ORR MISSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01157A000100080015-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 1999
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: June 1, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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19
v :D -cduction --+ Mat Ic Our Problem?
1.1 r? w } ? .r d rM~c > gyn. ;. t., .+.. '
of tho taoIk ricli hho Office of lwocarch and Report Central. Travc~1,:.i?.
genco A onx:, , must perform to dischargo its new mission as set forth in.
INSCID w.a.?.er.0 This diroctive calls upon ie Centry. Ix . :1li.Ccnce A ency
coordinate foreign oconomio intelliGence relating to the national
4swuriti throughout tho United. States Goverment and to produce such
x `artorr~ i.c i xtel nee as r be needed to n pplet mt that which other
aCencies must pwoduco in the discharge of their regular miser. l;? hi
paper is concernLd primarily nth O/rUts producing rather than with its
coo LJiaMi tj g reaps on iIJilitieDi 9
We have boon enf;a ;cd In kink; an in ontoxy of O/i cc; JZnorar co
concerning the oconoar of Saviet Russia. The main purpose of this 3xtven -
toss has been to :.aexe as a basis, for p1aru :nC a prof,?a.a of basic r gacar i
to vbich O/R:t shaald address itsal. ' in do irx. ditate to i Such a
progrw must $prinC from a cloar concoption of Z?rh`r t4 o United States Govern .
x nt anoads torvi m econor c into? ].i once, t~tc~at i'aroJ.l;n economic int l3gonae
iti at ro7.c of UR a ioruld play in t:ho to tat cc:onom]_c ~.ntellig nce ef'o ?t,;
and how the peculiar character of the Soviet econoarrty and of our i.nfor aticz
about it Influences the rrotbc a U> .. o r C?. r;4 s 4'r i oo e
*h vu t ~1~~ v60!1, f,M",,.... ~~ .:: t"
to do. Zr t Zr elect to i.sbvost lar Gay in rmi1?t Lary it ,tol,11atior
in tiro Far tact, Uieir potential. fcx attack in uropo is corxocpondingly
rostrietcd. This is not a matter of jud in,,i their intentions but
rather c.C seelx ; T4iat I .:a-.tationej are placed on the courues of action
open to them in the future by decisiono wish vh they be tod y about
the allocation of their total resourcen4
A principal purpaco of thus estiriatirc the character of
the military ttsreata sriUi thigh may possibly be faced is to ;,ado
us in d ry, ,-,nin our rays daft.*rtsp, affort so Vitt i.t'rif. protect us
a aixast real rather Wan ;4.:aoi.x5 >,.my danors.
3o ' To ausist; us in osth tini, within the r an;;e of the pos$ibie$
what the pro =Mitu4e sand character of the laitary threat is,
The econc :1.c rccc)ua:"cr'f.S of the oneiro az "thei j oscnt, l..tar~ ':Jit,O.1i'M ce On the Other hard,)
econqaic analysis is required to portrc-y the complooxx nexus of economic
a .lpport on i-thick militaxy production doponda and to pumeue the economic
chain reaction) ulxi.t;h rxlf.,~xt re uit #xom the rtesLruction of parti aUar
pt oduci n fa~.cili.1 ies o
The cocr on ground of overlap Totten political and rcono .e
intelligence is even gicatera one of the best ways of studying the
goals thich a ooflootivd.sed state nir es its econo ' to serve is to
examine the inrstitut&onal machinery it establis%es to guide econoW.c
:3 C,`.e-r"is': Of 11'(~ Li'xt ~?ry;,~.CJ^orc t1mo arel }hauj'- .i: rr ~1'C, b ".L iv` fed to
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additional information wc*il.d be most revealing if we could secure
Vhon, This point should not be oven-ether si;ccL. As Task Force I
reveals, the infoariayion required to give the anc ors e need about
a good mart' subjects is bolieved to be largely available in Washington,
In those canes 'what is needed is principally much more intensive
mining of a rather low grade oroa In otter awes, ho over, field
collection appears to Co the only my of filling in certain critical
Gaps, In studying an opon economy one would normally ask for much
more information than one expected to use and then sort out the
useful parts on it carao0 When the cost of i nfor:ra tiorn in ruorty
and lives is hij+h,, homvery much more careful consideration rust, be
given to which pieces of lxXornatlon are the vital onos? One of O/i11 s
principal responsibilities is to give this kind of guidance to the
infarmation collecting agoncieso
The considerations sot forth in this introduction do not de' u no
the details of our research program or of our t thud of tackling it, They
do provide a fr mrk of ideas within wwhich the reset rch program many be
carried fcmvr rd, Tao next tasks is to spoil out raotliod and content sr ,o hat
more preoise]yd
IIo G xal Methods -- How Shat. We Go About it?
A. The nc of the clamorous f.1$ati.oL^r#.1 r versus the basic s
,..E"+~.PCFp
The central question of how vic should allocate our time has
already been referred to. The problems to 'whose solution we are asked to
con "ibu-- are -Very ur Ten i 110t -V "-it fc]~ }. ; ,
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h ;' . 1. 3.oro ("In give ^a LfaWioo r ti ~ wore to these
prob1omaa If we rvro to devote oursolves exclusively to vs
tho Facts we need.. ve ,iould have to toll harried po2.lcy-makers that
vm1d be g, t o advi so them - boginni ng itn about two yearn,, ' Ie neifi r
uliould nor van sue' in Bryn ivory tam.-r that long, Even if it "re possible
devote our`seves exclusivoly to e Iaaustiw and oncycloporlic stiad3es for
U10 nexb 24 montlw$ it i.a hithly lilcO,y that at the and of that poxd, '
r y or the problems vo uld bo asked to help with mould havo chas:>t,*,ad co
that our roSu1ts would no longor be parti cu] arty applicablo,
{{yy S ++.~ y On' the otl or luand,r if w ruuccumb oc* 1etely to the vory real
~li~ o wax) upon us to v..~1.~?41 ~ ..~~_ s,,,i- t 'Y a ! , 1
i ~ G JT",.ro,I.ti ~, k~~E'~LIt?.wbi for 1),'7t in;`on;ii:3.'GJv3II7 im
a crash basis rill never have aror inSQr.z t:I or bo t r t}ice t?ia -,I fx? aa?rto scam nor. supply,
Thus our it is whothor to be c5r,:lopadie
and irrelevant or oporatioxvi . and moon otent,
Ciear2,y tho only t iorable 13olut1.cn is a co. } highly aul titutable for ono: another. This does net mean that
aconemic "mz'taro is bound to be inoi'tectjv?, one the aontrar r, the
very fact that resources aro interchan gesbl e means that to dory r an
oncoV arm rase .roe is to rcskcn directly or trxttroctay his zsAt1i ayr
P:oterrti, L. Thhis is paruicu:larly- true in Lul ecoai; iy Ulm V la
Soviet., has for year, boon d rocs zd tom a sinrr o set of goons. Icy
ooonoznjc activity rccogazod by the n-main an not oz): cnt3.al to these
#,OSt1i rrou. CI han'r: be 1 ,~) tilI pro&ero Task Force I
i= deaiQriod to brir *, us tlsiRou i fihla cocond stace --, to tell
ua wtiat -xi knots and what 'PQ cdors.ct kn= about each, of acw =Jcr
problems with respoct to the USSR. It 1 revealed what it z
i n t e n d e d to a h m r ., n 2y that our ignor nca of cortatn ArV.ortant
mattes Is rm.>4ch mate than our igz oranco of othoroo
'(:hc 'third 3ti q;o o2 Our
Ltc 1.h o d t1 t~' l'Lt: CU's, #R:1.v L" pr ;iC .T.e"`y GP~uP~'
is to conce t a m tc near most ear" u : ; r t c o 't: 2c w a brief jx:riod on t
: oz't nt parts of our Problem T.lLich wo ;sax least about. This dogs
not mean that ro seek autho t a" ~.~re or f:i na'J n, ,~ rs in these a rca r
of i.gnoranco,, but mero3y that we focuaw on them until t nadiodge
is brc ht up to o, level equza to or sor heat better than Or 1< 7r -.
ledgo of the other parts of the pioturo$
Zta Viheu ve have been wclcing t1ms on `vealc spot.a for a period
of two or three c' four a the st=d of'f and take another look
vr~ajr
at acre e nos ace ttY x L.~zt 5case to the total ou tI'f. sn The
spot: may ctill be weaker, than ara; tbin;, off.ao or t`t r y lj,,rare got
far ouch with tl aaa so that, although vro s; ill not know m ma,
about tht i, they are in better shape than 'rr %at for ex - w our best
.a.'ov ea ,d.!a ~.al! 7 x v6;) bc he,
C 7 T
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7O tackle Matover other recto; of our prob iii ero now tho
weakest, not again with tho notion that we are going to find m it,
avexythIxC about them but only that vo arc going to k on them
u nt .l our ignoranco of Boras otho natter requlrea raoro pressL g
attontiono In t:iic 'ausirxesa lmawuzg a littla but a gm- at r a r
il"ings is lika3y to be more heIpfi, than 1mord..ny ovrax^y jj-Z th oro
is to imavr about a vary #i =a nothing about any others, I.ch
sub3tantia1, drive to cover ssx exact of ignoranco s,t be iartc ivo
eno 2 and substantial enough to pcn t us to nialmi real progress
tou r 3. solutions and not, iacrr s. to hold our o;aj, Cm U ho otx .or
hLndp it, Est not be ymmod i ,it . such perfectionist zeal that
-we
negloct oVior area? in sh i cia our ignorance may be only 5lightiy
.1063 SOX-IOUn,,
ra In .su:: ,zaryj tar Method of Successive App ro xtiox a
involy a x%vated cr o of revio v and a=-,:nationj, p1zrrningp
and c overa1 moxatho a production #olloved another r :view in the
11{;ht both of pvorgress and of changes in the character of tho
problems to bo solved., Z?o have just coj )1otcdn: Task Force I ,
a review periori end are not enr;agod in the process of pla lmtr,
branch by branch; ' e+ ?e our czno 'g,: o shoo id ' .c #oc~asscd r.,o . ' r,,, , , a y
of those p!az follow In cr in this report,,
Problem In a)7Ayj -, }lire tmtaa t
Gortalui c Xaon ~ .rob c s '? d Cs:l.~~ `;4V!?~ i .t r?,y . ..4 et.
tiar
`. X 4 7 L%o `et4aod of uc "."?+ E ,,
.. 4f' J ._~.t,`L'.r,s.,i'v ?'~~'i :.' ^w~- 1 n~ a1:,.G"z'? ~~~ :?J(1~; '?
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.l.? A 91' $1Llar ' bothersome one is that t tin s we Iaats r
least about and them the things it is most it ortant to stur,S are
likel
to be the thing we haw least iraforma .on on, In general
we lancet' more about rates of production of iWortant col eaoditics
and products in the Soviet Union that o do about patternzs of
distribution of those products, This is partly because =dh more
evidence Is available on rates of production0 The temptation
is to study that nra,terial To have and draw suob generalizations
from it as it seems to contains
In texas of MtUM mm vers to our vital prob1ems$ hovu?e r
ve cannot permit the available, evidence to dictate the nature of
our, inquiry too completolyb Several week spent searching foremery
possible gray to button dcmii an illusive fact by ingenious reasoning
from other related facts, by working out, Limits on that its uagrAtuda
could possibly be from that 'wc Inow about other pti of the moor
or by L vine on coUoction requiremnts may be worth man+r tars trc
same amount of do devoted to ex actLngg sotti rag do ,,, and presenting
aU the facts that u y happen to be in a givon bc4y of docusra ntsu
Both methods tint be employed,, Until we have sy tema ieal?y
=mined the available mater w. o do not know what caa be gotten out
of it, But the mate- vial available was not desigted to answer our
questi.ons,q and must be made to be the se aunt of our i.nvc3atigation
and not its master,
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2* An irritating feats of the Uothod of Successive
Ap aacimations is that it may well involve us in going over the
same material sevoral tir is in search of tho answers to a series
of different qu.cstions, This is unfortunatoy and can be avoided
to some extent by is rest sozae t1w in index n and abstracting
either by O/Rh az lysts the= elves or by an exp xnded staff in Cif CDo
If, however, m =m:Uio exhaustively for every iVlication it ccnt'ains
all the material available to uc the first time we s tvcy it9 vm dII not
ra ,le?te our investiCatton for many : xxy months;, It is an unfortunate
fact of life that research IV- the Method of Successive Appr'ozi.mattons
irwoaves scme waste and some petitions but it is batter than being
abic to produce no are-vars until 19510
30 The natural inatixt of the researcher who has plenty of
time is to folltmr the logical process of is r g to build up a picture
of a whole sector of tho economy by first getting an idea o each of
its caller component parts. 11= the 1o(;jca1 fir j to estimate the
value of resources used in chemical production i?s to firth out yr jat
resources are used in Uio production of each of the naany difi'or )nt
kinds of ohemicalsa Aga In this logically ix oilves broal#ing oac'x
particular chemical, into the g1aatities produced in each specific
plant, This su.ggosts that the first step in wwymring the ovex%-all
question is to ?Uy to identiFy all the phyaS.aaj producing #aei .ties
S- C-R-E T
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and their capacities and rates of operation In martp cases,9 ho cwer9
a first apprcadmtion to the aggregato figure can be ,achieved by
shortcuts zvhi.ch avoid the necessity of knowing what in detail it is
made up of,
Thus one can start,, for lea with total resources
ong d In chemical, production in the United Staten, or in the
war eccmmiV of Nazi Gex a - &a a proportion of tot&. resources,
One can then consider 3 uo n respects in v&zich the propoeion in
'F.hc USSR t deviate .from those examples, Soap i rare in tho
USSR, and every how ehol d does not have Its Ott . spray,, Such estimates
of the whole before you lsziovt the parts u u 11y have *Fdde marglno of
error, but %ton current problems are pressirC they are frequent
better than nothing at a.11.
1o Fina]..ty, for this method to be : effective, it should
id a1iy be applied not siarq)ly to O/iU ea schedule of research produc.
tion brat to that of the Government as a ' ao1e, Our delineation of
areas of ignorance should be area Govern n ent> ic#e basisy am! our
pros tton to remedy Viesc ve.-d essee should be plan nod in co3_laborar.
tion with other agencies so that v do not all concentrate on the
same gaps at once, As the coordinating part of our activities progresses_,
it should be close 2y integn?at d with our production so that the Cm m=..
spent as a vahole may approach more rapidly an ada ;te umlerstaudi of
the Soviet econoray,,
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III, O/Rltss Production 1'xagzmm
AO ISM of describing o 3 or ce0
Task Force I was designod to reveal our major areas of ignorance
as a basis for planning our future research production program. In tr7ing
to generalico on that we have leaned f on this study, we face the problem
that. just as there are many Tarn of c3a:3si knorledga9 so there are
mar V rwju in which we can c3 assii~r arc of ignorance,, We can do th.:.~ s in
terms of comaodit: oo, indusstr os, o.r servers about which our enoral
economic katrrvlodge is particular uvoak; or we can consider ? hose aspects
of our knoylodgo which are alaar for all commodities than other a, cp..ects,
as for ale production, dist7ibution, roqu1z=a:Ytsq stoclu, tochniquea.,
etc,; or we can consider whicb of the basic purposes of econcmi c intrali-
genco we are lo wt, well equ )ped to serve, such as the study of capabilities,
vulnerabilit iee,, or intentions; or we can look at our weakness in terms of
the three fundamental aspects of the cooncmi c problem described a the
begin.ii ng of this paper, 3 1y tle estimating of the productive resources
of the econct y and thei.c capacities, the understaun&zig of the goals
objectives which thosa In control of the resources wish them to serge:, and
the Tys in which tee resources are in fact allocated in the sesame of
these goals.
An at' nt is made in this section to suggest z .t seem to be
some of the most serious weaknesses in our present lmowiedge as x- : .ed
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'-'y Task Force 1o L''o'hh of these weaknesses Is dram 92-cm a dif erer-i
of 1oaki at our problem. TI= they are not commensurable with each
other. In marV cases they overt-Vy aril. hence they do not add up to axr
single pri . y principle for deter mhat, gee should do nom, it is
inherent In our problem that zo reo+ui o studios be cct ,upon a wide .ofy
of different v of dieing that probl.n into its piecos4 Indecd m
must bo constantly alert, for still otFna- wcQm of subdividing the issxes
t o be t a c k l e d which r t ircasr mom light:, on certain of our gw,3,uoras than
r of the wars yac have thought of so fw,,,
It should also be kept in mind -.~ n what follows that the ezna~ s 3.
cations made in this section apply in. di ffl.,vrent duos to different branches
of 0/RRL There arc certain weal messes that spear to be gca r< ` pr relant
in much of our work but their relative importance varies widely from branch
to branch?
Finally,, in planning our work in sra; ;h a way as to linit the areas
of ignorance described below we mast make full allc rance for the re so- arch
and production plans of other agencies. Since ~,vhat follows has not been
discussed outside CIA.. our plans will prestmaably be modified come y t as
a result of discussions- in the Economic Inte3.l.igezz';o Comdttoo as to the
plans for intelligence production throuChout the Q.c ',bent,
B. The need for more attention to geeI5 aaMD wr organization.
a
In must soctors of the econoa we appear to knald a good deal more
about the resources and facilities of the Soviet Union than w do alx'ut what
they are try-in,- to do with hose resources and facilities. Broadly peaking
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be?,i they a trying to devote them to the increase of their
r:.:sits? y rc%thhe but e cannon go Lar beyond this master gecez~;atior
into what products and uses they regard as most iu ortant, what they rr1.? i
.. ve priority to in the event of a short-fall, antic -rd-VI and fhtat goals
nnrl objectives -gill shape the future development of them economic program,
we have of course a separate branch whose function it is to
study economic organizations and programs as such., but, the effort nvc ,red
in this field fig much broader than a single branch em make and much. -more
intimately tied with the problems of each of the other branches than
might at first appearo
Superfic ta1',y tho problem of how we go about the study of goals
and Plans is a difficult one. The USCR has published five-year pL n i in
the past, but there is considerable doubt as to wh thor they c,::n t roue
to do this in t.:e future, In ar case these plans have contained only Vne
broadest :amr of production targets,,, firth no aaalyuis of the re.,wons
then or of their relative priority, In this cave, as in many othFers:; hro mr,
,. can learn much more by indirection, ar d iuferonce thcr at first apps
In t'ne first Vlaco, the plans t eirrselves have my i i{a ws cat3_orls
rig .eh need further studyo goads for a series of inter-connected cony uod7 ties
such as coal, steel, raiix'oa . ecuipment, etco can be studied to see ho, the
pieces fit to ; ther and what they firmly as to the desired pattern of use of
DI {.r :?e ~ cored 17_t s'2t~'t~ a '?~' i jt.