is cognizant of our work and by association
can generally identify our unclassified production. The controls
instituted by the Map Library permits the maximum distribution of
unclassified production throughout the Government and selected non-
Government agencies. Attribution would in fact have an adverse
affect on its distribution policies.
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